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Abstract 
The current study investigates the quality of corporate reporting practices of the listed 
companies in Bangladesh. It measure quality through the quality of mandatory reporting, 
the quality of voluntary reporting and the timeliness of reporting by using panel data from 
2004 to 2010. The final sample consists of 123 companies with 861 firm year observations 
listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh.  
 
In order to measure the mandatory reporting quality the current study determines the 
extent as well as the determinants of corporate mandatory disclosure in total and its 
categories. This study uses seven self constructed checklists (items ranging from 148 to 
179) to measure the extent of mandatory reporting. The study presents average mandatory 
reporting at 76.42%. These results also indicate that mandatory reporting has significant 
positive association with firm size, firm profitability (ROA), and multinational parents, 
while it has significant negative association with ownerships. However, there is non-
significant relationship between mandatory reporting and firm profitability (ROE), audit 
firm size and industry category. 
 
For voluntary reporting both a weighted and unweighted index has been used. A self 
constructed voluntary reporting checklist consisting of 97 items has been prepared. A 
questionnaire survey has been conducted to determine the weight. A low level of 
voluntary reporting has been observed over the seven years, standing at 28.56%.There is a 
gradual increase in the average score. A significant positive relationship has been observed 
between voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, percentage of independent 
director and board structure, while there is a significant negative association with market 
categories, company age and number of independent director. However, there is a non 
significant relationship of voluntary reporting with audit committee, and board size. 
 
The study determines the extent of timeliness through calculating audit lag, preliminary 
lag and total reporting lag. It also examines the determinants of timeliness for all three 
categories. Empirical finding indicate that the sample companies need about 110 days to 
complete the audit process whereas average reporting lag is 170 days for the entire period. 
Finally total reporting lag time has a significant positive association with earning, financial 
condition, company's age and industry classification, while it has significant negative 
association with firm size and audit firm size. However, audit opinion type has weak or no 
association with total reporting lag time. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction: 
Disclosure represents one of the pillars of corporate governance as different stakeholders 
use corporate reporting in their decision-making process (Shehata 2014). Worldwide, 
several scandals have occurred due to the absence of, or improper, corporate reporting. It 
is used to reduce information asymmetry, thus increasing the exchange of company 
information to stakeholders who do not have ease of access to company information; 
corporate reporting increases accountability, in a time of growing demand for companies 
to become more transparent (Bhasin and Reddy 2011).  
 
This chapter provides the foundation for the research reported in this thesis. First it 
discusses the background of the study and defines quality of reporting. Then it provides 
motivation and rational for the research. After that it focuses on aims and objectives. It 
also includes a summary of the methodology applied, as well as the structure of the thesis 
presented. 
 
1.2 Background of the Study: 
In the corporate sector, accountability and transparency is the slogan of the day. 
Communication of economic information to the interest groups is of greater importance 
due to the increasing control of economic activities by the corporate sector. Adequate 
disclosure is the most important way of meeting the information needs of diversely 
interested groups and enabling rational decision making. The aim of reporting is to 
communicate economic messages resulting from business decisions to the users from time 
to time: this ensures transparency and accountability. Thus corporate reporting is a total 
communication system between a company and users and it is the most direct, least 
expensive, most timely and fair method of reaching all shareholders and other, present and 
potential users (Tiwari 2010).  
 
Currently, there is an increasing global concern about the issue of corporate governance in 
general and disclosure and transparency in particular. A key reason for such concern is the 
scandals in a number of developed markets around the world. Disclosure and transparency 
have been identified as a cause of these scandals. This raises questions about the 
possibility of future similar scandals in emerging capital markets that arguably lack 
institutions efficient enough to absorb the expected negative effects. Moreover, reporting 
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is identified as one of the biggest challenges facing the implementation of corporate 
governance especially in developing countries (CIPE 2003). 
 
Corporate reporting is a channel through which the existing and potential shareholders can 
obtain information regarding the firm. It is also the connection between corporate insiders 
and capital market investors (Omran and Marwa 2013). Disclosure encompasses the entire 
area of financial reporting. Financial reporting is by far the most effective and the most 
widely used medium by which management communicates to corporate stakeholders: it 
reports results as well as the latest financial position of the enterprise. Most users, both 
external and internal, depend heavily on the financial information contained in the annual 
reports when making their economic decisions concerning the enterprise.  
 
Williams (2008) described financial disclosures as: providing quantitative information in 
the financial statements; business segment information; financial review information; 
foreign currency information; and stock price information. On the other hand, non 
financial information was the details about directors, employees, or intangible assets 
(Williams 2008). Disclosure is generally made in company annual reports through the 
statements or accompanying notes.  Although other means of releasing information, such 
as medial release, interim reporting, letters to shareholders, and employee reports, are used 
by the companies, the annual report is considered to be the major source of information to 
various user-groups (Marston and Shrives 1991).  
 
Financial reporting disclosure may be either mandatory or voluntary. Mandatory reporting 
may arise from a number of sources, such as company law, stock exchange listing 
requirements, professional promulgations, and any other relevant regulatory requirement. 
Voluntary reporting in the annual report refers to the information beyond the required 
content in the financial statements (Kumar et al. 2008) or the discretionary release of 
financial and non-financial information through annual reports over and above the 
mandatory requirements (Barako et al. 2006. p. 114). In other words, voluntary reporting 
represents disclosure in excess of mandatory disclosure, and in efficient markets is likely 
to be provided where the marginal benefits to the provider exceed the marginal costs 
(Baba 2011). 
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Since voluntary reporting is subject to managerial discretion, there is a need to align the 
information-disclosure tendencies of firms with the interests of shareholders. While 
mandated regulation of disclosure is a possible solution, management would have less 
discretion in disclosing selectively, and there is insufficient evidence on the benefits of 
regulating disclosure (Healy and Palepu 2001). Therefore, if there is new information, it 
cannot remain undisclosed as it should be disclosed either mandatory or voluntary (Al akra 
et al. 2010; Hassan 2013 and Omran and Marwa 2013). The majority of the research so far 
has focused on investigating voluntary rather than mandatory disclosure (Einhorn 2005), 
even though both mandatory and voluntary disclosures are potentially vital (Omar and 
Simon 2011). 
 
Establishing the confidence of investors requires reliable and timely accounting 
information. Timeliness of reports is recognized, by the accounting profession, the users of 
accounting information, and the regulatory and professional agencies, as an important 
characteristic of financial accounting information (Al-Ajmi 2008). Timely reporting helps 
to mitigate, or reduce the level of, insider trading, leaks and rumors in the market (Owusu-
Ansah 2000). As a result, most stock exchanges demand, from their listed companies, the 
prompt release to the markets of audited financial reports. 
 
Reporting quality refers to the compliance of a company to all the disclosures required by 
the GAAP and the informativeness of the voluntary disclosures which are presented in the 
annual report. In effect, even if regulation of disclosure is effective, there is still  concern 
about which disclosures should be mandated, and which should be voluntary (Cheng and 
Courtenay 2006). Thus, there is a need for an internal, as well as an external, monitoring 
mechanism to ensure sufficient disclosure. 
 
Although Bangladesh inherited its internal company law from the British, it has yet to 
conform to the requirements of the existing law. In 1994 the 1913 Companies Act was 
replaced by the 1994 Companies Act. To ensure full, fair and adequate disclosure of 
information in the annual reports of companies in Bangladesh, financial reporting and 
disclosure are regulated by a number of regulatory bodies and acts. However, several 
empirical studies (Alam 1989; Parry and Groves 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Karim 
1995; and Karim et al. 1996, Akhtaruddin 2005) observed that companies do not comply 
with the requirements set by regulatory bodies and acts in Bangladesh. They also found 
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that the rate of compliance with mandatory disclosure requirements is low. Moreover, 
reviewing the Companies Act 1994 and of the regulations issued by SEC indicates that 
there has not been any comprehensive policy framework for ensuring the quality of 
reporting. Information needs of users and the extent to which companies meets their needs 
are not available. 
  
Moreover, the act, for instance, requires the listed companies to hold regular annual 
general meetings (AGMs), but most of them do not fulfill this statutory requirement 
(Uddin and Choudhury 2008 and Reaz and Arun 2006). In addition, when AGM(s) are 
held, these are characterized by domination by small groups of people, poor attendance 
and discussion of trivial matters (Siddiqui 2010; Uddin and Choudhury 2008). As such, in 
the absence of market-based monitoring and control measures, ownership based 
monitoring and controls have been established in Bangladesh as a core governance 
mechanism (Farooque et al. 2007). 
 
1.3 Quality of Corporate Financial Reporting:  
Quality is not readily measurable (Imhoff 1992). Financial reporting quality is an 
intangible concept in the accounting literature (Baba 2011). The literature suggests that the 
quality of reporting in corporate reports can be measured to determine whether the 
information contained in corporate report is: 1) adequate for a defined purpose (Buzby 
1974b, p. 428-429); 2) informative--i.e., whether the reported accounting earnings 
numbers suggest the direction of share prices and stock returns (Alford et al. 1993, p. 210-
213), or the direction of earnings (Imhoff 1992, p. 104-116; Lang and Lundholm 1993, 
p.252); 3) timely i.e., whether the time of release of the corporate report of a firm is 
affected by good or bad news or by the qualification or non-qualification of audit reports 
(Courtis 1976, p.48-50; Whittred 1980, p.624); 4) understandable/readable i.e., whether 
the corporate report communicates effectively with its reader (Smith and Smith  1971; 
Jones 1988; Smith and Richard 1992) and whether the level of communication is related to 
corporate performance or risk-return relationships (Courtis 1986,  p. 291-292), and 5) 
comprehensive i.e., whether  detailed information is provided (Barrett 1976, p. 11-21).  
 
There is little harmony among researchers about how best to measure financial reporting 
quality (Dechow et al. 2010). Each reporting quality (adequacy, informativeness, 
timeliness, understandability or readability, and comprehensiveness) is a proxy for 
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reporting and refers to a standard of reporting excellence, which can be measured along a 
range from poor to excellent. For example, adequacy is used when the desire is to 
determine whether each corporate report meets, say, a set of minimum standards of 
reporting; these could be compliance with accounting standards and rules or the 
information needs of a particular group of users. The desire may also be to examine the 
quality of reporting of several information items in a corporate report examining its role as 
a general-purpose document. On this basis, Imhoff (1992, p. 101) defined disclosure 
quality as an evaluator's "overall subjective assessment of the relevance, reliability, and 
comparability of the accounting data produced by the reporting entity--in essence, the 
relative usefulness of the data, and the analyses based on the data."  
 
In this study, the quality of reporting is defined by the quality of mandatory reporting, the 
quality of voluntary reporting and the timeliness of reporting. That means the quality of 
reporting is comprised of the degree of compliance with mandatory requirements 
(mandatory reporting), disclosure in addition to mandatory requirements (voluntary 
reporting) and timeliness of disclosing information. So, the current study considers 
adequacy, comprehensiveness and timeliness as a measure of quality. To determine the 
quality of reporting, the current study measures the extent of reporting over the year as 
well as factors affecting such reporting practice. It is widely accepted that disclosing more 
information may improve the quality of the annual report (Healy and Palepu 2001; and 
Watson et al. 2002). Thus, the quality of reporting would be expected to increase if more 
details were given on each information item of interest. No previous studies in Bangladesh 
consider whether the reporting pattern improving or not. So, this study is the journey 
towards the measuring of quality. 
 
1.4 Motivation of the Study: 
Financial reporting underpins accountability, and is a process to provide information about 
the financial position that is useful to a wide range of users to make a diversity of 
decisions. Users need to know the status of the past performance of the businesses to 
predict the current or future capacity of the entity. To be transparent and more accountable 
to stakeholders, companies need to provide detailed information. Following the Enron, 
WorldCom, Sunbeam, Parmalat, Global Crossing, Halliburton, Nicor Energy and many 
other cases of real life corporate accounting scandals which preceded the ongoing global 
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recession originating in 2007, there has been a wider recognition of the importance of 
corporate transparency and disclosure. 
 
In Bangladesh, the stock market crashes in 1996 and 2011 also revealed that the traditional 
reporting culture does not provide enough information to investors and insider information 
has become the key to gain abnormal returns (Nurunnabi et al. 2012). Financial reporting 
is blamed in those instances as there are ostensible claims that the reported financial 
information could have limited the damage to some extent, although not entirely. In some 
instances, financial reporting can be instrumental in committing financial fraud: in the past 
financial reporting regulations have been abused and loopholes have been exploited for 
gain. After being badly damaged by the devastating effect of the financial disasters in 
Bangladesh, market regulators and other users of corporate financial information are now 
clamouring for quality financial reporting. 
 
Although disclosure changes over time, most of the studies relating to reporting in 
Bangladesh consider either a single period of time (for example Akhtaruddin 2005; Karim 
and Jamal 2005) or two particular points of time (Hasan et al. 2008). Moreover, previous 
studies relating to Bangladesh focused on particular sectors such as the financial 
institutions (Das and Das 2008, Azim et al. 2009, Khan et al. 2009), non financial 
institution (Akhtaruddin 2005, Rahman and Muktakin 2005. Hasan et al. 2013, and 
Muttakin and Khan 2014) and some only considered the banking sector (Sobhani et al. 
2012). In addition, most of the studies concentrated on a specific part of reporting. For 
example Imam (2000), Belal (2001), Belal and Owen (2007), Momin and Hossain (2011) 
focused on social performance; Hossain (2002), Bala and Yosuf (2003), Rahman and 
Muktakin (2005), Islam and Deegan (2008) concentrated on environmental reporting; 
Karim and Jamal 2005, Imam et al. 2001 focused on audit delay, and Ahmed (2003) 
highlighted only reporting lag. Some of the studies used small sample sizes (for example- 
Rahman and Muktakin 2005, 4%; Belal 2001, 15%; Imam 2000, 19.30%; Bose 2006, case 
study). 
 
There is no single study in Bangladesh that considers mandatory reporting, voluntary 
reporting and timeliness of reporting focusing on all sectors and using a panel data set to 
provide information about reporting quality. That is why the total reporting pattern 
remains unrevealed. Moreover, from previous studies it is difficult to conclude whether 
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the reporting pattern of Bangladeshi companies is improving or not. These gaps also 
motivate the researcher to conduct further study to answer these unanswered questions. 
 
In order to improve the quality and quantity of reporting, it is important to study not only 
the current extent and quality of disclosure to determine best practice and detect trends, 
but also to study the factors influencing corporate reporting (Rizk 2006). This research, 
therefore, investigates the quality of reporting practices of the listed companies in 
Bangladesh by using panel data from seven years. The study is divided into three 
empirical models. Empirical model one determines the extent as well as determinants of 
corporate mandatory disclosure. Empirical model two focuses on the level of voluntary 
disclosure practices followed by listed companies; it also determines the factors affecting 
the voluntary disclosure practices of Bangladesh. In the third and final empirical model the 
study determines the reporting lag of corporate annual reports. At the same time, it also 
tries to find out the factors affecting the reporting delay of a company's annual report. All 
the three empirical models are based on a panel date set to discover whether the reporting 
patterns of Bangladeshi listed companies have improved over time. 
 
 
1.5 Rational of Selecting Bangladesh: 
This study has chosen Bangladeshi listed companies for a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
Bangladesh is a developing country at a transitional stage: major reforms of corporate 
governance started in 2006. As a result, accounting information in annual reports needs to 
be researched and understood so that it can better meet users’ needs. Moreover, it helps to 
identify whether regulatory reform has any impact on the quality of reporting at the firm-
specific level of developing countries like Bangladesh.  
 
Secondly, there is little research relating to corporate reporting practices and, in particular, 
no previous study has been undertaken in Bangladesh covering the total reporting pattern 
including mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting using a 
panel data set. The current study can contribute to the reduction of this existing gap in the 
literature relating to Bangladesh as a developing country. 
 
Thirdly, Bangladesh has drawn global attention in last few years as one of the fastest 
growing developing country with a rapidly developing capitalist economy (UNPF 2009), 
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and some of the hottest emerging markets (Stevenson 2008), “Frontier Five” countries 
(Bloomberg News 2008 as cited Abdullah et al. 2011 ), “Next Eleven” nations (BOI 
Handbook 2007). 
 
Fourthly, in February, 2006 the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission 
introduced the first corporate governance code named the Corporate Governance Code 
2006 which includes various recommendations. However, the effectiveness of the 
recommendations of the code is still empirically untested. 
 
Fifthly, as the decision-making process is a critical issue, the quality of this process is 
dependent to a great extent on the reliability and validity of the information provided. 
Moreover, the poor levels of corporate disclosure have been identified as one of the factors 
that have not only contributed to the Asian financial crisis but are also a stumbling block 
in the regional economic recovery (Berardino 2001 as cited in Gul and Leung 2004). So, it 
is essential to have a diagnostic view of the disclosure practices in the emerging capital 
markets of Bangladesh. 
 
Finally, since the researcher is based in Bangladesh, it might be more relevant to conduct 
this research using a sample of firms from the same country as it  the researcher is familiar 
with  the country’s relevant legislation, culture and reporting environment. 
 
1.6 Objectives of the Study: 
The present study will embark upon a number of objectives. Each objective will be 
achieved by answering a number of research question(s) (RQs). The objectives along with 
RQs are as follows: 
Objective 1 
To assess the quality of financial reporting and to determine the extent to which 
companies meet the information needs of users and comply with the regulatory 
requirements of Bangladesh. 
RQ 1: To what extent do Bangladeshi companies comply with the requirements of 
mandatory reporting? 
      RQ 2: Do Bangladeshi companies disclose information more than the minimum    
required by accounting standards and regulatory requirements? 
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Objective 2 
To assess the timeliness of financial reporting and determine the audit lag; preliminary lag 
and total lag of Bangladeshi Companies. 
RQ 3: To what extent do auditors delay in giving their opinion, management delay to 
announce annual general meeting date and companies delay in disclosing 
financial reports? 
Objective 3 
To identify the determinants to be used for assessing the quality of financial reporting. 
      RQ 4: Is there any association of company characteristics, corporate governance 
characteristics and board characteristics with the extent of mandatory reporting, 
voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting? 
Objective 4 
To evaluate whether the quality of reporting in Bangladesh has improved over the time. 
 RQ 5: Is there any significant difference in the extent of corporate reporting over the 
period of time and especially before and after the Corporate Governance Code of 
2006? 
 
1.7 Research Contribution to the Knowledge: 
The current study can be distinguished from prior studies in the following areas- 
 
To the best of knowledge, there is no prior empirical study, at the time of conducting this 
study, concerning the quality of reporting through mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of 
reporting using panel data set for seven years in the context of Bangladesh. So, it can be 
argued that the current study provides new evidence from a country which is important for 
the South Asian economy. 
 
In order to improve the quality of corporate reporting, it is important to study not only the 
current extent and quality of disclosure to determine best practice and detect trends, but 
also to study the factors influencing corporate reporting. This research, therefore, seeks to 
explore three separate sets of factors that are related to mandatory reporting, voluntary 
reporting and timeliness of reporting among listed companies in Bangladesh via publicised 
documents and data sources. 
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To measure the extent of reporting self constructed checklists have been used. For 
mandatory disclosure, this study used seven checklists (items ranging from 148 to 179) 
based on particular year acts and laws relating to mandatory reporting: this is new for 
disclosure studies. In the case of voluntary reporting, the checklist contains 97 items 
focusing on corporate social reporting, corporate environmental reporting and corporate 
sustainability reporting along with the total voluntary reporting using both a weighted and 
unweighted index. It helps to identify the user preference and outcome by two methods 
and provides new evidence from a first- fast growing developing country like Bangladesh. 
 
To identify the specific area of long standing lag problems in Bangladesh, audit lag, 
preliminary lag and total reporting lag has been determined from the annual report. The 
current study uses 861 firm year observations and measures the trend of reporting lag year 
by year: it pays attention to the situation before and after the corporate governance code of 
2006. Moreover, the present study contributes to the literature by discussing categories 
and sector wise.                       
 
The study addresses reporting practices over a period of considerable change in the legal 
environment in general and the capital market in particular. The period of the study has 
witnessed, among other changes, the first issuance of a corporate governance code, 
adaptation of IAS and IFRS and major amendments of various laws. 
 
1.8 Research Methodology: 
The first two research objectives will be answered by applying a descriptive analysis of 
mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting, timeliness of reporting and its categories in the 
annual reports of the listed companies over the period of the study. The results of the 
checklist, the research instrument, will be analyzed in total and in different categories. In 
line with the objective 3, the study empirically examines the association between the 
extent of reporting and three different set of determinants; 7 for mandatory, 9 for voluntary 
and 8 for timeliness. Also in order to fulfill the research question 4, these results will be 
analysed year by year to outline the trend of reporting over the examined period.  
 
To measures the extent of reporting and its categories in the corporate annual report, two 
self constructed checklists have been used one for mandatory disclosure (179 items) and 
another for voluntary disclosure (97 items). Three components are used to measure 
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timeliness: audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag. These have been determined 
from annual reports. The period of study covers the seven years from 2004 to 2010. The 
final sample consists of 123 companies with 861 firm year observations listed in the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange, Bangladesh. A questionnaire survey has been conducted to 
determine the weight of the voluntary disclosure index. 
 
Descriptive statistics are used to measure the extent and trend of reporting. Bivariate 
analysis is used to determine the association between dependent and independent 
variables. In this study; linearity, independence and normality of error, homoscedasticity 
and multicollinearity are checked to justify the regression before multivariate analysis. 
The Hausman test is used to determine the primary model. As the examined data is not 
normally distributed and needs to be tested using a non- parametric test, robustness test is 
used to overcome this problem. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis is applied to examine the 
sensitivity of the results towards changing the statistical test: this ensures the reliability of 
the driven results. 
 
1.9 Structure of the Thesis: 
This section presents an overview of the structure of the current study. Chapter two 
reviews the legal framework of reporting in Bangladesh. It starts with general information 
about Bangladesh. Then it provides a summary of the financial systems. It also highlights 
the legal environment for reporting, majors' legislation relating to reporting, and present 
obstacles of corporate reporting. A review of the corporate governance code and its recent 
notification has been also discussed. It also discusses the consequence of non compliance 
and finally, in the conclusion, the implication of the legal framework. 
 
Chapter three reviews the financial reporting literature. It divides the corporate reporting 
into mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting. The literature of 
quality of reporting is also outlined. Previous disclosure studies are reviewed on three sub-
sections: literature related to developed countries, literature related to developing countries 
and prior corporate reporting studies in the context of Bangladesh. This chapter also 
outlines the gap in the literature to which the current study contributes. 
 
Chapter four outlines the theoretical framework used in the current study. It critically 
reviews the different theories that can be used to explain the mandatory disclosure 
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requirements, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting. Then it makes a relationship 
among the theories. After that, based on this critical review and intregated relationships, a 
theoretical framework for the current study has been developed. At the end of chapter it 
makes clear that no single theory can fully explain the current study that includes 
mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting and why Agency 
theory, Stakeholder theory, and Signalling theory have been chosen for the study. 
 
Chapter five presents the bridge and articulates the theoretical section with the empirical 
section of the current study. This chapter starts with research philosophy, research 
paradigm, research approach, and research design. After that, it represents index 
construction, data collection and sample size. Then it divides the chapter into three parts: 
empirical one mandatory reporting, empirical two voluntary reporting and empirical three 
timeliness of reporting. Each empirical part shows the source and content of the disclosure 
checklist, variable measurements, determinants and hypothesis development, and 
regression equation. This chapter ends with the statistical techniques used in the current 
study’s empirical section.  
 
Chapter six aims to answer the research questions: what is the extent of total mandatory 
disclosure in the annual reports of the listed companies, what the determinants of 
mandatory disclosure are and how mandatory disclosure practices evolve over time? It 
starts with a descriptive analysis to the results of the checklist designed to measure the 
extent of mandatory disclosure and its categories: the dependent variable. It divides the 
data set into a combined sample and a non financial sample. The second part of this 
chapter reveals the determinants of mandatory disclosure practices. It starts with a 
descriptive analysis of the independent variables. Two types of analysis are employed in 
this part, bivariate and multivariate analyses. It summarises the results of regression 
diagnostics before choosing the suitable statistical technique. GLS random effect with 
robust standard error have been employed and GLS fixed effect with robust standard error 
have been used to add robustness to the results. The chapter ends with a discussion and 
implication of the results. 
  
Chapter seven’s objectives are to determine the extent of voluntary disclosure practice, 
how it evolves over time and what its determinants are. It starts with a descriptive analysis 
of the results of the checklist designed to measure the extent of voluntary disclosure and 
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its categories: these include social responsibility reporting, environmental reporting and 
sustainability reporting: the dependent variable. It uses weighted and unweighted index to 
determine the extent. The second part of this chapter determines the determinants of 
voluntary disclosure practices. Bivariate and multivariate analyses have been used. It 
summarizes the results of regression diagnostics before choosing the suitable statistical 
technique. GLS random effect with robust standard error have been employed and GLS 
fixed effect with robust standard error have been used to add robustness to the results. The 
chapter ends with a discussion of the results and implication thereof. 
 
Chapter eight is the third empirical part of the thesis which is composed of two main parts. 
The first part is the examination of the level of timeliness of corporate reporting, including 
audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag of the listed companies of Bangladesh. 
The second part is the investigation of relationship between timeliness of reporting and its 
determinants.  GLS fixed effect with robust standard error have been employed and GLS 
random effect with robust standard error have been used to add robustness to the results. 
The chapter ends with a discussion and implication of the results. 
 
Finally, chapter nine presents a summary of the results and findings of the study and its 
contribution to the knowledge. In addition, it outlines the implications, limitations and 
suggests a number of recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Legal Framework of Reporting in Bangladesh 
 
2.1 Introduction: 
Bangladesh, officially name The People’s Republic of Bangladesh, is a small South Asian 
country bordered by India on the east, west and north, by the Bay of Bengal on the south 
and a small border strip with Myanmar on the south-east. It has one of the highest 
densities of population in the world. According to the planning and housing census of 
2011, it has a population of about 142319 thousand. The service sector contributes 53.5 % 
of its GDP industry another 28.2% and 18.3% comes from agriculture (World Bank 2013). 
The general corporate environment of this country is characterised by poor regulatory 
frameworks, dependence on bank financing and a lack of effective monitoring (Rahim and 
Alam 2013). Weak national financial architecture, inadequate transparency and 
accountability, and a dearth of appropriate policy interventions are among the 
impediments cited for the country’s slow economic development (World Bank 2003).  
 
This chapter starts in 2.2 with the overview of financial systems. After that it considers the 
legal environment of financial reporting and its major legislation in section 2.3 and 2.4 
respectively. Section 2.5 examines the issues relating to present obstacles for corporate 
reporting. In addition it highlights SEC notification in section 2.6, penalties for non 
compliance in section 2.7 and finally a conclusion in section 2.8. 
 
2.2 Overview of Financial System of Bangladesh:  
The financial system of Bangladesh has three broad fragmented sectors: a) the formal 
sector, b) the semi-formal sector, and c) the informal sector. The sectors have been 
categorized in accordance with their degree of regulation. The formal sector includes all 
regulated institutions including Banks, Non-Bank Financial Institutions (FIs), Insurance 
Companies, Capital Market Intermediaries like Brokerage Houses and Merchant Banks 
etc. and finally Micro Finance Institutions (MFIs). The semi formal sector includes those 
institutions which are regulated but do not fall under the jurisdiction of Central Bank, 
Insurance Authority, Securities and Exchange Commission or any other enacted financial 
regulator. This sector is mainly represented by Specialised Financial Institutions like 
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The House Building Finance Corporation (HBFC), Palli Karma Sahayak Foundation 
(PKSF), Samabay Bank, Grameen Bank etc., Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and discrete government programs. The informal sector includes private intermediaries 
which are completely unregulated (Bangladesh Bank 2014). 
 
2.3 Legal Environment of Financial Reporting:  
Corporate reports generally include information conforming to reporting and disclosure 
laws: legislation requires them to provide a minimum amount of information to facilitate 
evaluation of the securities. Every country, in general, has its own regulatory framework 
that governs disclosure in corporate reports within that country. In Bangladesh, corporate 
reporting is governed by a number of statutes. For example, companies limited by 
liabilities are guided by the Companies Act 1994. Bangladesh is a common law country, 
and much of its corporate legal framework is based on significantly older UK legislation. 
The current legal framework surrounding corporate entities in Bangladesh include: The 
Companies Act 1994, Bangladesh Bank Order 1972, The Bank Companies Act 1991, 
Financial Institutions Act 1993, The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Securities 
and Exchange Rules 1987, The Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993, and The 
Bankruptcy Act 1997 (BEI 2003, p. 28-29).  
 
The extent and nature of disclosures is influenced through the BAS's and BFRS's. Three 
regulatory bodies, the ICAB, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC), 
and the Register of Joint Stock Companies provide the framework for corporate 
disclosures in Bangladesh. There is, however, no one set of generally accepted standards 
based on these three sources. Again, industries like railways, electricity, insurance, and 
banks have their own distinct regulations governing disclosures in their annual reports 
(World Bank 2003).  
 
Like other countries of this region, Bangladesh adopted the Companies Act 1913 of the 
then British India. This Act was in force in Bangladesh before the promulgation of the 
Companies Act of 1994, which is largely influenced by the British Companies Act. The 
Companies Act 1913 required limited public companies to submit an annual balance sheet 
containing a summary of their capital, liabilities, and assets. But no specific formats were 
prescribed. Profit and loss accounts were prepared without mentioning the nature of 
activities in detail. These two statements needed to be audited and presented at the annual 
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general meeting for approval prior to publication. The fundamental weakness of the 
regulation is that it does not provide any guidelines regarding the contents or how the 
value of the respective items has been arrived at.  
 
The Companies Act 1994 made major alternations to the financial reporting practices and 
disclosures of limited liability companies (Ahmed and Kabir 1995). Under the 1994 Act 
fixed assets are to be shown at cost or valuation. The provisions for depreciation are an 
annual charge to be disclosed separately. The required disclosures are classified and 
specified in far more detail and include reserves and the changes that occurred during the 
year, director’s remuneration, commission, tax provision, and the flow of foreign 
currency. Section 185 of the Companies Act provided mandatory items to be disclosed on 
the balance sheet and income statement and Section 186 provides a list of information 
items that must be disclosed in the director’s report (GoB 1994).  Companies Act 1994 
included many provisions, which are mandatory and, some of those are also required by 
the approved IAS's (Hossain and Taylor 1998). 
 
The accounting profession in Bangladesh is guided by two professional institutes, namely, 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Bangladesh (ICAB) and the Institute of Cost and 
Management Accountants of Bangladesh (ICMAB). The financial audit is done by 
members of ICAB and the cost audit by members of ICMAB. However, both are under the 
control of Bangladesh Ministry of Commerce. The two institutes are run and jointly 
managed by council members, who are elected internally and representatives from the 
government, responsible for the development of the accounting profession in Bangladesh. 
Moreover, the ICAB has been given the sole authority to develop and issue accounting and 
reporting standards and to monitor their application throughout the country. 
 
The securities market is an important component of a robust financial system. The BSEC 
regulates capital market intermediaries, including stock exchanges, stock brokers and 
merchant banks (IMF 2010). The BSEC administer securities market regulation, and 
exercise a strong influence in regulating disclosure; in particular, it monitors whether 
companies prepare financial statements in accordance with extant securities market 
regulations (Ali and Kamran 2007). Moreover, the BSEC governs disclosure in company 
reports as a part of listing requirements. At the time of independence in 1971, Bangladesh 
inherited only one stock exchange, the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE). It was formed in 
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1954 and registered as a limited liability company. The Chittagong Stock exchange (CSE), 
another stock exchange of the country, was set up in 1999 and functions in Chittagong. 
Both stock exchanges are regulated under the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and the 
Companies Act 1994. However, both the banking system and the stock market are less 
developed and less efficient in Bangladesh than in East Asia (Beck and Rahman 2006). 
 
It is recognized that IAS's issued by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
have made important contributions toward harmonization in accounting and reporting 
practices in individual countries. The IASB has, however, no authority to enforce the 
accounting practices of its member countries. The implementation of accounting standards 
is left to the local accountancy bodies. In countries where professional accounting 
institutions are not strong, the implementation of accounting standards will not be 
effective. The professional bodies may persuade the government to amend the law so that 
the standards issued by the IASB can be adopted. The Institute of chartered Accountants 
of Bangladesh as a member of this body (IASB) is entrusted with the task of adoption and 
enforcement of standards in Bangladesh.  
 
As of 15 January 2014, the ICAB adopted 28 IAS and 12 IFRS and renamed it as the BAS 
(Bangladesh Accounting Standard) and BFRS (Bangladesh Financial Reporting 
Standards) respectively (ICAB 2014). Like the IASB, the ICAB is, however, 
recommendatory in nature, as the ICAB has no legislative power to enforce compliance 
with the disclosure requirements of the accounting standards they issue (Hossain 2000). 
To ensure the transparency, accountability and good governance in the corporate sector, 
the Securities and Exchange Commission issued a notification on 29th December 1997 
that all listed companies are bound to follow the Accounting Standards adopted by the 
ICAB as Bangladesh Accounting Standards (BAS's) from February 2000 (BSEC  1997). 
Thus these accounting standards are mandatory for all companies listed in the Dhaka and 
Chittagong Stock Exchanges.  
 
All companies in Bangladesh are required to prepare and present audited financial 
statements to shareholders, the SEC and the Registrar. Some companies also publish 
additional information on their website. The Registrar of Joint Stock Companies is 
responsible for registering and collecting the records of companies. The Registrar has 
certain enforcement and instigative powers under the Companies Act that are rarely used 
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in practice. While all incorporated companies must file annual audited financial statements 
with the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies, there is no effective enforcement of the 
timely and accurate filing (Beck and Rahman 2006). The Registrar should undertake 
reforms to allow it to better fulfil its legal obligations and improve the disclosure of 
corporate control (World Bank 2010). 
 
In the last few years, the authorities undertook a series of reforms of the supervisory and 
prudential framework. Nevertheless, the financial system continues to be hampered by the 
fragile institutional and operating environment that is contributing to poor performance 
and has often triggered solvency issues (IMF 2010). The legal and regulatory framework 
for the securities market is adequate, but enforcement is lagging, in part due to a shortage 
of resources and the regulator’s lack of autonomy in enforcement of rules and 
administrative matters (World Bank 2010). 
 
2.4 Major Acts in the Regulatory Environment of Bangladesh: 
The regulatory environment in this country came under reform just after the first stock 
market debacle in 1996. The World Bank has lead this reformation, and considers 
corporate governance reforms a development goal (Uddin and Choudhury 2008; Singh and 
Zammit 2006). A brief overview of the major changes in the regulatory environment in 
Bangladesh over the last two decades, as they relate to the compliance requirements, is 
presented below: 
 
2.4.1 The Companies Act 1994 and its Amendment 2013: 
The Companies Act 1994 is the cornerstone in the regulatory framework for companies in 
Bangladesh. The Act was modeled on the British Act of 1908 and was originally enacted 
as the Indian Companies Act 1913. After the partition of British India the Companies Act 
of 1913 was eventually adopted in Pakistan in 1949 and subsequently, Bangladesh in 
1972. The accounting provisions in the 1913 Act were 'seriously out of date' (Parry and 
Khan 1984) and hence were limited to very minimum disclosure by companies. 
Consequently, this Act was replaced in 1994 with the Companies Act 1994. 
 
The Companies Act 1994 provides the requirements for preparation and publication of 
financial statements, disclosures, and auditing, among other provisions. However, in most 
cases, the Act lacks clarity with regard to statutory requirements on disclosures in the 
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financial statements of the incorporated companies. The formats for presentation of 
financial statements and requirements on disclosures prescribed in the Act need updating 
or removing. Moreover, some accounting requirements prescribed by the Act are 
incompatible with International Accounting Standards (IAS) (World Bank 2003 p.2). For 
example, contrary to IAS; the Companies Act requires capitalization of gains and losses 
arising from changes in foreign exchange rates under all circumstances. Inconsistencies 
between IAS and the Companies Act need to be eliminated. Consequently, a new 
amendment was made in 2013 and named as The Companies Act (Amendment) 2013. 
 
2.4.2 The Securities and Exchange Related Laws: 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Securities and Exchange Rule (SER) 1987, 
1997 and 2000, Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1993, Securities 
and Exchange (Amendment) Act 2012 and different notification are related with this. 
 
2.4.2.1 Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993: 
The Securities and Exchange Commission was established on 8th June 1993 under the 
Securities and Exchange Commission Act, 1993 and renamed as the Bangladesh Securities 
and Exchange Commission (BSEC) in 2012 (GoB 2012). The BSEC holds very wide-
ranging powers and regulates the activities of the capital market in Bangladesh, including 
licensing and regulation of capital market participants and intermediaries such as stock 
exchanges, brokers and dealers, merchant banks and portfolio managers. The objectives of 
the Commission as laid down in the SEC Act 1993 are to protect the interests of investors 
in securities, to regulate and develop securities markets, and to ensure proper issuance of 
securities (GoB 1993).  
 
The BSEC does not have any disclosure requirements of its own. However, they have the 
authority to impose penalties on companies for publishing misleading information or for 
not complying with general accounting and reporting requirements set out by law. Besides 
regulating the capital markets, the BSEC has the objective: of promoting  investors’ 
awareness in areas including: investment guidelines, the correct format for lodging a 
complaint, caution notices regarding the circulation of fake shares, an investor's education 
program and the provision of training for intermediaries of the securities market (GoB 
1993). 
 
 - 41 - 
2.4.2.2 Securities and Exchange Rules: 
The Securities and Exchange Rule (1987) is applicable for all listed companies. While the 
SER 1987 contains detailed disclosure requirements, extensive amendments were made to 
it in 1997 and 2000. Some of the most important features of the SER 1987 include the 
specification of detailed requirements and guidelines for the preparation of the balance 
sheet and the profit and loss account (income statement), the audit of financial statements 
by a chartered accountant (CA) and the format of the auditor’s report (GoB 1987). The 
annual report should be submitted to the shareholders, to the stock exchange and to the 
commission at least fourteen days before the Annual General Meeting (BSEC 1999). On 
the other hand, the major amendments contained in the SER in 1997 include requiring 
listed companies to publish in their annual reports, cash flow statements, set out in the  
prescribed format, as well as publishing half yearly financial statements within one month 
of the close of the first half year, audited or otherwise; they must also prepare financial 
statements of listed companies in accordance with the IAS's as adopted by the ICAB; 
additionally they must comply with applicable local GAAP. Since the October 1997 SEC 
rule did not mandate full compliance with all IAS and ISA. In February 2000, the SEC 
issued a new rule concerning the format of audit reports: it specified that auditors must 
verify that the financial statements have been prepared in accordance with IAS and the 
audit has been carried out in accordance with ISA (BSEC 2000).  
 
2.4.2.3 Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 and its Amendment 2012: 
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 and its recent amendment named as 
Securities and Exchange (Amendment) Act 2012 includes arrangements for the 
registration and regulation of stock exchanges; the regulation of issues, enquiries, 
penalties, orders and appeals. Major amendments made in 2012 have increased the power 
of the stock exchange and commission: they may now suspend trading of listing securities 
for up to thirty days instead of fourteen; the disclosure of information without permission 
of the commission carries a penalty which may extend to five years, and or a fine not 
exceeding taka five lakh (BSEC 2012). 
 
2.4.3 The Bank Companies Act 1991 and its Amendment 2013: 
The Bank Companies Act, 1991 authorises the Bangladesh Bank to regulate financial 
reporting by banks (World Bank 2003). The accounting and auditing requirements set by 
the Bank Companies Act 1991 are in addition to the requirements set by Companies Act 
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1994. The Bank Companies Act prescribes the format of balance sheets and income 
statements, including the disclosure requirements that each bank must follow for 
regulatory reporting to the Banking Inspection Department of the Bangladesh Bank. The 
same accounting and financial reporting rules are required to be followed by banks in 
preparing financial statements for external users (GoB 1991). The Bank Companies Act 
also empowered the Bangladesh Bank to approve the appointment of bank auditors. 
Although the Bangladesh Bank is formally independent, this is not reflected in reality. 
Rather, anecdotal evidence suggests that the licensing process is a political one, with the 
Bangladesh Bank following recommendations of the political class to allow new banks 
into the system (Beck and Rahman 2006). Moreover, the Bangladesh Bank’s supervisory 
and regulatory capacity is still weak – “compliance based instead of risk based” (World 
Bank 2014, p.10). 
 
 On the 22nd July 2013, some amendments are passed and named it as the Bank 
Companies (amendment) Act 2013. This amendment has fixed the maximum number of 
directors at twenty, which must include three independent directors. If any bank has less 
than twenty directors, it must have at least two independent directors. Moreover, before 
appointing independent directors a bank has to seek approval from the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. In addition to this, it allows a maximum of two members of the 
same family to sit on the board of directors at the same time. Other important amendments 
relate to the lowering of job experience of aspirants for the posts of MDs of banks from 
fifteen years to ten years. The amendments limit banks’ capital market exposure, direct or 
indirect, to twenty-five percent of the sum of paid-up capital, share premium, statutory 
reserves, and retained earnings, to be attained over a period of three years from the 
enactment of the Act. There are also provisions regarding general limits on loan exposure, 
lending to bank-related persons, and cross-ownership of banks (GoB 2013). 
  
2.4.4 Insurance Act 2010: 
In order to modernise the insurance sector a new Insurance Act was passed on 18th March 
2010 in place of the Insurance Ordinance 2008, the Insurance Corporation Act 1973 and 
the Insurance Act 1938. The Government and the Authority under the Insurance Act 2010 
regulates the financial reporting practices of insurance companies in place of the Chief 
Controller of Insurance under the Insurance Act 1938. Financial statements must comply 
with formats provided in the Insurance Act. The Insurance Act 2010 specifies that 
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insurance companies’ audited accounts, statements and abstracts together with a report on 
the working of the corporation during that year should be submitted to the Government 
and the Authority within six months from the balance sheet date (GoB 2010).  
 
2.4.5 Income Tax Ordinance 1984: 
Tax laws influence presentation and disclosure in general-purpose financial statements 
(GoB 1984). Taxation authorities do not accept some IAS, compatible accounting 
treatments for determining taxable profit: an example would be, recognising finance 
leases, prior period adjustments, and expensing of pre-operation costs. Although there is 
no legal requirement on observance of tax accounting rules in external financial reporting, 
those who prepare and audit financial statements generally ensure that the accounting 
treatments that are acceptable to the taxation authorities are used not only for tax reporting 
purposes but also for preparing the general-purpose financial statements. There are several 
weaknesses in the current Income Tax Ordinance. These include, the excessive discretion 
provided to tax authorities on policy issues and the proliferation of tax incentives and 
concessions; there is poor compliance arising from weak enforcement and limited use of 
information about taxpayers from other taxes, as well as third party information from other 
agencies; finally there is an over dependence on presumptive taxes as a final tax, 
irrespective of taxpayer size (World Bank 2003). 
 
2.5 Present Obstacles for Corporate Reporting:  
Bangladesh’s capital markets remain some of the most underdeveloped in the region. The 
basic legal framework for corporate reporting in Bangladesh is dated, and there are a 
number of contradictions and points of confusion between the various rules and 
regulations that apply to listed companies. Shareholders do not have sufficient rights 
regarding related party transactions, the choice of board members, or the disclosure of 
control. Building on current efforts, more needs to be done to raise the quality of 
accounting and reporting (World Bank 2009). Greater independence and professionalism 
is required in the boardrooms of the listed companies. 
 
In fact, Bangladesh has lagged behind its neighbours and the global economy in corporate 
reporting (Ali and Kamran 2007). One reason for this is that most companies are family 
oriented. Moreover, motivation to disclose information and improve governance practices 
by companies is viewed negatively. There is neither any value judgment nor any 
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consequences for corporate reporting practices. The current system in Bangladesh does not 
provide sufficient legal, institutional and economic motivation for stakeholders to 
encourage and enforce corporate reporting practices; hence failure in most of the 
constituents of corporate reporting is witnessed in Bangladesh. The BSEC is the only 
regulatory body working to improve the quality of financial reporting. But, the BSEC 
lacks sufficiently trained staff to conduct detailed analyses to monitor compliance with 
accounting and financial reporting requirements.  
 
The banking regulator has no mechanism to monitor and enforce accounting and financial 
reporting requirements. The Bangladesh Bank, as the regulator of banking and non 
banking financial institutions, conducts routine supervision exercises to monitor and 
enforce prudential regulations. Bangladesh Bank inspectors examine whether financial 
statements have been prepared in accordance with established regulations. In this 
inspection process, no attempt is made to assess the degree of compliance with the 
requirements on preparing general-purpose financial statements. Also, no attempt is made 
to determine the reliability of the auditor’s opinion on a set of financial statements.  
 
The office of the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies (RJSC) has legal authority to enforce 
the provisions of the Companies Act 1994 but it is not particularly effective at enforcing 
the Companies Act. Moreover, the RJSC has no technical capacity to identify accounting 
and auditing violations; in most cases it does not even enforce timely filing of annual 
audited financial statements. The RJSC records lack up-to-date information to verify the 
number of companies that have not submitted the required annual audited financial 
statements and returns.  
 
No effective and efficient institutional arrangement exists to ensure compliance with 
auditing standards and the code of ethics. The ICAB has not established an effective and 
efficient mechanism to ensure member compliance nor did they make an effective effort to 
review the practices of the auditors and audit firms to evaluate the degree of compliance 
with the auditing requirements. Intense work pressures force many large audit firms to 
comply more in form than in substance. Moreover, small firms find it difficult to bear the 
cost of implementing proper quality control arrangements. Auditors seldom note any 
material irregularities in their audit reports and poorly supervised trainee students who 
work for audit firms carry out most audits. Auditors are required to be rotated every three 
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years, and cannot perform internal audit functions for the client, although they do perform 
other services. 
 
The Company’s Act requires inclusion of the balance sheet, profit and loss account and 
schedules/notes as a part of the annual accounts. Moreover, the Company’s Act stipulates 
the time limit for presentation of annual accounts and reports at the annual general 
meeting of the shareholders of the company should be nine months from the balance sheet 
date; whereas other South Asian countries like Indian and Pakistani laws set the time limit 
as six months. Overall, the companies’ legislation contributed substantially to the 
development of their financial reporting systems. However, it fails to provide proper 
guidelines with respect to maintaining proper records and the preparation and distribution 
of financial statements to users. 
 
There is no separate accounting standard-setting body in Bangladesh. The ICAB therefore 
acts as the standard-setting body in most cases where there is a need for standards. In 
western developed countries, national accounting standards came into existence in the 
wake of public criticism against auditors and through societal and government demands 
(Ali and Kamran 2007). However, such pressure and lobbying is not common in the 
development of accounting and auditing standards in South Asia (Hossain and Islam 
2002). The process of standard setting is narrow and lacks rigorous debate, which dictates 
that the ‘due process’ requirements function is considered a formality, particularly in 
Bangladesh, due to the non-existence of a separate standard-setting body. 
 
As in other South Asian countries, accounting firms escape responsibility and 
accountability because they are not under pressure from the investing public or investor 
protection groups (Dalal 2000) and there are few incentives to produce quality financial 
statements ( Ashraf and Ghani 2005): there is a lack of effective enforcement mechanisms. 
The market for audit and consultancy services is currently dominated by local firms, and 
the ‘Big Four’ international accounting and auditing firms represented through their local 
associated firms. Moreover, ICAB has incorporated a number of international standards, 
but not all have been adopted, and some have not been updated. The CA and other 
legislation also contain provisions that are not consistent with IFRS. Legally, these 
provisions are superseded by securities regulation, but in practice they still hinder IFRS 
implementation by companies. 
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2.6 SEC Notification on Corporate Governance in 2006 and 2012: 
The BSEC has promulgated different orders and notifications from time to time to ensure 
good corporate governance practice in the listed public limited companies. On 9th January 
2006, the Commission issued an order requiring the listed companies to follow a number 
of corporate governance related conditions. On 20th February 2006, the commission 
revised its order and issued a notification (No.SEC/CMRRCD/2006-158/Admin /2-08) for 
complying with a number of governance codes (BSEC 2006). This was the SEC striving to 
stimulate the listed companies to comply with the corporate governance guidelines so that 
suppliers of funds could assure themselves of gaining a return on their investment (Imam 
2006, p.34). All these guidelines are issued on the basis of “Comply or Explain”. In other 
words, although the disclosure of compliance statement was mandatory, companies had 
the option to comply with individual provision or else explain the reasons for 
noncompliance (Biswas 2012). 
 
The objective of this notification, which is summarized in Table 2.1, is to oblige listed 
firms to disclose their corporate governance status and to motivate them to meet the set 
governance standards. As shown in the table, these CG conditions include: the size of the 
board of director (BOD), formation of audit committee, chief financial officer (CFO) and 
head of internal audit and company secretary, reporting to the audit committee and 
external / statutory auditors etc. 
 
Table 2.1: Format and Description of the Corporate Governance Compliance Report 
Section Title Condition 
1.1 Board's size Not less than five and more than twenty. 
1.2(i) Independent Director At least one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the 
company's board of directors, minimum 1. 
1.2(ii) Appointment of 
Independent Director 
The independent director(s) should be appointed by the 
elected directors. 
1.3 Chairman of the board and 
CEO 
The positions of the Chairman of the Board and the 
Chief Executive Officer of the companies should 
preferably be filled by different individuals. 
1.4(a) Fairness of financial 
statements 
Financial statements present fairly its operations 
prepared by the management. 
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1.4(b) Maintenance of proper  
books of accounts 
Proper books of account of the issuer company have 
been maintained. 
1.4(c) Appropriate accounting 
policies 
Appropriate accounting policies applied in preparation 
of the financial statements and estimates are based on 
reasonable judgment. 
1.4(d) Compliance with 
accounting standards 
International Accounting Standards have been followed 
in preparation of the financial statement. 
1.4(e) Soundness of internal 
control system 
The system of internal control is sound in design, 
effectively implemented and monitored. 
1.4(f) Abilities to continue as a 
going concern 
There are no significant doubts upon the issuer 
company's ability to continue as a going concern. 
1.4(g) Changes in operating 
results 
Significant changes from last year operating results 
should be highlighted and explained. 
1.4(h) Financial data Financial data of at least preceding three years should be 
summarized. 
1.4(i) Declaration of Dividend If the issuer company has not declared dividend for the 
year, the reasons should be given. 
1.4(j) Details of Board meeting The number of Board meetings and attendance by each 
director should be disclosed. 
1.4(k) Shareholding pattern The pattern of shareholding should be reported to 
disclose the aggregate number of shares. 
2.1 Appointment  The company should appoint a CFO, a Head of Internal 
Audit and a Company Secretary and should clearly 
define their respective roles. 
2.2 Requirement to attendance  
Board meetings 
The CFO and the Company Secretary of the companies 
should attend meetings of the BOD. 
3.1(i) Constitution  of Audit 
Committee 
The Audit Committee should be composed of at least 3 
members. 
3.1(ii) Inclusion of Independent 
Director on the Audit 
Committee 
The BOD should appoint members of the Audit 
Committee who should be directors of the company and 
include at least one independent director. 
3.1(iii) Filling of casual vacancy in 
the audit committee 
In case of vacancy, BOD should appoint the new 
committee member immediately not later than 1 (one) 
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month from the date of vacancy. 
3.2(i) Chairman of the committee The BOD should select one member of the Audit 
Committee to be Chairman of the Audit Committee. 
3.2.(ii) Qualification of Chairman The Chairman of the audit committee should have a 
professional qualification or knowledge, understanding 
and experience in accounting or finance. 
3.3.1 Reporting of the Board of 
Directors 
i) The Audit Committee should report on its activities to 
the Board of Directors. 
ii)The Audit Committee should immediately report to 
the Board of Directors on the following findings, if any:- 
(a) Report on conflicts of interests; 
(b) Suspected or presumed fraud or irregularity or 
material defect in the internal control system; 
(c) Suspected infringement of laws, including securities 
related laws, rules and regulations; and 
(d) Any other matter which should be disclosed to the 
Board of Directors immediately. 
3.3.2 Reporting to the concerned 
Authorities 
Audit Committee has reported to the BOD about 
anything which has material impact on the financial 
condition and results of operation. 
3.4 Reporting to the share 
holders and general 
investors 
Report on activities carried out by the Audit Committee 
should be signed by the Chairman of the Audit 
Committee and disclosed in the annual report. 
4. External/Statutory auditors The issuer company should not engage its external 
/statutory auditors to perform the following services of 
the company; namely:- 
(i) Appraisal or valuation services or fairness opinions; 
(ii) Financial information systems design and 
implementation; 
(iii) Book-keeping or other services related to the 
accounting records or financial statements; 
(iv) Broker-dealer services; 
(v) Actuarial services; 
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(vi) Internal audit services; and 
(vii) Other service that the Audit Committee determines. 
5 Reporting the compliance The directors of the company shall state in the directors’ 
report whether the company has complied with these 
conditions. 
Source: Compiled from (BSEC 2006) 
 
Major Changes in 2012: 
In 2012, BSEC issued its latest Corporate Governance Guidelines which is followed by all 
listed companies on a “Comply” basis. The said CG Guidelines were issued by BSEC 
through Notification no. SEC/CMRRCD/ 2006-158/134/Admin/44 dated 07 August 2012 
under Section 2CC of the Securities and Exchange Ordinance, 1969 (BSEC 2012). Major 
additions or changes in the 2012 notifications are given below: 
 
2.6.1 Involvement of Independent Directors in the Board: 
At least one fifth (1/5) of the total number of directors in the company’s board shall be 
independent directors. Previously it was one tenth (1/10) of the total number of the 
company’s board of directors. The new CG guidelines also specified some conditions to 
be fulfilled by aspiring independent directors. The independent director(s) shall be 
appointed by the board of directors and approved by the shareholders in the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM). The post of independent director(s) cannot remain vacant for 
more than 90 (ninety) days. The Board shall lay down a code of conduct of all Board 
members and annual compliance of the code to be recorded. The tenure of office of an 
independent director shall be for a period of three years, which may be extended for one 
term only.  
 
2.6.2 Qualifications of Independent Director: 
In 2012, notification added that an independent director should be a knowledgeable 
individual with integrity who is able to ensure compliance with financial, regulatory and 
corporate laws and can make meaningful contribution to business. The person should be a 
business or corporate leader, a bureaucrat or university teacher with economics, business 
studies or a law background; they might also be professionals like chartered accountants, 
cost and management accountants, and chartered secretaries. In addition to this, 
independent directors must have at least twelve years of corporate management or 
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professional experiences but it may be relaxed subject to prior approval of the 
Commission. 
 
2.6.3 The Directors’ Report to Shareholders: 
In addition to the previous 2006 CG Guidelines, the new CG Guidelines in 2012 
mentioned that the directors' report to shareholders must include the industry outlook and 
the possible future developments in the industry, segment-wise or product-wise. It should 
also include performance, risks and concerns, a discussion on the cost of goods sold, gross 
profit margin and net profit margin, and continuity of any extra-ordinary gain or loss. 
Moreover, the director’s report to the shareholder must include a statement of all related 
party transactions, utilisation of proceeds from public issues, rights issues and/or through 
any others instruments, any deterioration of financial results caused by initial public 
offering, repeat public offering, rights offer direct listing, significant variance occurs 
between quarterly financial performance and annual financial statements, remuneration to 
directors including independent directors, key operating and financial data of at least 
preceding 5 (five) years, in  place of 3 years. In the case of the appointment or re-
appointment of a director the company shall disclose a brief resume of the director, the 
nature of his or her expertise in specific functional areas, the names of companies in which 
the person also holds a directorship and the membership of committees of the board. 
 
2.6.4 Attendance of CFO and CS in Board Meetings: 
The new CG Guidelines make attendance mandatory at board meetings for corporate 
financial officer and company secretary. They can only absent parts of a meeting of the 
Board of Directors which involves consideration of an agenda item relating to their own 
personal matters. 
 
2.6.5 Audit Committee: 
The new CG Guidelines make it mandatory to have an audit committee as a sub-
committee of the Board of Directors. All members of the audit committee should be 
“financially literate” and at least one member must have accounting or related financial 
management experience. The company secretary must act as the secretary of the 
committee. The audit committee meeting is not quorum without at least one independent 
director. The chairman of the audit committee must remain present throughout the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM).  
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2.6.5.1 Role of Audit Committee: 
This section has been inserted into the new CG Guidelines, specifying the roles of the 
audit committee in overseeing the financial reporting process, monitoring the choice of 
accounting policies and principles and monitoring the internal control risk management 
process. It should also oversee the hiring and performance of external auditors, review 
along with the management, the annual financial statements before submission to the 
board for approval, review along with the management, the quarterly and half yearly 
financial statements before submission to the board for approval, review the adequacy of 
internal audit function, review statement of significant related party transactions submitted 
by the management, and review management letters/ letter of internal control weakness 
issued by statutory auditors. When money is raised through Initial Public Offering 
(IPO)/Repeat Public Offering (RPO)/Rights Issue the company must disclose to the audit 
committee  the uses and applications of funds by major category (capital expenditure, 
sales and marketing expenses, working capital, etc), on a quarterly basis, as a part of their 
quarterly declaration of financial results. Further, on an annual basis, the company must 
prepare a statement of funds used for purposes other than those stated in the offer 
document or prospectus. 
  
2.6.5.2 Reporting of the Audit Committee: 
The duration of reporting to the BSEC, about anything which has a material impact on the 
financial condition and results of operations, and where the Board of Directors and the 
management decide that some rectification is necessary has changed. The Audit 
Committee has reduced the time allowed for rectification from nine months to six. 
Moreover, reports on activities carried out by the audit committee, including any report 
made to the board of directors during the year, must be signed by the chairman of the audit 
committee and disclosed in the annual report of the issuer company.  
 
2.6.6 External/ Statutory Auditors: 
The new CG Guidelines mentioned that no partner or employees of the external audit 
firms should possess any share of the company they audit at least during the tenure of their 
audit assignment of that company; also some services are restricted as they were in 
previous CG Guidelines. 
 
 
 - 52 - 
2.6.7 Subsidiary Company 
This new section has been incorporated in new CG Guidelines specifying that the board 
composition of the subsidiary company must be the same as the holding company; the 
holding company  appoints one of its IDs to be the director of the subsidiary company; the 
minutes of the subsidiary company's board meeting should be reviewed by the board 
meeting of the holding company, and the minutes of the board meeting of the holding 
company must state that the board has reviewed the affairs of the subsidiary company; 
finally, the AC of the holding company shall review the financial statements of the 
subsidiary company including any investment made by the subsidiary. 
 
2.6.8 Duties of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO): 
This new section has been incorporated in new CG Guidelines specifying that the CEO 
and CFO review the financial statement for the year to the best of their knowledge and 
belief that the financial statements do not contain any materially untrue statement or omit 
any material fact or include any misleading statement; they must also consider whether the 
statements present a true and fair view of the company's financial affairs and are in 
compliance with existing laws and accounting standards; there should be no transactions 
by the company during the year which are fraudulent, illegal or violations of the 
company’s code of conduct. 
 
2.6.9 Reporting and Compliance of Corporate Governance: 
The company must obtain a certificate from a practicing Professional 
Accountant/Secretary (Chartered Accountant/Cost and Management Accountant/Chartered 
Secretary) regarding compliance of conditions of corporate governance guidelines of the 
commission and send a copy of this to the shareholders along with the annual report on a 
yearly basis. 
 
2.6.10 Mode of Implementation: 
Listed companies must comply with the guideline conditions and report their compliance 
statements in the annual reports, making both compliance and the reporting of the 
compliance statement mandatory. 
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2.7 Penalty for Non Compliance: 
Under the Securities laws, the Enforcement Dept takes legal measures including 
imposition of penalty against those who break /violate securities laws in consideration of 
the nature of offences they commit. Prior to taking measures it follows due process that 
includes carrying out inspection and enquiry. On the basis of violations of securities laws 
detected during the inspection/enquiry process, explanations are sought from the 
concerned issuer and person or institution alleged and then hearing is conducted as per the 
concerned securities laws and thereafter a report is submitted before the Commission. The 
Commission takes necessary legal action as per securities laws. The said actions include 
warning letter, imposition of penalty, suspension or cancellation of registration certificate.  
 
2.7.1 Penalties in Companies Act 1994:  
Section Provision Penalty 
68 Penalty on concealment of 
name of creditor. 
Imprisonment which may extend up to two years, or 
with fine, or with both. 
79(1) Penalties for non-
publication of name 
Fine not exceeding five hundred taka for everyday 
during which the default continue. 
79(2) Name without engrave in 
legible characters on its seal 
Fine not exceeding one thousand taka, and shall further 
be personally liable for the amount thereof. 
82 Penalty for default in 
complying with AGM 
The company and every officer - fine which may 
extend to ten thousand taka- which may extend to two 
hundred fifty taka for every day. 
139 Penalty for contravention in 
prospectus 
Punishable with fine which may extend to five 
thousand taka. 
146 Penalty for untrue statement 
in prospectus 
Imprisonment which may extend to two years, or with 
fine which may extend to five thousand taka or both. 
147 Penalty for fraudulently 
inducing persons to invest 
money 
Imprisonment for a term which may extend to five 
years or with fine which may extend to fifteen 
thousand taka or with both. 
173(1) Filing with the Registrar for 
registration 
Fine not exceeding one thousand taka for everyday 
during which the default continues. 
173(2) Non compliance of the Act Conviction to a fine not exceeding two thousand taka. 
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173(3) Delivery of debenture 
without Registrar 
Liable of conviction to a fine not exceeding two 
thousand taka. 
218 Penalty for non-compliance 
with provisions  of auditor 
Punishable with fine which may extend to one 
thousand taka. 
219 Penalty for non-compliance 
by auditor 
Punishable with fine which may extend to one 
thousand taka. 
332 Penalty for falsification of 
book 
Imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven 
years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
334 Penalty for false evidence Imprisonment for a term which may extend to seven 
years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
335(1) Director, managing agent 
and others alleged offence  
Imprisonment for a term two to seven years. 
335(2) Any person pawn, pledges 
or disposes of any property 
Imprisonment for a term not exceeding three years. 
397 Penalty for false statement Imprisonment may extend to five years and shall also 
be liable to fine. 
398 Penalty for wrongful with 
holding of property 
Fine not exceeding five thousand taka, and may be 
ordered by the Court trying the offence to deliver of or 
refund within a time to be fixed by the Court. 
399 Penalty for misapplication 
of securities by employers 
Conviction to a fine not exceeding five hundred taka. 
400 Penalty for improper use of 
the word "Limited" 
Liable to a fine not exceeding five hundred taka 
everyday upon which that name or title has been used. 
Source: Complied from (GoB 1994) 
 
2.7.2 Penalties in Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969 and Amendment 2012:  
Section Provision Penalty 
 19B Penalty for disclosure of 
secret information 
Imprisonment for a term which may extend to five 
years, or with fine not exceeding taka five lakh, or with 
both 
22 Penalty for  refusal or 
failure 
Not less than one lakh taka, in the case of a continuing 
default, ten thousand taka for every day. 
24 Penalty for market  Imprisonment for a term which may extend to five 
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manipulation of security 
prices and  fraudulent acts 
years, or with fine which shall not be less than five 
lakh taka or with both. 
Source: Complied from (GoB 2012) 
 
It has been observed that the most common type of noncompliance during the period of 
study is the failure to submit the half-yearly financial statements and the failure to comply 
with securities related laws. The consequences, in general practice, for the failure to 
submit half yearly statements is a warning to the relevant company. Because of the 
tendency of authority not to punish, by fining or even imprisonment, companies are not 
usually very much concerned about  submitting their half yearly statement in due time. On 
the other hand the maximum penalty for non compliance of securities related laws is taka 
2000 for section 173(2) and taka 1000 for 173(1), 218 and 219(average exchange rate in 
2014 was for the dollar 80 taka and for the pound, 130 taka). Moreover, in recent year 
there has been no example of imprisonment, cancellation or suspension for 
noncompliance. In order to reduce the non compliance and improve the quality or 
reporting, it is prime time to revise the fines and punishments. Besides, implementation of 
laws and rules are most important and in this case the Securities and Exchange 
Commission needs enough capacity and authority to implement the laws. An overview of 
the fines and warnings during the period of study is given in Appendix M. 
 
2.8 Conclusion: 
An overview of legal framework of reporting in Bangladesh is necessary to answer the 
research questions one and two: to what extent do Bangladeshi companies comply with the 
requirements of mandatory reporting? Do Bangladeshi companies disclose more than the 
minimum information required by accounting standards and regulatory requirements? By 
using the legal requirements of Bangladesh, a mandatory disclosure checklist will be set 
out in chapter 5(Research Methodology and Hypotheses Development). This check list 
will be used to determine the extent of mandatory disclosure in the first part of chapter six. 
In chapter 7 there is further consideration of the legal framework to determine whether 
Bangladeshi companies do or do not disclose additional information voluntarily (in 
addition to the mandatory). Chapter 8 will explore the time frame relating to the audit of 
financial statement and the submitting of the annual report to SEC, register of joint stock 
and shareholders before the AGM. 
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The financial reporting environment in Bangladesh is not in full conformity with 
international standards (Farooque et al. 2007). They found that financial disclosure is 
made primarily to satisfy tax authorities rather than to meet the needs of investors; 
furthermore, markets do not necessarily reward more transparent firms. On the other hand, 
in relation to reliability and comparability of financial information, the general level of 
compliance of Bangladesh firms to International Accounting Standards (as adopted in 
Bangladesh) is at best satisfactory (Karim and Ahmed 2005). Although the BSEC, the 
exchanges, and the ICAB have taken legal actions against wrongdoers from time to time, 
these actions are viewed by some as insufficient since many who break the law are 
believed to go undetected (World Bank 2002, 2003; Mir and Rahaman 2005; Solaiman 
2006; Uddin and Choudhury 2008; World Bank 2009; Rashid 2011). 
 
The quality of audited financial statements is a concern to investors and other users of 
financial statements. There is a widespread view that the low-level skills among 
accounting professionals and the lack of enforcement mechanisms contribute to 
noncompliance with established accounting requirements and auditing standards (World 
Bank 2009). There is a need to take some steps to ensure that the legal and regulatory 
requirements on accounting, auditing, and financial reporting fully protect the public 
interest. In order to meet this need the Companies Act (Amendment) 2013, Bank 
Company (Amendment) Act 2013, BSEC notification 2012 was published. 
 
There is a need for a new Financial Reporting Act and the repeal of the provisions on 
accounting, auditing, and financial reporting in the Companies Act 1994, Bank Companies 
Act 2013, Insurance Act 2010, and other related regulations.
 
The audit of financial 
statements prepared by public interest entities should be carried out in accordance with 
ISA and other related pronouncements issued by IFAC. Also the IFAC Code of Ethics for 
Professional Accountants should be mandatory for all practicing accountants and auditors.  
 
Moreover, an independent oversight body should be established to monitor and enforce 
accounting and auditing standards and codes. This body should be empowered to monitor 
and enforce accounting and auditing requirements with respect to general-purpose 
financial statements. In addition to this, Government should take the necessary steps to 
strengthen the capacity of the Securities and Exchange Commission, Bangladesh Bank, 
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and Authority of Insurance for enabling these regulatory bodies to effectively deal with 
accounting and financial reporting practices of the regulated entities. 
 
Finally, preventive measures can improve the degree of compliance with accounting 
requirements by the publicly traded companies. The BSEC can raise awareness among the 
top management of listed companies of the importance of compliance with accounting and 
auditing requirements through outreach programs: top management should be briefed on 
their responsibility for compliance with standards and on enforcement policies.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
 
3.1 Introduction 
It is argued that disclosure, transparency, accountability, and corporate governance play an 
important role in gaining market confidence (Ghazali and Weetman 2006). Moreover, 
disclosure is an important variable in any measurement of accounting quality (Marston 
and Robson 1997). Research focusing on the central theme of disclosure has been growing 
rapidly in recent years (Beattie 2005). The current chapter reviews the relevant prior 
studies concerning financial reporting and factors affecting financial reporting practices. It 
aims to provide a clear overview of prior studies and, a clear description of the new 
contribution this current study makes to the literature. Moreover, the literature review will 
improve the consistency of the current study. Reviewing the literature is a starting point 
that will help to identify the relevant theoretical framework, research hypothesis and 
methodology for this study.  
 
This study concentrates on the quality of corporate financial reporting: it considers the 
quality of mandatory and voluntary reporting and the timeliness of reporting. Section 3.2 
reviews the relevant literature of corporate financial reporting and its quality. In the same 
way section 3.3 reviews prior studies relating to empirical 1, mandatory reporting, section 
3.4 reviews prior studies of empirical 2, voluntary reporting and 3.5 reviews prior studies 
relating to empirical 3, timeliness of reporting. All three models of the literature review 
are subdivided into: developed countries, developing countries and Bangladesh following 
a research gap in that particular model.  Finally, the conclusion and the research gap to 
which the current research can contribute are presented in section 3.6. 
 
3.2 Corporate Financial Reporting: 
Corporate financial reporting has been variously defined by different writers (Cerf 1961; 
Singhvi and Desai 1971; Buzby1974a; Chandra 1974; Wallace 1988; Marston and Shrives 
1991; Gibbins et al. 1990; Chow and Wong-Boren 1997, Botosan 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 
1998) as the external release by the organisation, of information concerning its economic 
performance, position or prospects particularly as measured in monetary terms. It includes 
measurement, adjustment, quantification and application of accounting rules and any other 
shaping of data prior to its release and also any subsequent interpretation. Corporate 
financial reporting is a multidimensional array of managed activities, which occur in 
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varying contexts, and have various costs and benefits in factor markets (Gibbins et al. 
1990).  
 
Quality is not readily measurable (Imhoff 1992). Financial reporting quality is an 
intangible concept in the accounting literature (Baba 2011). According to Cooke and 
Wallace (1989) the quality of financial reporting is a conceptual term and cannot be 
calculated directly because it does not possess inherent distinctiveness by which one can 
determine its intensity or capacity. Consequently, there is little harmony among 
researchers about how best to measure financial reporting quality (Dechow et al. 2010). 
Prior research shows that stated accounting rules can be evaded by insiders and hence do 
not reflect firms’ actual reporting practices (Ball et al. 2003). Baba (2011, p. 8) suggested 
that to assess the financial reporting quality of a firm, it is not proper to rely on “what they 
say” but on rather “what they do.” 
 
Although one should expect that “better” corporate governance leads to improved 
financial reporting, there is a lack of consensus as to what constitutes “financial reporting 
quality":  the notion of financial reporting quality remains a vague concept (Cohen et al. 
2004, p 5). Auditors, audit committee members, and management are now struggling to 
define quality in relation to financial reporting (Jonas and Blanchet 2000). In the 
disclosure literature many expressions have been used to describe the quality of disclosure. 
Singhvi and Desai (1971) use the term “adequate”, Owusu-Ansah (1998) uses the term 
“extent”, Wallace et al. (1994) use “comprehensiveness”, and Naser et al. (2002) use 
“depth”. In most cases, however, “quality” of disclosure was only used in the sense of 
measuring the number of items disclosed.  
 
Wallace et al. (1994) are one of the few studies that investigate both the quantity and 
quality of disclosure, and not just whether the item is disclosed or not. They base the 
measurement of quality on the depth of information; that is, on a consideration of whether 
the disclosure improves how a user understands financial statements. Moreover, the aspect 
of quality that is being investigated and measured in Palmer's (2008) study is the perceived 
informativeness of the disclosure. It includes the total extent of disclosures as well as the 
quality of disclosures; that is, inferences are drawn from what companies have disclosed in 
their notes. It is recognized that it is difficult to define or offer an absolute measure of 
quality in relation to financial accounting information. There are many ways to define the 
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quality of narrative accounting disclosures which suggests it is a complex, multifaceted 
concept (Beattie et al. 2004).  
 
According to Marston and Shrives (1991) calculating an index score for a particular 
company can give a measure of the extent of disclosure but not necessarily the quality of 
the disclosure. For financial reports to be valuable to potential users, they must be made 
available in a timely manner, and users must be satisfied as to the accuracy of the 
information they contained (Abayo and Roberts 1993). They found a positive association 
between the extent of voluntary disclosure and compliance with mandatory standards, and 
between the type of audit opinion and the timeliness of the corporate annual reports. 
 
Prior empirical studies on corporate reporting and governance are varied. While some 
studies focus on specific types of reporting such as share option disclosure, Forker (1992), 
and corporate social responsibility, Haniffa and Cooke (2005): others address the 
comprehensiveness of information in financial reporting, Chen and Jaggi (2000). 
Elsewhere, disclosure of corporate governance information in corporate annual reports has 
been addressed by many researchers in developed countries (Anand 2005). Examples 
include Bujaki and McConomy (2002) in Canada, Parum (2005) in Denmark, Bauwhede 
and Marleen (2008) in the European Union and Sheridan et al. (2006) in the UK.  
 
In a study, Khandewal and Agarwal (1991) established that reporting levels were not 
significantly different between years but that they varied significantly across companies 
whereas, Abayo and Roberts (1993) found no significant difference in the disclosure 
quality of companies employing and not employing qualified accountants. In addition, the 
study reports evidence of a weak positive association between mandatory and voluntary 
disclosure. Moreover, they conclude a positive association between the type of audit 
opinion and the timeliness of the corporate annual reports. But their findings are based on 
only 51 companies using cross section data for four industries only which limits the 
findings to generalise. 
 
Chipalkatti (2002) examined the association between the nature and quality of annual 
report disclosures and found no significant association between the level of disclosure 
with share ownership and profitability. On the other hand, Felo et al. (2003) empirically 
examined the relationship between two audit committee characteristics - the composition 
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(expertise and independence) and the size of the audit committee - and the quality of 
financial reporting. They showed that the percentage of audit committee members having 
expertise in accounting or financial management is positively related to financial reporting 
quality. They also found some evidence of a positive relationship between the size of the 
audit committee and financial reporting quality. However, audit committee independence 
is not related to financial reporting quality.  
 
Regarding quality, Naser and Nuseibeh (2003) assessed the quality of information 
disclosed by a sample of non-financial Saudi companies listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange. The study also compared the extent of corporate disclosure before and after the 
creation of the Saudi Organization of Certified Public Accountants (SOCPA) using the 
annual reports of 1992 and 1999. The outcome of the analysis indicated a relatively high 
compliance with the mandatory requirements in all industries covered by the study. As for 
the voluntary disclosure, whether related or unrelated to mandatory disclosure, the analysis 
revealed that Saudi companies disclose more information than the minimum required by 
law. The level of voluntary disclosure, however, is still relatively low. A major weakness 
of the study was the sample selection; they offer no justification for using two specific 
points in time. Results may have differed if the researchers had used panel data from 1992 
to 1999. Moreover, they did not use match pair data making it very difficult to measure 
whether the reporting pattern is improving or not. 
 
On the other hand, Robinson and Paul (2004) examined how financial reporting quality 
relates to the overall quality of the financial statements and related disclosures; they 
considered how fairly the reported results present the operations and financial position of 
the company. Moreover, Han (2005) investigated the relationship between patterns of 
stock ownership and the quality of a firm’s financial reporting in the USA, as measured by 
the magnitude of discretionary accruals, the mapping of accruals into cash flows and the 
level of disclosure. The researcher found that managerial stock ownership is negatively 
associated with reporting quality and the level of disclosure, while a positive relationship 
is observed for institutional stock holdings. 
 
As regards to corporate governance on the financial reporting quality, Klai and 
Abdelwahed (2011) examined the effect of the governance mechanisms for a sample of 
Tunisian firms. Specifically, they focus on the characteristics of the board of directors and 
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the ownership structure of the firms listed on the Tunis Stock Exchange during the period 
1997–2007. The results reveal that the governance mechanisms affect the financial 
information quality of the Tunisian companies. Particularly, the power of the foreigners, 
the families and the block holders reduces the reporting quality, while control by the State 
or the financial institutions is associated with a good quality of financial disclosure.  
 
There is no study that measured the quality of corporate reporting in Bangladesh. More 
than two decades before, Parry and Groves (1990) examined empirically the annual 
reports of 94 companies to assess whether employment of qualified accountants by 
companies in Bangladesh had any impact on the quality of financial reporting. They found 
no significant relationships between the qualifications of accountants preparing the reports 
and those variables. In reaching their conclusions, however, the study did not assess the 
degree of statutory compliance or whether other corporate attributes had any impact on the 
level of disclosure compliance. 
 
In order to fill the gap in the literature, the current research investigates the quality of 
corporate financial reporting from longitudinal data. As the current study measures quality 
through quality of mandatory reporting, quality of voluntary reporting and timeliness of 
reporting, the following three section of this chapter will highlight the literature relevant to 
the study according to the empirical model that suits the investigation. 
 
3.3 Empirical Model 1: Mandatory Reporting: 
Reporting is the communication of economic information, financial or non-financial, 
quantitative or otherwise concerning a company’s financial position and performance. It is 
described as mandatory if companies are obliged to disclose insofar as the regulations are 
applicable to them (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Mandatory reporting is a regulatory tool and is 
perceived as the minimum framework of transparency (Brown et al. 2009). On the other 
hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) defined it as the presentation of a minimum amount of 
information required by laws, stock exchanges, and the accounting standards setting body 
to facilitate evaluation of securities. More specifically, Akhtaruddin (2005) concentrated 
on items of information required by the Companies Act, the listing rules of the stock 
exchanges, and the approved IAS's that listed companies need to disclose in their annual 
reports. 
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Since Bangladesh was a British colony prior to August 14, 1947, its financial reporting 
system is largely influenced by the British accounting system. As mentioned in chapter 
two, the mandatory disclosure requirements in Bangladesh are generally guided by the 
Companies Act 1994, Securities and Exchange Ordinance 1969, Securities and Exchange 
Rules (SER) 1987 and the subsequent amendments in 1999 and 2000, listing rules issued 
by Securities and Exchange Commission and BAS and BFRS adopted by the Institute of 
Chartered Accountant of Bangladesh (ICAB).  
 
Since the 1960s, there has been increased interest in accounting disclosure studies 
exploring various determinants of companies’ reporting practices. The best part of these 
studies  concentrated on developed countries such as the UK (Spero 1979; Firth 1979), the 
USA (Buzby 1974b; Lang and Lundholm 1993), Canada (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978), 
Sweden (Cooke 1989), Switzerland (Raffournier 1995), Japan (Cooke 1992). A small 
group of studies have inspected developing countries, such as Hong Kong (Singhvi and 
Desai 1971), Egypt (Mahmood 1999), Jordan (Naser et al. 2002), Nigeria (Wallace 1987), 
and Bangladesh (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). Moreover, a few studies have adopted a 
comparative approach to evaluate the intensity of reporting across two or more countries, 
for example Barret (1977), Zareski (1996), and Camfferman and Cooke (2002). In this 
study, the literature review is divided into developed countries, developing countries and 
finally those studies that focused on Bangladesh. 
 
3.3.1 Prior Studies in Developed* Countries: 
Most of the study relating to mandatory reporting is focused on compliance/ 
noncompliance of disclosure and determinants of it. Cerf (1961) is the pioneered in this 
area considering 527 corporate annual reports against a disclosure index of thirty one 
information items. He found that the level of reporting was positively associated with 
corporate size and listing status but not with profitability. He also concluded that financial 
reporting practices of many US companies need improvement. Subsequently, several 
researchers have replicated his methodology applying the same approach to different 
countries. Wallace et al. (1994) investigated both the quantity and quality of disclosure, 
and not just whether the item is disclosed or not. Their study provided evidence that the 
*Note: Developed country list was taken from Human Development Index as on 14 March 2013, Average 
disposable wage of OECD members in 2012, and IMF advanced economies  
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amount of detail in Spanish corporate annual reports and accounts concerning size and 
stock exchange listings is increasing: the detail relating to liquidity is decreasing. They 
also showed that the average compliance of mandatory disclosure in Spain is 59% with a 
range of 29% to 80%. However, the study excludes the finance sector and uses a small 
sample size for a particular year. Moreover, the study has focused on sixteen selected 
disclosure items. The results may be different if the numbers of items were increased or 
another set of disclosure items examined. 
 
Regarding the extent of compliance of mandatory requirements, Glaum and Street (2003) 
investigated the compliance with IAS and US GAAP disclosure requirements for 
companies listed on Germany’s New Market. Compliance levels range from 41.6% to 
100%, with an average of 83.7%. This high compliance may be due to the small sample 
used and data collected from a particular year. If the study considered a large sample for a 
period of time, the results might be different. They also suggested that average compliance 
level is significantly lower for companies that apply IAS compared to companies applying 
US GAAP. This finding only related to that particular country and cannot be generalised.  
 
In a similar study, Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005) found that, after controlling for the 
effects of other mandatory disclosure-related variables, the improvement in corporate 
disclosure compliance behavior is the result of the implementation of the financial 
reporting act. They investigated the effect of the financial reporting act of 1993 on 
mandatory disclosure practices and found that compliance levels increased throughout this 
period from an average of 78% in 1992 to an average of 88% in 1997. At the same time 
standard deviation has dropped from 4.3% to 2.87%. However, they used a short 
observation window: the reliability of the study would have been greater if they had 
considered a longer consecutive timescale rather than two specific points of time. 
 
As regards to extent and determinants of mandatory reporting, Fekete et al. (2008) 
investigated whether Hungarian listed companies comply with IFRS disclosure 
requirements or not. They identified some factors associated with the level of compliance 
using a very small sample of seventeen companies for a particular time point, 2006. They 
found that average compliance is 62%. They also mentioned that corporate size and 
industry type are statistically associated with the extent of compliance with IFRS 
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disclosure requirements. They only provide a snapshot of Hungary and the study does not 
represent the total picture due to its sample selection. 
 
In a similar study, Apostolos and Nanopoulos (2009) explored disclosures and the 
significant extent of noncompliance in respect of IAS's and Greek regulations. The key 
factors associated with the levels of compliance with IAS's include the composition of the 
board of directors, profitability and the number of common shares. The public firms in the 
sample have shown that because of the political cost, the management is forced to disclose 
accounting data and support transparency. However, the study limited only to 
manufacturing and construction companies.  
 
On the other hand, association between corporate mandatory disclosure and corporate 
governance quality has been examined by Kent and Stewart (2008). They computed the 
number of sentences in annual reports: they used the results to explore the effect of the 
transition to the Australian Equivalent of International Financial Reporting Standards. 
They found that corporate disclosure quality is positively related to board size and audit 
firm size; on the other hand, there is no relation between board committee independence 
and corporate mandatory disclosure. However, a count of the number of sentences of 
narrative and reference to specific accounting policies do not fully measure the quality of 
disclosure. Moreover, Matocsy et al. (2012) examine the association between corporate 
mandatory disclosure and board composition and different types of continuous disclosure. 
The study used both ordinary least-squares (OLS) regressions and two-stage least-squares 
(2SLS) regressions. They find that there is no relationship between board composition and 
different types of continuous disclosure. A summary of developed countries prior 
literature is given in table Appendix Q. 
 
3.3.2 Prior Studies in Developing* Countries: 
Like developed countries, most of the study of developing countries investigated the 
extent and determinants of mandatory reporting. Concerning the extent of mandatory 
reporting, Wallace (1988) examined the publicly quoted companies in Nigeria. The paper 
deals with the entire contents of the annual reports and highlights its different parts. The 
results of spatial analysis reveal a dualistic pattern in the corporate annual report. The 
*Developing Countries list is taken from- World Bank, March 2013 - 
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups 
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more desired types of information are relatively abandoned and/or overshadowed by the 
types which are not relevant to the needs of users but preferred by the accounting 
profession and by the reporting entities. The results are derived from a sample of forty-
seven profit seeking listed companies of manufacturing, commercial and service sectors: it 
is unlikely that finding are applicable to all other listed companies.  
 
In a similar study, Benjamin et al. (1990) identified ten mandatory disclosure items and 
assessed whether companies listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange comply with those 
items. Based on a sample of seventy-six companies, they observed an averaged non-
compliance rate of 22%. The study considers only ten mandatory items to assess the 
compliance which does not provide the total picture of reporting. In another study, 
Wallace and Naser (1995) examined the comprehensiveness of mandatory reporting in 
Hong Kong. Their study provided evidence that the researcher-created indexes vary 
positively with asset size and the scope of business operations but negatively with profits 
and average compliance of mandatory disclosure: the latter stands at 73%. Finance firms 
were excluded from the population and they selected every third firm systematically from 
the remaining names of firms in the list on the stock exchange. Moreover, they only 
consider the firm-specific variables when examining the relationships.  
 
Moreover, Xiao (1999) investigates corporate disclosure requirements placed upon 
Chinese listed companies, concluding that the general level of compliance was satisfactory 
in the sample studied. But the study represents a snapshot of disclosure practice based on a 
small sample of thirteen listed companies and hence some findings, especially those 
related to the level of compliance, may not be generalisable. Nevertheless, it provides 
evidence of the ways in which standard setting responds to disclosure practice.  
  
In addition, Samuel Sejjaaka (2003) studied corporate mandatory disclosure in Uganda 
including banks and insurance companies: he found that the extent of disclosure in the 
financial sector in terms of compliance with IAS is still poor. He only considers the 
financial sector so his findings cannot be generalised for non financial sectors in Uganda. 
However, findings indicate that reporting in the financial sector was particularly limited by 
lack of an accounting standard for insurance companies and a weak regulatory regime: 
regulators need to improve the standard of reporting in Uganda in order to improve the 
acceptability of annual reports.  
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Moreover, Ali et al. (2004) empirically examined the level of compliance with disclosure 
requirements mandated by fourteen national accounting standards and evaluate the 
corporate attributes which influence the degree of compliance with these standards. The 
results indicate significant variation in total disclosure compliance levels across countries 
and different national accounting standards. They found an average compliance of 
approximately 80% for each country with a large average standard deviation of 8%. They 
only considered the non financial companies using a single year’s data. Moreover, using a 
common 131 mandatory checklist items for all three countries is not always justifiable as 
mandatory requirements vary from country to country. 
 
As regards to extent and determinants of mandatory reporting, Hassan et al. (2006) used 
panel data to investigate the compliance. Results showed gradual increases in disclosure 
levels, with a high compliance for mandatory disclosure with an average of 90% over the 
entire period. Public business sector companies appear generally to disclose less 
information than private sector companies. But the study only considers non-financial 
companies and so findings may not apply to other sectors. Similarly, Aljifri (2008) 
examined the extent of disclosure in annual reports, and sought to determine the 
underlying factors that affect the level of disclosures among firms and between sectors. He 
reports an average compliance rate of 67% with a standard deviation of 11%. This study 
concludes that the extent of disclosure in the UAE has significant association with the 
sector type (banks, insurance, industrial, and service) The number of the firms examined is 
not large and the study only considers annual reports for the  year 2003. It could be 
extended by including more factors which could have an effect on the extent of disclosure. 
 
In a similar study, Al-Akra et al. (2010) examined mandatory disclosure compliance of 
listed Jordanian companies. They found that disclosure compliance with the IFRS is 
significantly higher in 2004 than that in 1996. Moreover, the size of the board, liquidity 
and gearing ratio emerged as significant determinants of mandatory disclosure in 1996 but 
not in 2004. The study shows that corporate disclosure research must consider the 
interaction of accounting systems and economic factors contingent to particular countries. 
However, the study used a two match pair sample of financial companies rather than panel 
data including all the sectors.  Additionally, Gao and Kling (2012) found that auditor 
opinion increases the mandatory disclosure requirement. Moreover internal governance 
measured by board size, CEO salary, CEO duality and external governance has a positive 
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effect on firm compliance to corporate mandatory disclosure requirements. They exclude 
banks and financial institution from their study and consider mainly corporate governance 
characteristics. 
 
Regarding quality of reporting, Agyei-Mensah (2013) investigated the financial reports 
before and after adopting IFRS's in Ghana, and also the influence of firm-specific 
characteristics on the quality of financial information disclosed.  The study confirms that 
the implementation of IFRS's generally reinforces accounting disclosure quality. It also 
indicates that company size and auditor type were found to be associated at a statistically 
significant level with the quality of financial information disclosed. A major limitation of 
the study is the time period. The author used years 2006 and 2008, to measure the effect of 
IFRS's adoption in 2007. It would have been better to go back two years before the cut-off 
point and then to have studied the effects for two or three years after the adoption. Using 
panel data set would have been useful in measuring the improvement. A summary of 
developing countries prior literature is also given in Appendix Q. 
 
 
3.3.3 Mandatory Reporting in Bangladesh: 
In Bangladesh, Parry and Khan (1984) conducted the first study on mandatory disclosure 
using the annual reports of seventy-four companies for the fiscal years from 1978 to 1982: 
they established several areas of non-compliance with the Bangladesh Companies Act 
1913. In particular, they highlighted major deficiencies with respect to non-compliance in 
the case of fixed assets, inventories, intangibles assets, and loan and equity capital. 
However, the study was undertaken before the promulgation of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission Rules 1987. Consequently, it is not possible to assess the extent of 
disclosure compliance with the combined reporting requirements of the companies. 
   
Later, Alam (1989) found that the sample companies failed to observe the minimum 
disclosure requirements in Bangladesh. Similarly, Parry (1989), Parry and Groves (1990), 
and Ahmed and Nicholls (1994) also found that the rate of compliance with mandatory 
disclosure requirements is low. They also found that subsidiaries of multinational 
companies and companies audited by large audit firms showed a higher degree of 
compliance to disclosure requirements while the accountant's qualification in the reporting 
company had weak influence on such compliance. All the studies mentioned above are 
 - 70 - 
conducted before the promulgation of Companies Act 1994. So, their findings are no 
longer valid in the present perspective as new disclosure requirements came into operation 
as a result of the Companies Act.   
 
On the other hand, Bala and Habib (1998) made a study on the practice of financial 
reporting to the employees in Bangladesh. They found that financial reporting to 
employees is not mandatory in Bangladesh and thereby not in practice. They concluded 
that the extent of disclosure is at minimum scale and even the mandatory disclosure under 
the Security and Exchange Rules was violated. This study was also conducted before 
introduction of BAS and BFRS (first BAS adopted in 1st January 1999). So, this study 
does not inform the present perspective. 
 
According to a World Bank review, the Bangladesh institutional environment suffers from 
several significant defects. For example, while the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies 
(RJSC) has the legal authority to enforce the provisions of the Companies Act, the RJSC 
lacks the technical competence to monitor compliance with accounting and auditing 
matters (World Bank 2003, para 23). The World Bank reported that the RJSC did not 
monitor or take action against companies that failed to file annual audited financial 
statements (World Bank 2003, para 23). The same body (2003, para 24) also noted that the 
BSEC did not have sufficiently qualified staff to effectively monitor the accounting 
practices of listed firms. 
 
Following previous studies, Karim and Jamal (2005), empirically examined the 
association between the extent of disclosure and various corporate characteristics. They 
used a sample of 188 corporate annual reports for a single period ending between January 
and December 2003. Moreover, they only considered firm characteristics rather than using 
a combination of firm and corporate governance characteristics. They found that corporate 
size, profitability, stock exchange security category, size and international link of 
company's auditor, and multinational subsidiary are all significantly associated with the 
extent of disclosure. 
 
In a similar study, Akhtaruddin (2005) indicates that companies in general have not 
responded adequately to the mandatory disclosure requirements of the regulatory bodies. It 
has been found that companies, on average, disclose 44% of the items of information, 
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which leads to the conclusion that prevailing regulations are ineffective monitors of 
disclosure compliance by companies. Company age appears to be an insignificant factor 
for mandatory disclosure. Profitability, industry size and also status, i.e., whether a 
company is modern or traditional also have no effect on mandatory disclosure. The study 
is limited to only non-financial manufacturing companies, and the sample size is 54% of 
the population for the single year of 1999. The findings have limitations and may not be 
generalised. Moreover, this study used sales as the basis of size and profitability which 
suggests a chance of multicollinearity. In addition sales as a basis can only be used for the 
non -financial sector. Additionally, age is measured through three categories for this 
variable: companies registered prior to the 1
st
 of January 1972 are grouped as very old, 
companies registered after the 1
st
 of January 1972 but before the 1
st
 of January 1986 are 
old and companies registered after the 31
st
 of December 1985 are new companies. There is 
no rationale provided for these categories and the author did not consider time related 
differences within the fairly broad categories.  
 
On the other hand, Hasan et al. (2008) found a significant improvement in the quality of 
compliance during the more regulated time period when investigating the quality of 
compliance to mandatory disclosure requirements in Bangladesh. Their findings differ 
from Akhtaruddin (2005)  who found that the size of the firm, the qualification of the 
accounting staff who prepare financial statements as well as the reputation of its auditing 
firm, all have significant positive impact on the quality of compliance. The analysis 
presented in the study point to two additional important findings: a lack of profitability for 
the firm does not seem to affect the quality of its compliance, and the performance of 
domestic firms are at par with foreign affiliated firms as far as the quality of the 
compliance is concerned. They used a match pair sample of eighty-six listed companies 
for the less regulated (1991) and the more regulated (1998) environments in Bangladesh 
rather than panel data for all the examined period. Although they used two indexes for the 
two time periods, they did not focus on what might provide leverage for financial 
companies. 
 
In a recent study, Hasan et al. (2013) examine the level of financial disclosures among 
Bangladeshi companies and its association with corporate governance characteristics. 
They conclude that the level of financial disclosures in Bangladesh has been increasing 
gradually but it is still below the level of expectation: their findings are based on data 
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obtained from a small number of samples of forty for four non financial sectors. They used 
a stratified sampling technique: a sample of 25% from the population for a year which 
limits the accuracy of generalisations based on these. Using six corporate governance 
variables, the association between external auditor and the level of financial disclosures is 
found to be significant. It is observed that external auditor, profitability and multi listing 
are significantly associated with disclosures level. 
 
3.3.4 Research Gap in Mandatory Reporting: 
To understand the nature of overall disclosure, it is necessary to undertake a study taking 
five to ten years’ data in order to investigate whether the quality of disclosure has 
improved over time (Galani et al. 2011). However, most of the studies relating to 
mandatory disclosure in Bangladesh consider either a single period of time (Akhtaruddin 
2005; Karim and Jamal 2005) or two particular points of time (Hasan et al. 2008). On the 
other hand, mandatory disclosure requirements of a country change over that period of 
time. New IAS's and IFRS's are adopted by ICAB and listed companies in Bangladesh 
must follow this. In this sense, the most recent studies discussed above, relating to 
mandatory disclosure, are no longer valid. For example, Hasan et al. published their study 
in 2008 but use the annual reports of 1991 and 1998; Akhtaruddin published his study in 
2005 but used annual reports of 1999, which was well before the introduction of the 
Corporate Governance Code of 2006. 
 
The current study makes a new contribution to the literature by not only considering 
multiple years of data but also considering the recent available data for the study. 
Moreover, the study used disclosure indexes that have changed over the period as a result 
of new laws and regulations relevant to that particular year. As far as study aware, this is 
the first study that used seven disclosure indexes for seven years: this will give a more 
reliable and accurate overview of Bangladesh. 
 
Most of the studies from developing countries tend to examine the level of compliance 
with mandatory disclosure; this is related to enforcement policies that are more relaxed 
than in of developed countries (e.g., Ali et al. 2004). As the current study focuses on 
quality, it also considers what factors affect the reporting of mandatory disclosure. 
Moreover, this study will focus on mandatory disclosure and its different categories which 
will help to discover the particular area where the major non compliance occurred. 
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Previous studies relating to Bangladesh focused on particular area such as the financial 
institution or non financial institution and some only considered the banking sector. 
However, in the current study covers all the listed companies in Bangladesh which will 
give us the total picture. In addition to this, the study will provide results sector wise 
which will give a more useful picture of reporting patterns in Bangladesh. 
 
3.4 Empirical Model 2: Voluntary Reporting 
Voluntary reporting in the annual report means disclosing information beyond the required 
content in the financial statements (Kumar et al. 2008). In other words, voluntary reporting 
is to release more information based on managerial incentives (Healy and Palepu 2001) 
and depends, apart from managerial motives, on the culture, the legal system, and the 
institutional background of the country in which the firms work (Hossain and Helmi 
2009). The aim of voluntary reporting is to provide a clear view to stakeholders about the 
business’s long-term sustainability and to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
conflicts between managers and investors (Healy and Palepu 2001; Boesso and Kumar 
2007). 
 
Voluntary reporting can avoid impairment of allocation of resources in the capital market 
by reducing the information asymmetry (Kristandl and Bontis 2007). However, Core 
(2001) and Einhorn and Ziv (2012) argued that voluntary disclosure will still remain a 
theme of biased information selected by managers. Because mandatory disclosure does not 
usually meet the information needs of investors, the need for voluntary information 
disclosure arises. Hence, voluntary disclosure is perceived as filling the gaps missed by 
mandatory disclosure (Graham et al. 2005). Researchers provide arguments in favour of 
voluntary reporting (Latridis 2008; Mcknight and Tomkins 1999; Skinner 1994; Trueman 
1986). 
 
Holland (1998) comparing the benefits to the costs of voluntary disclosure, states that the 
management will publish until they will reach the point when they will observe that the 
capital agency costs reduction has equalled the increase of the information publication 
costs for the market and the other users. The first benefit of the publication of a great 
volume of information is represented by a better capital allocation at national and 
international level, which can be translated as a capital cost reduction. Through the 
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increase of the publishing level, especially of the information provisioned, the firms can 
reduce the cost of capital attainment (Healy and Palepu 1993). However, Thompson 
(1995) warns that an undisciplined expansion of business reporting can lead to an un-
necessary increase in expense. According to Malone et al. (1993) the firms which are 
economically stimulated to supply more information, do so only if the marginal cost will 
surpass the marginal profit of the additional disclosure. 
 
Research on voluntary reporting has attempted to examine the nature and patterns of 
corporate social reporting (CSR) and investigate the determinants of CSR (Cormier and 
Magnan 2003). CSR is no longer a ‘fad’ or an ‘extra option’, but describes a more holistic 
approach to understanding organisations and their relationships with their stakeholders 
(Lewis 2001). CSR has been criticised by Milton Friedman and others, who argue that the 
responsibility of a corporation is to earn profits and that CSR is a distribution of 
shareholder wealth for the pursuit of managers’ own interests (Friedman 1970). On the 
other side of the CSR debate, some theoretical models and empirical findings indicate that 
CSR can be an economically justified business expenditure that enhances a firm’s future 
financial performance (e.g., Fisman et al. 2006; Lev et al. 2010; Caroll and Shabana 2010) 
or reduces a firm’s cost of capital (e.g., Dhaliwal et al. 2011; El Ghoul et al. 2011).  
 
The literature recognizes that CSR practices differ from country to country (Adams et al.  
1998) and between developed and developing countries (Imam 2000). Furthermore the 
nature and patterns of CSR vary between types of industry (Gray et al. 2001).  Surveys of 
CSR practices in western countries reveal that companies place the greatest emphasis on 
disclosing human resource information such as employee numbers and remuneration, 
equal opportunities, employee share ownership, disability policies, and employee training 
(Gray et al. 2001). Little disclosure exists in sensitive areas such as trade union activities, 
redundancy schemes, and costs (Adams et al. 1998). Moreover, the vast majority of 
disclosures are qualitative in nature. 
 
Corporate environmental reporting (CFR) can be defined as a mechanism whereby 
companies disclose the environmental aspects of their corporate activities to stakeholders. 
Since the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, people recognised that improved 
decision making needed sound environmental information (DEAT 2005). Environmental 
reporting was traditionally a voluntary process but from the mid-1990s, a number of 
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European countries began to introduce mandatory environmental reporting (DEAT 2005), 
Denmark being the first country to do so in 1996. 
 
Sustainability reporting is the practice of 'measuring, reporting, and being accountable to 
internal and external stakeholders for organizational performance towards the goal of 
sustainable development’ (GRI 2006, p.3). The global issue of sustainability urges 
corporate bodies to be transparent by disclosing those sustainability activities that may 
affect the earth and society at large (Sobhani et al. 2011). Sustainability or more usually 
sustainable development is typically defined as development which: 'meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs' (UN WCED 1987, p 8). 
 
In fact, corporate sustainability disclosure (CSD) around the world has been steadily rising 
since the end of 2000 and Japan is the pioneer in terms companies issuing sustainability 
reports (Kolk 2003). Thousands of global organisations now report their sustainability 
strategies and practices in their annual reports and corporate websites. According to 
KPMG (2008), 80% of the globally large companies (G250) now disclose sustainability 
reports. According to the report of KLD (2008), 51% of sample companies in emerging 
markets publish a standalone sustainability report. 
 
The Bangladesh Companies Act 1994 sets the general framework for corporate financial 
reporting. However, no provisions regarding CSR, CFR, and CSD exist in the Companies 
Act 1994 (GoB 1994). Neither is there a separate Bangladesh Accounting Standard (BAS) 
regarding social and environmental reporting (IASCF 2003). However, since the adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in Bangladesh on 5 July 2006, the 
Presentation of Financial Statements (BAS 1) encourages companies listed on the Stock 
Exchange of Bangladesh to publish additional statements on their non-financial activities. 
Therefore, in Bangladesh, CSR CFR and CSD are still voluntary, with the exception of 
disclosure of expenditures on energy usage which required under the Companies Act of 
1994 and the Securities and Exchange Rules of 1987; this requires the total amount spent 
on energy to be shown as a separate expenditure in the notes to the financial statements. 
 
For voluntary reporting, the literature review is also separated into research relating to 
developed countries, developing countries and Bangladesh. 
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3.4.1 Prior Studies in Developed Countries: 
Regarding voluntary reporting, Firth (l979) addresses the extent and the association with 
three firm characteristics: firm size, listing status and auditor type. The firm size and 
listing status were found to be positively associated with the level of voluntary reporting. 
The results indicate that the audit firm is not associated significantly with voluntary 
reporting. In another study, Firth (1980) examines the extent of the changes in voluntary 
reporting of companies at the time of raising finance. He uses six different samples of 
manufacturing firms in UK. The study concluded that the levels of voluntary disclosure by 
smaller sized companies increase when raising new stock market finance, via new issues 
and right issues. Using data from New Zealand, McNally et al. (1982) also examined the 
association between voluntary disclosure and five firm characteristics: size, profitability, 
growth, audit firm and industry. The study employed rank order correlations using 
Spearman and concluded that firm size is associated positively and significantly with 
voluntary reporting while the other characteristics were found to be insignificant. All these 
three study consider single year data. Their findings are relate to past practices and may 
well not illuminate the current perspective. 
 
In a similar study, Cooke (1989) used data from ninety non-financial companies of 
Sweden to examine corporate voluntary reporting. He classified the investigated 
companies into three groups according to their listing status: thirty-eight unlisted, thirty-
three single listed on the Swedish Stock Exchange (SSE), and nineteen multiple listed. The 
study provided evidence that the level of disclosure in the annual reports differs 
significantly among the three groups. The regression analysis indicated that listing status 
and firm size are positively associated with voluntary reporting. Cooke (1991) also 
conducted a similar study with the annual reports of some Japanese companies. He used 
the same criterion to classify the sample into three groups: thirteen unlisted, twenty-five 
listed and ten multiple listed. The study employed stepwise regression and concluded that 
firm size is the   best explanatory variable followed by listing status. Unlike Swedish 
manufacturing companies, Japanese manufacturing companies were found to disclose 
more information voluntarily than trading and service companies. Both studies are based 
on a particular period and focus on firm characteristics only. 
 
Considering industry specific disclosure decisions, Craswell and Taylor (1992) addressed 
Australian oil and gas companies to find out information disclosure about estimated 
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reserves. As the study focuses on the specific item of disclosure, there is no checklist, a 
dichotomous approach was used. The results indicated that the audit firm is associated 
positively with the disclosure decisions, while there is weak support for the effect of 
leverage, firm size, cash flow risk, and the proportion of shares held by the top twenty 
shareholders, on the disclosure decision. Their findings differ from previous studies. As 
secondly one particular sector was taken into account, findings are not applicable for other 
sectors of the country. 
 
In Switzerland, Raffournier (1995) examines the relation between voluntary reporting and 
some firm characteristics of listed companies. The disclosure items were derived from the 
Fourth and Seventh EU directives. Using univariate analysis and stepwise regression, he 
concludes that firm size and internationality play a major role in the disclosure policy of 
firms. The interesting point in this study is the use of ownership diffusion as an 
explanatory variable of voluntary reporting. Similarly, Hossain et al. (1995) addressed 
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and examined empirically the effect of 
five firm-specific characteristics. As with the majority of disclosure studies, they use OLS 
regression, concluding that firm size, leverage, and foreign listing status all have 
significant association with the level of information voluntarily disclosed in the annual 
reports of investigated companies. 
 
In France where the annual report was not mandatory, Depoers (2000) relies on agency 
theory and limitations imposed by information costs to conduct a cost benefit analysis for 
the voluntary disclosure practices in corporate annual reports. The study investigates the 
effect of some economic determinants on the extent of voluntary disclosure in the annual 
reports. The results of multiple regressions based on stepwise procedure indicate that firm 
size, foreign activity and proprietary costs have significant association with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
Concerning voluntary reporting, Gruning (2007) commented that driving factors do not 
have singular impacts on disclosure but are interrelated. Using sixty annual reports from 
Germany and Poland, he employed a structural equation model to investigate interrelations 
between four firm characteristics as drivers of corporate disclosure. The results of this 
study showed that the four characteristics are interrelated factors that affect corporate 
disclosure quality. His findings contradict that firm size was found to have only an indirect 
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effect on corporate disclosure. However, the effect of the home country is of a direct and 
indirect nature with the latter being mediated by firm size and cross listing. 
 
On the other side, Wang and Claiborne (2008) examined empirically the determinants of 
voluntary reporting in the annual reports of listed firms that issue both domestic and 
foreign shares. The results indicated that the level of voluntary reporting is positively 
related to the proportion of state ownership, foreign ownership, firm performance 
measured by return on equity, and reputation of the engaged auditor while leverage has no 
significant association. They examined the extent of voluntary disclosure cross-sectionally 
using annual reports from 2005. The specific time frame of the study suggests that 
findings may not be generalised. 
 
In the same way, Alves et al. (2012) studied the effects of corporate governance 
determinants on voluntary disclosure. Using several corporate governance mechanisms, 
they investigate the association among corporate characteristics, corporate governance 
variables and corporate voluntary disclosure. The results indicate that the main 
determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure are those variables related to firm size, 
growth opportunities, organisational performance, board compensation and the presence of 
a large shareholder. Their study contradicts  previous studies indicating that board 
independence, board size or the existence of monitoring structures do not have a statistical 
association with voluntary disclosure. 
 
As regards to environmental reporting, Walden and Schwartz (1997) investigated the 
practices for selected firms in four industries, including oil and forestry products, 
subsequent to the 1989 Alaskan oil spill. From an industry perspective, they showed that 
significant positive differences in the levels of environmental disclosures from year 1988 
to 1989 and from year 1989 to 1990, using both assessment measures. Their findings 
support environmental disclosures being time- or event-specific, and being made in the 
firm's self-interest in response to public policy pressure. 
 
Bewley and Li (2000) also examined factors associated with the environmental reporting 
in Canada from a voluntary disclosure theory perspective. The study found that firms with 
more news media coverage of their environmental exposure, higher pollution propensity, 
and more political exposure are more likely to disclose general environmental information, 
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suggesting a negative association between environmental disclosures and environmental 
performance. The results in this study are based on a cross-sectional sample of different 
types of manufacturing firms for a single year. So, findings are not applicable in other 
settings.  
 
Similarly, using a sample of 191 firms from the five most polluting industries in the US, 
Clarkson et al.(2008) found  a positive association between environmental performance 
and the level of discretionary environmental disclosures. They found that the result is 
consistent with the predictions of the economics disclosure theory but inconsistent with 
the negative association predicted by socio-political theories. They showed that socio-
political theories explain patterns in the data ‘‘legitimisation’’ that cannot be explained by 
economic disclosure theories. On the other hand, highlighting the factors affecting the 
environmental disclosures in listed firms from, heavy polluting industries Tang and Geling 
(2010) showed that the level of environmental disclosure from heavy polluting industries 
is low and the level of disclosure among industries is greatly different. Only firm size and 
capital structure are significant for environmental disclosure, others are not. As the sample 
firms come from twenty-one heavily polluting industries, the findings did not represent the 
total picture. Moreover, the study considers single year data. 
 
Regarding social and environmental reporting, Deegan et al. (2000) examined the reaction 
of Australian companies, to five major social and environmental incidents. The incidents 
reviewed are the Exxon Valdez, Bhopal disasters, the Moura Mine oil spill disaster in 
Queensland and the Kirki oil spill, off the coast of Western Australia. They found that, 
following the incidents, sample firms operating in the affected industries provided more 
environmental information in their annual reports than they did prior to the incidents. In 
another study, Skouloudis et al. (2014) investigate non-financial aspects of performance, 
mainly within the domains of social and environmental responsibility. The analysis 
suggests that only a small group of leading Greek firms appear to endorse a meaningful 
business and society dialogue as an instrument for stakeholder communication and the 
discharging of organisational accountability. However, the sample size is small and 
reflects only the indicative findings of organisational practices of firms pertaining to 
different sectors and ownership structure. Moreover, the study does not assess any 
potential for improvement in accountability practices over time, since it only examines the 
disclosures within a narrow time frame.  
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On the other side, Hedberg and Malmborg (2003) analyzed why companies have chosen to 
use the GRI guidelines and how this has affected corporate social responsibility and 
environmental management. They found that companies produce CSR's mainly to seek 
organisational legitimacy, and that the main reason for use of the GRI guidelines is an 
expectation of increasing credibility of the CSR: it also provides a template for how to 
design a report. Moreover, they found that the CSR report and the GRI guidelines are of 
more help for internal than external communication at this stage of development. In this 
study, the use and experiences of GRI in ten companies based in Sweden were 
investigated. Its findings cannot be generalised for all companies. 
 
As regards to sustainability reporting, Visser (2002) examined the nature and extent of  
disclosure in the annual financial reports of South Africa’s largest 184 companies, as well 
as in 17 standalone public reports on sustainability or aspects of sustainability: these 
included environment, health, safety or social responsibility. The findings of the survey 
suggested that disclosure on sustainability issues by South African companies continues to 
improve. In annual financial reports, the issues most reported are corporate governance, 
codes of conduct, ethics, employment equity and education and training: black economic 
empowerment, fraud prevention and HIV AIDS are the least reported. The production of 
standalone public reports on sustainability issues has also increased in South Africa, but 
still lags substantially behind international levels. 
 
In a similar study, significant inconsistencies and frequent gaps in sustainability reporting 
has been observed by Frost et al. (2005) examining the nature and extent of sustainability 
reporting practices in various reporting media (annual reports, discrete reports and 
websites) of  Australian companies. They found that annual report is the least valuable 
source of information on corporate sustainability in terms of the number of indicators 
observed:  corporate websites provided a more diverse range of disclosure. The discrete 
report and websites provide greater levels of information on sustainability, however the 
overall levels of information is low. This analysis is merely a snapshot of reporting 
practices of a limited number of companies, and these companies do not represent of the 
general reporting practices of Australian companies on sustainability issues. 
 
On the other side, sustainability reporting and its reputation is measured by Michelon 
(2007) using a control group sample matched on country, industry and size. He examined 
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sustainability disclosure by type of information – strategic, financial, environmental and 
social. This study extends previous research on CSD by concentrating on information 
released not only in annual reports, but also in the multimedia, including social reports, 
environmental reports and sustainability reports. Two major findings in this study are that 
reputation does affect the extent of sustainability disclosure and European companies 
disclose more than US companies. 
 
With reference to corporate social reporting, Idowu and Towler (2004) analysed the 
contents of different companies across different industries in the UK. They found that 
some UK companies issue separate reports for their corporate social reporting activities 
and others devote a section in their annual reports. They found that UK corporate social 
reporting discloses information about the contributions an entity has made in four main 
perspectives. These are the environment, community, the marketplace and the workplace. 
They were also concluded that corporate social reporting in the UK is still in its infancy. 
However, the small sample size and the use of telephone interviews question their 
findings.  
 
Similarly, O'Dwyer et al. (2005) investigated of nongovernmental organisations’ 
perceptions of corporate social disclosure. Evidence is collected from in-depth interviews 
with senior representatives of major Irish NGOs. The researcher found active corporate 
resistance to discursive dialogue, corporate resistance to voluntary reporting, and 
compliant political elite unwilling to confront the corporate sector on social and 
environmental issues. On the other hand, Silberhorn and Warren (2007) explored why and 
how corporate social responsibility was developed. Although the samples are not 
representative for the British and German economies, they found that CSR policies varied 
with turnover, industry sector and nationality. Their finding also argued that the size of 
company has an impact on corporate social responsibility practices and that different 
starting points exist for corporate social responsibility in Germany and the UK. 
 
In similar study, Prado- Lorenzo et al. (2009) examined the effect that shareholder power 
and a dispersed ownership structure have on the decision to disclose corporate social 
responsibility information. They found that the influence exerted by certain stakeholders 
together with the strategic posture of the companies, have an important effect on the 
publication of corporate social responsibility reporting. However, the study result shows 
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the power of stakeholders to be quite limited. Government is one of the most important 
agents for change and has an impact on social responsibility disclosure practices. A 
summary of developed countries prior voluntary reporting literature is given in Appendix 
Q. 
 
3.4.2 Prior Studies in Developing Countries: 
As regards to voluntary disclosure, Hossain et al. (1994) address the association between 
the extent of voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and some firm characteristics 
of Malaysia. The findings of the study indicated that both firm size and ownership 
structure have significant association with the level of voluntary disclosure in corporate 
annual reports. But the findings of the study cannot be generalised as it only consider non 
financial companies based on cross sectional data. Moreover, it measure the association 
with firm characteristics only and omitted corporate governance and others factors.  
 
In a similar study, Barako et al. (2006) using a longitudinal examination of voluntary 
disclosure practices, suggested that the extent of voluntary disclosure is influenced by a 
firm’s corporate governance attributes, ownership structure and company characteristics. 
The presence of an audit committee, institutional and foreign ownership, large companies 
and companies with high debt are positive significant factors associated with the level of 
voluntary disclosure; the proportion of non-executive directors on the board has significant 
negative association with the extent of voluntary disclosure. In contrast, board leadership 
structure, liquidity, profitability and type of external audit firm do not have a significant 
influence on the level of voluntary disclosure.  
 
On the other hand, Alsaeed (2006) found that firm size is the only variable that has 
significant positive association with the level of voluntary disclosure while the remaining 
variables are insignificant in explaining the variation of voluntary disclosure of Saudi 
firms. When interpreting the results, caution should be exercised as the study focused on 
20 selected disclosure items; the sample includes non-financial companies and used firm 
characteristics only. Moreover, the items constituting the disclosure index were 
subjectively assembled from three prior studies. The choice of the items, however, does 
not reflect their level of importance as perceived by financial information users. 
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In a similar study, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) investigate the extent of corporate governance 
and voluntary corporate disclosure in Malaysian listed companies. The proportion of 
independent non-executive directors has a positive association with voluntary disclosure 
but is negatively related with family control. The study randomly selected one out of every 
four firms listed, and limited itself to non-financial firms in Malaysia. The results may not 
extend across all firms in Malaysia. Moreover, the study considers only one year of data. 
The results may differ across different years if multiple years are considered for analysis. 
 
In a different research, Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) examined the linkages between 
board ownership and audit committees' (ACs) effectiveness on corporate voluntary 
disclosures. Using different corporate governance characteristics that affect the financial 
disclosure, their results indicate that board ownership is associated with lower levels of 
corporate voluntary disclosures. More independent directors on the AC increases 
disclosure levels and reduce information asymmetry between firm management and 
investors. In the same way, Al Shammari and Al Sultan (2010) investigated the 
relationship between corporate governance characteristics and corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Using a self-disclosure index to measure corporate voluntary disclosure, the 
results indicate that the average level of voluntary disclosure stands at 19%: the existence 
of a voluntary audit committee is significantly and positively related to the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosure. 
 
Regarding voluntary disclosure, Samaha and Dahawy (2010) also examine the factors 
influencing corporate disclosure transparency as measured by the level of corporate 
voluntary disclosure in the annual report. They use archival data to collect information on 
the corporate voluntary disclosure, corporate governance characteristics and company 
characteristics. The study results indicate that lower managerial ownership was associated 
with increased corporate voluntary disclosure; moreover there is a relationship between an 
independent board of directors', existence of an audit committee and corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Findings from this study suffer from an external validity problem as they come 
only from the actively traded, listed firms in Egypt. In addition, only firms with the 
highest trading were included in the sample: the results may not extend across all 
companies in Egypt. 
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In the same way, but using graphs from annual reports, Uyar (2011) investigates the 
association between firm characteristics and corporate voluntary disclosure. The results of 
univariate and multivariate analyses indicate that firm size and auditor size have 
significant positive association with corporate voluntary disclosure level using graphs. On 
the other hand, profitability and ownership structure do not have any significant 
association with graphical disclosure level. The study has its limitations as the sample 
consists of the listed companies in the ISE-100 Index, one should be cautious, when 
generalising the results to the entire ISE Index. In addition, the findings may not be valid 
for non-listed companies.  
 
Samah et al. (2012) assess the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure on the extent of 
corporate governance by using a measure of disclosure based on published data created 
from a checklist developed by the United Nations; this was gathered from a manual review 
of financial statements and websites of a sample of ESE. The study’s findings indicate that 
the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure is lower for companies with duality in position 
and higher for concentrated ownership. However, Qu et al. (2012) examined how firms in 
the Chinese stock market have responded to the coercive pressure exerted upon them by 
the market regulatory body, the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission, and its demand 
to provide transparent information to the stock market is examined They find that over the 
study period, listed companies have gradually increased their voluntary disclosure. They 
conclude that corporate voluntary disclosure has been adopted by firms to achieve 
institutional legitimacy in the stock market. 
 
In another study, Haji and Ghazali (2013) investigate the quality of corporate voluntary 
disclosure practices in Malaysia. They indicate that the quality of voluntary disclosures 
overall is low which is consistent with prior studies. The multivariate regression analyses 
reveal that board size, company size, leverage and government ownership are significant 
in explaining the quality of corporate voluntary disclosure. 
 
Regarding corporate social responsibility, reporting in Malaysian companies is in its 
infancy compared with other developed countries (Thompson and Zakaria 2004). The 
study suggested that reasons for the poor state of social disclosure are many and varied, 
but essentially the dearth is largely a consequence of a lack of drivers and in particular a 
lack of government and societal pressure to report on social issues. The study is only cross 
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sectional and the robustness of its findings would be improved by extending the empirical 
analysis over a time series. Furthermore, no effort has been made to standardise the page 
and font size either within or between the annual reports. In a similar study, Abreu et al. 
(2005) explored CSR the experience and practice of enterprises in Portugal. Their findings 
showed the relationship between CSR activity and corporate image, cultural differences 
and performance. On balance, the shortcomings of this survey are the sample size [10] and 
the sensitivity of the consequent statistical analysis and inferences. The survey could 
provide some evidence, but this cannot be generalised, without more empirical 
demonstration.  
 
In a comparable study, Gunawan (2007, p. 26) found that the level of CSR reporting in 
Indonesia is 'relatively low'. The most important information on CSR perceived by the 
stakeholders relates to “products” while information about “community” is perceived as 
the least important. However, “community” is considered as the most influential party of 
CSR for the companies. This study provides useful information and describes early 
pictures of CSR practices in Indonesia. However, its findings may be limited because of 
only small samples were investigated and they are not representing the population. The 
study needs to re-test the hypotheses. Another study on Malaysia, Ghazali (2007) provides 
a starting point for understanding the influence of ownership on CSR disclosure. They 
found that there are influences of ownership structure on CSR practices on the Malaysia 
stock market. The sample for this study comes from larger and actively traded stocks on 
the Bursa Malaysia. Thus, the results may not be generalisable to smaller and less actively 
traded stocks. However, his findings appear to suggest that the level of CSR disclosure in 
annual reports of companies depends on the extent of ‘‘public pressure’’ faced by each 
company. The results also raise the question of whether corporate involvement in social 
activities should be made a mandatory disclosure in annual reports. 
 
Some studies try to explain variation in the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure within 
the corporate social disclosure context. For Example, Naser et al. (2006) test the validity 
of theories employed in the literature to explain variation in the extent of corporate 
voluntary disclosure within the corporate social disclosure context under Qatari 
companies. The findings indicate that variations in corporate social disclosure are 
associated with the firm size, business risk and corporate growth. There is no significant 
difference in the level of disclosure achieved by the financial and non-financial 
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companies. Same as Ratanajongkol et al. (2006), for Thai companies over a three-year 
period, emphasised that industry membership strongly influences the key themes of CSR 
disclosures which are increasingly, related to human resources. Environment is the 
dominant theme in the manufacturing sector. One limitation of this study is the short time 
period considered. Moreover, the extent and nature of CSR in annual reports was 
measured according to the number of words disclosed. It is very difficult to measure the 
importance of a particular word. 
 
In an attempt to determine the most successful companies on social responsibility issues 
Dincer and Dincer (2007) conducted a study in Turkey. They collected data from two 
sources: firstly, a survey conducted on consumers and secondly face-to-face interviews. 
However, this should not be taken as an accurate representation of the situation in Turkey 
since these companies are leaders in the field. Although the aim of this study had been to 
examine the future prospects of CSR projects in Turkey, the interviewees did not provide 
give details relating to future projects. It is also impossible to make generalizsations for 
Turkey with the data that was collected from consumers as it was collected only in the 
urban area of Istanbul. Furthermore only five firms are included in the interviews. 
 
In a study, Narwal (2007) highlighted the CSR initiatives taken by the Indian Banking 
Industry, which help them to enhance their overall performance. The findings showed that 
banks have an objective view-point about CSR activities. They are concentrating mainly 
on education, balanced growth, health, environmental marketing and customer satisfaction 
as their core CSR activities. The study was conducted on 33 banks in Northern Haryana. A 
small sample size of a particular sector limits the usefulness of generalising its findings. 
Moreover, whether Libya follows the western capitalist model or has developed its own 
practices for CSR has been scrutinized Pratten and Mashat (2009). Content analysis was 
used to analyze the annual reports. The results suggested that the emphasis on CSR 
disclosure in Libya is different from that to be found in the west. The study used 56 firms 
from manufacturing, service, banking and insurance sectors which limits the application of 
its findings to other sectors. 
 
Attitudinal displays of Kazakhstan companies towards CSR have been analysed by Potluri 
et al. (2010). The study examined CSR towards Kazakh owners or shareholders, 
employees, customers, creditors and suppliers, general public or the community at large 
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and government. A total of four types of questionnaires were used to collect the 
information through informal personal interviews with concerned respondents. They found 
difference of opinions between Kazakh corporate sector and their employees, customers 
and general public on CSR. 
 
Haji (2013) examines CSR disclosures when the business environment, particularly the 
Malaysian environment, experienced several significant financial crises and regulatory 
changes. The results showed that the extent and quality of CSR disclosures is, on average, 
low, with narrative disclosure being the most commonly adopted mode to disclose CSR 
information. The paper considers factors influencing the CSR disclosures before 2006 and 
after 2009 when the changes of 2007 would have affected conditions. However, it would 
be more practical if the study considered a panel data including two years before the major 
reforms and regulatory changes. 
 
The objective of De Villiers and Alexander (2014) is to examine corporate social 
responsibility reporting structures through a comparison of the disclosures in two countries 
with different social issues. Among the thirty comparisons of disclosure patterns, twenty-
nine show no difference, indicating that the same reporting templates are used in CSR 
reporting globally. They examined overall patterns of CSR reporting in diverse settings; 
there remain differences in CSR reporting content at a more detailed level remain. 
Moreover, management intent or company-specific characteristics, such as social and 
environmental performance, do not necessarily drive CSR reporting patterns. However, 
findings may not be generalisable beyond the mining industry. 
 
Concerning environmental reporting, Sumiani et al. (2007), conclude that the level of 
reporting in Malaysian annual reports is relatively low. Interestingly, ISO certification is 
an influential factor on the motivation of environmental disclosures (p. 900). With the 
increase in awareness of environmental issues, the level of environmental disclosure and 
stakeholder demands for environmental information is increasing. 
 
As regards to social and environmental reporting, Rizk et al. (2008) explored corporate 
practices of Egyptian corporate entities. Their random sample found that there are 
significant differences in reporting practices among the members of the nine industry 
segments surveyed. Findings from this study also lend support for the significance of 
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ownership structure on the reporting decision. The study is based on the annual report 
disclosures of corporations in the industrial sector. Hence, the conclusions arrived at 
cannot be generalised to the non-industrial sector. A small sample size further limits its 
findings. In a similar study, Mitchell and Trevor (2009) investigated the businesses within 
a large municipality in South Africa. The authors found no evidence to suggest companies 
would engage in increased external reporting despite measuring and recording significant 
environmental and social data to meet the requirements of legislation or internal 
environmental policy. Purposeful selection was undertaken from the population, selecting 
the three largest companies from each of the business sectors. It has been argued that three 
companies should provide enough understanding about each sector and the forces that 
operate within it. 
 
The interrelationship between corporate governance and corporate disclosure of 
companies has been investigated in a study by Francis et al. (2012). The results indicate 
that although there has been improvement of disclosure practices over the years, the level 
of disclosure in Ghana is only moderate or fair. The study also documents a significant 
positive relationship between the presence of accounting or finance expert(s) on the audit 
committees and corporate disclosure practices. However, the study findings are limited 
due to its small size. A summary of developing countries voluntary reporting prior 
literature is given in Appendix Q. 
 
3.4.3 Voluntary Reporting in Bangladesh: 
The disclosure of voluntary information in corporate annual reports and their determinants 
has attracted considerable attention in the West, but, there has been much less concern in 
developing countries like Bangladesh. Expectations about the responsible role of business 
in society are increasing and the recent research on corporate social responsibility 
discourse shows that there have been developments of a variety of instruments that aim to 
improve, evaluate and communicate socially responsible practices (Golob and Bartlett 
2007).  
 
The concept of CSR and CFR is still very new in Bangladesh. In the developed and 
developing countries reporting corporate social responsibilities is very much emphasised, 
whereas in Bangladesh, it was generally being neglected (Imam 2000).  In recent years 
there is considerable pressure from various agencies for companies to act responsibly and 
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be accountable for the impacts they have on social, political and ecological environments 
(Azim et al. 2011).  
 
Some earlier studies, Chowdhury and Chowdhury (1996) concluded in their study that 
some progressive companies in Bangladesh voluntarily provide some information with 
regard to social and environmental matters. The study of Belal (1997) on green reporting 
practice in Bangladesh observed that out of fifty companies, only three (6%) companies 
made environmental disclosures. However, a later study by Belal et al. (1998) revealed 
that all selected companies disclosed at least some social information. His study showed 
that the highest number of companies disclosed information which fell into employee and 
other categories and the lowest number of companies made ethical disclosures followed by 
environmental disclosures. Belal (1999) also surveyed annual reports of thirty companies 
of Bangladesh of which twenty-eight were listed and two were unlisted. He found that 
90% of the companies studied made some environmental disclosures, 97% made 
employee disclosures and 77% made some ethical disclosures. These studies lack detailed 
findings on the CSR practices in Bangladesh. All of these studies consider small sample 
sizes and single year data. Moreover, they consider a particular aspect, either social 
reporting or environmental reporting. 
 
Early studies provide a largely descriptive account of corporate social disclosure in 
developing countries like Bangladesh. Of them, Uddin et al (1999) found that disclosure as 
well as performance of social responsibility activities had been confined to mainly 
employees’ welfare, contribution to government, operational activities and business 
expansion. However, disclosure or performance in the area of community development, 
human resource development and environment was very low. Similarly, Belal (2001) 
found CSR reporting focus on employee-related disclosures, presence of a unionized labor 
force and responses to the government’s strong emphasis on employee welfare. Over time 
the focus of business reporting has changed as Das and Das (2008) found that companies 
are focusing more on general corporate information, corporate strategy and accounting 
policy and little focus is placed on financial performance, corporate social disclosure and 
corporate governance. The main weakness of these studies is that Imam considers only 
15% of the total listed companies and Das and Das consider only financial institution. 
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Hossain et al. (2004) identified the nature of voluntary disclosure in the annual reports of 
Bangladeshi companies. They conducted a questionnaire survey to find out users’ 
perception on this issue and concluded that Bangladeshi companies are making some 
disclosures on human resource even though this kind of disclosure is not required by any 
regulatory authority. Using the same technique of questionnaire survey, Khan et al. (2004) 
investigated the status of voluntary disclosure on corporate governance through a case 
study on the BEXIMCO group. They found that sample companies make some disclosures 
on corporate governance on a voluntary basis. This is mainly a case study and the result of 
this study cannot be generalised.  
 
As regards to corporate voluntary disclosure, Rouf and Al Harun (2011) also examine the 
association between ownership structure and levels using ninety-four listed companies 
from 2007. The results show that the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively 
associated with a higher management of ownership structure. Furthermore, the extent of 
corporate voluntary disclosures is positively associated with a higher institutional 
ownership structure. In this study ownership structure is separated into management 
ownership and institutional ownership. But in Bangladesh, listed companies ownerships 
are categorised as sponsor, government, foreign, institution and public ownership: these 
distinctions should have been incorporated into the study. 
 
Considering environmental reporting, Imam (2000) studied companies listed in the Dhaka 
Stock Exchange, Bangladesh and concluded that only 22.5% of the sample companies 
provided environmental information in their annual reports. He reported that company size 
is a vital factor behind the voluntary reporting practices in this country. Imam used 40 out 
of 207 listed companies for 1996–1997; this represents 19.30% of companies and failed to 
come to a unified conclusion that is applicable to all listed companies.  Moreover, Hossain 
(2002) conducted a survey of annual reports of 150 listed non-financial companies for the 
year of 1998-99. The study reveals that only 5% of the companies disclosed environmental 
information in their Directors’, Chairman’s or annual reports: not a single company 
disseminated any quantitative information on environmental items. Similarly, Bala and 
Yusuf (2003) found some improvement in environmental reporting: 10.4% companies 
included environmental information in their Directors’ Report or in the Chairman’s 
Statement or elsewhere in their annual reports. Using 249 public limited companies for the 
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year of 2001, they also reported that the information disclosed was qualitative in nature. 
Companies did not follow any specific or standard reporting format.  
 
In a similar study, Khan and Hossain (2003) conducted a very short study on the 
environmental reporting practices of manufacturing companies in Bangladesh. The study 
covered fifteen companies listed from 1999 to 2002. They also found that Bangladeshi 
manufacturing companies are mostly reporting environmental information in a non-
financial manner and this reporting is mainly done in the Directors’ or Chairman’s 
statement in the annual report. Out of these fifteen companies only one company included 
financial reporting: they included ‘environmental expenses’ under the head of 
‘Administrating expenses’ in the financial statements. In another short study, Bose (2006) 
used case studies of eleven Petrobangla companies to examine their environmental 
reporting status. The study found that environment reporting of Petrobangla companies is 
increasing (1998-1999 and 1999-2000 45.45%; 2000-01, 63.63%; 2001-02 and 2002-03, 
81.81%) and the nature of the information disclosed was qualitative and descriptive. 
 
Concerning environmental reporting, Rahman and Muttakin (2005) surveyed 125 
manufacturing companies listed on the Chittagong Stock Exchange of Bangladesh, 
analysing the annual reports for 2003-04 and found that only 4% companies disclosed 
environmental information. The information was descriptive in nature and not 
quantitative. They also report that the disclosure of environmental information was done in 
different places of the annual report and there was no standard environmental reporting 
framework. Moreover, Shil and Iqbal (2005) reported that only 11% companies disclosed 
environmental information. They also focused on 121 manufacturing companies listed on 
the Dhaka Stock Exchange. Both studies consider manufacturing sectors and so their 
findings may not apply to other sectors. 
 
Considering social and environmental disclosure, Hossain et al. (2006) examined 107 non-
finance companies, for the financial year 2002-2003. This study reports that 8.33% 
companies in Bangladesh are making efforts to provide social and environmental 
information on a voluntary basis, which is mostly qualitative in nature. Companies in 
Bangladesh appeared to have the lowest levels of social and environmental disclosure 
which they reported as “very disappointing”. Using a combination of interviews, and 
content analysis of annual reports, Islam and Deegan (2008) describe and explain the 
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social and environmental reporting practices of major garment export companies. The 
result shows that particular stakeholder groups have placed pressure in the Bangladesh 
clothing industry in terms of its social performance. This pressure, which is also directly 
related to the expectations of the global community, in turn drives the industry’s social 
policies and related disclosure practices. 
 
Similarly, Hossain and Anna (2011) explored the enablers of corporate social and 
environmental responsibility (CSER) practices in Bangladesh by seeking the views of 
senior managers of listed companies in Bangladesh. Preliminary findings reveal that the 
enablers of CSER in Bangladesh include: social obligation; regulations, poverty 
alleviation desire; and corporate branding motivation. The primary motivation for 
embracing CSER by the textile sectors appear to stem from powerful stakeholder 
pressures, including that exerted by international buyers. 
 
On the other side, Banerjee and Probal (2009) investigated the use corporate annual 
reports and corporate websites for communicating corporate environmental information by 
the listed companies of Bangladesh. The sample for the study consists of corporate annual 
reports of thirty companies and corporate websites of seventeen companies in Bangladesh. 
The study showed that corporate environmental reporting in Bangladesh is still in its 
infancy, no matter which medium of communication is used. The sample selection process 
mainly limits the findings. They select seventeen company websites which only have 
environmental reporting and thirty annual reports which include those from sixteen out of 
the seventeen companies in the online sample. 
 
To determine the motivational factors for social voluntary disclosure, Belal and Owen 
(2007) conducted a series of interviews with senior corporate managers during 2001-2002. 
They held interviews with 23 Bangladeshi companies representing the multinational, 
domestic and public sector and found that the main factors behind corporate voluntary 
disclosure practices lay in the desire of corporate management to manage powerful 
stakeholder groups. Using the same questionnaire survey, Khan et al. (2009) used twenty 
banking companies, listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange, to investigate the level of users’ 
understanding and their perceptions of CSR reporting. Their study revealed that the 
selected banking companies did some CSR reporting on a voluntary basis and the user 
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groups favored CSR reporting and would like to see more disclosure. However, their study 
used selected banks only and a very small sample size.  
 
Regarding corporate social reporting, Azim et al. (2009) investigated the practices of listed 
companies from Bangladesh. Findings showed that the highest rank in terms of corporate 
social reporting come from companies in the banking sector; three quarters of all 
disclosures are generalised qualitative statements without any attempt at attestation; more 
than half of the disclosures are located in the director's report; the mean space devoted to 
disclosures was less than half a page. Although these provide a snapshot of social 
reporting, they only concentrate on the finance sectors of Bangladesh. In the similar way, 
Momin and Hossain (2011) examined the extent of CSR reporting by subsidiaries of MNC 
in Bangladesh. They suggested that MNC subsidiaries report less social information in 
Bangladesh compared to their parent corporations. However, most prior studies of CSR 
reporting in Bangladesh have been descriptive in nature, and limited to measuring the 
volume of CSR reporting using content analysis. 
 
In a similar study, Muttakin and Khan (2014) investigate the firm and industry 
characteristics that determine corporate social responsibility disclosure practices using 116 
manufacturing firms from 2005 to 2009. They found that CSR disclosure has a positive 
and significant relationship with export-oriented sectors, firm size and types of industries 
while family ownership has negative relationship. They only consider the manufacturing 
sector. In order to contribute to the literature the current study considers all the listed 
companies. In addition, the current study uses corporate governance characteristics to 
measure the motivation of disclosure 
 
In a study, Belal and Cooper (2011) concentrated upon the lack of disclosure on three 
particular eco-justice issues: child labor, equal opportunities and poverty alleviation. They 
examined the underlying motives behind corporate unwillingness to address these issues. 
For this purpose, 23 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with senior corporate 
managers in Bangladesh. They suggest that the main reasons for non-disclosure include 
lack of resources, the profit imperative, lack of legal requirements, a lack of knowledge or 
awareness, poor performance and the fear of bad publicity. 
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Corporate sustainability disclosure practices in Bangladesh were first highlighted by 
Sobhani et al. (2012). They focus on the annual reports and corporate websites of the 
banking industry in Bangladesh and found that all listed banks, to varying degrees, 
practice sustainability disclosure in an unstructured manner in both the annual reports and 
corporate websites. They only consider the banking sector and do not represent the total 
picture across all industry in Bangladesh. Moreover, it is important to highlight that this 
study focuses on sustainability disclosure where, in terms of the issues, coverage is greater 
compared to CSR. Therefore, it may be considered an extension of the same authors’ 
earlier work in the arena of social and environmental disclosure Sobhani et al. (2009). 
 
All the studies discussed above consider single period data except Muttakin and Khan 
(2014), Bose (2006) and Khan and Hossain (2003). Khan and Hossain (2003) used a small 
sample size of fifteen to measure environmental reporting whereas Bose employed a case 
study of Petrobangla. Muttakin and Khan (2014) consider manufacturing firms only. 
Therefore, no previous studies, based on Bangladesh, considered the total number of listed 
firms for the panel data: doing so, will provide a fuller understanding of reporting patterns 
in Bangladesh. Moreover, all the studies discussed above investigate only CSR or CFR or 
sustainability reporting: studies considering the total voluntary disclosure fail to mention 
without mentioning the contribution CSR, CFR and sustainability disclosure. 
 
3.4.4 The Research Gap in Voluntary Reporting: 
Therefore, it is clear that although there have been extensive research work in voluntary 
disclosure around the world; little attention has been paid to general and voluntary 
reporting in Bangladesh. Moreover, the selection of voluntary items varies from country to 
country (Cooke 1991; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Hossain and Reaz 2007). Most of the 
studies concentrated on a specific part of voluntary disclosure. For example Imam (2000), 
Belal (2001), Belal and Owen (2007), Momin and Hossain (2011) focused on social 
performance and Hossain (2002), Bala and Yosuf (2003), Rahman and Muktakin (2005), 
Islam and Deegan (2008) concentrated on environmental reporting. Some of the studies 
used small sample sizes (for example- Rahman and Muktakin 2005, 4%; Belal 2001, 15%; 
Imam 2000, 19.30%; Bose 2006, case study). On the other hand some used only particular 
sectors rather than the total, including Rahman and Muktakin (2005) and Muttakin and 
Khan (2014) manufacturing and Das and Das (2008) concentrated on financial institutions 
only. For these reasons, the current study consider  all the listed companies in Bangladesh 
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and at the same time it covers CSR, CFR and sustainability disclosure under the head of 
voluntary reporting. 
 
Kanto and Schadewitz (1997) indicate that while disclosure literature provides plenty of 
evidence on the determinants of disclosure in accounting reports, relatively few studies 
have focused on the differences between the determinants of mandatory and voluntary 
disclosures. In this study, a separate determinant is selected for determining the quality of 
voluntary disclosure. To broaden the understanding, the current study includes firm 
characteristics and corporate governance characteristics to identify the determinants of 
voluntary reporting. 
 
Although disclosure changes over time, most of the previous disclosure studies 
concentrate on one point in time (e.g. Cooke 1989; Tai et al. 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls 
1994; Hossain et al. 1994 and 1995; Haniffa and Cooke 2002, Ghazali and Weetman 
2006). Therefore, suffering from bias may be one of the criticisms that faces the results of 
these studies (Hossain et al. 1994). A limited number of disclosure studies examine the 
extent of disclosure over a period of time (e.g., Marston and Robson 1997; Watson et al 
2002; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003). However, most of these few studies select only 
two points in time, the first year and the last year of the study period. The reason may be 
the availability of data (Marston and Robson 1997). These studies address the effect of 
specific changes in the business environment such as new regulations. However, by 
adopting a longitudinal approach covering several years and studying the same companies 
over that period, this research hopes to provide more explanations and a clearer view about 
the trend of disclosure practice employed by companies. Marston and Robson (1997) 
indicate that our understanding of disclosure decisions will be enhanced by studying 
disclosure practice over time. Considering the benefits of panel data study and to 
contribute to the literature the current study used panel data from 2004 to 2010. 
 
Previous studies indicated that there was a low level of CSR reporting in Bangladesh. 
There is an implicit aspiration from different stakeholders group that corporate houses 
should spend on societal well-being and they like to look into such information in 
companies’ financial statements. The above contradictory information provide motivation 
for further longtitudinal study on the quality of voluntary reporting practices to determine 
whether it has improved over time. 
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In the case of developing countries, and especially in Bangladesh, there has been no 
attempt to either assess the information needs of users and the extent to which companies 
meet their needs. In order to correct this omission, the voluntary disclosure index will be 
measured through a weighted and unweighted disclosure index: weight is measured 
through a questionnaire from academics, professional accountants and accounting 
personnel from different institutions and the users of financial statements. In the case of 
sustainability reporting, very few researchers concentrated on Bangladesh. So, there is a 
gap in the research literature concerning corporate sustainability reporting in Bangladesh. 
In order to fill the gap, the current study highlights CSR, CFR and sustainability reporting 
under the categories of voluntary reporting.  
 
3.5 Empirical Model 3: Timeliness of Reporting 
Corporate reporting is generally directed at providing information which will assist the 
user in decision making. Establishing the confidence of investors requires reliable and 
timely accounting information. In developing capital markets, the audited financial 
statements in the annual report are likely to be the only reliable source of information 
available to the market (Leventis et al. 2005). Timeliness of financial reporting, an 
important qualitative characteristic of accounting information, has received much attention 
from regulatory and professional bodies (Al-Ajmi 2008; Soltani 2002; Knechel and Payne 
2001).  
 
Timely reporting contributes to the prompt and efficient performance of stock markets in 
their pricing and evaluation functions. Timely reporting helps to mitigate or reduce the 
level of insider trading, leaks and rumors in the market (Owusu-Ansah 2000). As a result, 
most stock exchanges in the world demand from their listed companies the prompt release 
of audited financial reports to the markets. Moreover, timely reporting is a function of 
audit-related and company-specific factors. Audit-related factors are those that are likely 
to impede or help the auditor in carrying out the audit assignment and issuing the audit 
report promptly. In contrast, company-specific factors are those that either enable 
management to produce a more timely annual report or reduce costs associated with undue 
delay in reporting. 
 
Prior research has studied the audit report lag in the US (Givoly and Palmon 1982; Ashton 
et al. 1987; Bamber et al. 1993; Kinney and McDaniel 1993; Schwartz and Soo 1996; 
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Henderson and Kaplan 2000; Knechel and Payne 2001), Canada (Newton and Ashton 
1989; Ashton et al. 1989), Australia (Davies and Whittred 1980), New Zealand (Courtis 
1976; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991) and France (Soltani 2002). The few studies that could be 
regarded as exploring emerging or developing capital markets relate to Hong Kong (Ng 
and Tai 1994; Jaggi and Tsui 1999), Zimbabwe (Owusu-Ansah 2000), Bahrain (Abdulla 
1996) and Pakistan (Hossain and Taylor 1998). In general these studies use public domain 
data; exceptions are Ashton et al. (1987) and Knechel and Payne (2001) who was given 
access to audit firms’ data. 
 
The issue of the audit delay is important because, the informative value of audited 
financial statements decreases proportionately to the number of days it takes to obtain 
audit report signatures: users will seek information from alternate resources (Knechel and 
Payne 2001). Moreover, audit delay adversely affects the timeliness of financial reporting 
(Ashton et al. 1987). The effect of audit delay on investors’ decisions has motivated 
numerous researchers to investigate factors affecting that delay. Most studies have focused 
on markets in large developed countries such as the United State, Canada, Australia, Hong 
Kong, New Zealand, and China (Courtis 1976; Gilling 1977; Davis and Whiltred 1980; 
Garsombke, 1981; Ashton et al. 1987; Ashton et al. 1989; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; Ng 
and Tai 1994; Simnett et al. 1995; Jaggi and Tsui 1999; Wang and Song 2006). 
 
Research on financial reporting timeliness span most regions. There are a  number of 
studies the issue of timeliness in the United States (Ashton et al. 1987; Payne and Jensen 
2002), in Canada (Ashton et al. 1989), in Bahrain (Abdulla 1996), in Bangladesh (Karim 
et al. 2005), in France (Soltani 2002), in Saudi Arabia (Almosa and Alabbas 2008), in 
Greece (Owunsu-Ansah and Leventis 2006), in Malaysia (Che-Ahmad and Abidin 2008;  
Ismail and Chandler 2004; Ahmad and Kamarudin 2005 and Mohd Naimi et al. 2010), in 
Egypt (Afify 2009), in Singapore (Sharma et al. 2007) and in China (Firth et al. 2009). 
This activity shows that financial reporting timeliness is of great concern whether in 
developed or developing countries. The motivation for this study is derived from a long-
standing problem of a lack of timely provision of corporate financial information in 
Bangladesh. 
 
 
 
 - 98 - 
3.5.1 Prior Studies in Developed Countries: 
Ashton et al. (1987) for the US, Ashton et al. (1989) for the Canada and Simnett et al. 
(1995) for Australia reported empirical evidence for certain determinants of audit delay, 
defined as the length of time from a company’s fiscal year-end to the date of the auditor’s 
report. All three studies used variables that describe companies, their auditors, and the 
various types of interaction between these parties. They showed that audit delay is 
significantly longer in the case of companies that receive qualified audit opinions. 
Additionally, Simnett et al. showed that it is not only the issuing of a qualification, but 
also the type of qualification, that affects audit delay. Besides this, Simnett et al. indicate 
that variables representing audit complexity, debt/equity position, extraordinary items, 
audit technology, and the Big Eight–non-Big Eight status of the auditor had little or no 
impact on audit delay. All three studies consider more or less same perspective in different 
countries and they only consider audit delay. 
 
Furthermore, Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) investigates variables affecting audit delay, 
using seven variables employed by Ashton et al. (1989), adding company ownership and 
debt proportion, The R
2
 level calculated in this study exceeded the level reported by 
Ashton et al. (1989), indicating more association between the variables and audit delay. 
On the other hand, Leventis et al. (2005) explored the audit report lag of companies listed 
on the Athens Stock Exchange at the time of its transition from an emerging market to a 
newly developed capital market. The results suggest that audit report lag is reduced by 
appointing an international audit firm or paying a premium audit fee, but is extended by 
aspects of potentially bad news. This results contradicts Simnett et al, who found big eight 
and non big eight status of auditors had little or no impact. 
 
Ng and Tai (1994) and Jaggi and Tsui (1999) scrutinise the effect of company specific 
characteristics on audit delay in Hong Kong. Following mainly Ashton et al. (1989) and 
Carslaw and Kaplan (1991), Ng and Tai (1994) observe, in both 1990 and 1991, that 
company size and the degree of diversification are significantly associated with audit 
delay:
 
extraordinary items and financial year-end affected only one year
.
 Jaggi and Tsui 
(1999) enlarge Ng and Tai (1994) by integrating the firm’s financial condition, ownership 
control and audit firm technology. Findings of their study suggest that longer audit 
processes are associated with the structured audit approach and the need to ensure the 
reliability of audit opinion as well as the proper documentation of audit results.  
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Al-Ghanem and Hegazy (2011) investigate the factors that affect delays in the signing of 
audit reports. Major limitations of the study are that it only considers two years’ data and 
concentrated only on company characteristics rather than corporate governance 
characteristics or audit related factors. Although, timeliness remains unexplored in non-
profit settings, Reheul et al. (2013) adds to the recent and rapidly growing literature on 
financial reporting and auditing by examining audit report lag among a large sample of 
Belgian non-profit organization. The study itself suffers from the generalisation of 
findings regarding audit report lag by considering only non-profit sector. However, their 
findings are important in a sense that audit report lag decreases after two years following 
the introduction of new legal obligations.  
 
Most of the studies relating to developed countries only consider the audit lag. But audit 
lag is only a part of total reporting and more specially the timeliness of reporting. So, the 
current study focuses on audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag to fill the gap in 
the literature and identify the time required for audited reports to be submitted to the 
annual general meeting. Studies in the various countries show differences in respect of 
periods, methodology, variables introduced and conclusions obtained. In this section, 
reference is made to some of those research studies, with the object of establishing 
similarities and differences.  A summary of timeliness of reporting in developed countries 
prior literature is given in appendix Q.  
 
3.5.2 Prior Studies in Developing Countries: 
Non-compliance and poor timeliness in annual report publishing is more concentrated in 
developing countries. For this reason, most of the research on timeliness concentrated on 
developing countries. In this part, the study critically analyses some of the previous work 
relating to timeliness of reporting in developing countries. A summary of the study is also 
given in Appendix Q.  
 
Regarding audit delay, Hossain and Taylor (1998) examined the relationship with several 
company characteristics in Pakistan. Their evidence suggests that timeliness may not be an 
important concern for Pakistani companies in financial reporting policy. With regard to 
timeliness as a qualitative objective of financial statements, this evidence can be regarded 
as unsatisfactory. This study only considers non-financial companies for one year’s data. 
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Moreover, it only focuses on audit delay and used company a characteristic that limits a 
wider application of its findings. 
 
Examining the determinants of audit delay of listed companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock 
Exchange, Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) found that non-financial industry, audit opinion, 
financial year-end, non–Big Five firm, negative earnings, and higher risk significantly 
affect audit delay. However they limit their study to audit delay alone. In a similar study, 
Owusu-Ansah and Leventis (2006) empirically investigated the factors that affect timely 
financial reporting practices of companies listed on the Athens Stock Exchange. They 
found that companies in the construction sector, companies whose audit reports were 
qualified and companies that had a greater proportion of their equity shares directly and 
indirectly held by insiders do not promptly release their audited financial statements. They 
used non financial company's data to determine financial reporting lag avoiding audit lag 
and preliminary lag. 
 
In a study, Prabandari and Rustiana (2007) examined the factors affecting the audit delay 
of listed financial firms at the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE). They found earnings or 
revenue affect audit delay which is similar to the findings of previous studies but audit 
opinion is non-significant which contradicts Owusu-Ansah and Leventis (2006) and 
Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003). They also limit their study by employing financing firm's 
data to measure audit delay for a shorter period from 2002 to 2004.  In another study, Che-
Ahmad and Abidin (2008) extend the research of Ahmad and Kamaruddin (2003) by 
including another three variables which include the number of subsidiaries, change of 
auditor, and ratio of inventory: the only significant variable was the number of subsidiaries 
a company had. Their analysis model is replicated and extended by Carslaw and Kaplan 
(1991) and follows only one year’s data. The study found that delays were much more 
common than in developed countries such as U.S.A, Canada and New Zealand. The results 
on significant variables in this study are consistent with studies in Western countries. 
 
Regarding the impact of CG characteristics on audit report lag, Afify (2009) examined in 
listed companies of Egyptian companies. He found that the maximum and mean score 
number of days to complete and submit the annual report was 115 days and 67 days 
respectively. The study includes explanatory variables relating to CG characteristics, 
which have not previously been considered: these may shed more light on the structure 
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and dynamics of the audit report lag. In another study, Tauringana et al. (2008) 
investigated the association between corporate governance mechanisms, dual language 
reporting and the timeliness of annual reports of companies listed on the Nairobi Stock 
Exchange. The result showed that the average time taken to publish the report in 2005 was 
74.50 days and was 76.47 days in 2006. The study posits that dual reporting will increase 
the time taken to produce the annual report. However, dual reporting is not suitable for all 
countries where there is only one official language. Moreover, this research is limited as it 
only considers thirty-six companies for two years’ data.  
 
In order to measure the effect of the Malaysian’s code of corporate governance, 
Mohamad-Nor et al. (2010) examined audit report lag in Malaysian public listed 
companies. The result of this study suggests that more emphasis should be given to 
strengthening the independence and expertise of the audit committee. The study measures 
the effect of the code in 2001 by using data from 2002. It would be more practical if the 
study showed the audit lag position before and after the code. Moreover, it would more 
justifiable if the study also considers 2003 and data from a later period: it takes more than 
a year for some companies to adopt and maintain the standards set out within the code 
(Reheul et al. 2013). 
 
In the same way, following Tauringana et al. and Afify, Hashim and Abdul Rahman 
(2011) used corporate governance mechanisms and examined the audit report lag. They 
found that reporting among listed companies in Malaysia is relatively better compared to 
results found in previous studies by Che-Ahmad and Abidin (2008) and Ahmad and 
Kamarudin (2003). There are significant negative relationships between board diligence 
and audit report lag. However, they could not provide any evidence concerning the link 
between board independence, board expertise and CEO duality on audit report lag. This 
indicates corporate governance characteristics are not significant for audit lag.  In a similar 
study, Apadore and Noor (2013) analyse the relation between corporate governance 
characteristics and audit report lag. They consider 180 companies chosen randomly from 
843 companies, which lack the generalizations of findings. However, the results show that 
on average, the companies took around 100 days to complete their audit report. They also 
found that with few exceptions, Malaysian companies comply with listing requirement. 
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Regarding timeliness of annual reporting, Owusu-Ansah (2000) investigated non-financial 
companies listed on the Zimbabwe Stock Exchange (ZSE). The empirical data indicate 
that audit reporting lead time is significantly associated with the timeliness with which 
sample companies release their preliminary annual earnings announcement, but not with 
the timeliness of their audited annual reports. These findings need testing for their 
relevance for other developing country. However, the results of this study should not be 
generalised to financial companies listed on the ZSE. In addition, the study investigates 
the timeliness of reporting at a particular year rather than over a period. Elsewhere, Al-
Ajmi (2008) studied the effect of seven variables on timeliness in a sample of 231 
financial and non-financial firms listed on the Bahrain Stock Exchange over the period 
1992–2006. He found company size; profitability and leverage had significant effects on 
audit lag but not in preliminary lag and reporting lag: this indicates that some determinants 
may affect a particular part of reporting but not all areas of reporting. 
 
Moreover, Iyoha (2012) examined the impact of company attributes on the timeliness of 
financial reports in Nigeria. However the study suffers from a number of limitations: it 
uses a small sample size and only considers total reporting lag. Findings in the literature 
add that reporting lag is reduced by the existence and enforcement of rules and regulations 
of regulatory bodies: this encourages current study to measure the effect of the corporate 
governance code of 2006 on reporting of timeliness.  
 
Almost all the study discussed above considers either audit delay or reporting delay except 
Owusu-Ansah (2000) and Al-Ajmi (2008). These studies consider audit lag, preliminary 
lag and total reporting lag. However, Owusu-Ansah narrows their focus by selecting non 
financial companies only. To obtain a detailed overview of timeliness of a particular 
country, it is necessary to consider all the components (audit lag, preliminary lag and total 
reporting lag) as well as all sectors of the country. Like other studies discussed above 
Owusu-Ansah (2000) only give attention to a particular year rather than behavior over a 
period of time. Bearing in mind these limitations, the current study considers audit lag, 
preliminary lag and total reporting lag for listed companies over the period of 2004-2010. 
 
3.5.3 Timeliness of Reporting in Bangladesh: 
Timeliness of reporting and its determinants has attracted considerable attention in 
developing countries, but, there has been much less concern in Bangladesh. Karim (1995) 
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revealed that the financial reporting environment in Bangladesh is characterised by a lack 
of transparency, adequacy, reliability, and timeliness. In Bangladesh, the first study on 
timeliness was carried out by Imam et al. (2001). They conducted a study on 115 listed 
companies for the year 1998. They examined the association between audit delay and an 
audit firm's association with international firms. The results found average audit delay 
stood at 5.86 months with a standard deviation of 2.56. Moreover, audit firms associated 
with international firms have longer audit delays. 
 
In a similar study, Ahmed (2003) reports long delays in reporting to shareholders in the 
three South Asian countries India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Using a sample of 115 annual 
reports for the year 1998, Ahmed finds that the total lag between the financial year end 
and holding the annual general meeting is 179 days. In Bangladesh, Ahmed did not find 
any association between corporate characteristics and timely reporting. Both Imam et al 
and Ahmed consider the same sample size, collect data from the same year, 1998 but their 
findings are contradictory. Imam found an average audit delay of 5.86 months, or 
approximately 176 days where as Ahmed found a total reporting lag of 179 days. 
Generally, this situation is impractical as the company needs to send their annual report to 
shareholder fourteen days before the AGM. It may be due to the different companies used 
in the studies’ samples: there is scope for further study.  
 
Considering only audit delay, Karim and Jamal (2005) investigate the impact of regulatory 
change on timeliness of financial reporting. For this purpose, the study considers the year 
immediately preceding the regulatory change and the year two years after the change: 
these are examined using observations of 1999 and 2001, and then using the observation 
from 1999 and 2003. The results showed that audit delays could be reduced by the 
regulatory change. Long  audit delay is one  of  the  main  causes  behind  the chronic  
delay  observed  in  issuing  financial  statements  to shareholders. On the other hand, 
Karim et al. (2006), considering all the parts of timeliness of reporting found no 
improvement after regulatory changes, as measured by audit lag, issue lag and total lag. 
The average audit lag is 156 days, preliminary lag is 187 days and total lag is 218 days for 
all listed companies that published annual reports during the period 1990 to 1999. 
However, the study used fifty-seven companies for each of the ten years. Their findings 
contradict with other recent studies; Reheul et al. (2013) and Iyoha (2012), and previous 
studies in Bangladesh (Karim and Jamal 2005) all conclude that enforcement of laws and 
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regulations reduce the lag time of reporting: again this is an area that would benefit for 
further study.  
 
3.5.4 Research Gap in Timeliness of Reporting: 
The motivation for this study derives from: a longstanding problem with achieving of 
timely provision and of a lack of studies measuring the timeliness of reporting quality in 
Bangladesh. The few studies that have been done so, relating to Bangladesh is no longer 
valid. Moreover, upon reviewing the literature, it would of seem that some of variables 
that have of been tested in previous studies can be re-examined the future studies of 
reporting lag. This is because over the years, the trend and characteristics may change and 
will give significantly different significant results. 
 
The current study will contribute to the literature and reveal whether the timeliness of 
reporting is changing over time or not. As the study considers audit lag, preliminary lag 
and reporting lag, it helps to identify the cause of delay. In addition, determinants will help 
to identify the factors affecting the timeliness in total and its categories. 
 
3.6 Conclusion:  
Reviews of voluntary reporting in Bangladesh have revealed that interest in social and 
environmental disclosure by corporations is increasing, although the level of reporting is 
still poor compared to that in developed countries (Akhtaruddin 2005; Belal 2008; Belal 
and Owen 2007; Islam and Deegan 2008; Sobhani et al. 2009). Sobhani et al. (2009) 
concluded that although the disclosure level appeared to have increased over the last ten 
years, the quality of disclosure was poor. Belal and Roberts (2010) suggested that 
mandatory CSR reporting through regulation was preferred by stakeholders in Bangladesh, 
although the authors believed that the imposition of social accounting standards without 
consideration of the important socio-economic context of Bangladesh would lead to 
unintended consequences.  
 
Developing countries, including Bangladesh, are lagging far behind in sustainability 
research. Although a significant amount of theoretical and empirical research on corporate 
social and environmental reporting has been conducted, excluding Sobhani et al (2009), 
there is a lack of research on sustainability disclosure in Bangladesh. Previous authors 
including Belal (2001), Belal and Owen (2007), Imam (2000), Islam and Deegan (2008) 
and Belal and Cooper (2011) are the main contributors to Social and Environmental 
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Accounting research in this country. The studies of Belal (1999, 2001) and Imam (2000) 
were mostly limited to an overview of social and environmental disclosure practices in 
corporate bodies.  
 
The majority of disclosure studies cover a single point of time, which may just be one 
single year. Other studies address disclosure over two points of time in order to assess the 
extent of disclosure. However, a longitudinal study on a yearly basis that can trace 
disclosure practices over a number of years may help to provide more explanation as to 
how disclosure practices evolve over time. In addition, it will help trace the trends of 
disclosure and the impact of culture and corporate governance against the backdrop of 
social and economic development in the country (Haniffa and Cooke 2005). 
 
The current study tries to contribute to disclosure literature and corporate governance 
literature through examining the mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of disclosure 
practices in the corporate annual reports of Bangladeshi listed companies. The study is 
cover seven years that witnessed increasing awareness of corporate governance and 
transparency: in addition this period saw the introduction of a number of initiatives 
including of the code of corporate governance. 
 
Financial reports in their present form might become obsolete as users decided 
individually on the types of information that are important to them (Baker and Philip 
2000). However, there has been no attempt to either assess the information needs of users 
and the extent to which companies meet their needs; additionally there has been no 
attempt to or measure disclosure quality longitudinally and to determine whether it has 
improved over time. In order to do this the present study uses questionnaire survey in 
voluntary reporting and uses panel data for 2004 to 2010 for all empirical models. 
 
A literature review is justifiable because on the basis of that current study can find the 
research gap, focus the research area and select the methodology suitable for the study. 
Moreover, of the literature review can help to justify the hypotheses of the current study. 
So on the basis of current literature review, the methodology will be selected in chapter 5 
and hypotheses will be examined in chapter 6, 7 and 8. 
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Chapter 4: Theoretical Framework 
4.1 Introduction: 
The purpose of a theoretical framework is to understand the financial reporting and 
disclosure practices and the reasons behind non-disclosure. According to Haniffa (1999) 
these theories seem to be unclear in the sense that all of them are logical and acceptable 
but none could be nominated as the best theory to explain corporate reporting and 
disclosure practice. When explaining why particular disclosures are made, or in describing 
how organisations should make particular disclosures, reference is made to a particular 
theoretical perspective. As there is no perfect theory for social and environmental 
accounting, there is much variation in the theoretical perspectives being adopted (Deegan 
2010). 
 
However, theories enable us to understand in general terms how the world works, to move 
around mentally, among the objects and relationships to which the theories relate, and to 
act in ways that, as far as we can tell, will not defeat our reasonable expectations. A theory 
will not tell us what to do; but it will tell us what it is possible to do and what is not 
possible to do. In that way it removes countless things from consideration when we are 
confronted with the necessity of choosing or acting (Chambers 1996 as cited in Iskander 
2008). 
 
The aim of this chapter is to provide critical analysis of the most used theories employed 
in the corporate reporting literature to achieve three main objectives: 
1. Give a general idea of different theoretical perspectives.  
2. Offer a critical evaluation of the various theoretical perspectives adopted in explaining 
the corporate reporting phenomenon. 
3. Choose the appropriate theoretical base for the three empirical models of this study, 
measuring the quality of corporate financial reporting.  
 
In the context of disclosure, as an accounting topic, clearly the literature employs several 
theories as guidance in explaining disclosure practices. There is no comprehensive theory 
of reporting and more work is suggested and called for to understand reporting practices 
(Hopwood 2000; Healy and Palepu 2001; Verrecchia 2001). It is argued that corporate 
reporting does not have an accepted theoretical base or commonly accepted paradigm as 
yet (Parum 2005). Although there are marked differences between the various theoretical 
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frameworks, as they each attempt to analyse the same problems but from different 
perspectives, they do share significant features (Solomon 2007). In corporate reporting 
literature, agency theory and stakeholder theory are the dominant theories. Mueller (2006), 
points out that central to any discussion of corporate reporting is the question of how well 
a particular set of institutions mitigates the various principal agent problems that arise in a 
firm. However, Haniffa and Cooke (2005) used legitimacy theory to address the potential 
effects of corporate governance and culture on social disclosure. 
  
In attempting to provide a theoretical underpinning and a link between disclosure and 
company characteristics, researchers developed different theoretical approaches based on 
the disclosure situations being investigated (Haniffa 1999). As the study seeks to measure 
quality through mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting, 
different relevant theories are presented under the heading of Relevant Theories of 
Corporate Reporting in section 4.2 and the relationship among theoretical framework i.e., 
integrating the concepts among the theories, is presented in section 4.3. Section 4.4 
represents the theoretical framework of the study and the rationale behind the chosen 
theoretical base for the current study. Finally, a summary and conclusion will be presented 
in section 4.4. 
 
4.2 Relevant Theories of Corporate Reporting: 
According to Gray et al. (1995), there is a lack of any agreed theoretical perspective to 
explain reporting activities. However, there are several possible explanations regarding 
why organisation do, or do not, engage in corporate reporting: the two most obvious being, 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. Other theories which are used to explain 
reporting are agency theory and signalling theory. The perspectives of the legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory are seen to be consistent and build on the assumptions of the 
political economy perspective (Deegan 2010; Gray et al. 1996). Legitimacy theory and 
stakeholder theory are two theories referred to as system-oriented theories. Watson et al. 
(2002) suggest that the important advantages of voluntary reporting by the firms for both 
firms and managers are explained by three main theoretical theories: legitimacy theory, 
signalling theory, and agency theory. 
 
The majority of literature does not refer to any theory at all, while those studies adopting 
or at least considering a theory show a preoccupation with stakeholder theory (e.g., Belal 
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and Roberts 2010; Parsa and Kouhy 2008; Reynolds and Yuthas 2008), legitimacy theory 
(e.g., Criado- Jiménez et al. 2008; De Villiers and Van Staden 2006; Haniffa and Cooke 
2005), and to a certain extent also institutional theory (e.g., Fortanier et al. 2011 and Chen 
and Bouvain 2009. Agency theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory, signalling 
theory, institutional theory, and political economy theory, will explain in the following 
sections to choose a theoretical framework for the study.  
 
4.2.1 Agency Theory: 
Agency theory was developed by Berle and Means (1932) for a corporate setting with a 
clear separation between ownership and control. Its central issue is how to resolve the 
conflict between owners, managers, and debt holders over the control of corporate   
resources through the use of contracts (Simerly and Li 2000). Agency theory helps to 
explain why a diversity of accounting practices exists. Moreover, agency theory provides a 
necessary explanation of why the selection of particular accounting methods would affect 
the organisation, and hence is an important facet in the development of positive 
accounting theory (Deegan 2010). 
 
According to Deegan and Samkin (2009, p. 71), agency theory is based on the central 
assumption of economics that “. . .all individual action is driven by self-interest and that 
individuals will act in an opportunistic manner to increase their wealth”. Agency theory 
assumes that both the principal and the agent are utility maximisers and the interests of 
both parties might not be aligned (Berle and Means 1932; Jensen and Meckling 1976). The 
two assumptions indicate that both the principal and the agent have their own interests and 
they seek to maximize their individual utility, which is likely to result in conflicts between 
them, referred to as “the agency problem”. The agency problem could not be avoided 
unless both parties share the same interests completely. 
 
Traditionally, research into corporate governance has adopted an agency theory approach, 
focusing exclusively on resolving conflicts of interest or agency problems between 
corporate management and the shareholder (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Fama 1980; Fama 
and Jensen 1983; Eisenhardt 1989). Jensen and Meckling (1976) emphasised that the 
agency theory shows the contract between principal and agent. By means of this contract, 
the principal will delegate the authority to the agent to make different decisions on the 
behalf of this principal. Using the terms of agency theory, there is a contract between the 
 - 110 - 
shareholders (principal) and the management (agent) regarding managing and operating 
the organisation on their behalf. Moreover, there is another network of contracts between 
the shareholders (principal) and the auditor (agent) regarding controlling and auditing the 
disclosures of the management about the organisation's performance. 
 
Agency theory may explain why managers voluntarily disclose information (Chow and 
Wong-Boren 1987; Cooke 1989, 1991, 1992; Firth 1980; Hossain et al. 1994). 
Shareholders will seek to control managers' behaviour through bonding and monitoring 
activities. Therefore, managers may have an incentive to communicate with and convince 
shareholders. By disclosing more information, companies attempt to reduce cost of capital 
by reducing investor uncertainty (Ball and Foster 1982; Watson et al. 2002). Moreover, 
agency theory indicates that managers will disclose social information if it increases their 
welfare, while the benefits of this disclosure outweigh its associated costs (Ness and Mirza 
1991).Theory predicts that agency costs will vary with different corporate characteristics, 
such as size, leverage and listing status.  
 
As a result of the separation between ownership and management or control, agency 
theory has been used to explain the relationships within organisations that create 
uncertainty amongst their stakeholders due to various information asymmetries (Deegan 
2010). Such relationships involve the delegation of some decision making authority to 
managers (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Therefore, managers have power to use the 
resources and they consequently have access to all information about the company. On the 
other hand owners, resources providers, have the power to hire managers and need 
information to evaluate performance. As such, there is a problem of information 
asymmetry. So, the theory indicates that there is an interest conflict, or lack of goal 
congruence between agent (managers) and the principal (owners); agents may take 
decisions that maximize their benefits but not necessarily maximize the benefits of 
owners. Such conflict requires a number of mechanisms to measure and monitor the 
agent's behavior (Abdel-Fattah 2008) not because agents are universally selfish, but 
because it is difficult for principals to know when this occurs and when it does not. 
Furthermore, agents may interpret what is best for the organisation in a manner that differs 
from that of a principal. 
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It is widely accepted that disclosing more information may improve the quality of the 
annual report (Healy and Palepu 2001; and Watson et al. 2002). Given that managers aim 
to reduce agency costs using disclosure, the agency theory can explain why managers wish 
to improve their disclosure quality. But, Moldoveanu and Martin (2001) identify two kinds 
of managerial failures that restrict the agent from acting perfectly towards the principals 
(shareholders). Firstly, failures of managerial competence related to unwitting mistakes in 
the discharge of managerial control. Secondly, failures of managerial integrity related to 
willful behaviors on the part of managers having a negative impact on the value of firm's 
assets. 
 
Since agency relationships suffer from the problems of conflict of interest and information 
asymmetry, an optimal solution needs to be discovered to control such problems. Healy 
and Palepu (2001, p. 409) outline several solutions to the agency problem. Firstly, 
appropriate contractual incentives must be developed to reduce conflict of interests. 
Secondly, the monitoring function of the board of directors must be effective in observing 
and controlling managerial behavior on behalf of the shareholders. Finally, capital market 
players, including financial analysts and rating agencies, must accept responsibility and act 
as whistleblowers, in the case of any wrongdoing.  
 
Given that disclosure is effective in limiting agency cost (Huang and Zhang 2008), agency 
theory has been widely used in the literature to explain variations in disclosure quality that 
are due to managerial disclosure decisions. Within agency theory, disclosure quality is 
viewed as one form of monitoring mechanism used by investors. It has the potential to 
reduce of information asymmetry between an agent and the managers and may, therefore, 
be effective in lowering agency cost in the firms (e.g. Jensen and Meckling 1976; Huang 
and Zhang 2008; Junker 2005). In other words, disclosure is recognised as one of the 
possible solutions to the agency problem (Eng and Mak 2003). Well informed investors 
are expected to scrutinise firms on the basis of the information provided to them and this 
subsequently reduces the agency cost (Junker 2005; Huang and Zhang 2008). 
 
Critics of agency theory have argued that the theory lacks validity outside a specific social 
context. Specifically, they contend that agency theory relies on an assumption of self-
interested agents who seek to maximize personal economic wealth while minimizing 
personal effort (Bruce et al. 2005; Davis et al. 1997; Lubatkin et al. 2007). Thus, their 
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view of agency theory is that it applies only to settings in which agents (and possibly 
principals) hold little regard for others and have little compunction when it comes to 
avoiding one’s responsibilities (Davis et al. 1997). Also, agency theory doesn't take into 
consideration corporate environments that have no discernible separation between 
ownership and control, nor does it consider that managers might have to make choices 
from a perspective other than maximizing wealth for stockholders (Rahman et al. 2010). 
Moreover, agency theory ignores the fact that managers have significant motives to 
conceal adverse information or artificially enlarge the firm's short term results (Vlachos 
2001; Ghazali 2004). 
 
Agency costs stem from the assumption that the two parties, agents and principals, have 
different interests. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), the separation of the 
ownership and management that occurs between the principal and the agent results in a 
variety of agency problems and different agency costs including monitoring costs, bonding 
costs, and residual loss. 
 
Monitoring costs are paid by the principals, shareholders, to limit the agents’ aberrant 
activities (Fama and Jensen 1983). The monitoring process is restricted to certain groups 
(Denis et al. 1997). At the same time, the monitoring process must have the necessary 
expertise and incentives to monitor the management, and provide a credible thread to 
management's control of the company. Therefore, the cost of undertaking an audit is 
referred to as a monitoring cost (Deegan 2010). However, too much monitoring would 
results in constricting the managerial initiative (Burkat et al. 1997). 
 
Bonding costs are paid to guarantee that no harm of the principal’s interests will result 
from their decisions and actions. Agents need to disclose additional information to show 
their shareholders that they are acting in a satisfactory behavior that coincides with their 
interests. Moreover, managers have an obligation to prepare financial statements. This is 
costly, and referred in positive accounting theory as a bonding cost (Deegan 2010). 
Moreover, the agents would accept bearing the bonding costs in order to reduce 
monitoring costs (McColgan 2001). As it is impractical to satisfy all the request of the 
shareholders, there would not be a perfect bonding contract that satisfies all their needs 
(Denis 2001). 
 
 - 113 - 
Residual loss occurs when decisions of the agents diverge from decisions that would 
maximize the principal’s welfare. The existence of the residual or agency loss is due to the 
existence of the monitoring costs and bonding costs and the imbalance between them 
(Iskander 2008). That means the failure agent to satisfy the needs of the shareholders 
regarding monitoring the agent's performance and so the agency contract is imperfectly 
satisfied (McColgan 2001). 
 
The agency relationship leads to the information asymmetry problem due to the fact that 
managers have greater access to information than shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Optimal contracts is one of the means of mitigating the agency problem as it helps 
in bringing shareholders’ interests in line with managers’ interests (Healy and Palepu 
2001). In addition, voluntary disclosure is another means of mitigating the agency 
problem, where managers disclose more voluntary information, reducing the agency costs 
(Barako et al. 2006): it can also convince the external users that managers are acting in an 
optimal way (Watson et al. 2002). Finally, regulations are another means of mitigating the 
agency problem as they require managers to fully disclose private information (Healy and 
Palepu 2001). However, full disclosure is never guaranteed even in the presence of 
regulations (Al-Razeen and Karbhari 2004). The absence of full disclosure is explained by 
the conflict that exists between the interests of managers and shareholders (Lev and 
Penman 1990; Samuels 1990). In addition, corporate reporting regulations are intended to 
provide investors with the minimum quantity of information that helps in the decision-
making process (Al-Razeen and Karbhari 2004). 
 
The implications of this theory have given rise to several hypotheses. Among others, the 
size hypothesis, gearing hypothesis, listing status hypothesis, auditor size and ownership 
hypothesis which will all be discussed in chapter five under the development of 
hypotheses for the current study. Agency cost tends to increase with firm size (Hossain et 
al. 1995). As disclosure can reduce monitoring costs, a significant agency cost, one would 
expect to find greater disclosure among large firms relative to small firms. Francis and 
Wilson (1988) argue that company size may proxy for agency costs since, in general, as a 
company’s size increases so do its agency costs. The existence of a positive relationship 
between auditor size and disclosure has been explained on the basis of agency costs.  
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Agency theory also predicts that managers of companies whose ownership if diffuse have 
an incentive to disclose more information to assist shareholders in monitoring their 
behaviour (Raffournier 1995). In addition, agency theory explains that the potentials for 
wealth transfer from fixed claimants to residual claimants increase with leverage (Jesen 
and Mecking 1976; Myers 1977 and Watts 1997) suggesting that highly leveraged 
companies would disclose more information in order to satisfy the needs of debenture 
holders and trustees. Finally, Cookie (1989) argues that agency cost increases as 
shareholder become more remote from management. Due to greater separation between 
owners and managers, Z category companies are likely to incur higher agency cost such as 
monitoring costs. 
 
4.2.1.1 Evaluation of Agency Theory: 
Although agency theory has been widely used in disclosure literature, a number of authors 
criticise the assumption that individuals act in self- interest to maximise their benefits and 
suggest that there are internal and external pressures that direct the performance of 
managers to serve the interests of owners in addition to their interests (Fama 1980; 
Eisenhardt 1989; Ashton 1991). Moreover, agency theory ignores the fact that managers 
have significant motivation to conceal adverse information or artificially enlarge the firm's 
short term results in order to maximise benefits related to these short term results (Vlachos 
2001; Ghazali 2004). Coffee (1984) pointed out that agency theory ignores the fact that 
some managers have strong incentives to withhold positive information. It is the incentive 
problems that are at the heart of agency theory. Again, agency theory does not assume that 
individuals will ever act other than in self-interest, and the key to a well functioning 
organisation is to put in place mechanisms that ensure that actions that benefit the 
individual also benefit the organisation. On the other hand, Crowther and Jatana (2005) 
argue that there may be no relationship between the principal and agent. They indicate that 
there is no requirement or even expectation that a shareholder will remain a shareholder 
for an extended period of time. In addition managers under share option schemes may be 
considered also as principals.  
 
4.2.2 Legitimacy Theory: 
Legitimacy theory is based on the premise that companies signal their legitimacy by 
disclosing certain information in the annual report. Legitimacy theory is centered on the 
notion of a contract or agreement between an enterprise and its constituents (Shocker and 
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Sethi 1974). Suchman (1995) defined legitimacy as: “a generalized perception or 
assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some 
socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definition”(p. 573). The concept 
of a social contract is the basic notion of the legitimacy theory (Guthrie and Parker 1989; 
Mathews 1993; Patten 1992). In this respect, Guthrie and Parker (1989) claim that 
business operates in society via a social contract where it agrees to perform various 
socially desired actions in return for approval of its objectives, other rewards and its 
ultimate survival. 
 
The legitimacy theory assumes that a company has no right to exist unless its values are 
perceived as matching with that of the society at large where it operates (Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975; Lindblom 1994; Magness 2006). Since the objective of accounting is 
providing users with information that help in decision-making, i.e., satisfying social 
interests, the theory has been integrated in accounting studies as a “means of explaining 
what, why, when and how certain items are addressed by corporate management in their 
communication with outside audiences” (Magness 2006, p. 542). Since the legitimacy 
theory is based on a society’s perception, management is forced to disclose information 
that would change the external users’ opinion about their company (Cormier and Gordon 
2001). Legitimisation can occur both through mandatory disclosures -disclosures provided 
in financial statements because of regulations, and voluntary disclosures provided in other 
sections of the annual report (Magness 2006; Lightstone and Driscoll 2008). 
 
According to Gray et al. (1996), legitimacy theory is derived from the idea that every 
company operates in a society through an expressed or implied social contract. It is 
essentially a systems-oriented theory, i.e. companies are viewed as components of the 
larger social environment within which they exist. Thus, a company needs this theory to 
legitimise its activities to the society in which it operates in order to justify its continued 
existence. Deegan (2002) suggests that organisations need to take community expectations 
into account if they want to be successful. Organisations will be penalised or may not 
survive unless they are congruent with the society in which they operates (Dowling and 
Pfeffer 1975). 
 
According to Lindblom (1994), the legitimacy is defined as 'a condition or status which 
exists when an entity's value system is congruent with the value system of the larger social 
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system of which the entity is part. When a disparity, actual or potential, exists between the 
two value systems, there is a threat to the entity's legitimacy' (p.2). Moreover, Tinker and 
Neimark (1987) state that 'the public in general, become increasingly aware of the adverse 
consequences of corporate growth. They apply pressure on business and government to 
make outlays to repair or prevent damage to the physical environment, to ensure health 
and safety of consumers, employees, and those who reside in the communities where 
products are manufactured and wastes are dumped and to be responsible for the 
consequences of technological unemployment and plant closure. Therefore, businesses are 
forced to respond to the diversified social issues that are consequences of their activities’ 
(p.84). 
 
In legitimacy theory, the organisation is said to be a part of a wide social construct with 
different expectations that must be met to maintain its operations (Ratanajongkol et al. 
2006). Legitimacy theory suggests that there is a stress on the corporations to react to the 
community's expectations (Guthrie and Parker 1989). Therefore, the community's 
expectations are satisfied by additional disclosure of information (Wilmshurst and Frost 
2000). However, organisational legitimacy is not fixed, and it is subject to change in terms 
of time and place due to changing community attitudes (Deegan 2010). So, to survive, 
organisations need continually to adapt their activities to the changing requirements of 
legitimacy. They also need to take all measures necessary to ensure that their activities are 
perceived to be commensurate with the societal expectations of various stakeholder groups 
in society.  
 
The term ‘social contract’ reflects the expectations of society about how an organisation 
should conduct its operations. These expectations could be explicit or implicit. Deegan et 
al. (2000) argued that legal requirements form the explicit terms of contract, while 
community expectations constitute the implicit. Deegan (2010) also argued that the 
implicit terms of a social contract are difficult to determine and different organisations 
might have different perceptions of the terms. However, as the societal bounds and norms 
may change over time, the organisation continuously has to demonstrate that its actions 
are legitimate and that it behaves as a good corporate citizen, usually by engaging in 
corporate social responsibility.  
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Legitimacy theory argues that organisations can only continue to exist if the society 
recognizes it as acting within acceptable value system (Rizk 2006). Based on this theory, 
organisations aim to win social approval, in other words to legitimize their actions (Patten 
1991; Mathews 1993; Reich 1998 and Deegan 2010). According to Lindblom (1994), to 
legitimise its actions, a company has four ways or strategies: firstly, it may educate and 
inform its relevant stakeholders about changes in the company's performance; secondly it 
may change the perceptions of the relevant stakeholders but not change its actual behavior; 
thirdly, it might manipulate perception by deflecting attention from the issues of concern 
to other related issues through an appeal, and lastly, it may change the external 
expectations of its performance. 
 
Suchman (1995) articulates three types of legitimacy - pragmatic, moral, and cognitive - 
and suggests that in most settings they co-exist and reinforce one another. Pragmatic 
legitimacy behaviors may focus on ‘delivering favorable outcomes vis-à-vis audience 
interests, or the dynamics may focus on incorporating constituents into policy-making 
and/or adopting constituent measures of performance’ (p. 578). Moral legitimacy “. . . 
rests not on judgments about whether a given activity benefits the evaluator, but rather on 
judgments about whether the activity is ‘the right thing to do’, and it “reflects[s] beliefs 
about whether the activity effectively promotes societal welfare . . .” (Suchman 1995, p. 
579). Cognitive legitimacy stems mainly from the availability of cultural models that 
furnish plausible explanations for the organisation and its endeavors. 
 
Jenkins (2004) asserts that the legitimacy theory is dominating research theory usd to 
explain why companies disclose corporate information. This theory leaves much of 
corporate reporting and disclosure to the discretion of management and ignores both the 
right of many stakeholders to receive information, and the obligation of the company to 
provide this type of information. In recent years, this particular theory has been subjected 
to empirical testing within several corporate social reporting and disclosure studies (see 
for example, Abeysekera and Guthrie 2005; Guthrie et al. 2006; Petty and Cuganesan 
2005; Whiting and Miller 2008; Adams and Harte 1998; Adams et al. 1998; Ahmad and 
Sulaiman 2004; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deegan et al. 2000; O’Dwyer 2002; Patten 
1992; Tsang 1998, Guthrie and Parker 1989; Patten 1992; and Deegan and Gordon 1996.  
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Prior empirical research attempted to use legitimacy theory to explain voluntary disclosure 
practices by firms. Voluntary disclosure can be used by managers to communicate with 
stakeholders and to acquire their support (Watson et al. 2002). Moreover, legitimacy 
theory is most successful in explaining the extent and content of social and environmental 
reporting (Gray et al. 1995 and Milne 2002). Different stakeholders have different 
priorities (Wolfe and Putler 2002), and need different information. Moreover, their 
abilities to gain information are different. So, the effective use of disclosure policy, 
especially the voluntary one, may help in building the trust with the shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  
 
4.2.2.1 Evaluation of Legitimacy Theory: 
The idea of the legitimacy theory resembles a social contract between the company and 
society (Magness 2006). Organisational legitimacy theory predicts that corporations will 
do whatever they regard as necessary in order to preserve their image of a legitimate 
business with legitimate aims and methods of achieving those aims (Rizk 2006). 
Legitimacy is mostly used in the literature to support the idea that social disclosures will 
be maintained at present levels, or increased over time, to avert legitimacy crises. The 
most important unanswered question is whether nondisclosure then can also have a 
legitimising effect? If not, then the applicability of legitimacy theory to developing 
countries becomes quite limited. However, organisational legitimacy is not fixed, and it is 
subject to change in terms of time and place due to changing community attitudes (Deegan 
2010). Moreover, Guthrie and Parker (1989) provided evidence that legitimacy theory is 
not adequate as a means of explaining social disclosure during a specific period of time. 
This is based on the absence of any reaction to economic, social or political events as a 
result of the social disclosures. Furthermore, given that legitimacy theory is dealing with 
perceptions, the theory has not provided an appropriate measure of the effect of disclosure 
changes in the perception of the relevant public in isolation from other influences and 
events in the society (Campbell et al. 2003). 
 
4.2.3 Stakeholder Theory: 
Stakeholders are the central focus of stakeholder theory. Stakeholders include a wide 
range of people and interest groups who are involved in some capacity with organisations 
(Price 2004). While agency theory concentrates only on the relationship between 
managers (agent) and shareholders (the principal), stakeholder theory considers the 
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relation between managers and all stakeholders (the principal); such as shareholders, 
employees, customers, suppliers, and government. Based on stakeholder theory, a variety 
of stakeholders are involved in the organisation and each of them deserves some return for 
their involvement (Crowther and Jatana 2005). 
 
From a stakeholder perspective, an organisation should attempt to meet multiple goals of a 
wide range of stakeholders rather than merely those of shareholders. As Guthrie et al. 
(2006, p. 256) state: an organisation’s management is expected to undertake activities 
deemed important by their stakeholders and to report on those activities back to the 
stakeholders. Stakeholder theory highlights organisational accountability beyond simple 
economic or financial performance. 
 
The ethical branch purports that all stakeholders have certain intrinsic rights (e.g. fair 
treatment) that should be protected by the organisation. Therefore the management should 
engage in activities for the benefits of all stakeholders, or seek to satisfy the demands, 
needs and expectations of all stakeholders (Deegan 2010; Deegan and Samkin 2009). 
According to Deegan and Samkin (2009) and Gray et al. (1996), a good relationship with 
various stakeholders could gain their support and approval, an example being loyalty of 
customers. The good relationship with stakeholders might distract competitors and draw 
their disapproval, which is beneficial for the organisation allowing it to survive and 
succeed in a sustainable manner in society. 
 
Stakeholder theory was applied to the concept of corporate social responsibility and 
disclosure in the 1960s and 1970s. Since that time many ideas concerned with corporate 
social responsibility and disclosure were added to the literature of company management. 
However, the confusion about the nature and purpose of the stakeholder theory can be 
identified as one of the essential problems in the evolution of this theory; it has been used 
either explicitly or implicitly, for different purposes (Elmogla 2009) 
 
The contemporary stakeholder literature can be traced back to the seminal work of 
Freeman (1984). He drew attention to the role of external stakeholders, which were 
defined as “any group who can affect, or is affected by, the accomplishment of 
organisational purpose” (p. 25). Stakeholders are persons or groups that have or claim, 
ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, present, or future. 
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Such claimed rights or interests are the result of transactions with, or actions taken by, the 
corporation, and may be legal or moral, individual or collective (Rizk 2006, p. 26). 
 
A primary stakeholder group is one without whose continuing participation the 
corporation cannot survive as a going concern. Primary stakeholder groups typically are 
comprised of shareholders and investors, employees, customers, and suppliers, together 
with what is defined as the public stakeholder group: the governments and communities 
that provide infrastructures and markets, whose laws and regulations must be obeyed, and 
to whom taxes and other obligations may be due (Clarkson 1995: 106). Secondary 
stakeholder groups are defined as ‘those who influence or affect, or are influenced or 
affected by, the corporation, but did not engage in transactions with the corporation nor 
are they essential for its survival. The media and a wide range of special interest groups, 
such as lobbyists and NGO's, are considered as secondary stakeholders under this 
definition’ (Rizk 2006, p.27). 
 
According to this theory, ‘managers should assess the importance of every group of 
stakeholders and try to satisfy them. For the purpose of benefit maximization, managers 
must work on behalf of all stakeholders not only the shareholders. Consequently, 
shareholders will benefit, as the main stakeholder, in the long run’ (Abdel-Fattah 2008, 
p.107). 
 
Sternberg (1997), a proponent of agency theory, criticises stakeholder theory arguing that 
this theory is incompatible with business and also with corporate governance. It rules out 
the objective of business which maximizes long term owner value. Also, the theory 
implies that a company should be accountable to everyone not just to their owners and 
encourages managers to violate their prior obligations to owners. In addition, Sternberg 
indicates that balancing stakeholder benefits is an unworkable objective and is unjustified. 
Moreover, stakeholder theory undermines private property and accountability. 
 
On the contrary, Turnbull argues that stakeholder relationships can legitimise and protect 
private property, agency, and wealth. Three aspects of stakeholder theory can be 
identified: descriptive; instrumental and normative (Donaldson and Preston 1995). The 
first, descriptive, is used to describe and explain specific firm characteristics and behaviors 
such as how board members consider the interests of corporate constituencies, i.e. 
stakeholders. The second, instrumental, is concerned with the connections between 
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stakeholder management and the achievement of corporate objectives such as profitability. 
The third, normative; is used to interpret the function of the corporation and the related 
moral and ethical guidelines.  
 
In recent years stakeholder theory has gained significant ground in the area of business 
ethics and also in issues such as organisation or company strategy, economics and public 
policy. Freeman (1984) deserves full credit for popularizing the term since 1984. He 
defines stakeholders as groups or individuals who can affect and are affected by the 
achievement of an organisation's mission. Amongst these interest groups would be 
investors, employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, government bodies, pressure groups 
and the wider society. The list may become even more comprehensive in future 
generations (Gray et al. 1996). 
 
According to Deegan (2010) a large body of literature on stakeholders has developed since 
the publication of Freeman (1984). He argues that this development varied in nature and 
becomes somewhat tangled as different researchers use different theories with different 
aims and assumptions but under the one label of stakeholder theory. In the words of 
Deegan (2010, p. 345): 
"More correctly, perhaps, the term of stakeholder theory is an umbrella term that 
actually represents a number of alternative theories that address various issues 
associated with relationship with stakeholders, including considerations of the 
rights of stakeholders, the power of stakeholders, or the effective management 
stakeholders". 
 
Freeman (1984) suggests that each firm should have a generic stakeholder map identifying 
specific stakeholders. As the organisation changes over time, and as decisions change, the 
specific stakeholder map will vary. Stakeholder theory has become important for 
companies that want to secure their relationship with stakeholders through corporate social 
disclosure. This view is supported by Carroll (1999) who explains that corporate social 
disclosure relates to the wider society, which is represented by stakeholders. Wilson 
(2001) argues the importance of stakeholder theory as a concept whereby companies are 
able to integrate social and environmental information in their business operations and in 
their interaction with stakeholders.  
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To deal with the stakeholder, managers should consider a number of points such as 
information cost and competitive advantage. In addition, the power held by a stakeholder 
will affect the disclosure decision (Mitchell et al. 1997). That means managers must make 
a balance, or tradeoffs, between the stakeholders' information needs. Rizk (2006) indicates 
that stakeholder theory may be particularly relevant in developing countries, transitional 
economies and highly regulated industries. To address the voluntary disclosure practice, it 
is helpful to consider the different types of voluntary disclosure that aim to satisfy the 
stakeholder's information needs. 
 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) and Gray et al. (1996) make a different subdivision in the 
theory. In their view, there are two variants. One variant is related to accountability, which 
is: “The duty to provide and account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or 
reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible” (Gray et al. 1996, p. 38). 
Deegan and Unerman (2006) mentioned that the accountability variant is similar to the 
ethical or normative perspective of the theory. The second variant is organisational 
stakeholder theory. Deegan and Unerman (2006) describe the organisational and 
managerial variants of stakeholder theory as both being instrumental. Like Gray et al. 
(1996), Van der Laan Smith et al. (2005), suggest that the organisational perspective of 
stakeholder theory describes the relation between the corporation and its stakeholders. 
 
Using the strategic management view presented by Freeman (1984), Ullmann (1985) 
suggested a three-dimensional conceptual model of corporate activity based on 
stakeholder theory. The first dimension is stakeholder power which reflects the theoretical 
basis of the proposed framework; this dimension suggests that a company would be 
responsive to the intensity of stakeholder demands. The second dimension of the model is 
the company’s strategic posture towards corporate reporting and disclosure action, which 
describes the company's mode of response or attitude to its key decision makers regarding 
social demands. The third dimension in Ullmann’s model is concerned with a company’s 
past and current economic performance. Ullmann argues that the financial capability of a 
company to undertake corporate social activities and disclosure is influenced by its 
economic strength. 
 
Hence it can be expected that disclosure could reduce information asymmetry between the 
organisation and its stakeholders, and as a consequence improve the relationships between 
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them. According to Deegan and Samkin (2009) and Gray et al. (1996), a good relationship 
with various stakeholders could gain support and approval from them (e.g. loyalty of 
customers) or distract their opposition and disapproval, which is beneficial for the 
organisation to survive and succeed in a sustainable manner in society. Some researchers 
in the area, such as Guthrie et al. (2006), Schneider and Samkin (2008), Vergauwen and 
Alem (2005) and Whiting and Miller (2008), have used stakeholder theory or some 
concepts of the theory to interpret the disclosure practice of organisations. However 
empirical evidence in those studies indicates that the organisations did not fulfill the 
expectations of various stakeholders for voluntary disclosure sufficiently. 
 
4.2.3.1 Evaluation of Stakeholder Theory: 
Stakeholder theory implies that managers will measure the magnitude of various 
stakeholder groups in the organisation, and may voluntarily disclose information, as they 
deem most important, to gain the approval of the stakeholders. On the other hand, 
stakeholder theory implies that managers identify the importance of stakeholders based on 
their power. In order to predict disclosures using stakeholder theory, an assessment of the 
relative importance managers’ place on each of the stakeholder groups would need to be 
made. Such an assessment is arguably, quite difficult, and is unlikely to be homogeneous 
across different firms or different industries (Rizk 2006). Finally, there is also a further 
problem with the stakeholder concept in that an individual can have multiple stakes in the 
business as an employee, consumer, shareholder and a member of the local community. It 
is easier to identify the information needs of a stakeholder group than those of an 
individual who has multiple stake holdings in the same organisation (Sternberg 1997). 
 
4.2.4 Signalling Theory: 
According to signalling theory, a manager discloses information in order to reduce 
information asymmetry; one party tries to credibly convey information about itself to a 
second party (Spence 1973; Álvarez et al. 2008, Connelly et al. 2011) and to signal to 
outsiders that a firm is performing better than its peers (Miller 2002). Signalling theory is 
useful for describing behavior when two parties, individuals or organisations, have access 
to different information. Typically, one party, the sender, must choose whether and how to 
communicate, or signal, that information, and the other party, the receiver, must choose 
how to interpret the signal (Connelly et al. 2011). Signalling theory also posits that, in 
making decisions, investors rely on the information delivered by firms (Abhayawansa and 
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Abeysekera 2009), highlighting that the credibility of information is crucial in ensuring 
lower information asymmetry (Hughes 1986). 
 
Signalling is a reaction to informational asymmetry in markets; in this case, companies 
have information that investors do not. Asymmetries can be reduced if the party with more 
information signals to others. This is done to signal quality and to distinguish themselves 
from competitors. In order to signal successfully, managers should use credible signals 
(Eccles et al. 2001). Bauwhede and Marleen (2008) suggest that companies disclose 
corporate governance information in order to reduce information asymmetry and agency 
costs stemming from the separation between ownership and control, and to improve 
investor confidence in the reported accounting information. 
 
Verrecchia (1983) argues that a manager's decision to disclose information will be made 
on the basis of the effect of the disclosure or signal on the market. He posits that there will 
be a "threshold level of disclosure" below which information will be withheld and above 
which information will be disclosed. This level, it is suggested, will be determined in part 
by how non disclosure would be interpreted by the market. In 1990, Verrecchia added to 
this concept by suggesting that the quality of information available to the manager may 
influence the threshold level. The higher the quality of the information the lower the 
threshold level of disclosure. 
 
It is argued that when information is costless, the seller will disclose both good and bad 
information, as buyers would put the worst interpretation on non-disclosure (Grossman 
1981). Likewise, disclosing favorable information by the firms is necessary as non-
disclosure will result in users inferring the content of such information as unfavorable 
(Milgrom 1981; Jung and Kwon 1988). Such disclosure provides credible signals about a 
firm's value as the firm would be penalized if it provides misleading information (Hughes 
1986). Furthermore, managers voluntarily disclose both good and bad news, as the good 
news signals quality and bad news is signaled to prevent a decline in the firm's share price 
(Skinner 1994). According to Khaled (2011), companies will try adopt the same level of 
disclosure as other companies within the industry: where this does not happen the 
organisation may be perceived by stakeholders that hiding bad news. 
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Newman and Sansig (1993) explored the use of signalling and disclosure decisions using 
of three parties: the incumbent or existing market player, the stockholders and an entrant 
or potential competitor. Going on the assumption that the incumbent acts to maximize 
shareholders' wealth, they argue that in order to assist stockholder investment or 
consumption decisions, disclosures will be made. However, these disclosures will be 
imprecise or noisy in order to try and deter market entry. They conclude that if this 
analysis were expanded to include more users, including government and lobby groups, 
the company's communication problems would be complicated even further. 
 
Moreover, Okcabol and Tinker (1993) indicate that there is a question whether non 
disclosure means bad news especially in a highly competitive environment. Non 
disclosure in this case aims to protect the company from adverse effects not to hide or 
mitigate the severity of bad news. Dye (1985) pointed out that even a company with good 
news may choose to withhold information. On the other hand a company with bad news 
may choose to disclose this news if the company is worried about the competitors' reaction 
to this information. A number of authors indicate that the reason for non disclosure may be 
that managers do not have information to disclose (Penno 1997) or may be uncertain about 
the effect of disclosure on the manager's performance (Nagar 1999). 
 
Cheung and Lee (1995) suggests that being listed in reputable foreign exchanges (e.g. the 
New York Stock Exchange) signals a firm’s high level of disclosure and increases its 
opportunity to be listed in other stock exchanges. Other studies that use signalling theory 
include Chiang (2005), who showed that high firm transparency signals sound firm 
performance. Hussainey and Aal-Eisa (2009) demonstrate that disclosure of narrative 
forward looking information is superior to dividend information in respect to reducing 
investor uncertainty about future earnings.  
  
Lang and Lundholm (1993, pp. 248- 249) suggest that there is a common perception that 
management is more forthcoming with information".... when the firm is performing well 
than when it is performing poorly". In such situations management is keen to raise 
shareholder confidence and support management compensation contacts (Singhvi and 
Desai 1971 and Malone et al. 1993). This is also true for highly liquid companies. 
Managers of highly liquid companies may be motivated to reveal their high levels of 
liquidity through disclosure (Wallace and Naser 1995 and Owusu- Ansah 1998). 
 - 126 - 
Signalling theory also suggest industry differences in disclosure. If a company within the 
industry fails to follow the disclosure practice of others in the same industry it may be 
thought that the company is hiding bad news (Craven and Martson 1999). 
 
4.2.4.1 Evaluation of Signalling Theory: 
Signalling is a reaction to informational asymmetry in markets, that is, firms have 
information that stakeholders do not. Asymmetries can be reduced if the party with more 
information signals it to the other relevant parties, implying that market participants will 
not only interpret the signal correctly, but will also react and adjust accordingly. As such, 
signalling theory has been used in many studies to explain disclosure decisions by 
managers. However, signalling theory is based on several assumptions, the most important 
of which is the efficient market hypothesis. While signalling theory may be an appropriate 
explanatory theory in developed market economies with at least semi-strong efficient 
capital markets, it is arguably invalid in developing or transitional economies. Moreover, 
over time, the key concepts underlying signalling theory have become blurred (Highhouse 
et al. 2007), causing some to argue that signalling theory is ill defined (Ehrhart and Ziegert 
2005). Although a number of studies integrate signalling concepts with related 
management theories (e.g., Deephouse 2000; Ryan et al. 2000; Sanders and Boivie 2004), 
no existing management research has systematically described the core ideas of signalling 
theory and how management scholars have applied them. 
 
4.2.5 Institutional Theory: 
Institutional theory explores how, at a broader level, particular organisational form might 
be adopted in order to bring the legitimacy to an organisation (Deegan 2010). Institutional 
theory offers a generic framework to analyse corporate practices. It provides insights into 
how an organisation understands and responds to changing social and institutional 
pressures and expectations. Institutional theory has been developed since the late 1970s, 
by researchers such as Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powel (1983), and 
Zucker (1977, 1987). Researchers who adopt institutional theory typically embrace a view 
that managers are expected to confirm the norms that are largely imposed on them. 
 
Institutional theory tends to take a broader macro view to explain why organisations take 
on particular forms or particular reporting practices. Moreover, it provides an argument 
that, while organisations might put in place particular processes, such processes might be 
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more for 'show' than for influencing corporate conduct (Deegan 2010, p.365). Through the 
processes of adoption and adaptation, the institutional norms and rules impact on the 
positions, policies, programs, and procedures of organisations (Scott 2003). 
 
Institutional theorists point out that all social systems, hence all organisations, exist in an 
institutional environment that defines social reality and that, just as with technical 
environments, institutional environments are enormously diverse, and variable over time 
(Scott 2003). Institutional theory proposes that organisations are affected by “common 
understandings of what is appropriate and, fundamentally, meaningful behavior” (Zucker 
1983, p.105). Accordingly, institutional theory advocates that "organisational structures 
and processes are moderated by the institutional environment "(Lincoln et al. 1986, p.340). 
 
Institutional theory, therefore, is capable of explaining organisational behaviour in any 
setting, whereas, agency theory deals with the setting of the separation between ownership 
and control. In other words, institutional theory can explain why businesses have similar 
organisational structures and cultural elements within a particular socio-cultural setting, 
even though they are separate entities, and, in turn, can explain why the features of an 
organisation, in a particular setting are different from those of another. Agency theory is a 
theory of a particular institutional setting, the setting where ownership is separate from 
control: whereas institutional theory is a generic theory, intended to identify and explain 
the features of organisations in any setting. 
 
In recent years, various types of institutional theory have been used to gain insights into 
organisational change and accounting practices. These include: old institutional economics 
which is concerned with the institutions that outline the actions and thoughts of individual 
human agents, new institutional economics, which is related with the structures used to 
govern economic transactions and new institutional sociology (NIS), which is connected 
with the institutions that figure organisational compositions and systems. A brief outline of 
the nature of these three types of institutional theory is as follows. 
 
4.2.5.1 Old Institutional Economics (OIE) 
The OIE; the most established and oldest type of institutional theory; considers individuals 
as a cultural product affected by their institutional and cultural situations; therefore it is 
important to add other dimensions, anthropological and evolutionary, to the economic 
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dimension. In this approach, human beings, organisations, and the economic system itself 
are regarded as part of a larger social system. However, OIE is criticised because its focus 
is primarily on the micro (individuals, groups and organisations) rather than the macro-
level institutions. The concern expressed, regarding the limitation of OIE, is that it pays 
insufficient attention to environmental pressures (Yazdifar 2003). Burns (2000; 2001) 
argues that OIE is more suitable for studies of processes of change and resistance to 
change within organisations. In particular the theory is effective in investigating the role of 
power, politics and vested interests in change. 
 
4.2.5.2 New Institutional Economics (NIE) 
The institutions matter for economic performance is the essence of NIE (Furuboton and 
Richter 2000). A distinguishing feature of this theory is its persistence in maintaining that 
transactions are costly and the creation of institutions and organisations, and their day-
today use, requires the input of real resources. In order to explain the determinants of 
institutions and their development over time, the function of NIE includes assessing the 
influence of institutions on economic performance, efficiency, and distribution. The 
relationship between institutions and economic growth is mutual. i.e., institutions have an 
insightful impact on economic growth, and, economic growth often results in a change in 
institutions (Nabli and Nugent 1989).  
 
The basic elements in the literature of NIE are transaction costs, property rights, and 
contractual economics. Martinez and Dacin (1999) argued that as efficiency is not the 
overriding imperative guiding organisational and individual decisions, transaction cost 
economics can not explain all organisational actions and outcomes. Consequently, in the 
context of disclosure, NIE may be not appropriate for studying reporting practices 
especially in developing countries. There are two reasons for this conclusion: firstly, the 
difficulty of defining and identifying transaction costs in developing countries, and the 
secondly the accessibility of a range of additional theories that may be more helpful in 
understanding reporting practices. 
 
4.2.5.3 New Institutional Sociology (NIS) 
While recognizing the social and cultural basis of external influence on organisation is one 
of the contributions of institutional theory, neo institutionalists moved beyond recognition 
to describe the processes by which practices and organisations become institutions (Hatch 
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and Cunliffe 2006). NIS focuses on change at an extra-organisational, or macro, level and 
primarily focuses on the 'legitimation' of organisational structures, forms and processes in 
society. Institutional theory suggests that social legitimacy is considered an input to the 
organisational transformation process (Hatch and Cunliffe 2006). 
 
According to Hussain and Hoque (2002), NIS has contributed significantly to the 
understanding of relationships between organisational structures and their wider social 
environment. Institutional theory, specifically (NIS), has been applied in a number of 
financial reporting studies: Carpenter and Feroz 2001; Chalmers and Godfrey 2004; and 
Rodrigues and Craig 2006). Carpenter and Feroz (2001) employ institutional theory to 
explore how institutional pressures exerted, affect the adoption of generally accepted 
accounting principles for external financial reporting by public sector entities. In addition, 
institutional theory has been applied to financial accounting standards setting by the FASB 
(Fogarty 1992), the changing process of standard setting and regulation in UK (Radcliffe 
et al. 1994). Moreover, Fogarty (1996) discusses institutional theory and the insight it 
provides into the accounting profession's self-regulation actions. In developing countries 
in transition, Al-Twaijry et al. (2003) use institutional theory to address the development 
of internal audit in Saudi Arabia; while Hassan (2008) relies on institutional theory to 
address the development of accounting regulations in Egypt.  
 
New institutional sociology is a popular choice among researchers who study the adoption 
of corporate governance reform by countries (Tareq 2013) Examples of the use of this 
theory for studying a country’s corporate governance reform are Sanders and Tuschke 
(2007), Khadaroo and Shaikh (2007), Siddiqui (2010), Chizema and Kim (2010), and 
Chizema (2010).  
 
4.2.5.4 Evaluation of Institutional Theory: 
Institutional theory has made great advances in recent years, but also has a number of 
significant theoretical and methodological problems. The most important of these 
problems is the generally static nature of institutional explanations (Guy 2000). Moreover, 
OIE is criticised because its focus is primarily on the micro (individuals, groups and 
organisations) rather than the macro-level institutions. On the other hand, Ahmed and 
Scapens (2000) point out that NIE does not recognise the impact of the broader economic, 
political and social institutions, which can be important in understanding the development 
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of accounting practices. Moreover, Robins (1987) was critical of NIE for their failure to 
recognise the importance of the institutional environment. However, new institutional 
sociology does not consider the effectiveness and efficiency perspective which is the focus 
of traditional institutional theory. 
 
4.2.6 Political Economy Theory: 
According to Gray et al. (1996, p. 47) “…the political economy theory is the social 
political and economic framework within which human life takes place”. The main theme 
of this theory is that it recognizes the interaction of economic activities with politics, 
society and institutions (Hannifa 1999). In other words, it emphasizes the specific 
historical and institutional environment of the society in which it operates. It is argued that 
by considering the political economy, a researcher is able to consider broarder issues that 
impact on how an organisation operates and what information it elects to disclose (Deegan 
2010). This theory concentrates on exchanges that arise in any framework (e.g., the 
market) and the relationship among social institutions participating in such exchanges 
(Gray et al. 1995).  
 
Guthrie and Parker (1990) assert that the main theme of this theory is that political, 
economic and social contexts are inseparable and should all be considered in corporate 
social reporting and disclosure researches. It also helps researchers to interpret social 
disclosure from the rich social political and economic context within which disclosure take 
place. This is a first move in recognising that the nexus of contracts for a company is not 
only between management and shareholders but other stakeholders as well. 
Political economic theory has been divided into two broard streams which Gray et al. 
(1996, p. 47) have labelled 'classical' and 'bourgeois' political economy. Classical Political 
Economy Theory is related to the works of Karl Marks, and explicitly places 'sectional 
interest, structural conflicts, inequity, and the role of the state at the heart of the 
analysis'(Gray et al. 1996, p.47). This can be contrasted with 'bourgeois' Political 
Economy Theory which according to Gray et al. (1995, p. 53) largely ignores those 
elements and as a result, is "content to perceive the world as essentially pluralistic". 
 
According to Rizk (2006) the political environment could affect the development of 
accounting both directly and indirectly; the political freedom of a country is also important 
in the development of accounting. Belkaoui (1983, 1985) argues that the political 
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atmosphere, in general, and political rights and civil liberties, in particular, have 
significant influence on the development of accounting practices. In addition, the political 
environment affects accounting in an indirect way through its effect on the national culture 
and the economy. Moreover, many believe that factors in the political environment, such 
as stable governments and a stable currency can significantly affect the economic 
environment, which in turn, may have an impact on the accounting environment (e.g. 
Larson and Kenny 1995). 
 
To explain and understand aspects of corporate reporting, a number of disclosure studies 
have used the idea of ‘the bourgeois’ form of political economic theory (Guthrie and 
Parker 1990; Williams 1999). Williams (1999) further argued that firms voluntarily 
provide social and environmental information in response to the pressures of the social, 
political and economic systems that surround them. 
 
4.2.6.1 Evaluation of Political Economy Theory: 
The political economy theory has much to offer as a basis for explanation of corporate 
social reporting and disclosure when compared with other theories (Guthrie and Parker 
1990 and Gray et al. 1996). This theory sees the world from a view point that involves 
social, economic, and political factors. On the other hand, this theory fails explicitly to 
consider the inter-organisational factors, internal factors including the corporate 
characteristics and the management attitude and cognition, which have an important role 
in corporate reporting and disclosure in a given country (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; 
Cowen et al. 1987; Patten 1991; and Tilt 1994). 
 
4.3 Relationship among Theories: 
To construct an integrated theoretical framework based on the aforementioned theories it 
is necessary to integrate the concepts among the theories that are consistent in explaining 
mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting. The study need to 
understand the relationships between the theories as a basis for explaining quality of 
reporting. In the following section, those relationships are explained. 
 
4.3.1 Agency Theory and Stakeholder Theory: 
Agency theory is mainly concerned with the relationship between the principal and the 
agent; it is generally referred to as the management-owner relationship in a business 
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setting. It is based on the central assumption of individual self-interest. It argues that both 
the principal and the agent tend to maximize their own returns by all means, which might 
result in conflicts between both parties - the agency problem. Information asymmetry is 
seen as one of the key factors leading to agency problems. It is also considered to be the 
most relevant concept because it is widely accepted that disclosures whether mandatory or 
voluntary could reduce information asymmetry between the management of a company 
and its shareholders, and consequently improve the relationship between them. 
 
Stakeholder theory deals with the relationships of an organisation with various stakeholder 
groups in the society. Within the theory, the organisation is a part of the broader societal 
system. From a stakeholder perspective, organisations should discharge accountability not 
only to the shareholders, but also to other stakeholders. However, stakeholder theory does 
not utilise the concept of information asymmetry. Therefore in explaining the corporate 
reporting quality both theories need to be integrated. As a consequence, it can argue that 
corporate reporting can reduce information asymmetry between the organisation and 
various stakeholders, and improve the relationship between them.  
 
4.3.2 Stakeholder Theory and Legitimacy Theory: 
Similar to stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory deals with the relationship between the 
organisation and the society (or community) in which it operates. Both theories place the 
organisation within the larger social system. However, legitimacy theory is concerned with 
the society as a whole, both stakeholders and non-stakeholders, and has a relatively 
broader context than stakeholder theory, which focuses principally on the stakeholders of 
an organisation (Deegan 2010). 
 
Legitimacy theory argues that organisations should operate within societal expectations 
and norms, or comply with the social contract, and simultaneously seek to ensure their 
operations are perceived to be legitimate by society. This is a two-way interaction between 
the organisation and society, unlike stakeholder theory that emphasises a one-way delivery 
of organisational accountability to various stakeholders in society (Li 2008). From this 
perspective, legitimacy theory plays a more positive role in explaining corporate 
disclosure since disclosure is not only a means for organisations to discharge their 
accountability to various stakeholder groups, but also to gain and maintain their legitimate 
status in society. Apart from this difference, most notions within legitimacy theory in 
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relation to disclosure are consistent with those of stakeholder theory. Moreover, legitimacy 
theory and stakeholder theory are both derived from a broader theory which has been 
called Political Economy Theory (Gray et al. 1996). 
 
4.3.3 Signalling Theory and Agency Theory: 
Signalling theory deals with how to address problems arising from information asymmetry 
(e.g. adverse selection and moral hazard) and thus is closely linked to agency theory. 
Signalling theory suggests a number of potentially effective solutions to the information 
asymmetry problem in that the management of an organisation can positively highlight its 
excellence to various stakeholders through mandatory and voluntary disclosure of 
accounting information in a timely manner.  
 
Agency theory and signalling theory partially overlap, in the sense that both theories relate 
to information asymmetry between firms and investors. Both theories suggest that 
promoting disclosure quality is crucial in reducing information asymmetry (Álvarez et al. 
2008). However, one of the basic assumptions of signalling theory which makes it slightly 
different from agency theory is that there are signalling costs that are inversely related to 
the quality of information (Morris 1987). He also suggested that they do not share the 
same necessary conditions, they are not equivalent, and nor does one theory imply the 
other. 
 
Morris (1987) concludes that agency theory and signalling theory are consistent and that 
there is a considerable amount of overlap between them:  the sufficient conditions of both 
are consistent. The two theories recognise rational behavior; information asymmetry, the 
necessary condition of signalling theory, is implied in agency theory; quality can be 
defined in terms of agency theory variables; and signalling costs are implicit in some 
bonding devices of agency theory.  
 
4.3.4 Legitimacy Theory and Signalling Theory: 
Legitimacy theory suggests that organisations should report the information on a 
mandatory and voluntary basis in order to indicate (or signal) that they are complying with 
societal expectations and norms. Signalling theory provides a range of disclosure 
strategies through which organisation can disclose information and fulfill societal 
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expectation and norms. Accordingly legitimacy theory and signalling theory are 
complementary theories in explaining corporate reporting practices of organisations. 
 
4.3.5 Institutional Theory and Legitimacy Theory: 
Legitimacy theory discusses how particular disclosure strategies might be undertaken to 
gain, maintain or as operating within a social framework of norms, values, and shared 
assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic behavior (Oliver 
1997). 
 
Legitimacy theory and institutional theory are linked to political economy theory: the 
political economy constitutes the social, political and economic framework within which 
human life takes place and social, political and economic issues are considered as 
inseparable. Moreover, institutional theory provides a complementary, and partially 
overlapping, perspective to both legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory (Deegan 2010. 
p. 366) 
 
4.4 Choosing a Theoretical Framework for the Study: 
The theoretical discussion has shown that the theories are interrelated and underpin each 
other in explaining disclosure practice. While each of these theories may provide some 
interesting insights into the disclosure decision, applicability of single theory to the current 
study is questionable due to the inherent limitations in each of the theories. Moreover, it is 
clear that there is overlap among these theories. After examining the relationships between 
the theories it indicates that each theory takes a look at disclosure from a different 
perspective. Regardless of which theories are adopted and used to explain disclosure 
practice, they are equally important: appropriate theories should be selected according to 
the nature of the study. The choice of the theory should depend on the focus of the study 
(Chen and Roberts 2010). Some theories may be more appropriate and relevant to some 
countries than others (Mallin 2010). Adrem (1999); and Cormier et al. (2005) argue that 
disclosures are a complex phenomenon that cannot be explained by one single theory 
whereas Yi et al. (2011) suggested a comprehensive theoretical framework to study 
disclosure decisions. When the aim of the study is to explain an empirical phenomenon, it 
could be problematic to consider theories as competitive instead of complementary (Gray 
et al. 1995).  
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There could, of course, be several motivations simultaneously driving organisations to 
report information and expecting that one motivation might dominate all others is 
probably unrealistic. Due to the overlapping nature of a number of theories, and because 
these theories can provide slightly different and useful insights, there has been a move by 
some researchers to use more than one theory to provide an explanation for particular 
managerial actions (Feidler and Deegan 2002). There is no reason to believe that the 
different emphasis is simply a shift in paradigm; this depends on the objectives of 
accounting, whose interests are being emphasised, and the underlying assumptions and the 
limitations of the proposed theories (Haniffa 1999). 
 
The first part of this study examines mandatory disclosures and significant regulatory 
noncompliance: these episodes of organisational transgression reveal negative 
consequential outcomes. Such conditions are expected to result in agency problems. 
Moreover, mandatory disclosure serves to reduce agency losses that arise because of the 
conflicting interests of promoters, directors, investor, and managers. It is clear that part of 
the purpose of mandatory disclosure is to address some standard agency problems. In 
Bangladesh, the Securities Exchange ordinance of 1987 requires that all publicly traded 
companies make periodic disclosures, including detailed information about management's 
compensation and significant transactions between managers and the company. The 
evident purpose of such disclosures is to help the shareholders to monitor management's 
self-interested behavior. Given that the present study is designed to examine disclosure 
quality, which is associated with information asymmetry in principal agent relationships, 
agency theory is found to be the most relevant theory for the purposes of the study. 
 
The second part of this study, addresses the voluntary reporting practices in the annual 
reports of the Bangladeshi listed companies. The annual report is prepared for general 
purposes and is not directed towards a specific user:  it can be used by several stakeholders 
and not only by shareholders. As voluntary disclosures are in addition to mandatory, for 
the purpose of benefit maximization, managers must work on behalf of all stakeholders 
not only the shareholders. Moreover, to address the voluntary disclosure practice, it is 
helpful to consider the different types of voluntary disclosure that aim to satisfy the 
stakeholder's information needs.  Furthermore, management may choose either to disclose 
information voluntarily that differentiates them from competitors or may adopt the same 
level of disclosure as other firms within the same industry i.e., to signal in the market 
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about the quality. Therefore stakeholder theory and signalling theory are most appropriate 
for second part of the study.  
 
The timeliness of corporate financial reporting helps in the efficient allocation of resources 
by reducing dissemination of asymmetric information. In this regard, agency theory is 
considered to be relevant because it explains how the board of directors, director's 
ownerships and audit committee, all function as monitors of mechanisms to reduce the 
agency problems. Moreover, timeliness is regulated by the Companies Act and stock 
exchange listing requirements. As the annual report reaches different stakeholder, the 
company uses it to signal their performance; it can be assumed that stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory is also relevant in this part. 
 
The study does not examine political pressure and used all the listed firms and users rather 
than only large or political sensitive firms: therefore, political cost theory is not useful in 
the study. In the same way, the economic approach that is based on assumptions of an 
efficient market, profit maximization and self interest is considered to be not appropriate 
for the purpose of the current study. Again this study does not focus on any particular 
organisational structure rather it considers all listed companies and therefore institutional 
theory will not be applicable because this theory explores how particular organisational 
forms might be adopted in order to bring legitimacy. Legitimacy theory is most successful 
in explaining social and environmental reporting (Gray et al. 1995 and Milne 2002). This 
study focuses on overall disclosure, including social and environmental but not only social or 
environmental disclosure. That is why it is assumed that legitimacy theory will not support the 
study. 
 
The current study addresses the mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of 
reporting practices and their determinants by the listed companies in Bangladesh. So due 
to the countries legal perspective, the nature of the data and objectives of the study- 
agency theory, stakeholder theory and signalling theory will be most appropriate. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that organisations disclose mandatory and voluntary 
information in a timely manner for three reasons: firstly, to reduce information 
asymmetry; secondly, to discharge accountability to various stakeholders; and thirdly, to 
signal their performance, quality and excellence to society and the market.  
 
 - 137 - 
Information asymmetry is seen as one of the key factors leading to agency problems 
whereas; stakeholder theory deals with the relationships of an organisation with various 
stakeholder groups in the society. Signalling theory also deals with how to address 
problems arising from information asymmetry. So, agency theory and signalling theory 
partially overlap, in the sense that both theories relate to information asymmetry between 
firms and investors. However, stakeholder theory does not utilise the concept of 
information asymmetry. All these theories are interrelated to each other but not 
contradictory. Although the constructed framework has some limitations, it is expected 
that this research could initiate more in-depth explorations in future research with respect 
to theoretical perspectives on corporate reporting, for instance, combining more relevant 
theories into the framework. 
 
However, it must be emphasised that choosing these theories does not mean that they have 
some absolute superiority over other theories. Due to the inherent limitations of the 
respective theories and the multifaceted nature of the disclosure decision, it is the position 
of this research that no single theory alone can be used to accurately capture, convey and 
explain the reporting phenomenon. 
 
4.5 Conclusion: 
This chapter summarises the dominant theories that have been used to justify different 
types of disclosure practices. When explaining why particular disclosures are made, or in 
describing how organisations should make particular disclosures, reference is made to a 
particular theoretical perspective. Regardless of which theories are adopted and used to 
explain disclosure practice, they are all important: their value is dependent on the 
emphasis of the study. However, as there is no perfect theory for disclosure, there is much 
variation in the theoretical perspectives being adopted (Deegan 2010). Moreover, each of 
the theories is questionable due to inherent limitations. 
 
By considering the country’s legal perspective, the nature of the data and objectives of the 
study, agency theory, stakeholder theory and signalling theory have been relevant to the 
purpose of the present study. Agency theory is considered to be the most relevant concept 
because it is widely accepted that disclosures whether mandatory or voluntary could 
reduce information asymmetry between the management of a company and its 
shareholders, and consequently improve the relationship between them. Moreover, 
 - 138 - 
stakeholder theory deals with the relationships of an organisation with various stakeholder 
groups in society. As the organisation is a part of the broader societal system, 
organisations should discharge accountability not only to the shareholders, but also to 
other stakeholders. In addition, signalling theory suggests a number of potentially effective 
solutions to the information asymmetry problem in that the management of an 
organisation can positively highlight its excellence to various stakeholders through 
mandatory and voluntary disclosure of accounting information in a timely manner. 
 
It is therefore the intention of this research to follow a multi-theory approach; neither to 
focus on any one theory nor to discard any of these theories but rather carry them through 
the thesis with the aim of revisiting them in light of the results of the empirical study. The 
next part of the study is concerned with examining the validation of this theoretical 
argument. These theories are used to develop the hypotheses in the chapter 5, which will 
be empirically tested in the chapter 6, chapter 7 and chapter 8. 
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Chapter Five: Methodology and Hypotheses Development 
 
5.1 Introduction: 
The previous chapter, Chapter Four, presents the theoretical sections of this study and 
outlines the appropriate theories for the study. Chapter three reviews the relevant 
literature, and an overview of the legal framework of Bangladesh is presented in chapter 
two. Based on the chosen theoretical framework and the literature, the core intention of 
this chapter is to outline the methodology and hypotheses in the light of the research 
ontological and epistemological positions that would be employed in the current study's 
empirical analysis. The empirical section in the present study aims to measure the quality 
of financial reporting and its trend over the period of study. Furthermore, the research 
justifies the investigated level of mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of reporting by 
examining their different determinants.  
 
In the current study, the first two empirical studies depend on the designing of a checklist 
that includes the main issues of the mandatory and voluntary reporting. Furthermore, the 
results of the checklist would form an index of their disclosure. Current research also uses 
questionnaire survey to examine the weight of voluntary disclosure. The third empirical 
study measures the reporting lag time by clearly distinguishing the audit lag time and 
preliminary lag time.  
 
The current chapter outlines the research method and the procedures employed in the 
empirical section. Section 5.2 outlines the research philosophy. The research paradigm is 
presented in section 5.3. While section 5.4 provides the research approach and section 5.5 
presents the research design. Section 5.6 outlines the index construction. Moreover, 
section 5.7 and 5.8 provides detail of the data collection and sample size. The next three 
sections of this chapter, 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 describe the three empirical models, their 
determinants, and the hypotheses development. Section 5.12 represents the statistical test 
followed by a conclusion in section 5.13. 
     
5.2 Research Philosophy: 
Research is “a systematic investigation to find answers to a problem” (Burns 2002, p. 3). 
Eldabi et al. (2002) mentioned that for conducting any type of research, a researcher 
should follow a well-defined research methodology based on scientific principles. In this 
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context, Hussey and Hussey (1997) argue that research can be classified in several ways. 
The first is the reason why the researcher is conducting such research – the purpose of the 
study. The second is the method by which the researchers collect and analyse data – the 
process of the research. The third is whether the researcher is moving from the general to 
the specific or vice versa – the logic of the research. The last one is whether the research is 
attempting to investigate a particular problem or to make a general contribution to 
knowledge – the outcome of the research. However, the choice of any particular method of 
research depends on the research philosophy or paradigm that researchers follow to 
conduct their research (Creswell 2003). Thus, it is essential to understand the 
philosophical issues of research i.e., how the search for truth, reflected in the 
accomplishment of the aims of the research, is to be achieved. 
 Figure 5.1: Research Onion 
 
Source: Saunders et al. (2007). 
 
The research process involves a number of steps or procedures that should be followed to 
conduct research. Saunders et al. (2007) indicated that the steps of research process can be 
viewed as layers of a research onion. The research onion consists of six layers namely, 
research philosophies, approaches, strategies, choices, time horizons, techniques and 
procedures: these are shown in figure 5.1. There are important layers of the research onion 
which need to be peeled away before deciding about data collection and data analysis. 
Questions of research method are of secondary importance to questions of ontology, 
epistemology, and paradigm applicable to the research (Guba and Lincoln 1994; Saunders 
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et al. 2007). Based on this classification of the steps of research process, this section sheds 
light on the first layer of the research onion of the current study; the research philosophy.  
 
The term research philosophy relates to the development of knowledge and the nature of 
that knowledge (Saunders et al. 2007). The research philosophy adopted by researchers 
contains important assumptions about the way in which they view the world. Research in 
social science, including accounting, is based on assumptions about the nature of social 
science and the nature of society. The assumptions about the nature of social science are 
related to the ontological perspective, epistemology perspective, human nature and 
methodology. Two extreme positions can be identified on each of these assumptions, 
based on the subjective and objective dimension. These positions are presented in figure 
5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Assumptions about the Nature of Social Science 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 3).  
Thus, four assumptions are related to the nature of social science; ontology, epistemology, 
human nature and methodology. The subjective - objective dimension can be used to 
distinguish the extreme positions of each assumption. 
 
5.2.1 Ontology: 
The first assumption, ontology, concerns with the very essence of the phenomena under 
investigation. The choice of a suitable research philosophy that fits with the nature of the 
research is based on the ontological position of this sort of research. In short, ontological 
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assumptions are concerned with 'what we believe constitutes social reality' (Blaikie 2000, 
p.8). Therefore, the research ontological position is referred to as the answer to the 
question of what is the nature of the investigated social and political reality; it is a theory 
of being (Marsh and Stoker 2002, p.169).  
 
There are two ontological positions: objectivism (realism) and subjectivism (nominalism) 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979; Hirschheim 1985; Chua 1986; Hirschheim and Klein 1989; 
and Weber 2003). While the former considers that 'an ontological position that implies that 
social phenomena confront us as external facts that are beyond our reach of influence' 
(Bryman 2001, p.16), the later involves that 'social phenomena and their meanings are 
continually being accomplished by their social actors. It implies that social phenomena 
and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a 
constant state of revision' (Bryman 2001, p.18). In other words, the question is whether the 
reality is external to the individual cognition or it is a product of individual cognition. The 
realists believe that the social world exists independently of an individual's appreciation of 
it (Burrell and Morgan 1979). It is also noted that objectivists view the organisation's 
culture as something that the organisation 'has'. On the other hand the subjectivist's view 
the culture as something that the organisation 'is' as a process of continuing social 
enactment (Smircich 1983). 
 
The current research argument is based on the agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory(as discussed in chapter 4) which are considered to be an important part 
of the positive accounting theory (descriptive research). So, an objectivism ontological 
position is suitable for the study. Baker (2011) informed that, by the end of 1980s, there 
was a major shift in accounting research from a normative framework to empirical and 
positivist research. The positive accounting theory is referred to as a neo-empirical 
research. Ontologically neo-empirical research (positive accounting theory) adopts a 
strong realist (objective) position. It was founded on the ontological view that "the reality 
of accounting can be discovered by the use" (Bisman 2010, p. 6). It is believed that there is 
an objective reality that exists independent of any human agency (human involvement). 
Moreover, Bisman (2010) explained that positive accounting theory based on objectivist 
ontology had dominated the literature. Ashton et al. (2009) explained that there was 
increased popularity of positivist approaches to research. The positivist approach is the 
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scientific approach that appropriately identifies, explains and predicts accounting 
phenomena (Sharma 2013).  
 
5.2.2 Epistemology: 
The second assumption is Epistemology, a word coming from two Greek words: 
“Episteme which means ‘knowledge’ or ‘science’ and Logos which means ‘knowledge’, 
‘information’, ‘theory’ or ‘account’ (Johnson and Scholes 1997). Epistemology concerns 
what constitutes acceptable knowledge; the grounds and the nature of knowledge. In short, 
‘claims about how what is assumed to exist can be known' (Blaikie 2000, p.8). In other 
words, epistemology is the theory or science of the method or grounds of knowledge 
(OECD 2004). 
 
In general, two contrasting epistemological positions can be identified, anti-positivism and 
positivism. Positivist epistemology seeks to explain and predict what happens in the social 
world, based on the traditional approaches that dominate the natural sciences, by searching 
for regularities and causal relationships between its constituent elements (Burrell and 
Morgan 1979). According to this position the main objective of the theory is to generate 
hypotheses that can be examined. Hence, the role of research is to test theories and 
develop these theories if possible (Bryman and Bell 2003). On the other hand, Anti-
positivism is an epistemology that advocates that it is necessary for the researcher to 
understand the differences between humans as social actors. Anti-positivism epistemology 
indicates that researchers have to adopt an empathetic stance, which is considered to be a 
challenging task, to enter the social world of the research subjects and understand their 
world from their point of view.  
 
Empiricism (positivism) is the epistemological foundation of positive accounting theory. 
The positivist epistemology is built on an assumption of dualism between subject and 
object. This position believes that it is necessary to separate the subject and the object 
(Keat and Urry 1975). This indicates that role of the researcher is neutral showing that 
he/she does not influence what is being observed. Therefore, the current study follows the 
positive epistemological position. This position is called 'theory-neutral observational 
language' (Gill and Johnson 1991). 
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5.2.3 Human Nature: 
The third assumption is related to the human nature debate concerned with the relationship 
between human beings and their environment. Human nature assumption debate concerns 
the relationship between the human being and the society in which he/she lives and the 
effects of each on the other (Burrell and Morgan 1979). The two extreme positions in 
these debates are voluntarism and determinism. The determinist view considers human 
beings and their activities as being completely determined by the situation in which they 
are located. That is, it is based on perceiving human beings and their experience as the 
products of their environment. The voluntarism view, in contrast, is based on the idea that 
human beings are completely autonomous and free-willed. This view considers the human 
being as the creator and the controller of his environment (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
 
5.2.4 Methodology: 
The last assumption is related to the methodology debate which is concerned with the 
methods used to investigate and learn about the social world. A methodology is a set of 
rules which helps researchers to carry out their research. It is also a theory and analysis of 
how research does or should proceed. According to Collis and Hussey (2003, p.55), 
“methodology refers to the overall approach to the research process, from the theoretical 
underpinning to the collection and analysis of data”. In a similar vein, Easterby-Smith et 
al. (2002) maintain that methodology refers to a combination of techniques to assist 
researchers to enquire into a specific situation. There are a number of key issues with 
which methodology is concerned, including why data is collected, what data is collected 
and from where the data is collected; also, when and how the data is to be collected, and 
how it is to be analysed (Collis and Hussey 2003). 
 
Ideographic and Nomothetic are the contrast positions in this debate. The ideographic 
approach assumes that one can only understand the social world by obtaining firsthand 
knowledge of the subject under investigation. It implies the analysis of the subjective 
accounts that one generates by participating inside the situations. On the contrary, the 
nomothetic approach emphasises the importance of basing research upon systematic 
protocol and technique and involves a rigorous and scientific testing of the hypotheses 
(Burrell and Morgan 1979; Riahi-Belkaoui 2002). 
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Both ontological and epistemological positions have direct impacts to the employed 
methodological approach. Accordingly, if the philosophical assumptions of positivism and 
its consequent epistemological prescriptions are accepted, a nomothetic methodology 
would be suitable which means that it is set out to establish law-like generalisations (Gill 
and Johnson 1991). 
 
5.3 Research Paradigm: 
A paradigm is a way of examining social phenomena from which understandings and 
explanations can be gained (Saunders et al. 2007). A research paradigm is based on the 
ontological and epistemological positions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) illustrate four 
research paradigms by the following figure 5.3: 
Figure 5.3: Paradigms of Social Science 
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Source: Developed from Burrell and Morgan (1979, p. 22). 
 
The previous figure shows four paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist 
and radical structuralist. The four paradigms are arranged to correspond to four 
dimensions: radical change; regulation; subjectivist; and objectivist. These paradigms can 
be used to differentiate between four visions of accounting research (Riahi-Belkaoui 
2002). The purposes of the four paradigms are to assist researchers in clarifying their 
assumptions, offering useful understanding of the way in which researchers approach their 
work and to help researchers plotting their own route of research, to understand where it is 
possible to go and where they are going (Burrell and Morgan 1979). 
 
Subjectivist and objectivist dimensions are present in the research ontological positions. 
The radical change dimension adopts a critical perspective on organisational life. The 
regulatory perspective is less judgmental and critical. Regulations explain the way 
organisations are regulated and provide suggestions as to how they may be improved at 
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present. On the other hand, radical change dimension explains organisational problems 
from the viewpoint of the existing state of affairs (Burrell and Morgan 1979).  
 
In the top left corner the radical humanist paradigm is located within the subjectivist and 
radical change dimensions. Burrell and Morgan (1979) indicate that this is the state 'to 
articulate ways in which humans can transcend the spiritual bonds and fetters which tie 
them into existing social patterns and thus realize their full potential' (p. 32). The 
ontological position that would fit with this state is the subjectivist approach of social 
science; nominalism, anti-positivism, voluntarism and ideographic. In the top right corner 
of the quadrant is the radical structuralist paradigm which tends to the objectivist approach 
to social science; realism, positivism, determinism, and nomothetic. In this state, the 
researcher’s concern would be to approach the research with an intention of fundamental 
change based upon an analysis of specific organisational phenomena (Saunders et al. 
2007). The current study is concerned with the status quo of the corporate reporting 
practices in the annual reports of the listed companies. Therefore the radical humanist and 
radical structuralist paradigms are considered to be irrelevant to the current study. 
 
The bottom left corner of the quadrant contains the interpretive paradigm. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) stated that this paradigm suggests that 'everyday life is accorded the status 
of miraculous achievement' (p. 31). This state does not require the researcher to achieve 
change in the order of things, but it would be to understand and explain what is going on. 
However, this paradigm tends to the subjectivist approach of social science; the 
nominalist, anti-positivist, voluntarist and ideological positions which is not related with 
current research. 
 
Finally, the bottom right corner of the quadrant is the functionalist paradigm. It is noted by 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) that this paradigm 'is often problem-oriented in approach, 
concerned to provide practical solutions to practical problems' (p. 26). This paradigm 
assumes that organisations are rational entities, in which rational explanations provide 
rational solutions to rational problems. Its main assumptions include the separation 
between theory and observations that are used to test that theory, employing the hypothetic 
- deductive approach and quantitative methods in collecting and analysing data. 
Objectivism is the ontological position that fits with this paradigm. Referred to the 
research philosophy discussion, objectivism is the current research ontological position. 
 - 148 - 
Therefore, the functionalist would be the appropriate paradigm that fits with the current 
research nature and philosophy. 
 
5.4 Research Approach: 
The second layer in the research onion according to Saunders et al. (2007) is the research 
approach. In general, there are two main research approaches to choose: the deductive 
approach and the inductive approach. Deduction is "the process by which we arrive at a 
reasoned conclusion by logical generalization of a known fact". On the other hand 
induction is "a process where we observe certain phenomena and on this basis arrive at 
conclusions" (Sekaran 2003, p.27). Deductive research’s beginning point is the search to 
explain causal relationships between variables leading to the hypothesis development. 
Consequently, it is necessary to collect quantitative data, or even qualitative data, to test 
the developed hypothesis using a highly structured methodology to facilitate replication of 
the findings (Gill and Johnson 2002). The other alternative is the inductive approach. This 
approach begins with collecting and then analysing the data, the result of this analysis 
would lead to the formulation of a theory. Alternatively, the researcher may end with the 
same theory, but he/she would have gone about the production of that theory in an 
inductive way.  
 
Therefore, it is noted that theory would follow data rather than vice versa as in the 
deductive approach (Saunders et al., 2007). The deductive approach is moving or starting 
from a theory: the hypothesis is developed based on this theory and then a research 
strategy is designed to test this hypothesis, using data collected. On the other hand, under 
the inductive approach data is collected and analyzed and then a theory is developed as a 
result of the conclusion from data analysis (Bryman and Bell 2003; Sekaran 2003). 
 
Saunders et al. (2007) indicate that deduction owes more to positivism and induction to 
anti- positivism. In addition, Bryman and Bell (2003) indicate that the deductive approach, 
the testing of theory, is related to quantitative research that follows objectivism/ realism 
and positivism as ontological and epistemological positions respectively. In contrast, the 
inductive approach, the generation of theory, is related to qualitative research that follows 
constructionism/ nominalism and interpretivism as ontological and epistemological 
positions. 
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The current study does not aim to develop a theory but it seeks to describe the quality of 
corporate reporting practices in the annual reports and to investigate the relationship 
between the extent and trend of such disclosure and a number of determinant variables. 
Therefore, the deductive approach is considered to be more suitable to the present study. 
The deductive approach has been employed heavily in the disclosure literature (for 
example, Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak 2003, Ghazali and Weetman, 2006; 
Barako et al 2006; Iskander, 2008 and Abdel-Fattah 2008). This approach involves five 
sequential stages: deducing a hypothesis from the theory; expressing the hypothesis in 
operational terms; testing the operational hypothesis; examining the specific outcome of 
the inquiry (confirms the theory or indicates the need for modification); and finally 
modifying the theory, if necessary (Saunders et al. 2007). 
 
5.5 Research Design: 
The key underlying assumption is whether quantitative or qualitative research approaches 
would be appropriate. It is believed that quantitative research considers objectivity not 
only desirable but an essential aspect of this type of research. On the other hand, 
qualitative research believes that objectivity is not possible therefore subjectivity must be 
acknowledged for this sort of research. As this sort of research is based on the realist 
(subjective) ontology, variables are representations of the real world and can objectively 
determine the established causal relationship where the outcome can be generalised to 
other (similar) situations (set of variables). Moreover, while employing quantitative 
research, the researcher remains separate from the data in order to maintain objectivity 
(Gaffikin 2005). As a result, with reference to the objective ontological position of the 
current research, it is believed that a quantitative research stance would be appropriate to 
test the developed hypotheses deduced from the agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory employed by the study. It can be said that the current study uses 
quantitative research to find out the quality of corporate reporting. 
 
The survey technique is appropriate to this type of quantitative research and is usually 
associated with the deductive approach (Saunders et al. 2003). Surveys give a picture of 
what many people think or report doing and are often used in descriptive or explanatory 
research (Neuman 1997). The survey technique facilitates the research of the 'what' 
question in the form of 'how many' or 'how much' (Yin 2003). Strategically, the research is 
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using the survey method to gather the required data through two different sources, 
secondary and primary data respectively. 
 
The current study is a single country study; it focuses on the mandatory reporting, 
voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting practice in the annual reports of the 
Bangladeshi listed companies. As indicated in chapter three, the majority of single country 
disclosure studies employ cross sectional analysis and focus on the reporting practice in a 
specific point of time (one year), a few studies address the reporting practices over a 
period of time. The present study is considered to be a longitudinal study; it examines 
quality of reporting through quality of mandatory reporting, quality of voluntary reporting 
and timeliness of reporting practice over a period of time using up to date data; the recent 
available data at the time of conducting the study. 
 
As a result, the study adopts an objectivist ontology and positive epistemological position 
because the current research is considered to be neo-empirical research adopting a positive 
accounting theory (descriptive research): in this light this research relies on agency, 
stakeholder and signalling theory. Therefore, the study used a hypothetico-deductive 
methodological approach because it fits with testing the employed theory by setting a set 
of research hypotheses.  
 
5.6 Index Construction: 
Disclosure indices are extensive lists of selected items, which may be disclosed in 
company report (Marston and Shrives 1991). A disclosure index could include mandatory 
items of information and/or voluntary items of information. It can enclose information 
reported in one or more disclosure vehicles such as corporate annual reports, interim 
reports and investor relations. It can also cover the information reported by the company 
itself or others including the reports of financial analysts (Hassan et al. 2009). Hence, a 
disclosure index is a research appliance to evaluate the extent of information reported in a 
particular disclosure media or medium, by a particular organisation(s) according to a list 
of selected items of information. The first use of such an index was in 1961 by Cerf and it 
has been in use ever since. Some of the examples of using disclosure index are given 
below:  
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1970s Singhvi and Desai 1971; Choi 1973; Buzby 1974a; 1975; Firth 1979. 
1980s Firth 1984; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987. 
1990s Cooke 1992; Wallace et al. 1994; Meek et al. 1995; Inchausti 1997; Botosan 1997. 
2000s Depoers 2000; Hope 2003a; 2003b; Abd-Elsalam and Weetman 2003; Naser and 
Nuseibeh 2003; Ali et al. 2004; Coy and Dixon 2004; Das and Das 2008; Hasan et 
al. 2008; Hassan et al. 2009; Alsaeed 2006; Aljifri 2008; Hossain  2008; Hossain 
and Hammami 2009.  
2010s Al Shammri and Al Sutal 2010; Rouf and Al Harun 2011; Galani et al. 2011; 
Sobhani et al. 2012; Bhayani 2012; Ahmed 2012; Alves et al. 2012; Samah et al. 
2012; Hassan 2013; Hajji and Ghazali 2013; Antonis et al. 2014; Kaya 2014; 
Muttakin and Khan 2014. 
 
Disclosure studies that employ a disclosure index can be classified based on the extent of 
content analysis, into two types: a partial content analysis and a holistic content analysis. 
In a partial content analysis, researchers identify a list of disclosure topics, while in 
holistic content analysis researchers investigate the whole annual report to construct their 
disclosure index (Beattie et al. 2004 and Hussainey 2004). The current study focuses on 
the whole annual report to measure the level of mandatory and voluntary disclosure. The 
disclosure index is a ratio of the actual disclosure scores awarded to a company to the 
maximum possible disclosure required or expected (Cooke 1989 and Hodgdon 2004). 
 
A review of previous studies shows a great variation in the construction of the disclosure 
index. Prior studies using the disclosure indexes vary in terms of the degree of the 
researcher involvement in constructing the index, the type of information disclosed and the 
number of items of information included in the index. There are differences in the 
measurement approach, the range of industries/countries covered by the index and other 
differences, which are subject to the research purpose(s), design, and context. For 
example, studies from developing countries tend to examine the level of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure because of a relaxed enforcement policy compared to that of 
developed countries (e.g., Ali et al. 2004). 
 
The degree of the researcher involvement in constructing a disclosure index varies from 
full involvement to no involvement. Full involvement means that the researcher controls 
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the entire process of constructing a disclosure index from selecting the items of 
information to be included in the index, to scoring these items. No involvement means that 
the researcher depends on available disclosure indices from prior studies or professional 
organizations (see, for example Patel et al. 2002; Ali et al. 2007; Barron et al. 1999; Salter 
1998; Hope 2003a; 2003b; Bushman et al. 2004; Richardson and Welker 2001). Between 
these two extremes, various degrees of researcher involvement are found (see, for 
example, Choi 1973; Buzby 1974a, 1975; Firth 1979; 1984; Chow and Wong-Boren 
1987).  
 
Different disclosure indices have been used in previous studies since there is no agreed 
theory on either the type or the number of items of information to be included in the index. 
The number of items of information included in disclosure indices in prior studies varies 
from a few items (Tai et al. 1990) to a few hundreds of items of information (Ahmed and 
Karim 2005, 411 items). In addition the type of information selected can cover: 
 
Mandatory disclosure Tai et al. 1990; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Wallace et al. 
1994, Akhtaruddin 2005; Hasan et al. 2008; Galani et al. 
2011; Hassan 2013.  
Voluntary disclosure Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; Botosan 1997; Depoers 2000; 
Meek et al. 1995; Das and Das 2008; Akhtaruddin et al. 
2009; Al Shammari and Al Sultan 2010; Rouf and Al Harun 
2011; Samah et al. 2012; Qu et al. 2012; Hajji and Ghazali 
2013. 
Mandatory and Voluntary Singhvi and Desai 1971; Buzby 1975; Cooke 1992; 
Inchausti 1997; Marston and Robson 1997; Naser and Rana 
2003; Hossain 2008; Hassan et al. 2009. 
 
5.6.1 Steps of Disclosure Index: 
In order to construct a disclosure index, three steps have be taken. The first is developing a 
checklist or scoring sheet, by selecting informational items to be included in this checklist. 
The second is to score the items and the third is to compute the disclosure index. The three 
steps involve some practical problems that may affect the reliability and validity of the 
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disclosure index e.g. using partial scores, weighted scores, and scoring inapplicable items 
(Marston and Shrives 1991). The following paragraphs deal with these steps. 
 
5.6.1.1 Developing the Checklist: 
The first and important step is the selection of items that might be expected to be reported 
in corporate annual reports. However, Wallace (1988) indicates that there is no general 
theory on the items that should be selected to assess the extent of disclosure. Moreover, 
the relevant literature shows that there is no commonly used theory to determine the 
number and selection of items for a disclosure index (Hooks et al. 2000). The content of 
and number of items in a disclosure index have varied from one study to another and 
selection depends on the focus of the research (Wallace and Naser 1995). The majority of 
disclosure studies base their selection of items on many sources such as previous studies, 
laws and regulations, recommendations from specialised professional organisation, and 
comments from the users of annual reports. 
 
The present study follows the laws and regulations to develop a self-constructed 
mandatory index. In the case of the voluntary disclosure index, this research follows prior 
disclosure studies and recommendations from specialised professional organisation. To 
develop the checklist a number of steps have been taken as follows: 
 
• A mandatory disclosure index was constructed by considering each of the financial 
reporting requirements in Bangladesh, including the Company Act SEC rules and 
guidelines, BAS and BFRS. In the case of the voluntary index, with the first stage was to 
prepare a preliminary checklist that contains the expected voluntary information items. 
The literature concerning voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports and voluntary 
items recommended for disclosure by professional organisations has been used to develop 
such checklist.  
 
• To ensure the clear distinction between mandatory and voluntary checklist items, the 
preliminary checklist that includes voluntary disclosure items, is reviewed against the 
mandatory disclosure requirements in accounting standards, company act, listing rules and 
other laws.  
 
• Since the current study covers seven years, attention has been paid to any new 
requirement for mandatory disclosure during the examined period to ensure that the 
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checklist is relevant to each of the seven years. For this reason, index items for mandatory 
disclosure are different in different periods. 
 
• As one of the steps used to achieve the validity of the research instrument, three 
Bangladeshi academics have been asked to refine the preliminary checklist for 
independent review; one of them experienced in auditing with Bangladeshi listed 
companies and another has experience of working with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission.  
 
• Additionally to ensure that the final checklist includes the voluntary and mandatory 
items that are important and relevant to the context of Bangladesh, the checklist is updated 
by following a pilot study of annual reports of ten companies for the first and last year of 
the examined period, 2004 and 2010. These ten companies are selected randomly from 
different sectors in the sample population. 
 
5.6.1.2 Scoring the Items: 
To capture the level of disclosure, Cooke (1989) indicates two main approaches to 
developing a scoring scheme: The first approach, advocated by Copeland and Fredericks 
(1968), depends on the presentation of information. Under this approach, the researcher 
counts the number of words used to describe an item disclosed. Cooke (1989) criticises 
such a scoring procedure due to the subjectivity in the allocation of scores and suggests a 
second approach: a dichotomous procedure. Under a dichotomous procedure, a required 
disclosure item scores one if it is disclosed and zero if it is not disclosed. Support for such 
a system stems from Cooke (1989, 1993) and is endorsed by Williams (2001), Bujaki and 
McConomy (2002), Barako et al. (2006), and Morris et al. (2011).  
 
However, to avoid any negative effect on the reliability and validity of the disclosure 
scores, two issues related to the scoring process must be considered: weighting the score 
and inapplicable items. The literature on the use of indexes was divided between 
unweighted and weighted indexes. For the unweighted index, dichotomous scores are 
used, where 0 is given for nondisclosure and 1 is given for disclosure item. The weighted 
index, however, is based on the rank a user of the annual report attaches to the information 
in a disclosure item. Those who advocate the use of the weighted index believe that such a 
score reflects both the extent and importance of each disclosure item that forms the index 
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(Robbins and Austin 1986). However, those who argue against the use of the weighted 
index contend that the weighting does not significantly alter the results (Chow and Wong- 
Boren 1987; Robbins and Austin 1986; Wallace and Naser1995).  
 
In this study, for mandatory reporting an unweighted (i.e., all elements are treated equally) 
disclosure model was used. An unweighted index obviates the necessity of making 
judgments on the relative importance of each information item. Research shows that 
individuals, even experts, have poor insight into their own judgment process (see, e.g. 
Ashton 1974). Secondly, it permits an independent analysis devoid of the perceptions of a 
particular annual report user group. Finally, this study does not focus on the interest of any 
particular annual report user group and since this reporting is mandatory, users do not have 
any options to choice or rank them. The differential weighting system is beset by several 
problems which are well documented in the literature (see, e.g., Firer and Meth 1986; 
Dhaliwal 1980; Owusu-Ansah 1998). Einhom and Hogarth, (1975) also demonstrated that 
the equal weighting system is superior to the differential weighting system. 
 
In contrast, the analysis of voluntary reporting is based on both weighted and unweighted 
methods. This helps assess the outcome under the two methods and provides new evidence 
from a developing country such as Bangladesh. Five weighting points are given to items 
viewed as very important by the respondents; four points for those viewed as important, 
three points for moderately important, two points for little importance, and one point for 
very little importance.  
 
5.6.1.3 Index Computation: 
After scoring all items, the disclosure score is calculated by summing the scores. It is 
common in the literature to use additive indices (Williams 2001; Bujaki and McConomy 
2002; Gompers et al. 2003; Bebchuk et al. 2009; Aggarwal et al. 2010). To avoid a 
situation where a sample company will be penalised for non-disclosure of certain items in 
the index which, in fact, are inapplicable to it, a 'relative index' was used (Babbie 2009, p. 
172). The relative index is the ratio of what the reporting company actually discloses to 
what the company is expected to disclose under a regulatory regime. The relative index 
approach has been used in prior studies (e.g., Wallace 1988; Cooke 1989, Wallace et al. 
1994; Inchausti 1997, Leventis and Weetman 2004; Akhtaruddin 2005; Barako et al. 2006; 
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Ghazali and Weetman 2006; and Galani et al. 2011). This can be presented mathematically 
as follows:  
UIx = [∑ T tx]/ nx 
Where, UIx is the unweighted index scored by company, x, 0 ≤ Ix ≤1; Ttx is the 
information item disclosed by company x; nx is the maximum number of items expected 
to be disclosed by a company; 
WIx = [∑ wT tx]/ nx  
Where, WIx is the weighted index scored by company x, 0 ≤ Ix ≤1; w is the weighting 
point, and Ttx is the information item disclosed by company x. 
 
5.6.1.4 Questionnaire Survey: 
In order to determine the weightings for voluntary disclosure, the research uses a 
questionnaire survey. The main objective of this questionnaire is to determine the extent of 
voluntary disclosure using user expectation. In total 450 questionnaires were sent and a 
total of 198 individuals responded, giving an overall response rate of 44%, ranging from 
23% for financial analyst to 72% for academicians (see Table 5. 1), 65% of these 
responded are male and the rest are female. The questionnaire was conducted online. A 
sample questionnaire and basic information on respondents is given in appendix P and N 
respectively. 
Table 5.1: Response Rate of Questionnaire 
S.L. Categories No. in Sample No. of Responding Response rate 
1 Accountant 86 36 42% 
2 Financial Analyst 26 6 23% 
3 Researchers 20 12 60% 
4 Academician 71 51 72% 
5 Students 145 57 39% 
6 Other Users 102 36 35% 
  Total 450 198 44% 
 
The questionnaire was sent to six different categories of user: Accountants, Financial 
Analysts, Researchers, Academicians, Students and Other users. For the students’ group 
the questionnaire was only given to those who had completed at least three years in 
undergraduate study. The main intention of these six categories is to cover the major area 
of knowledgeable users as the questionnaire is related to the expectation of voluntary 
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disclosure. The current study obtained this objective as 97% of those who responded hold 
educational qualifications at Bachelor degrees or above and 48% of those who responded 
have work experience of five years or more. On the basis of users response different 
categories of voluntary disclosure weight is given in table 5.2. In addition individual 
weight of each voluntary item has been given in Appendix O.  From the table 5.2 it is 
observed that financial information got the highest priority followed by corporate strategic 
information: whereas social responsibility information had the lowest priority. Using the 
weight from the questionnaire a weighted disclosure index will be computed in chapter 7. 
Table 5.2: Weight of Different Categories of Voluntary Disclosure 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.7 Data Collection: 
Published reports are the main vehicle firms use to communicate information to external 
users and the annual report is perceived as the most important, frequent and major source 
of information among all other sources (Epstein and Pava 1993; Lang and Lundholm 
1993; Cook and Sutton 1995; Gray et al. 1996; Bartlett and Chandler 1997; Botosan 1997; 
Naser et al. 2002; Akhtaruddin 2005; Alattar and Al-Khater 2007; Catasús 2008; Chau and 
Gray 2010). In the case of Bangladesh, according to Karim et al. (1996), annual reports of 
the companies are considered as the most important source of information about the 
company. 
 
To provide answers to the research question mentioned in chapter 1, a two step approach 
was used. For primary data, in order to measure the weight of voluntary disclosure, a 
questionnaire was prepared and sent to professional accountants, academics, research 
organisations employees, regulatory authorities and users of annual report who had a 
 Categories of Voluntary Disclosure Weight 
General Information 0.8217 
Corporate Strategic 0.8455 
Corporate Governance 0.7507 
Financial Information 0.8260 
Financial Review 0.8462 
Social Responsibility 0.7404 
Environmental Reporting 0.7594 
Sustainability Reporting 0.7674 
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business education background. For secondary data, three steps are followed to collect the 
data. Firstly, collection from the DSEB Library; secondly, where annual reports are not 
available in the DSE, current study first try to collect them from that particular company's 
website: finally, if this fails to uncover the reports then a direct address is made to the 
company.  In general companies’ websites did not have previous year's annual reports and 
most interestingly, in most of the cases they provide only a summarised version of their 
annual report. Also, the company's respective personal did not reply to the mail and letter. 
Even when approached directly in person, they are not interested in providing the 
published annual report.  
 
But the fact is that in Bangladesh, except for the Dhaka Stock exchange library; there is no 
particular organisation that can provide companies’ annual reports. There is a regulation 
that every listed company has to submit their annual report to the BSEC. When collecting 
data for the study, it is observed that either companies did not follow that regulation or the 
DSE authority did not manage it properly. Recently, scanned PDF copy of annual reports 
may be bought from the DSEB library by the intended user. However, they did not have a 
soft copy of all the annual reports that are in the library. For this reason, both soft and hard 
copies of annual report are secondary information sources. 
 
5.8 Sample Size: 
The data set for this study is based on panel data collected from companies listed on the 
Dhaka Stock Exchange of Bangladesh for the period 2004-2010. In order to compare the 
changes of reporting pattern before and after the corporate governance code of 2006, the 
study considers two years back from the cut-off point and uses data up to the year 2010 
when the latest published annual reports available during the period of data collection. 
Bangladeshi listed companies made a significant delay in publishing their annual reports 
on a timely basis, and approximately 10 percent of listed companies have do not published 
annual reports even three years after fiscal year-end dates (Karim and Jamal 2005).  It is 
desirable to take the same number of years before and after the code for comparison. 
However this would have required working with a much smaller sample size as the 
number of available annual reports of sample companies was very small before 2004. So, 
the current study decided that it was better to enlarge the sample size to find out the 
boarder picture. However, the current sample year is not inappropriate with the research 
objectives as it analyses the findings year by year rather than only before and after the 
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code of 2006. Moreover, as the study shows reporting patterns increase significantly year 
by year: there is also a significant difference before and after the code: giving the study an 
earlier start date would produce the same results. 
 
According to annual report of SEC 2010, the total number of listed companies in 2010 is 
233. Data is taken from the annual reports of listed companies on the Dhaka Stock 
Exchange (DSE); all companies were considered for inclusion in the survey. The main 
criteria used for sampling the firms were: firstly, the firm must have been listed for the 
entire period of the study (2004-2010) and secondly, annual reports must be available at 
the stock exchange. In order to fix the population size, the current study tracks the 
following simple mathematical formula: 
Particulars Population Size 
Companies listed  at the end of 31st December, 2010 
Less: Total companies listed in period  from 2005 to 2010 
233 
72 
Companies listed and operated from 2004 to 2010 161 
 
Based on the above criteria, a population size is 161 firms. From the population the study 
obtained 123 companies (sample’s name is given in appendix L) annual report for the 
seven year by using all possible sources mentioned above. For this reason the total sample 
size is (123*7)861 firm years. An overview of the sector wise sample size is shown in 
table 5.3. 
Table 5.3: Population and Sample Size of the Study 
Sectors Total*
1
 Population*
2
 Sample 
Bank 30 25 24 
Cement 5 5 5 
Ceramic 5 3 3 
Financial Institution 21 4 3 
Engineering  22 17 11 
Food and Allied 17 17 8 
Fuel and Power 12 5 1 
Insurance 44 21 20 
IT Sector 5 4 4 
Jute  4 4 2 
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Paper and Printing 1 1 1 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 19 15 11 
Services and Real Estate 6 4 2 
Tannery Industries 5 5 4 
Textile 25 21 16 
Telecommunication 1 0 0 
Travel and Leisure 2 1 1 
Miscellaneous 9 9 7 
Total 233 161 123 
*1 Total listed companies at the end of 2010.  
*2 Based on criteria, total listed companies operating from 2004 to 2010. 
 
5.9 Empirical 1: Corporate Mandatory Reporting: 
5.9.1 Introduction: 
In empirical one, the study aims to investigate the quality of mandatory reporting practices 
in the annual reports of the listed companies in Bangladesh. Furthermore, it seeks to 
examine empirically, the association between the extent of mandatory reporting: and a 
number of corporate governance characteristics, ownership aspects and firm 
characteristics. It measures the extent of total mandatory reporting and its categories in the 
corporate annual report based on a self-constructed checklist of mandatory reporting items 
and using an unweighted disclosure index. The index was applied to the sample 
companies’ annual reports from 2004 to 2010: accounting period ending any time between 
January and December 2004 and 2010.  
 
5.9.2 Mandatory Disclosure Checklist: 
The checklist forms a disclosure index that will show the level of mandatory corporate 
reporting. The checklist is composed of different sections relating to the different 
categories of mandatory reporting. The disclosure level is measured using the percentage 
of the present items over the total disclosure index items. Table 5.4 shows the number of 
items relevant to each of those parts of an annual report. 
 
A disclosure index was constructed based on a rigorous study of the existing regulatory 
framework for listed companies and an examination of the IASs and IFRS adopted in 
Bangladesh until January 2010, when it was last updated. The mandatory components of 
the regulatory framework, as mentioned in Chapter Two, included the Companies Act 
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1994, the Securities and Exchange Rules 1987 and SEC Corporate Governance Code of 
2006 and others. The mandatory corporate disclosure checklist is shown in the Appendix 
A with their sources. 
Table 5.4: Distribution of Index into Different Parts of Annual Report 
 Parts of Annual Report 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
M
a
n
d
a
to
ry
 D
is
cl
o
su
re
 
General Information 25 25 26 27 27 27 27 
Directors Report 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 
Balance Sheet 48 48 48 57 57 57 59 
Income Statement 35 35 35 40 40 40 40 
Cash flow Statement 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Accounting Policies and Notes 17 17 18 23 23 23 25 
Other information 9 9 10 13 13 13 13 
 Total 148 148 152 175 175 175 179 
 
Current study used seven mandatory disclosure indexes, as all BAS, BFRS and corporate 
governance code are not applicable to all year of the study. Some regulations are imposed 
during the period of study and these items are checked from the year of adaptation and not 
before that. For example BAS 1, BAS 2, BAS 8, BAS 10, BAS 16, BAS 17, BAS 18, BAS 
21, BAS 26 and BAS 33 are adopted on or after 1st January 2007, so these items are only 
included in the year 2007 and onwards. Moreover, BAS 23, BAS 27 and BEFS 3 adopted 
on or after 1st of January 2010, so these are only applicable in the year 2010. All others 
mandatory items are applied from the beginning of the study or the items are sourced from 
a law that was passed before the study period. 
 
5.9.3 Hypotheses Development for Mandatory Disclosure: 
Demand for corporate disclosure and financial reporting increases day by day due to 
agency conflicts and information asymmetry between managers and outside investors 
(Healy and Palepu 2001). Firm characteristics as well as corporate governance attributes 
are considered to be important in this respect (Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Ho and Wong 
2001; Chau and Gray 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; Aktaruddin 
2005; Barako et al. 2006; Aljifri 2008; Hossain 2008; Hossain and Hammami 2009; 
Akhtartuddin et al. 2009; Rouf 2011; Galani et al. 2011; Hajji and Ghazali 2013). Based 
on the literature review in chapter three and theory in chapter four the study consider firm 
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size, profitability, leverage, audit firm size, multinational parents, industry and ownership 
as determinants of mandatory reporting for listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
5.9.3.1 Firm Size: 
Prior studies have found a positive relationship between company size and the extent of 
disclosure. A number of reasons have been advanced in the literature in an attempt to 
justify this relationship on a priori grounds. For example, Singhvi and Desai (1971, p.131) 
offered three justifications for the variations in the extent of financial disclosure in firms 
of different sizes. Firstly, the cost of accumulating certain information is greater for small 
firms than for large firms. Secondly, larger firms have a greater need for disclosure 
because their securities are typically distributed across a more diverse network of 
exchanges, and thirdly, management of a smaller corporation is likely to believe more 
strongly than the management of a larger corporation, that the full disclosure of 
information could endanger its competitive position. 
  
Larger companies tend to disclose more information than smaller companies in their 
annual reports due to their competitive cost advantage (Lang and Lundholm 1993; Lobo 
and Zhou 2001). Larger companies are more likely to have the resources in place to 
prepare for an event (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Hossain and Adams 1995) and are likely 
to have a higher level of internal reporting to keep senior management informed of 
progress and, therefore, are likely to have relevant information available (Owusu-Ansah, 
1998). Additionally, larger companies are likely to come under more scrutiny from 
financial analysts (Hossain and Adams 1995) and shareholders (Cooke 1989) than smaller 
companies: this leads to pressure for better disclosure. Wallace and Naser (1995) argue 
that larger firms naturally attract a large number of suppliers, customers, and analysts, 
which consequently increases the demand for information about their activities. The 
higher disclosure enables these large companies to maintain their reputation in the eyes of 
the public and to attract investors (Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Wallace and Naser 
1995). Moreover, political cost arguments have been put forward in support of a positive 
association between firm size and disclosure (Cooke 1989; Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Wallace et al. 1994). 
 
Empirical evidence generally supports the association between firm size and financial 
reporting quality (Singhvi 1968; Singhvi and Desai 1971; Buzby 1975; Davies and Kelly 
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1979; Courtis 1979; Firth 1979; McNally et al. 1982; Chow and Wong-Boren 1987; 
Cooke 1989, 1991, 1992; Tai et al. 1990; Hossain et al. 1994; Wallace et al. 1994; Hossain 
et al. 1995; Raffournier 1995; Wallace and Naser 1995; Inchausti 1997; Marston and 
Robson 1997; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Clarkson et. al. 2003;  
Kamal et al. 2006; Alsaeed 2006; Hasan et al. 2008; Adelopo 2010;  Nandi and Ghosh 
2012) although there are a number of notable exceptions, such as Stanga (1976), Spero 
(1979), Malone et al. (1993), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994);  Ahmed (1996) , Aljifri (2008),  
Pahuja and Bhatia (2010) and  Hasan et al. (2013). 
H1: There is a significant positive association between firm size and the extent of 
mandatory reporting in the listed companies of Bangladesh. 
 
5.9.3.2 Profitability:  
Profitability is another factor that is found to affect the extent of mandatory reporting 
(Ahmad and Karim 2005). Corporate annual reports are deliberately made complex to 
communicate bad news and made more lucid to communicate good news (Adelberg 1979). 
Inchausti (1997) employing signalling theory, states that  management when in possession 
of “good news” due to better performance are more likely to disclose more detailed 
information to the stock market than that provided by “bad news” companies who wish to 
avoid undervaluation of their shares. It can also be argued that unprofitable companies will 
also be inclined to release more information in defense of poor performance.  
 
Profitability was found positive association with reporting by Cerf (1961), Singhvi (1967), 
Singhvi and Desai (1971), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Spero (1979) and Wallace (1987), 
Wallace et al. (1994), Karim et al. (1996), Owusu-Ansah (1998), Hossain (2000), Ali et 
al.(2004), Wang and Claiborne (2008), Tagesson et al. (2009), Nandi and Ghosh (2012) 
and Wu and Chung-Hua (2013). In contrast, Reverte (2009), Bujaki and McConomy 
(2002), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978) found a negative association between them. Bujaki and 
McConomy (2002) asserted that firms facing a slowdown in revenue tend to increase their 
disclosure on issues relating to disclosure. However, previous researchers such as Wallace 
et al. (1994), Akhtaruddin (2005), Hasan et al. (2008), Aljifri (2008) and Uyar (2011) 
found that the association between the profitability and comprehensiveness of disclosure is 
not significant.  
H.2 There is a significant positive association between profitability and the level of 
mandatory reporting in the annual reports of listed companies. 
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5.9.3.3 Leverage:  
The degree to which a firm's financial structure is geared has been used in a few disclosure 
studies to examine the association between gearing ratio and reporting levels. Highly 
leveraged firms have a wider obligation to disclose the information, especially financial 
information, in order to convince their long-term creditors that they have enough sources 
to fund the business (Muhamad et al. 2009). Agency theory has largely been used also to 
explain the relationship between firm leverage and financial reporting quality. It is argued 
that as leverage increases, there are wealth transfers from fixed claimants to residual 
claimants (Baba 2011). Ahmed (1996) suggests that the agency costs of debt are higher for 
companies with more debt in their capital structure and these costs may be reduced by an 
increased the level of reporting. Thus, to reduce monitoring costs, firms are expected to 
disclose more information and so there is an association between the levels of corporate 
disclosure and leverage (Jensen and Meckling 1976 and Aksu and Kosedag 2005). 
Moreover, a company with a higher gearing level has a greater obligation to satisfy the 
needs of its long-term creditors for information and may therefore provide more 
information in its annual reports than a more modestly geared company (Wallace et al. 
1994).  
 
Empirical evidence appears to be inconclusive. While Courtis (1979), Ahmed and Courtis 
(1999), Malone et al. (1993), Hossain et al.(1994), Wallace and Naser (1995), Hossain et 
al.(1995), Patton and Zelenka (1997), Aksu and Kosedag (2005), Barako et al. (2006), 
Adelopo (2010) and Hajji and Ghazali (2013) found a positive relationship between 
leverage and the extent of financial reporting, many researchers have not (Chow and 
Wong-Boren 1987; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Wallace et al. 1994; Raffournier 1995; 
Wallace and Naser 1995; Ahmed 1996; Inchausti 1997; Owusu-Ansah1998; Collett and 
Hrasky 2005 and Gunawan 2007. On the other hand, Belkaoui and Kahl (1978), Zarzeski 
(1996), Nandi and Ghosh (2012) and Allegrini and Greco (2013), found a negative 
relationship between leverage and corporate reporting, suggesting that highly leveraged 
companies tend to disclose private information to their creditors which may not be 
reflected in their annual reports. These conflicting results provide genuine incentives for 
further investigation of this relationship.  
 
H3: There is a significant positive association between the leverage and the level of 
mandatory reporting for non-financial companies. 
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5.9.3.4 Audit Firm Size: 
The audit firm responsible for reporting to shareholders can significantly influence the 
amount and quality of information disclosed in the corporate annual report (Belkaoui and 
Kahl 1978; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994, and Owusu-Ansah 1998). It is expected that in 
countries where the Big Four audit firms operate, financial statements certified by any Big 
Four firm carry more credibility than those audited by non Big Four firms. Many 
disclosure studies examined the potential association between the audit firm size and 
extent of reporting. Among them Singhvi and Desai (1971), Ahmed and Nicholls (1994), 
Clarkson et al. (2003), Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005), Kent and Stewart (2008); Hasan et 
al.(2008) and Uyar(2011) found positive association between audit firm size and the extent 
of reporting. However, Wallace et al. (1994); Hossain et al. (1994) and Barako et al. 
(2006) found an insignificant association. On the other hand, Wallace and Naser (1995) 
reported a negative association between type of auditor and the extent of compliance with 
mandatory disclosure.  
 
In practice, auditor reputation or quality is perceived in a connection to the major audit 
firms, namely the BIG 4 (Brown et al. 2010) and financial information is more reliable for 
BIG 4 clients in comparison with other companies (Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker et al. 
1998). Clients believed larger audit firms offer greater assurance on financial statements 
prepared for external parties and consequently they may have appointed a larger audit firm 
to signal their own quality (Omran and Marwa 2010). It is also assumed that these firms 
have a greater incentive to protect their reputation because of their larger client base 
(Francis and Krishnan 1999; Krishnan 2003). But, Kabir et al. (2011) adds to the literature 
by demonstrating that the Big 4 affiliates may have no positive impact on reporting quality 
in a small and emerging market with poor regulations and low investor protection. 
  
According to signalling theory, audit firms may benefit from the higher level of disclosure 
in the annual reports of its clients as a signal of their own quality and reputation. 
Therefore, auditing firms may support and encourage their clients to comply with 
mandatory disclosure requirements (Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Inchausti 1997; 
Abdelsalam 1999). In Bangladesh, none of the Big Four audit firms have a named branch. 
The Big 4 international audit firms tend to operate in smaller capital markets through a 
local audit firm and Bangladesh is one such setting where this unique alliance occurs. To 
enhance the reputation of its capital market, Bangladesh attracted the international Big 4 
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audit firms to operate through a local audit firm (Kabir et al. 2011). Four local audit firms 
are members of the Big 4 auditors; Rahman Rahman Huq (RRH), Hoda Vasi Chowdhury, 
A Qasem and Co. and S F Ahmed are linked with KPMG International, Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu, Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst and Young, respectively.  
 
H4: There is significant positive association with audit firm size and extent of mandatory 
reporting of listed companies. 
 
5.9.3.5 Multinational Parent: 
Multinational Corporation (MNC) affiliation status is believed to positively influence 
disclosure level, i.e., firms, which have MNC affiliation, are likely to disclose more 
information. MNC's are expected to demand more information because of various reasons 
associated with emerging economies (Owusu-Ansah 1998). Wallace (1987) and Ahmed 
and Nicholls (1994) used multinational company influence as an explanatory variable in 
developing their models and the latter found it to be the most significant variable 
explaining disclosure levels. 
 
Subsidiaries of multinational corporations operating in developing countries are expected 
to disclose more information and observe higher standards of reporting for a number of 
reasons. Firstly, they have to comply with the regulations of not only the host country but 
also the parent company, where substantially higher standards of accounting and reporting 
are maintained (Karim and Jamal 2005). Secondly, demand for information is expected to 
be higher from foreign investors due to the geographical separation between management 
and owners (Bradbury 1992; Craswell and Taylor 1992). Thirdly, they are under closer 
scrutiny from various political and pressure groups within the host country who view them 
as sources of economic exploitation and agents of imperialist power (Ahmed and Nicholls 
1994). Finally, diffusion of ownership has been empirically found to be an important 
variable in explaining the variability of corporate financial disclosure (Leftwich et al. 
1981; Craswell and Taylor 1992; Hossain et al. 1994): the demand for information is 
expected to be greater when a high proportion of shares are held by foreign investors. 
 
H5: There is a significant positive association between the multinational company 
influence and the extent of mandatory reporting. 
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5.9.3.6 Industry:  
The nature of the industry has been identified as a significant factor that influences the 
disclosure practices (Amran and Haniffa 2010). A number of studies investigate the 
relationship between a company’s industry membership and the extent of its disclosure 
(e.g. Cerf 1961; Owusu- Ansah 1998). Because of their unique features, companies from a 
particular industry group might have different disclosure levels compared to others 
(Wallace et al. 1994). As a result of competition or political pressure, companies in some 
industries may face a level of pressure to disclose certain type of information. If a 
company does not adopt a similar reporting strategy to other companies in the same sector 
or industry, the market may interpret this situation as a bad signal (Inchausti 1997).  
 
The empirical evidence from previous studies is mixed. A number of studies report 
evidence of a significant association between the extent of disclosure and the industry 
type: manufacturing companies were found to disclose more information than non 
manufacturing companies (Cooke 1991, 1998; Ng and Tai 1994; Meek et al. 1995; 
Camfferman and Cooke 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002 and Fekete et al. 2008). It may be 
worth mentioning that the suggested reasons for this association differ among studies. On 
the other hand, some studies provide evidence of no significant association between the 
industry type and the extent of disclosure (Tai et al. 1990; Wallace et al. 1994; Raffournier 
1995; Inchausti 1997; Patton and Zelenka 1997; Naser et al. 2002; Eng and Mak 2003; 
Alsaeed 2006). 
 
H6: There is significant positive association between financial institutions and the extent 
of mandatory reporting of the listed companies.  
 
5.9.3.7 Ownership:  
Ownership structure is another mechanism that aligns the interest of shareholders and 
managers (Wang and Claiborne 2008; Eng and Mak 2003; Haniffa and Cooke 2002 and 
Chau and Gray 2002). Studies have found conflicting results on the impact of ownership 
structure on a firm’s financial reporting quality. Hossain et al. (1994) suggested a negative 
association between management ownership structure and the level of disclosure by 
Malaysian listed firms. Moreover, Adelopo (2010) found that the percentage of block 
share ownership and the percentage of managerial share ownership were found to be 
negatively related to firm disclosures. Akther and Rouf (2011) argued that firms with 
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higher management ownership structure may disclose less information to shareholders. 
This is because the determined ownership structure provides firms lower incentives to 
disclose information to meet the needs of non-dispersed shareholders groups. Chau and 
Gray (2002) found a negative relationship between insider-family controlled companies 
and reporting quality. Again, Eng and Mark (2003) reported that lower management 
ownership and significant government ownership are associated with higher disclosure.  
Similar results are also found in Oliveira et al. (2006), Bauwhede and Marleen (2008) and 
they reported that firms with a lower management ownership report more information.  
 
From an agency theory perspective, a positive relationship is envisaged between 
ownership and firm disclosure (Fama and Jensen 1983; Jensen and Mecklings 1976). In 
addition, Hongxia and Ainian (2008) show that higher managerial ownership companies 
have high level of disclosures. Eng and Mark (2003) reported that significant government 
ownership is associated with higher disclosure among listed firms in Singapore. 
McKinnon and Dalimunthe (1993) reported a positive relationship between dispersed 
ownership structure and financial reporting quality. Similar results have been reported in 
Barako et al. (2006) who found a positive relationship between foreign and dispersed 
ownership and corporate disclosure. Hongxia and Ainian (2008) also show that companies 
with a higher managerial ownership have a high level of disclosure. On the other hand, 
Naser et al. (2002) and Wallace et al (1994) could not document any significant 
relationship between ownership structure and firms’ reporting quality.  
 
H7: There is significant negative association between ownership and mandatory 
disclosure of the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
5.9.4 Variable Measurement: 
Firm Size: 
Corporate size can be measured in a number of different ways and there is no overriding 
reason to prefer one to the other(s) (Cooke 1991). Foster (1986) highlighted corporate size 
by total assets, net sales (structure related characteristics) and/or market capitalized value 
of the firm (a market-related characteristic). These three measures have been used as 
predictors of the level of disclosure in corporate reporting:  
 
 
 - 169 - 
Asset size Cerf (1961, pp. 31-32), Singhvi and Desai (1971, p. 131), Buzby (1975, p. 
24), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978, p. 40), Firth (1979, p. 279), Kahl and 
Belkaoui (1981, p. 192-195), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987, p.539), 
Wallace (1987, p. 575), Cooke (1989, p. 118; 1991, p. 176; 1992, p. 231; 
1993, p. 531), Imhoff (1992, p. 105), Malone et al. (1993, p. 253) Hossain 
et al. (1994, p. 342) and Wallace et al. (1994, p. 44);Ho and Wong (2001) 
and Aljifri (2008). 
Sales Stanga (1976, p. 47), Belkaoui and Kahl (1978, p. 40), Cooke (1989, p. 
118; 1991, p. 176), Wallace et al. (1994, p. 44); 
Market 
capitalization 
Belkaoui and Kahl (1978, p. 40), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987, p. 539); 
Lang and Lundholm (1993, p. 258), and Hossain et al. (1994, p. 342) 
 
Numerous studies combine some measures together (Cooke, 1992) while others use one 
measure. However, there is no criterion to select the finest proxy of firm size (Hassan et al. 
2006). In the present study, the size of the company was determined by taking the basis of 
asset and the log of total asset: this is used consistently in the disclosure model as the size 
variable. 
Profitability:  
A number of profitability measures were used by previous researchers. They include net 
profit to sales, earnings growth, dividend growth and dividend stability (Cerf 1961), rate 
of return and earnings margin (Singhvi 1967 and Singhvi and Desai 1971), and return on 
assets (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). In this study, dividend based measures could not be used 
because many companies in the sample may have earned profits but have paid no 
dividends during the period under study. This problem limited the choice of profitability 
measures to: net profit to sales, return on total assets, and return on equity. Following 
Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Bewley and Li 2000; Magness 2006, the current study 
employs both the return on equity (ROE) and return of assets (ROA) as a proxy for the 
firm profitability. 
Leverage: 
The debt equity ratio is used in the present study as the measure of leverage but, due to 
difficulties in computing the ratio for financial institutions, the variable was used only for 
non-financial companies.  
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Audit Firm Size: 
In previous studies, both size and an international link for audit firms were considered for 
use as explanatory variables, but there was no obvious cutoff point for firm size. 
Moreover, the number of chartered accountants, partners and employees, employed by an 
audit firm is not available in all the cases: furthermore, the number employed varies from 
time to time. However, since information on the audit firms' international links was 
available, it was considered a more objective measure of audit quality than using any 
arbitrary measure of auditor size. Therefore, in the present study, international links of 
audit firms were used as explanatory variables. Audit firms having an affiliation with an 
international Big Four firm were treated as 'Big' and audit firms' failing to meet the 
criterion were treated as ‘non big firms” in the context of Bangladesh.  A dichotomous 
procedure was used awarding one if the company's audit firm was big and zero otherwise.  
Multinational Parent: 
The influence of a multinational parent is used by means of a dummy variable with 1 for 
MNC subsidiaries and 0 for domestic companies. 
Industry: 
Some disclosure studies have concentrated solely on non-financial companies in 
developing their models (see for example, Wallace 1987 and Ahmed and Nicholls 1994). 
The reasons for excluding financial companies are the rather different disclosure 
regulations applied in many countries to banks, insurance and investment companies, the 
unique nature of the transactions and the asset portfolio of such entities. In the current 
study, financial institutions are not excluded because they form a major part of the 
corporate structure in Bangladesh as a whole and of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in 
particular. A dummy variable is used entering with the value of 1 for financial sector 
companies and zero otherwise. 
Ownership: 
The corporate sector in Bangladesh is predominantly owned and controlled by founder 
families, groups of families or foreign owners (Farooque et al. 2007). The prevalence of 
family-owned businesses, together with state ownership, thus plays a significant role. In 
Bangladesh, Public Limited Companies’ ownership pattern includes sponsor ownership, 
institutional ownership, government ownership, foreign ownership and public ownership 
(Bhuiyan and Pallab 2006). Since the study concentrates on listed firms in Bangladesh, 
and listed firms are of limited liability in nature, so the study focuses on sponsors as a 
dependent variable rather than single or dual ownerships. Sponsors are investors holding 
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50% or more of a company’s reflects the concentrated ownership (50% or more) by the 
sponsors of the company. Following Hossain and Arifur (2006) it is expected that if 
ownership is concentrated with the sponsor in a company the disclosure pattern might be 
influenced. The phenomenon is captured with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if it 
has concentrated sponsors and 0 otherwise.  
 
5.9.5 Regression Equation-Empirical 1: 
In order to provide primary evidence of the impact of corporate attributes on corporate 
mandatory disclosures of different enlisted companies in Bangladesh, the following 
regression has been estimated:  
 
Dependent Variables: 
MDI = Mandatory Disclosure Index 
 
Explanatory Variables: 
Explanatory variables and their expected sign of the study are given below: 
 
Determinants Variable Variable  
Level 
Expected 
sign 
Firm Size Natural log of total asset LDASST  + 
Profitability Return on Equity  and Return of Assets ROE and ROA + 
Leverage Debt to equity ratio LEVERAGE + 
Audit Firm Size Audit firms link with Big Four Firm  AUDITOR + 
Multinational Parents Subsidiary of a multinational company MNCSUBSI + 
Industry Financial  and non-financial sector FIN + 
Ownership Sponsor hold 50% or more  ownership SPONSOR - 
 
5.9.5.1 Regression model: 
The following multiple linear regression models are used to investigate the association 
between the determinants and mandatory disclosure requirements in Bangladesh: 
 
The model based on the combined sample: 
Equation 1:  
MDI = β0 + β1 LDASST + β2 ROE and ROA + β3 AUDITOR + β4 MNCSUBSI + β5 
FIN + β6 SPONSOR+ Є  
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The model based on the non-financial services sector companies stands as: 
 
Equation 2: 
MDI = β0 + β1 LDASST + β2 ROE and ROA + β3 AUDITOR + β4 MNCSUBSI + β5 
LEVERAGE + β6 SPONSOR+ Є 
Where, 
  MDI= Mandatory Disclosure Index 
  β0 = Constant 
  β1- β6 =  Explanatory variables 
  Є = Error term 
 
5.10 Empirical 2:  Voluntary Reporting 
5.10.1 Introduction: 
In Empirical 2, the study aims to investigate the voluntary reporting practices in the annual 
reports; the status quo of the listed companies in a promising capital market; namely 
Bangladesh that lacks prior voluntary reporting studies. Furthermore, it seeks to examine 
empirically the association between the extent of voluntary reporting and a number of 
corporate governance characteristics, ownership aspects and firm characteristics. It 
measures the extent of total voluntary reporting and its categories in the corporate annual 
report based on a self constructed checklist using both an unweighted and a weighted 
index.  
 
The checklist would form a disclosure index that shows the level of voluntary corporate 
disclosure. The model aims to measure the disclosure level by examining the presence or 
absence of the different items on the checklist using a dichotomous procedure. The 
presence of the item in the annual reports is represented by 1, while the absence of the 
item in the annual reports is represented by 0. The checklist is composed of different 
sections showing the voluntary disclosure categories. The disclosure level is measured 
using the percentage of the present items over the whole disclosure index items. 
 
5.10.2 Voluntary Disclosure Index: 
For the purpose of this study, voluntary reporting will be classified as; General 
information, Corporate strategic information, Corporate governance/directors information, 
Financial information, Financial review information,  Social reporting, Environmental 
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reporting, and Sustainability reporting. The voluntary corporate disclosure checklist and 
their source(s) are in the Appendix B. The checklist has total 97 items in 8 categories. In 
order to prepare the checklist the current research follows prior disclosure studies and 
recommendations from specialised professional organisation. At the same time it also 
checked whether the items are important and relevant to the context of Bangladesh. 
 
5.10.3 Determinants of Voluntary Disclosure 
5.10.3.1 Firm Size: 
Firm size is the most common variable in disclosure literature either in developed or 
developing countries. The firm size of a certain corporation is considered to be the most 
statistically significant variable in examining the differences between voluntary reporting 
practices of firms (McNally et al. 1982, McKinnon and Dalimunthe 1993; Hossain and 
Adams 1995; Meek et al. 1995; Ahmed and Courtis 1999; Choon et al. 2000). Moreover, 
the previous literature offers evidences that the firm size is positively related with the 
extent of voluntary disclosure level (Tai et al. 1990;Lee and Morse 1990; Marston and 
Shrives 1991; Cooke 1992; Hossain et al. 1994; Ward 1998; Ahmed and Courtis 1999;  
Beiner et al. 2006; Black et al. 2006; Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Barako et al. 2006; 
Alsaeed 2006; Agca and Onder 2007 and Boesso and Kumar 2007; Khanchel 2007;  Da 
Silveira et al. 2009; Uyar 2011; Samaha et a. 2012, Alves et al. 2012; Hajji and Ghazali 
2013). It can be noticed that firm size is a comprehensive variable that can proxy a number 
of corporate attributes such as competitive advantage, information production costs, and 
political costs (Hossain et al. 1994 and Abdelsalam 1999). Also, Gruning (2007) 
concludes that firm size has an indirect effect on disclosure which is mediated by listing 
status.  
 
Many theories have been used to explain the influence of firm size on disclosure policy. 
Referring to  agency theory, larger firms disclose more information because they have 
higher agency costs and they are more sensitive to political cost (Jensen and Meckling 
1976; Leftwich et al. 1981) Moreover, the advocates of stakeholder theory argue that firms 
are expected to have a high level of voluntary disclosure in order to be registered in the 
stock market to attract more funds at lower cost of capital: so in this case, they have 
greater responsibility to provide information to customers, suppliers, analysts and 
government (Choi 1973; Cooke 1991). However, due to being more exposed to political 
attacks, Cooke (1998) indicates that large companies may respond by reducing the extent 
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of disclosure in their annual reports. Therefore, the theoretical relationship is somewhat 
uncertain. Drawing on the theoretical and empirical evidence from prior studies, the 
current study can expect a positive relationship between the firm size and the level of 
voluntary reporting in the annual reports of the listed companies in Bangladesh.  
 
H1:  There is a positive significant association between firm size and the level of 
voluntary reporting in annual reports of the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
5.10.3.2 Liquidity: 
A high liquidity ratio is an indicator of good management performance. Accordingly, 
companies with higher liquidity ratios are expected to disclose more information (Al-Akra 
et al. 2010). Some of the prior disclosure studies use signalling theory to explain the 
relation between liquidity and disclosure. According to this theory companies with a 
considerable or reasonable liquidity ratio may be more motivated to disclose information 
voluntarily to distinguish themselves from other companies that face liquidity problems 
(Abd El Salam 1999). On the other hand, agency theory suggests that companies with a 
low liquidity ratio might disclose more to satisfy the needs of shareholders and creditors 
(Aly et al. 2010). According to stakeholder theory, managers may be motivated to disclose 
more information about liquidity (Barako et al. 2006). It is hypothesised that a company’s 
liquidity level impacts on its disclosure practices.  
 
According to Wallace and Naser (1995), regulatory bodies, as well as investors and 
lenders, are particularly concerned with the going-concern status of companies. In view of 
this, companies that are able to meet their short-term financial obligations without a 
recourse to the liquidation of their assets-in-place may desire to make this known  through 
disclosure in their annual reports (Belkaoui and Kahl 1978). Camfferman and Cooke 
(2002) and Ghosh and Nandi (2009) provide evidence of a positive association between 
liquidity and disclosure However, Wallace et al (1994) and Naser et al. (2002) report 
evidence of a negative association between liquidity and disclosure, while Barako et al. 
(2006) provide evidence of an non significant association between liquidity and voluntary 
disclosure. 
 
H2: There is significant positive association between liquidity and the level of voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports of the listed companies of Bangladesh. 
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5.10.3.3 Market Category:  
Market category concerns the sector of the market in which the company performs. In 
Bangladesh there are five market categories at present. Category A indicates companies 
which are regular in holding the annual general meetings and have declared dividends at 
the rate of 10 percent or more in a calendar year. Category B includes companies which 
are regular in holding the Annual General Meetings but have failed to declare dividends of 
at least10 percent in a calendar year. Companies which have failed to hold the Annual 
General Meetings or failed to declare any dividend or which are not in operation 
continuously for more than six months or whose accumulated loss after adjustment of 
revenue reserve, if any, is negative and has exceeded its paid up capital are  in Z category. 
Moreover, Category N indicates newly listed companies and G indicates Greenfield 
companies. The categorisation helps investors in choosing companies when making 
investment decision. Stock exchange security categories are all significantly associated 
with the extent of disclosure (Karim and Jamal 2005). 
H3: There is a significant negative association between market category and the level of 
voluntary disclosure in the listed companies of Bangladesh. 
 
5.10.3.4 Age:  
The level of a firm’s disclosure may be influenced by its age, i.e. stage of development 
and growth (Owusu-Ansah 1998; Aktharuddin 2005). Older, well-established companies 
are likely to disclose much more information in their annual reports than younger 
companies. On the other hand, younger firms might also exhibit better reporting quality 
since they need to compete with older firms to survive. For this study, it is expected that 
company age is a critical factor in determining the level of corporate disclosure. Older 
companies with more experience are likely to include more information in their annual 
reports in order to enhance their reputation and image in the market (Owusu-Ansah 1998; 
Akhtaruddin 2005). Owusu-Ansah (1998) pointed out three factors that may contribute to 
this phenomenon. Firstly, younger companies may suffer competition, secondly, the cost 
and the ease of gathering, processing, and disseminating the required information may be a 
contributory factor, and finally, younger companies may lack a track record on which to 
rely for public disclosure (p. 605). 
 
Empirical evidence is also mixed in relation to age of the firm and the level of reporting. 
Owusu-Ansah (1998) have found a positive association between the said variables, 
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whereas, Akhtaruddin (2005), Alsaeed (2006) Hossain (2008), Nandi and Ghosh (2012) 
found no significant association. This notion is weakly supported by Black et al. (2006) 
and Haque et al. (2011), who report a positive, though statistically non-significant 
association. Owusu-Ansah and Yeho (2005) found company age as the critical factor in 
explaining the extent of disclosure practices. Al shammari et al. (2007) found that age 
does not have significant impact on corporate governance disclosure. However, Lei (2006) 
finds a negative association between firm age and the level of reporting. 
 
H4: There is significant positive association between the age of the company and the level 
of voluntary disclosure of the listed companies. 
 
5.10.3.5 Audit Committee Size: 
The audit committee is a subset of the corporate board of directors and has the 
responsibility of enhancing internal control procedures, overseeing a firm's financial-
reporting process, external reporting and the risk management of companies. The audit 
committee acts as a monitoring mechanism and can help to improve the overall quality of 
information flows between managers and the different interested parties (Nandi and Ghosh 
2012). Audit committees, therefore, may play a key role by facilitating communication 
between the board, external auditors and internal auditors (Klein 2002 and Chau and 
Leung 2006) which, in turn, are expected to reduce information asymmetry. The structure 
and characteristics of effective audit committee are currently under the spotlight to ensure 
reliable and high quality financial reporting (Bhuiyan et al. 2007).  
 
Previous research provide evidence of a positive association between the presence of an 
audit committee and corporate reporting practices (Barako et al. 2006; Rosario and Flora 
2005; Ho and Wong 2001; McMullen 1996). The board usually delegates responsibility 
for the oversight of financial reporting to the audit committee to enhance the breadth of 
relevance and reliability of annual report (Wallace et al. 1995). Thus, audit committees 
can be a monitoring mechanism that improves the quality of information flow between 
firm owners, who are in effect shareholders and potential shareholders, and managers, 
especially in the financial reporting environment where the two have disparate information 
levels (Akhtaruddin and Rouf 2011).  
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Previous research has examined the relationship between the presence of an audit 
committee and the quality of corporate reporting (Beasley 1996; DeFond and Jiambalvo 
1991; McMullen 1996; Felo et al. 2003; Barako et al. 2006). The empirical evidence 
regarding this matter is mixed. Simnet et al. (1993) found that audit committees do 
improve or maintain the quality of the financial reporting process and improve the 
confidence in the quality of financial reports for financial statement user. Bradbury (1990), 
Pincus et al. (1989), Ho and Wong (2001), Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) supported the 
view that the presence of an audit committee will reduce financial reporting problems and 
improve the transparency and disclosure of financial reports. Goodwin and Seow (2002), 
and Beasley et al. (2000) found that investors, auditors and directors believe that a strong 
and effective AC is able to increase the level of quality disclosure. Ho and Wong (2001) 
found that companies, which have an AC, are more likely to have a higher extent of 
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) evidences insignificant 
positive association between size of the audit committee and the degree of corporate 
voluntary disclosure. 
 
In Bangladesh, Islam et al. (2010) found that an independent audit committee is one of the 
important mechanisms for minimising, not only agency problems, but also the failure of 
different instruments of corporate governance which create so many further problems. 
Kamal and Ferdousi (2006) in a study of the effects of audit committees in the banking 
sector of Bangladesh were unable to provide information regarding the magnitude of audit 
committee disclosure in the annual reports. Moreover, Akhtaruddin and Rouf (2011) found 
positive association between audit committee and voluntary disclosure. While these 
studies suggest that the existence of an audit committee has an impact on financial 
reporting quality, they do not investigate whether audit committee size affect financial 
reporting quality.  
 
H5: There is significant positive association between audit committee size and level of 
voluntary reporting in the listed companies. 
 
5.10.3.6 Board Characteristics: 
A corporate board is the primary and dominant internal corporate governance mechanism 
(Brennan 2006). The board monitors or supervises management, gives strategic guidelines 
to the management and may even act to review and ratify management proposal (Jonsson 
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2005). Large boards are usually more powerful than small boards and, hence, considered 
necessary for organisational effectiveness (Florackis and Ozkan 2004). For instance, as 
Pearce and Zahra (1991) point out, large powerful boards help in strengthening the link 
between corporations and their environments, provide counsel and advice regarding 
strategic options for the firm and play a crucial role in creating corporate identity. Hossain 
(2008) has found that the board composition of a firm may be an important determinant of 
corporate disclosure level. Several previous research studies have found a significant 
association between these two variables (Haniffa and Cooke 2002; Akhtaruddin et al. 
2009). In this study three board characteristics have been used- independent non-executive 
director, board leadership structure and board size. 
 
5.10.3.6.1 Independent Non-executive Directors: 
A board is generally composed of inside and outside members. Kosnik (1990) argues that 
outside directors are more effective than inside directors in maximizsing shareholders' 
wealth. In contrast, Klein (1998) suggests that inside directors can contribute more to a 
firm than outside directors due to their firm-specific knowledge and expertise. According 
to agency theory (Jensen and Meckling 1976) board independence reduces managerial 
leeway thus increasing transparency and financial reporting quality.  
 
There are mixed results concerning the relationship between independent boards of 
directors and corporate reporting. For example, Chau and Gray (2010), Samah and 
Dahawy (2010), Duchin et al. (2010), Ho and Wong (2001), Chen and Jaggi (2000), 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990), Klein (1998), Fama and Jensen (1983) find a positive 
relationship between independent board of directors and corporate reporting. Meanwhile, 
Al Shammari and Al Sultan (2010), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Barako et al. (2006), 
Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Haniffa and Cooke, (2002), and Ho and Wong (2001), find 
no relationship between independent non-executive directors and management voluntary 
disclosures; while, Eng and Mark (2003), Gul and Leung (2004) found a negative 
association. Moreover, Cheng and Courtenay (2006) found that boards with a larger 
proportion of independent directors are significantly and positively associated with higher 
levels of voluntary disclosure.  
 
H6: There is significant positive association between independent non-executive director 
and level of voluntary reporting in the listed companies. 
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5.10.3.6.2 Board Leadership Structure:  
Within the context of corporate governance, the central issue often discussed is whether 
the chair of the board of directors and CEO positions should be held by different persons, 
a dual leadership structure or by one person, unitary leadership structure. Supporter of this 
view believe that duality gives a greater understanding and knowledge of the firms 
operating environment and this should impact positively on a firm’s performance (Nandi 
and Ghosh 2012). While others believe that a combined chair and CEO positions signals 
the absence of separation in decision management and decision control (Dulacha 2007). 
 
In the sense of the stakeholder theory and the agency theory this situation affects the 
independency status and the bias as this person would accumulate much power by driving 
two critical positions at the same time (Williams 2002 as cited in Iskander 2008). 
According to agency theory, the important function of a board can be damaged by the 
unitary leadership structure. A CEO may be engaged in some opportunistic behavior in a 
firm with a unitary leadership structure because of his or her dominance over the board 
(Rechner and Dalton 1991; Donaldson and Davis 1991; Forker 1992; Shamser and Annuar 
1993, Stiles and Taylor, 1993; Blackburn 1994, Nandi and Ghosh 2012).  However, there 
are other views, based on the stakeholder theory, suggesting that the existence of role 
duality would improve the board’s effectiveness allowing it good control over the board 
and the selection of its members (Eisenhardt 1989; Dahya et al. 1996; Rechner and Dalton 
1991; Donaldson and Davies 1991). 
 
Therefore, it is argued that the separation of the roles of chairman and chief executive will 
increase monitoring quality and improve the level of disclosure (Forker 1992). However, 
some studies argue that there is no association between CEO duality and the extent of 
voluntary disclosure of information (Haniffa and Cooke 2000; Ho and Wong 2001). 
Rashid (2011) found that neither the board composition, nor the CEO-duality influence the 
firm performance. The finding of this study does not support the agency theory for board 
composition, implying that external, independent directors are not good for firm 
performance in Bangladesh. Moreover, the “CEO duality diminishes the monitoring role 
of the board of directors over the executive manager, and this in turn may have a negative 
effect on corporate performance” (Elsayed 2007, p 1204). 
 
H7: There is significant positive association between board leadership structure and level 
of voluntary reporting in the listed companies. 
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5.10.3.6.3 Board Size:  
Board size may influence the level of voluntary disclosure. The level of disclosure is a 
strategic decision made by the board of directors. As a top-level management body, the 
board of directors formulates policies and strategies to be followed by managers. Larger 
boards are better for corporate performance because they have a wide range of collective 
experience and expertise that may result in better decision making (Nandi and Ghosh 
2012). Moreover, to maintain the agency theory logic it is recommended to raise the board 
size (Hermalin and Weisbach 2003). At the same time, big boards would be more diverse 
that would help the companies to secure critical resources and reduce environmental 
uncertainties (Pearce and Zahra 1992; Goodstein et al. 1994). Several previous research 
studies have found a significant association between board size on the level of corporate 
disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; and Allegrini and Greco 2011). 
 
From the stakeholder theory perspective, large board size is believed to enable a high 
degree of independence as it enables the election of a broad range of directors that lead to 
diversification of the board composition. This variation addresses wider scope for the 
stakeholder's interests, which leads to a greater propensity to disclose more information 
(Williams 2002 as cited in Iskander 2008). Research emphasises the importance of 
strategic information and resources in a highly uncertain environment. Birnbaum (1984) 
suggests that uncertainty and the lack of information may be minimised by a larger board. 
The size of the board is believed to affect the ability of the board to monitor and evaluate 
management and a small board encourages faster information processing (Zahra et al. 
2000). 
 
However, other researchers put forward the opposite argument: board size needs to be 
reduced to improve board effectiveness (Jensen 1993; Lipton and Lorsch 1992; Kesner 
and Johnson 1990) and a greater number of directors on the board may reduce the 
likelihood of information asymmetry (Chen and Jaggi 2000). Other studies suggest that 
board size does affect the corporate performance and corporate disclosures (Monks and 
Minow 1995).  
 
H8: There is a significant positive relationship between board size and the level of 
voluntary corporate disclosure of the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
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5.10.4 Variable Measurement: 
Firm Size: 
Different measures for firm size have been used in the disclosure literature including total 
assets, total sales, number of employees and market capitalization. A number of studies 
combine some measures into one measure (Cooke 1992) while others use a single 
measure. However, there is no criterion to choose the best proxy of firm size (Hassan et al. 
2006). Reviewing the literature, it can be noticed that the most common measure is total 
assets. The study measures firm size by a log of total assets.  
Liquidity: 
A sample of a company’s liquidity position is measured by quick (acid test) ratio, as it is a 
more stringent measure of corporate liquidity. It is defined as the ratio of current assets 
less inventories to current liabilities.  
Market Category: 
It is expected that Bangladeshi companies which are in the Z category, according to BSEC 
criteria, are likely to have less voluntary information than those in the other categories. 
The phenomenon is captured with a dummy variable with the value of 1 if it is in the Z 
category and 0 otherwise.  
Age: 
There are two dates that the study can use to measure the age of the company. One is 
establishment date and the other is the listed date. There are some companies that are 
established as private limited companies, partnerships or single ownership companies after 
that transform into public limited companies. Reporting rules are also different among the 
sole ownership, partnerships, private limited and listed public companies.  Moreover, as 
the study is working with listed companies, listing date would be more justifiable. Age is 
measured by a simple count of years passed from its listing year to the particular sample 
year.  
Audit Committee Size: 
In Bangladesh, the existence of an audit committee was not mandatory in the earlier years. 
However, in the 2006 the BSEC provided some conditions relating to audit committees. 
SEC notification suggested that a company should have an Audit Committee as a sub-
committee of the Board of Directors and it should have at least three members. As the 
notification indicates the minimum number, it is assumed that large number of audit 
committee member can influence the voluntary reporting. In the current study, audit 
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committee size is measured through audit committee members as a percentage of board 
size. 
Independent Non-executive Directors: 
Given the mixed findings in relation to the impact of independent non-executive directors 
on manager's disclosure decisions, this study will further investigate the relationship. A 
firm may have a higher level of disclosure if the board contains more independent 
directors. In this study two measures have been used: one is the number of independent 
directors on the board and another is the proportion of independent directors in the audit 
committee. It is assumed that more independent non-executive directors have more power 
to influence the disclosure of voluntary information. 
Board Leadership Structure:     
Based on mixed findings the current study is also motivated to determine the effects of 
board leadership structure on voluntary reporting. In this study a dummy variable 1 is used 
if any company has dual leadership structure in the board and otherwise 0. 
Board Size:  
Following previous studies it is hypothesised that a large board would improve disclosure 
level. In this study board size has been measured by the number of board members on the 
board. 
 
5.10.5 Voluntary Disclosure Model Specification:  
In order to provide primary evidence of the impact of corporate attributes on corporate 
voluntary reporting of different listed companies in Bangladesh, the following regression 
has been estimated:  
Dependent Variables: 
VDI = Voluntary Disclosure Index 
Explanatory variables: 
Explanatory variables and their expected sign of the study are given below: 
Determinants Variable 
 Label 
Variable Expected 
sign 
Firm Size LASST Natural log of Total Assets + 
Liquidity LIQ Current assets-Inventories/ Current liabilities + 
Market Category MKT Market category of DSE, 1 for Z, 0 otherwise. - 
Firm Age AGE Listed year of the firm. Number of year. + 
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Audit Com. Size AUDITCOM Audit committee percentage in the board. + 
Independent 
director 
INDDIR Number of independent director and 
proportion of independent director in the 
audit committee. 
+ 
Leadership 
Structure 
CEODU Dummy variable 1 for CEO Duality or Role 
Duality, otherwise 0. 
+ 
Board Size BSIZE Number of board member + 
 
5.10.6 Regression Model: 
The following multiple linear regression model is used to investigate the association 
between determinants and extent of voluntary disclosure in Bangladesh: 
VDI = β0 + β1 LASST + β2 LIQ+ β3 MKT+ β4 AGE+ β5 AUDITCOM +β6 INDDIR+ 
β7 CEODU+ β8 BSIZE + Є  
  Where, 
   VDI= Voluntary Disclosure Index 
   β0 = Constant 
   β1- β8 =  Explanatory variables 
   Є = Error term 
 
5.11 Empirical 3: Timeliness of Corporate Reporting 
5.11.1 Introduction: 
According to the FASB’s conceptual framework (SFAC) No. 2, there are four criteria that 
a financial report can be useful for users’ decision-making. The four criteria include 
relevance, verifiability, free from bias and quantifiable. For annual report to be relevance 
the provision of information must have predictive or feedback value and that information 
should be provided in timely manner. Timely financial statement information helps in 
efficient allocation of resources by reducing dissemination of asymmetric information 
(Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 2, 1980), by improving pricing of 
securities (Chambers and Penman 1984, p. 32), and by mitigating insider trading, leaks 
and rumors in the market (Owusu-Ansah 2000). Timeliness of financial reporting is 
crucial to all users of financial reports. This is because most users and particularly the 
shareholders and potential investors, rely on the audited financial reports before deciding 
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whether to remain as shareholders or to become investors of a company (Ghosh et al. 
2009). 
 
With regards to the quality of annual reporting, efficiency is an important feature. 
Efficiency is often referred to as the timeliness that enhances the qualitative 
characteristics. This is provided in the Exposure Draft of an improved Conceptual 
Framework for Financial Reporting, (May 2008) issued by the International Accounting 
Standard Board (IASB). Usefulness of information disclosed in a company’s annual report 
reduces when time lag increases (Ghosh et al. 2009). This is consistent with the note that 
the longer the period between year end and publication of the annual report, the higher the 
chances that the information would be leaked to some interested investors (FASB, 2000). 
 
For listed companies in Bangladesh, there are primarily two sources that govern timely 
reporting: (1) the Companies Act and (2) the Stock Exchange Listing Requirements. The 
Companies Act, 1994 in Bangladesh requires that the first annual general meeting (AGM) 
must be held within eighteen months from the date of incorporation and the subsequent 
general meeting must be held within fifteen months from the first AGM (Section 81). This 
provision also suggests that public limited companies have a maximum of nine months to 
prepare annual accounts and to present the accounts to the shareholders for approval at the 
AGM. 
 
With regard to stock exchange listing rules on the release of audited financial statements, 
the provisions are consistent with those of the Companies Act. According to the listing 
regulations of the Dhaka Stock Exchange (DSE) in Bangladesh (Section 19), a listed 
company must hold its AGM within nine months following the close of its financial year 
and present the audited financial statements to shareholders for approval at the AGM. 
Moreover, Securities and Exchange Rules, 1987 required that companies are required to 
complete the audit process within 120 days from the end of the financial year and submit 
audited annual reports, approved by the directors, to the relevant stock exchange at least 
fourteen days before holding the AGM.  
 
5.11.2 Reporting Lag: 
Conceptually, timeliness denotes a quality of: firstly, ‘being available at a suitable time’ or 
secondly, ‘being well-timed’ (Gregory and Van Horn 1963: 576). The key variable in 
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timeliness is the delay in the release of annual reports. Gregory and Van Horn (1963) 
defined delay as ‘the length of time between the cut-off point, the time no transactions are 
accepted for inclusion in the particular report, and the distribution of reports to users.’ 
According to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB 2008:p.40) timeliness 
of financial reports is the “availability of information needed by decision makers for useful 
decision making before it loses its capacity to influence decisions”. Delay, in this study, is 
described as reporting lag time. Reporting lag time is defined here as the length of time a 
company takes after its financial year-end to release its financial information to the public. 
 
The operational definition of reporting lag varies in the literature depending on the 
research design and context. Following Dyer and McHugh (1975), Courtis (1976) and 
Whittred (1980), Owusu-Ansah (2000), Ahmed (2003) and based on the availability of 
information, the following three definitions of reporting lags have been offered: 
(1) Audit lag – interval of days between the balance sheet’s closing date and the signed 
date of the auditor’s report stated in the corporate annual report. 
(2) Preliminary lag – interval between the balance sheets closing date and the date of 
notice of the AGM when companies are required to submit their audited accounts to the 
Stock Exchange. 
(3) Total lag – interval of days between the balance sheet closing date and the date of the 
AGM. 
 
5.11.3 Determination of Reporting Lag Time: 
Following Dyer and McHugh (1975), Owusu-Ansah (2000) and Ahmed (2003) three 
reporting events for each sample company were specified : firstly the audit report date, 
secondly the preliminary earnings announcement date, and finally, date of annual general 
meeting. The audit report dates were taken from the annual reports of each sample 
company and were used to compute the audit lag for each company. A preliminary lag 
time is the number of days between each sample company’s financial year-end and the 
date of notice of the AGM when companies are required to submit their audited accounts 
to the Stock Exchange. A final total lag time is the number of calendar days between a 
sample company’s financial year-end and the date on which its annual general meeting is 
held.  
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5.11.4 Model Development and Variables: 
Following prior research, eight audit-related and firm-specific variables have been selected 
in order to evaluate the determinants of these variables on timeliness of reporting in 
Bangladesh. These variables are: Firm size, Sign of earning, Financial condition, Audit 
firm size, Company year-end, Company age, Industry and Modified audit opinion. Ashton 
et al. (1989) suggested incorporating specific internal audit related variables such as the 
number of auditors assigned to the audit engagement, the efficiency of the internal control 
department, time spend and the degree of overtime actually spent on the job. However, Ng 
and Tai (1994) suggested that the use of these additional variables does not improve 
significantly the model’s explanatory power on those that used only publicly available 
information. Further, in the context of Bangladesh, it is not possible to obtain this 
information mainly due to a lack of data and the partnership type organisational structure 
of audit firms (Ahmed 2003). Therefore, only publicly available sources such as corporate 
financial statements, proxy forms and notices of the AGM are used to extract the required 
information.  
 
5.11.5 Determinants of Reporting Lag 
5.11.5.1 Firm Size: 
Corporate size has been found to be a significant factor associated with reporting lag (see, 
for example, Courtis 1976; Davies and Whittred 1980; Givoly and Palmon 1982; Newton 
and Ashton 1989; Ashton et al. 1989; Carslaw and Caplan 1991; Jaggi and Tsui 1999; Ng 
and Tai 1994; Owusu-Ansah 2000; Ahmad and Kamarudin 2003; Ismail and Chandler 
2004; Dogan et al. 2007; Al-Ajmi 2008; Afify 2009; Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Hashim 
and Abdul Rahman 2011 and Apadore and Noor 2013. Most of the previous studies 
supported the negative association between audit lag and firm size (Jaggi and Tsui 1999; 
Afify 2009; Mohamad-Nor et al. 2010; Hashim and Abdul 2011 and Apadore and Noor 
2013) with exceptions (for example, Ashton et al. 1987; Bamber et al. 1993; Simnett et al. 
1995; Abdulla 1996; Leventis and Weetman 2004; and Owusu-Ansah and Leventis 2006) 
find an non significant association between timeliness and the firm size. 
 
Ahmed (2003) identified several reasons for a negative association between reporting lag 
and the reporting firm’s size. Firstly, larger firms have more resources to establish 
sophisticated internal control systems and to use auditors on a continuous basis, thus 
enabling the auditors to carry out more interim compliance, and substantive tests of year-
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end balances (Ng and Tai 1994). Secondly, larger firms are subject to more public scrutiny 
and are followed by a large number of investment and media analysts who review their 
performance for investment decision-making: this places pressure on these firms to release 
financial information on a more timely basis than their smaller counterparts (Dyer and 
McHugh 1975; Ashton et al. 1989; Frost and Pownall 1994; Owusu-Ansah 2000). Finally, 
larger companies may be able to exert greater pressures on the auditor to start and 
complete the audit on time (Carslaw and Caplan 1991).  
 
H1: There is significant negative association between firm size and timeliness of financial 
reporting. 
 
5.11.5.2 Sign of Earning: 
Prior research documents that good news is released more promptly by managers than bad 
news (Chambers and Penman 1984; Ng and Tai 1994). It has also been found that firms 
that experience losses for the period would result in longer audit report lag (Givoly and 
Palmon 1982; Ashton et al. 1989; Ismail and Chandler 2004). Moreover, an auditor may 
take a cautious approach if he or she believes that a loss is going to increase the likelihood 
of financial failure or management fraud, and therefore the probability of litigation by the 
stakeholders for failure to take due care and diligence (Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; Afify 
2009). According to Owusu-Ansah (2000), 'the market for corporate managerial skills uses 
the performance of a company to set management’s outside opportunity wage. It is, 
therefore, reasonable to expect the management of a successful company to report its good 
news to the public on a timely basis. In contrast, auditors take much time to audit failing 
(high risk) companies as a defense against any potential future litigation'(p.10). 
 
However, Annaert et al. (2002) found that there are no significant associations between 
report lag and either good or bad news and profit or loss. This is because the investors 
already have the warnings concerning profits through the half yearly report of the 
company. So, it would not have any effect on delay of the report with the earnings for the 
year. Overall, it is expected that companies would be more eager to release ‘good news’ 
without delay and be reluctant in releasing ‘bad news’.  
 
H2: There is significant positive association between the sign of earning and the 
timeliness of financial reporting in Bangladesh. 
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5.11.5.3 Financial Condition: 
Profitability, leverage and liquidity are separately used by previous studies to examine the 
effects of a firm’s financial condition on reporting delays (Abdullah 1996; Carslaw and 
Kaplan 1991; Owusu-Ansah 2000). Prior studies in emerging nations did not find any 
significant association between reporting delays and debt and profitability (Abdullah 
1996; Owusu-Ansah 2000). 
 
Rather than relying on one measure of risk, a combination of other financial indicators 
may be necessary to fully capture financial risk, explaining why some studies used a 
combined index to reflect the firm’s financial condition following Zmijewski (1984) (see  
Bamber et al. 1993; Jaggi and Tsui 1999; Ahmed 2003). Zmijewski Financial Condition 
(ZFC) represents an estimated risk index of the financial condition of the company, which 
indicates the company’s propensity to fail. From an auditor’s perspective, Jaggi and Tsui 
(1999) have argued that a firm with weak financial condition poses a greater audit risk, 
which in turn increases the time spent by auditors to review the accounts. Although several 
bankruptcy models have been developed in the U.S., no such model has been developed in 
the context of emerging nations. However, Jaggi and Tsui (1999) have argued that the 
Zmijewski (1984) model is relevant for other countries such as Hong Kong. They found a 
significant positive association between the higher the value of the index, the higher the 
propensity to fail and the weaker the financial condition. Conversely, the lower the value 
of the index, the lower the propensity to fail and the stronger the financial condition.  
H3: There is a significant positive association between the financial condition and 
timeliness of reporting. 
 
5.11.5.4 Audit Firm Size: 
Large audit firms have a stronger motivation to complete their audit work on time in order 
to maintain their reputation and name (Afify 2009). Moreover, the large audit firms 
normally have more resources (Palmrose 1986; Hossain and Taylor 1998; Ahmad and 
Kamaruddin 2003), quality staff (Chan et al. 1993; Hossain and Taylor 1998; Ahmad and 
Kamaruddin 2003), conduct more trainings for their staff (Owunsu Ansah and Leventis, 
2006), and are also able to employ more powerful audit technologies (Williams and 
Dirsmith 1988) which will reduce the time of audit work. Thus Big audit firms are 
expected to complete audits more efficiently and in less time than non-big audit firms. 
Conversely, Affify (2009) found that type of audit firm did not reduce audit report lag. 
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Previous research reports some mixed findings. Some studies found no difference in audit 
delay between big and non-big audit firms (Garsombke 1981; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; 
Ng and Tai 1994; Al-Ajmi 2008; Affify 2009). While other studies found differences in 
audit delay between big and non-big firms (Abdulla 1996; Gilling 1977; Davis and 
Whittred 1980; Ashton et al. 1987; Ashton et al. 1989; Hossain and Taylor 1998; Ahmad 
and Kamaruddin 2003; Krishnan 2005; Owusu-Ansah and Leventis 2006; Choudhary et al. 
2012; Impink et al. 2012).  
H4: There is a significant negative association between the audit firm size and timeliness 
of financial reporting. 
 
5.11.5.5 Financial Year End: 
It is expected that the month of the year in which a company’s financial year ends would 
influence its reporting lead time. If most companies in a country have their financial year-
ends within a particular period of time, and because they are required by law to have their 
final accounts audited, there will be much demand for the services of auditors operating in 
that country. This may result in possible audit delay as the workload of auditors increases 
(Owusu-Ansah 2000). Most of the listed firms have their year-ends either in June or 
December in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2003). These months are considered to be busy 
seasons. According to Ng and Tai (1994), because of difficulties with scheduling, delays 
are likely when performing audits during a busy season. 
 
 On the other hand, audit firms may employ more audit staff and pay overtime to complete 
audits on time. In the context of emerging countries, it is costly to complete an audit on 
schedule because audit firms may have difficulties in finding trained audit staff: 
developing countries always suffer from a shortage of qualified accounting staff (Ghosh 
1990). So, recruiting additional staff by an audit firm may not be an option, which will 
prolong the audits and hence delay the release of annual financial statements by the 
reporting firm. Davies and Whittred (1980), Newton and Ashton (1989), Ng and Tai 
(1994), Owusu-Ansah (2000), Knechel and Payne (2001), and Ahmed (2003) found a 
positive association between financial year-end and reporting lag. 
 
H5: There is a significant positive association between financial year end and the audit lag 
reporting in Bangladesh. 
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5.11.5.6 Company Age: 
The age of a company has been identified in prior literature as an attribute likely to have 
an impact on the quality of accounting practice in terms of timeliness. The older the firms, 
the more likely they are to have strong internal control procedures. Similarly, younger 
firms are more prone to failure and have less experience with accounting controls (Hope 
and Langli 2008). That is, age has the potential to reduce reporting lag although Courtis 
(1976) did not find age a significant attribute in his study of listed companies in New 
Zealand. However, Owusu-Ansah (2000) employs a two-stage least square regression 
model and found age as significant determinants of reporting lags of Zimbabwean listed 
companies. Moreover, Musa et al. (2013) found age appear to exert a positive influence in 
reporting. 
 
It is proposed in this study that promptness in financial reporting by a company is 
influenced by its age (i.e., its development and growth). In the context of this study, the 
theory suggests that a reduction in reporting time would occur as the number of annual 
reports produced is increased. As a company continues and its accountants learn more, the 
‘teething problems’ which would cause unusual delays are minimised. As a result, an 
older, well-established company is likely to be more proficient in gathering, processing 
and releasing information when needed because of their experience.   
H6: There is significant negative association between the age of the company and the 
timeliness (reporting lag) of financial reporting. 
 
5.11.5.7 Industry Classification: 
The nature of the industry has been identified as a significant factor that influences the 
timeliness of reporting. Prior empirical studies found that audit delays for financial 
companies are shorter than audit delays for non-financial companies (Courtis 1976; 
Ashton et al. 1987 and 1989; Newton and Ashton 1989; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; Ng and 
Tai 1994). Moreover, Al-Ajmi (2008) found that industry membership (bank) has a 
negative and significant relation with reporting, indicating that members of highly 
regulated or scrutinised industries underwent audits earlier than other firms. One of the 
causes of longer delay for non-financial companies was the existence of non-financial 
assets that take more auditing time than financial assets. 
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Abdulla (1996) hypothesises that there are a number of plausible explanations for such 
behaviour. Some of them are: the importance of the company in the economy in terms of 
its role; the importance of company relative to other listed firms; the level of regulation 
pertaining to that sector and regulators who may differ within themselves in terms of 
expertise and effectiveness. As regulated industries are followed by different regulators 
this might affect the timeliness of corporate reports of the companies they regulate and 
monitor.  
H7: There is a significant positive association between non-financial companies and 
timeliness of reporting. 
 
5.11.5.8 Audit Opinion: 
The presence of remarks in the audit report arises from the requirements of audit 
regulation. According to the Bangladesh Standard on Auditing 700 and 701 (similarly IAS 
700 and 701), requires the auditor’s report to include,  any observations or remarks on 
material matters taken into account by the auditor to support the audit conclusions. This 
applies whenever these conclusions contain some qualification, adverse opinion or 
disclaimer of opinion. Spathis (2003) reported that some qualifications refer to ‘subject to’ 
(or ‘except for’) opinions. These are not for qualified opinion but for unqualified opinion 
with modified wording. According to Spathis(2003), the ‘subject to’ (or ‘except for’) 
qualifications observed mainly refer to depreciation, provision for bad debts, issues related 
to subsidiaries; provision for redundancy payments and falsifying accounts for tax 
purposes. Arens et al. (2010) identified five reasons for modified opinion: lack of 
consistent application of GAAP, substantial doubt about going concern, departure from 
promulgated accounting principles, emphasis placed on a matter and reports involving 
other auditors.  
 
There is evidence in the literature that the qualification of an audit report will delay the 
audit (Whittred 1980; Dodd et al. 1984). Whittred (1980) found that the time lag increases 
as the qualifications become more serious. It is expected that the greater the number of 
‘subject to’ opinions, the longer the delay might be. This is partly because auditors are 
expected to extend tests when they find or suspect irregularities, and partly because 
auditors might wish to take more time to audit transactions as a defense against any 
potential future litigation. Furthermore, while negotiations between auditor and client 
occur on a regular basis (Beattie et al. 2000; Gibbins et al. 2001) it is likely that 
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negotiation is more intense and lasts longer when accounting problems arise. In addition, 
studies found that firms that receive modified audit opinions and going concern opinions 
require more days to complete their financial statement audit (Schwartz and Soo 1996; 
Leventis et al. 2005; Ettredge et al. 2006).  
H8: There is a significant positive association between audit opinion and timeliness of 
reporting of the listed companies in Bangladesh. 
 
5.11.6 Variable Measurement 
Firm Size: 
In this study, the natural log of total assets is used to measure firm size following- Gilling 
1977; Davies and Whittred 1980; Simnett et al. 1995; Jaggi and Tsui 1999; Owusu-Ansah 
2000 and Ahmed 2003.  
Sign of Earning: 
Consistent with prior studies (Ashton et al. 1989; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991, Ahmed 
2003), a dummy variable is used where 1 is assigned to indicate a loss, otherwise 0.  
Financial Condition: 
Current study used Zmijewski’s (1984) model which is shown below: 
ZFC = −4.336 − 4.513(ROA) + 5.679(FINL) + 0.004(LIQ) 
where: 
ZFC represents an estimated risk index of the financial condition of the company.  
ROA is measured as the ratio of net income to total assets.  
FINL as the ratio of total debt to total assets; and 
LIQ is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Audit Firm Size: 
This study classifies audit firms into the Big Four (Four local audit firms are members of 
the Big 4 auditors; Rahman Rahman Huq (RRH), Hoda Vasi Chowdhury, A Qasem and 
Co. and S F Ahmed are linked with KPMG International, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, 
Price Waterhouse Coopers and Ernst and Young, respectively) and non-Big Four audit 
firms, these are other local domestic firms. The Big 4 audit firms are assigned a dummy 
variable 1 and the non-Big 4 audit firms are assigned as 0 and expect relationship between 
them. 
Financial Year End: 
The study expect that financial year end is only applicable to audit lag that's why a dummy 
variable is used in the model and  expected a positive association between financial year 
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end and audit lag. Companies completing the financial year in the month of December 
which is considered a busy season and are assigned a dummy variable 1, otherwise 0. 
Company Age: 
There are two dates that the study can use to measure the age of the company. One is 
establishment date and another one is listed date. There are some companies that establish 
as a private limited or partnerships or single ownership company and then are transformed 
as public limited companies. Reporting rules are also different among the sole ownership, 
partnerships, private limited and listed public companies.  Moreover, as the study consider 
listed companies, listed date would be more justifiable for the present study. The research 
measures the variable by a simple count of the number of years passed since its listing 
year to the particular sample year.  
Industry Classification: 
Companies listed on the Dhaka Stock Exchange Bangladesh are classified into seventeen 
categories that have been divided into two groups in this study: financial and non-financial 
companies. The study uses dummy variable 1 for financial companies and 0 for non-
financial companies.  
Audit Opinion: 
In this study, unqualified opinion with modified wording and qualified opinion, which are 
termed as modified audit opinion, expected to increase the reporting time that is why a 
dummy variable of 1 is used for companies reported a modified wording and qualified 
opinion and 0 otherwise. 
 
5.11.7 Model Specification 
In order to provide primary evidence of the impact of corporate attributes on timeliness of 
reporting of different enlisted companies in Bangladesh, the following regression has been 
estimated:  
Dependent Variables: 
ADLAG = Audit lag time 
PRELAG = Preliminary lag time  
TOTLAG = Total reporting lag time 
 
Explanatory variables: 
Explanatory variables and their expected sign of the study are given below: 
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Determinants Variable 
Level 
Variable  Expected 
sign 
Firm Size LASST Natural log of Total Assets - 
Sign of Earning ESIGN Dummy variable 1 for the sign of net 
loss,  if profit 0 
+ 
Financial 
condition 
ZFCINDEX Financial condition as defined by 
Zmijeski’s(1984) index . 
+ 
Audit Firm Size AFSIZE Dummy variable 1 for Big 4 affiliated 
audit firm,  otherwise 0; 
       - 
Financial Year 
End 
YEND Dummy Variable 1 for company 
financial year end in December, 
otherwise 0. 
+ 
Company Age CAGE Number of year passed from listed. - 
Industry Category IND Dummy variable 1 for financial 
companies, otherwise 0 
+ 
Audit Opinion MOPINION Dummy variable 1 for modified wording 
and qualified opinion, otherwise 0. 
+ 
The following three linear equations present the model that will be tested using 
multivariate statistical procedures: 
Equation 1: 
ADLAG = β0 + β1 LASST + β2 ESIGN + β3 ZCFINDEX+β4 AFSIZE + β5 YEND + β6 
CAGE+ β7 IND + β8 MOPINION+ Є  
Equation 2: 
PRELAG = β0+ β1 LASST + β2 ESIGN + β3 ZCFINDEX+β4 AFSIZE + β5 CAGE+ β6 
IND + β7 MOPINION+ Є 
Equation 3: 
TOTLAG = β0+ β1 LASST + β3 ESIGN + β3 ZCFINDEX+β4 AFSIZE + β5 CAGE+ β6 
IND + β7 MOPINION+ Є  
Where, 
β0 = Constant;  β1- β8 = Explanatory variables; Є = Error term 
Following Owusu-Ansah (2000) and Ahmed (2003), YEND is dropped from Equation (2) 
and (3) since this variable is audit related and is not expected to influence managerial 
decision to hold the AGM or submission of financial statements to the Stock Exchange. 
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5.12 Statistical Tests: 
This section provides an overview of the statistical techniques that will be used to carry 
out the empirical sections. The study will first analyse the total disclosure; then the 
categories of such disclosure. The model is analysed using descriptive statistics of the 
collected data using Pearson correlation and Spearman correlation to identify the 
correlation between the dependent and independent variables. The regression models 
would be applied on two dimensions. Firstly, in investigating the association between total 
mandatory disclosures, total voluntary disclosure and timeliness of disclosure as a 
dependent variable, and the different determinants of mandatory, voluntary and timeliness 
of disclosure, as independent variables. Secondly, an examination of the association 
between the different categories of mandatory disclosure, voluntary disclosure and 
timeliness of disclosure as dependent variables, and the different determinants of 
mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of disclosure, as independent variables. 
 
The empirical section will start by performing regression diagnostics to examine the data 
before choosing the appropriate tests. Normality of residuals can be checked by most 
common normality plots: Q-Q plot; P-P plot. Moreover, the most common normality tests 
skewness-kurtosis and Shapiro-Wilk will be used for both the residuals and the dependent 
variable. To check for the linearity assumption, the residuals will be plotted versus the 
independent variable(s) values. Linearity can also be checked through plotting each 
independent variable against the dependent variable and see how well does the fitted 
regression line represent their relationship. To check for heteroscedasticity, two tests will 
be conducted by STATA the first is Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's tests and 
the second is Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM test. To check for 
multicollinearity, the current study will apply the common methods which include 
correlation coefficients; parametric (Pearson) and non-parametric (Spearman); and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) in addition to tolerance values.  
 
The hypotheses are examined using Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression of panel 
data. The Hausman test will be used to determine the primary model. A robust standard 
error is employed as the examined data is not normally distributed, which needs to be 
tested using a non- parametric test. Therefore, a robustness test is used to overcome this 
problem. Moreover, a sensitivity analysis will be applied to examine the sensitivity of the 
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results towards changing the statistical test which ensures the reliability of the driven 
results. The models are statistically analysed using STATA statistical package. 
 
5.13 Conclusion: 
The current chapter helps in making a link between the theoretical and empirical sections. 
Based on the theoretical framework in chapter four, evidence from the corporate literature 
in chapter three and the legal framework in chapter two, it seeks to examine empirically 
the extent and determinants of mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of 
reporting. The current research argument is based on agency, stakeholder and signalling 
theory (as discussed in chapter 4) which are considered to be an important part of the 
positive accounting theory. The objectivist ontological and positivist epistemological 
position would fit with this research. Based on ontological and epistemological positions, 
a nomothetic methodology is appropriate for the study. Referred to the research 
philosophy discussion, objectivism is the current research philosophical assumption. 
Therefore, the functionalist paradigm and deductive approach are fit with the current 
research nature and philosophy. With reference to the objective ontological position of the 
current research, it is believed that the quantitative research and survey technique would 
be appropriate to test the developed hypotheses. 
 
The study measures the extent of reporting and its categories in the corporate annual report 
based on a self constructed checklist of mandatory and voluntary reporting items. 
Moreover, it also calculates audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag from the 
listed companies in Bangladesh. The period of study is the seven years from 2004 to 2010 
during which time the important corporate governance code was issued in 2006. The final 
sample is 123 companies with 861 firm year observations. This chapter developed three 
sets of hypotheses and regression equations for three empirical chapters. Different sets of 
hypotheses are used based on the theoretical framework, literature review, country 
perspective and empirical model. For example, firm year end is suitable for timeliness of 
reporting rather than mandatory reporting. Hypotheses are related to corporate governance 
characteristics, ownership structure, firm characteristics and audit. Based on the current 
chapter the next three chapters will demonstrate how the empirical section answers the 
research questions of the current study.  
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Chapter Six: Analysis and Findings-Corporate Mandatory Reporting 
 
6.1 Introduction: 
As indicated in chapter five, the current study developed a self constructed checklist as a 
research instrument to measure the extent of total mandatory reporting and its sub 
categories. The current chapter aims to answer the research question, to what extent do 
Bangladeshi listed companies disclose mandatory information in their annual reports. 
Furthermore, to what extent do mandatory reporting practices in annual reports evolve 
over time, and what are the determinants of mandatory reporting practice. It provides 
answers for these questions primarily through a detailed analysis of the level of mandatory 
corporate information and its different categories using descriptive analysis. Then, it 
examines the determinants of mandatory reporting and tests the hypotheses; finally it finds 
associations between different determinants within different categories of mandatory 
reporting. 
 
The chapter starts with the analysis of the extent and trend of total mandatory reporting 
over the period of study and then moves to different categories of mandatory reporting in 
section 6.2. The findings of the empirical analysis showed the contribution of each 
mandatory reporting category to the whole level of reporting over the seven examined 
years as well as sector wise performance. The level and determinants of mandatory 
reporting is given in section 6.3 and 6.4 respectively. Then it examines the bivariate 
analysis in section 6.5. Section 6.6 discusses the multivariate analysis: starting with 
regression diagnostics to determine the regression technique. After that, the merits of fixed 
and random effects are discussed and finally the test of the hypothesis, the association 
between, the total mandatory reporting and its determinants on one side, and the 
association between each reporting category and the different determinants on the other 
side. A sensitivity analysis is applied to identify the effect of changing the statistical test 
on the results and findings of the main applied test in section 6.6 followed by the 
conclusion in section 6.7. 
 
6.2 The Extent and Trend of Mandatory Reporting and its Categories: 
To measure the extent of mandatory reporting in annual reports of the listed companies of 
Bangladesh, the study constructed a checklist of items ranging from 148 to 179 for seven 
year and divided into seven groups (for example 148 items in year 2004 and 179 items in 
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2010, given in chapter five). The total 861 annual reports of 123 companies for the years 
of 2004 to 2010 have been analysed using this checklist. The percentage of awarded 
reporting score to the applicable score represents the extent of mandatory reporting; the 
dependent variable in the current study. The mandatory reporting scores over the seven 
years provide the trend of mandatory reporting practice in the annual reports. 
 
To start the analysis, appendix C presents the descriptive statistics of total mandatory 
reporting and its categories for each year and for the seven years all together. Appendix C 
indicates that the mean of total mandatory reporting score over the seven years is about 
76.42 %. This average suggests a low level of mandatory reporting which is to be 
expected. At the same time, the study observed some improvement in reporting when 
current study compares the results with a previous study (Akhtaruddin, 2005; 44% 
reporting). Also, direct comparisons with other countries are applicable. For example, 
Wallace and Naser 1995 (Hong Kong, 73%); Glaum and Street 2003(83.7%, Germany); 
Owusu Ansah and Yeoh 2005(New Zealand, 78% in 1992 and 88% in 1997) and Aljifri 
2008(UAE, 68%). 
 
Appendix C also shows that the extent of mandatory reporting over the years has a wide 
range. While the minimum reporting index obtained is 41.22% for the years 2004 and 
2005, the maximum is 93.85% for the year 2010. This wide range of mandatory reporting 
level can be noticed also in each year of the investigated period. The minimum score of 
mandatory reporting for all the following years is still under 42.29%. On the other hand, 
the maximum score has been not crossed over 93.85%. This result confirms the wide 
variation in the mandatory reporting practices in the annual reports of listed Bangladeshi 
companies. This is because of institution factors and the strength of legal enforcement, 
which significantly affects accounting quality. In a series of papers, La Porta et al. (1998, 
1999, 2000, and 2002) documented the importance of legal rules and enforcement for 
understanding financing patterns and ownership structures across countries.  In addition, it 
justifies our decision to focus the current study on the extent of mandatory reporting 
practices over the period. 
 
Appendix C also indicates the variation in the level of mandatory reporting categories over 
the period of study. It can be seen from appendix C that there is gradual increasing in the 
average score of each of the seven groups. However; the increasing rate differs among the 
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categories. For example, while the maximum increasing rate in director report reporting, 
21.37% (from 69.51 in 2004 to 84.37% in 2010) over the year followed by miscellaneous 
reporting 16.79% (from 73.89% in 2004 to 86.30% in 2010). On the other hand, the lowest 
increasing rate in cash flow statement reporting for the same years is 3.78 % (from 71.54% 
in 2004 to 74.25% in 2010). Regarding the average over the period, current study found 
that general information reporting was the highest at 90.23% ( maximum 93.74%, 
minimum 86.31%) and structures of notes reporting is the lowest, 70.34%( maximum 
74.95%; minimum 66.26%). 
 
6.2.1 Sector Wise Mandatory Reporting: 
From previous discussion it is already understand that average compliance rate of 
mandatory reporting is relatively low (76.42%) in Bangladesh. In order to obtain a detailed 
overview, it is necessary to discuss sector wise mandatory reporting performance of the 
listed companies in Bangladesh. No previous studies in Bangladesh consider different 
sectors to analyse mandatory reporting performance. It will help to find out the most 
compliant sector and at the same time it will focus on which sectors’ regulatory authorities 
need more close monitoring.   
 
Table 6.1: Sector Wise Total Mandatory Reporting 
Sectors Mandatory 
Bank 81.83% 
Cement 67.44% 
Ceramic 70.98% 
Engineering 74.47% 
Financial Institution 78.57% 
Food & Allied 64.70% 
Insurance 75.43% 
IT Sector 73.09% 
Jute , Paper and Printing 72.53% 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 83.87% 
Services and Real Estate, Tannery 75.60% 
Textile 77.13% 
Miscellaneous 75.69% 
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From the table 6.1, it is observed that highest reporting over the period of time is in 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals sectors (83.87%) followed by Banks (81.83%). On the 
other hand the worst reporting pattern is found in Food & Allied sector (64.70%). 
Moreover, the reporting patterns of Service and real estate, Tannery, Insurance and 
Engineering sectors are very close to the average reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
6.2.2 Mandatory Reporting Before and After the Code:  
As the study focused on the difference between before and after the corporate governance 
code of 2006, table 6.2 clearly justifies the effect of that code. It is observed that the 
average mandatory reporting of 2004 and 2005 is 72.86%, which is quite low compared to 
the average of 2007 to 2010, 78.62%. This can be justified by the issuing of the corporate 
governance code in year 2006 in which year average reporting is 74.73%. It is also finds 
that average mandatory reporting before the corporate governance code was 72.86%. It 
represents total company disclosure at an average of 108 (72.86% of 148 checklist items) 
checklist items of the study. On the other hand, average disclosure after the corporate code 
of 78.62%. This indicates an average company disclosure of 140 (78.62% of 175 and 179 
checklist items) checklist items which the study investigates. This clearly showed a 
significant improvement in the reporting pattern of mandatory disclosure after the 
corporate governance code. 
Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics of Average Reporting Before and After the Code 
 2004- 2005 2006 2007-2010 
Mandatory 72.86% 74.73% 78.62% 
General 86.43% 88.40% 92.59% 
Director 70.07% 75.43% 82.91% 
Balance Sheet 71.34% 73.12% 76.74% 
Income Statement 68.72% 70.34% 72.70% 
Cash Flow 71.61% 72.63% 73.95% 
Structure of Notes 66.67% 66.26% 73.19% 
Miscellaneous 74.30% 78.05% 85.16% 
 
Now, it is necessary to identify whether this difference between total mandatory reporting 
over the period under investigation and before and after the code is significant or not. 
Testing for normality is essential to determine the type of tests to be used (parametric tests 
or non-parametric tests). After conducting a series of statistical tests, the results indicate 
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that total mandatory reporting is not normally distributed, so nonparametric tests are 
recommended. For this study, it is decided to use Kruskal-Wallis tests and Wilcoxon 
Matched-pairs Signed Rank test to measure the significance over the period and before 
and after the code respectively. 
 
Regarding the differences among the seven years, Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is 
significant difference between total mandatory reporting over the period. Again to test the 
effect of corporate governance code 2006 on the extent of mandatory reporting Wilcoxon 
Matched-pairs Signed Rank test indicate that there is significant difference of mandatory 
reporting before and after the corporate governance code.  
Kruskal-Wallis test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Chi-squared =   113.223 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
Ho: before = after 
z =  -2.521 
Prob > z =   0.0117 
 
Chi-squared with ties =   113.235 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
In summary, from the descriptive analysis it is observed that extent of mandatory reporting 
is improving over the period and this increase is sufficient to be statistically significant 
especially before and after the corporate governance code. 
 
6.3 Measuring the Level of Mandatory Corporate Reporting: 
The empirical study of this model is considered to be a descriptive analysis that shows the 
average mandatory reporting and the averages of the different components of this 
mandatory reporting. Descriptive statistics help us to simplify large amounts of data in a 
sensible way. The strength of descriptive statistics is their ability to collect, organise and 
compare vast amounts of data in a more manageable form. Descriptive analysis is 
necessary in this study to find out the extent of disclosure in total and in different 
categories showing the average along with the range. Also it will give an idea of whether 
the data set are normal or abnormal which suggests the alternative analysis techniques for 
the next part of the analysis. The descriptive study includes two different samples. The 
first sample includes the combined data set that includes all the companies of the sample 
and second sample includes only the non financial companies. 
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6.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Combined Sample: 
Table 6.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the total mandatory reporting level and the 
level of each of the mandatory reporting categories for the combined sample of data for 
year 2004-2010. The total mandatory reporting level presents 76.42% of the examined 
checklist items with a variant between 41.22% and 93.85% for the least and highest 
Bangladeshi companies reporting respectively. Moreover, the general reporting represents 
the highest reporting level at 90.23%, while the structures of notes reporting presents the 
lowest reporting level at 70.34 %. In addition, it is observed that the maximum reporting 
of all categories is 100% presented by general, director, balance sheet, cash flow 
statement, structures of notes and miscellaneous reporting. As usual notice that for the 
whole categories of reporting, the minimum reporting for any category is 0%, which 
means that at least one company of those examined missed the director’s report in their 
annual report. 
 
Table: 6.3 Descriptive Statistics for Combined Sample 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Devi. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Mandatory 
0.7642 0.7763 0.086 0.4122 0.9385 -0.9818 4.7123 
General 
0.9023 0.9200 0.060 0.6800 1 -0.4564 3.1449 
Director 
0.7817 0.7778 0.170 0 1 -1.1640 5.4600 
Balance Sheet 
0.7468 0.7627 0.095 0.3542 1 -0.7844 4.2411 
Income Statement 
0.7122 0.7143 0.109 0.3000 0.9429 -0.5762 3.7307 
Cash Flow 
0.7309 0.6667 0.142 0.3333 1 0.2237 3.0894 
Structure of Notes 
0.7034 0.7222 0.150 0.2222 1 -0.7447 3.5043 
Miscellaneous 
0.8104 0.8462 0.153 0.2000 1 -1.1438 4.4301 
 
Moreover, in relation to the standard skewness of statistics the presented data is normally 
distributed. As a common rule, the standard skewness of the data needs to be within the 
range of ±1.96 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). It is observed that of the total mandatory 
reporting and its different categories standard skewness is within the range of ±1.96, 
evidencing that the data is normally distributed. On the other hand, with respect to the 
standard kurtosis the data is not normally distributed. The data is said to be normally 
distributed if the standard kurtosis falls in the range of ±3 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). The 
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standard kurtosis of the total mandatory reporting and its different categories are more 
than 3 indicating that the data is not normally distributed. As a result any hypotheses test 
related to the entire data needs to use a robust analysis. 
 
6.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Non Financial Sample: 
Table 6.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the total mandatory reporting level and the 
level of each of the mandatory reporting categories for the sample of non financial 
companies over the period 2004 to 2010. These results indicate that the mean total 
mandatory reporting is 75.03% which is considered a low level in comparison to the 
combined sample. The highest component of the mandatory reporting is the general 
reporting of 89.51%, while the lowest reporting level is represented by the cash flow 
statement reporting of 67.07%. 
Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics for Non Financial Sample 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Devi. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Mandatory 
0.7503 0.7653 0.0962 0.4121 0.9371 -0.885 3.945 
General 
0.8951 0.8888 0.0612 0.68 1 -0.546 3.398 
Director 
0.7552 0.7777 0.1807 0 1 -1.201 5.500 
Balance Sheet 
0.7375 0.7543 0.1038 0.3541 1 -0.803 3.963 
Income Statement 
0.7075 0.7142 0.1229 0.3 0.9428 -0.575 3.266 
Cash Flow 
0.6707 0.6666 0.1088 0.3333 1 -0.348 4.381 
Structure of Notes 
0.6749 0.6956 0.1682 0.2222 1 -0.486 2.840 
Miscellaneous 
0.7897 0.8461 0.1684 0.2 1 -1.009 3.913 
 
The descriptive statistics also shows the normality of the different variables data. It is 
noted that the cash flow statement reporting represents the maximum skewness of -0.348, 
while the director reporting shows the minimum skewness of -1.201. This indicates that 
the minimum and maximum skewness are within the normally distributed range of ±1.96 
(Gujarati and Dawn 2009). While the Kurtosis of the reporting data indicate that most of 
the reporting data is not normally distributed. The maximum Kurtosis is shown by the 
director reporting of 5.50, while the minimum Kurtosis is shown by the structures of notes 
reporting of 2.84. With reference to the Kurtosis most of the reporting data is not normally 
distributed as they are out of the range of ±3 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). 
 
 - 205 - 
Since the data is not normally distributed, that would cast some shadows over the selected 
test to examine the research hypotheses applied over the entire data. Therefore, a robust 
analysis should be employed when testing the research hypotheses in the further analysis. 
 
      6.3.3 Descriptive Statistics for Financial Companies: 
      From the table 6.5, it is observed that the financial company's mean is higher than the 
combined and non financial company's mean mandatory reporting with all its components. 
In the same way, standard deviation is lower than the financial sample and combined 
sample. In addition, by observing minimum and maximum reporting, it can be said that 
financial companies disclose more mandatory information than the non financial 
companies. However, the financial company's data is also non normal as the kurtosis value 
for director reporting, income statement reporting, structuring of notes reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting has a value greater than three. 
 
Table 6.5: Descriptive Statistics for Financial Companies 
  Mean Median 
Std. 
Devi. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Mandatory 
0.7864 0.7829 0.0609 0.6053 0.9385 -0.044 2.819 
General 
0.9137 0.9231 0.0585 0.7600 1 -0.277 2.382 
Director 
0.8244 0.8750 0.1429 0.3750 1 -0.730 3.154 
Balance Sheet 
0.7617 0.7708 0.0775 0.5208 0.9831 -0.239 2.998 
Income Statement 
0.7199 0.7143 0.0815 0.4857 0.9250 -0.066 3.200 
Cash Flow 
0.8283 0.8333 0.1352 0.5000 1 -0.013 1.687 
Structure of Notes 
0.7494 0.7647 0.1002 0.4118 0.9600 -0.424 3.129 
Miscellaneous 
0.8439 0.8889 0.1191 0.3846 1 -0.994 3.730 
 
 
6.4 Measuring the Determinants of Mandatory Reporting: 
This empirical model examines the relationship between the mandatory reporting level and 
the determinants of this mandatory reporting. Descriptive statistics are used to describe the 
basic features of the data in a study. Descriptive statistics simply describe what the data 
shows and easily translates results into a distribution of frequency and percents and overall 
averages. The determinants of the level of the mandatory reporting that are examined in 
this model are firm size, firm profitability measured by both ROE and ROA, leverage, 
audit firm size, multinational parents, industry and ownership. These determinants are 
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divided into two equations: one for the combined sample and one for the non financial 
companies as mentioned in chapter 5. 
 
6.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Determinants for Combined Sample: 
Table 6.6 shows the descriptive statistics of the mandatory reporting determinants for 
combined sample. As indicated in the table, the mean firm size is about 9.25 with 
minimum 6.428 and maximum 11.765. Also profitability measured by ROE ranges from -
479 % to 2255% with average 23.4% while profitability measured by ROA average 
4.070% with minimum -31.914% and maximum 55.680%. It is also notable that, only 
23.50% observation audited by Big four firm and only 12.2% observation has operated by 
multinational parents. 
 
Table 6.6: Descriptive Statistics of Determinants for Combined Sample 
 
  Mean Median Std. Devi. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Firm Size 9.250 8.996 0.8789 6.428 11.765 .4590 2.530 
Profitability(ROE) .234 0.121 1.3044 -4.793 22.552 10.1779 144.687 
Profitability(ROA) 4.070 2.606 6.5059 -31.914 55.680 1.4579 14.206 
Audit Firm Size 0.235 0 0.4242 0 1 1.2547 2.569 
Multinational Parent 0.122 0 0.3274 0 1 2.3146 6.339 
Industry 0.382 0 0.4862 0 1 0.4861 1.235 
Ownerships 0.459 0 0.4986 0 1 0.1658 1.027 
 
Referred to  standard skewness the data is considered not to be normally distributed as the 
skewness of Firm profitability(ROE) and Multinational parents exceeds the standard 
normality range of ± 1.96( Gujarati and Dawn 2009). In the same way, with reference to 
the standard kurtosis the data is also considered not to be normally distributed as 
Profitability(ROE), Profitability(ROA) and Multinational parents exceeds the standard 
normality range of ± 3(Gujarati and Dawn 2009). The figures in table 6.5 indicate that 
observations have some extreme figures (outliers) which need more attention during the 
analysis process and the interpretation of the results.  
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6.4.2 Descriptive Statistics of Determinants for Non Financial Sample: 
Table 6.7 shows the descriptive statistics of the different determinants of the corporate 
mandatory reporting for the non financial sample. As indicated in the table, the mean firm 
size is about 8.88 with minimum 6.428 and maximum 10.40. Also profitability measured 
by ROE ranges from -479.30% to 2255% with average 27.06% while profitability 
measured by ROA average 4.278% with minimum -31.914% and maximum 55.680%. It is 
also notable that, only 19.17% of non financial observations are audited by Big four firms 
and 13.16% non financial observation have been performed by multinational parents. 
Regarding leverage, average debt equity ratio is 3.32 times with maximum 150.91 times 
and minimum -154.85 times. 
 
The skewness of the different determinants indicates that the data of the different variables 
is not normally distributed. The maximum skewness of 8.2315 is represented by 
profitability (ROE), while the minimum skewness of -0.1205 represented by firm 
ownerships. The minimum and maximum skewness are not within the skewness range of 
±1.96 which indicates the non normality of the variables data (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). 
Therefore, based on the skewness the data of the different variables is not normally 
distributed and so is considered to be non parametric data. 
 
Table 6.7: Descriptive Statistics of Determinants for Non Financial Sample 
  Mean Median Std. Devi. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Firm Size 8.8807 8.8604 0.6080 6.428 10.40 0.0349 3.8694 
Profitability(ROE) 0.2706 0.0847 1.6353 -4.793 22.55 8.2315 93.9802 
Profitability(ROA) 4.2788 2.9207 7.4223 -31.914 55.68 1.0539 10.6471 
Leverage 3.3258 1.1561 15.4627 -154.854 150.91 3.1652 62.4623 
Audit Firm Size 0.1917 0 0.3940 0 1 1.5632 3.4436 
Multinational Parent 0.1316 0 0.3384 0 1 2.1798 5.7515 
Ownerships 0.5301 1 0.4996 0 1 -0.1205 1.0145 
 
The kurtosis shows that the minimum kurtosis of 1.0145 is represented by the firm 
ownerships, while the maximum kurtosis of 93.98 is represented by the Profitability 
(ROE). Since the minimum and maximum kurtosis are not within the range of ±3 (Gujarati 
and Dawn, 2009) the data is not normally distributed and the data is considered to be non 
parametric. As in the non financial sample, observations have some extreme figures 
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(outliers) that need more attention during the analysis process and the interpretation of the 
results. 
 
6.5 Bivariate Analysis: 
Bivariate analysis provides an estimate of the degree of association between the variables. 
In fact, it investigates for interdependence of the variables. In this study, correlation 
analysis is used to discover the level of association between the dependent and 
independent variables. With the help of this, it is also possible to recognise the correlation 
among the independent variables. Moreover, it shows whether the data needs to change or 
whether any independent variables need to be taken out. So, before approaching the 
regression analysis, this study carried out correlation analysis to recognise whether all the 
independent variables are appropriate for the multiple regression analysis. 
 
The correlation between the different categories of mandatory reporting and the 
determinants of reporting is shown for the combined sample using Spearman's correlation 
coefficients in the table 6.8. The Spearman correlations in table 6.8 show the significance 
association between the total and different categories of reporting with the different 
determinants of this type of reporting for combined observation. The significance 
association is identified using a confidence level of 99% and 95%. Referred to the 
correlation coefficients, there is a significant relationship (at 1 % and 5% significance 
levels) between total mandatory reporting and firm size, firm profitability (ROE), firm 
profitability (ROA), audit firm size, multinational parents and industrial categories. This 
suggests the stronger association between these variables and mandatory reporting. 
According to the results, companies with big size, high profitability (measured by both 
ROE and ROA), audited by big four audit firm, multinational parents and which are 
financial companies, disclose more mandatory information in their annual reports. 
 
On the other hand, there is a non-significant negative association between firm ownerships 
and mandatory reporting. The results indicate weak or no association between mandatory 
reporting and firm ownerships. The results of this table agree with the research hypothesis 
regarding the association between mandatory reporting and the different reporting 
determinants. 
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Regarding the different categories of mandatory reporting, there is a significant positive 
relationship between different categories of mandatory reporting and firm size, firm 
profitability (ROE) and firm profitability (ROA). In addition to this, there is significant 
positive relationship between general reporting, director report reporting, balance sheet 
reporting, cash flow statement reporting, and structures of notes reporting with audit firm 
size. Moreover, there is significant positive relationship between general reporting, 
balance sheet reporting, income statement reporting, structures of notes reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting amongst companies with multinational parents. Also, there is 
significant positive relationship between general reporting, director report reporting, 
balance sheet reporting, cash flow statement reporting, structures of notes reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting with industrial categories. Finally, there is significant negative 
relationship between balance sheet reporting and cash flow statement reporting with firm 
ownerships. 
 
Table 6.9 shows the correlation between the different categories of mandatory reporting 
and the determinants of reporting of the non financial sample using Spearman's correlation 
coefficients. The Spearman correlations in table 6.9 show the significance association 
between the total and different categories of reporting with the different determinants of 
this type of reporting for non financial observation. The significance association is also 
identified using a confidence level of 99% and 95%. Referred to the correlation 
coefficients, there is a significant relationship (at 1 % and 5% significance levels) between 
total mandatory reporting and firm size, firm profitability (ROE), firm profitability (ROA) 
audit firm size and multinational parents. This suggests the stronger association between 
these variables and mandatory reporting. According to the results, companies with large 
size, high profitability (measured by both ROE and ROA), audited by big four audit firm 
and multinational parents disclose more mandatory information in their annual reports. 
 
On the other hand, firm ownership is identified as having a non-significant relationship 
with mandatory reporting. The results indicate weak or no association between mandatory 
reporting and firm ownership. While, there is a significant negative association (at 5% 
significance level) between leverage and mandatory reporting. This suggests that the 
extent of mandatory reporting in the annual reports increase with the decrease of firm 
leverage. The results of this table agree with the research hypotheses regarding the 
association between mandatory reporting and the different reporting determinants. 
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Table: 6.8 Combined Sample's Spearman's Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables   
Spearman's Correlations 
 
Mandatory General Director 
Balance 
sheet 
Income 
statement 
Cash 
Flow Notes 
Misce 
llaneous LASST ROE ROA 
Audit 
firm 
Multi 
national Industry Ownerships 
Mandatory 1.000               
General .801
**
 1.000              
Director .643
**
 .595
**
 1.000             
Balance sheet .941
**
 .733
**
 .531
**
 1.000            
Income statement .826
**
 .559
**
 .467
**
 .710
**
 1.000           
Cash flow .365
**
 .286
**
 .356
**
 .333
**
 .226
**
 1.000          
Notes .877
**
 .626
**
 .514
**
 .792
**
 .680
**
 .327
**
 1.000         
Miscellaneous .793
**
 .694
**
 .569
**
 .695
**
 .567
**
 .189
**
 .688
**
 1.000        
Firm Size .339
**
 .295
**
 .304
**
 .308
**
 .251
**
 .604
**
 .320
**
 .148
**
 1.000       
Profitability(ROE) .241
**
 .206
**
 .198
**
 .245
**
 .155
**
 .399
**
 .224
**
 .166
**
 .340
**
 1.000      
Profitability(ROA) .115
**
 .148
**
 .143
**
 .088
**
 .141
**
 .099
**
 .085
*
 .129
**
 -.118
**
 .465
**
 1.000     
Audit firm size .099
**
 .086
*
 .165
**
 .119
**
 .043 .267
**
 .093
**
 .062 .335
**
 .325
**
 .168
**
 1.000    
Multinational .106
**
 .128
**
 .058 .086
*
 .136
**
 .031 .067
*
 .136
**
 .140
**
 .163
**
 .206
**
 .413
**
 1.000   
Industry .118
**
 .100
**
 .160
**
 .070
*
 .017 .534
**
 .147
**
 .116
**
 .472
**
 .247
**
 -.034 .129
**
 -.037 1.000  
Ownerships -.057 -.055 -.029 -.093
**
 .008 -.193
**
 -.027 .026 -.178
**
 -.099
**
 .098
**
 .117
**
 .212
**
 -.182
**
 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table: 6.9 Non Financial Sample's Spearman's Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables  
Spearman's Correlations 
 
Mandatory General Director 
Balance 
sheet 
Income 
statement 
Cash 
Flow Notes 
Miscell- 
aneous 
Firm 
Size ROE ROA Leverage 
Audit 
Firm 
Multi. 
parent Ownerships 
Mandatory 1.000               
General .828
**
 1.000              
Director .665
**
 .601
**
 1.000             
Balance sheet .960
**
 .784
**
 .586
**
 1.000            
Income statement .869
**
 .634
**
 .518
**
 .776
**
 1.000           
Cash flow .393
**
 .368
**
 .410
**
 .345
**
 .351
**
 1.000          
Notes .918
**
 .700
**
 .558
**
 .859
**
 .761
**
 .305
**
 1.000         
Miscellaneous .882
**
 .743
**
 .618
**
 .818
**
 .700
**
 .276
**
 .801
**
 1.000        
Firm Size .199
**
 .223
**
 .281
**
 .143
**
 .240
**
 .306
**
 .166
**
 .130
**
 1.000       
Profitability(ROE) .167
**
 .169
**
 .147
**
 .163
**
 .172
**
 .285
**
 .142
**
 .112
**
 .220
**
 1.000      
Profitability(ROA) .230
**
 .213
**
 .183
**
 .225
**
 .235
**
 .417
**
 .200
**
 .127
**
 .159
**
 .669
**
 1.000     
Leverage -.095
*
 -.126
**
 -.029 -.115
**
 -.124
**
 -.202
**
 -.018 -.034 .191
**
 -.029 -.352
**
 1.000    
Audit firm Size .127
**
 .101
*
 .256
**
 .098
*
 .110
*
 .236
**
 .140
**
 .117
**
 .363
**
 .355
**
 .368
**
 .012 1.000   
Multinational parent .154
**
 .180
**
 .134
**
 .103
*
 .172
**
 .126
**
 .126
**
 .177
**
 .196
**
 .217
**
 .372
**
 -.113
**
 .460
**
 1.000  
Ownerships .020 -.003 .038 -.032 .063 -.009 .038 .038 -.027 -.001 .124
**
 .023 .153
**
 .144
**
 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table: 6.10 Combined Sample's Pearson's Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables  
Pearson's Correlations 
 
Mandatory General Director 
Balance 
sheet 
Income 
statement 
Cash 
Flow Notes 
Misce 
llaneous LASST ROE ROA 
Audit 
firm 
Multi 
national Industry Ownerships 
Mandatory 1               
General .794
**
 1              
Director .657
**
 .593
**
 1             
Balance sheet .949
**
 .738
**
 .554
**
 1            
Income statement .865
**
 .578
**
 .483
**
 .763
**
 1           
Cash flow .371
**
 .299
**
 .341
**
 .329
**
 .261
**
 1          
Notes .909
**
 .654
**
 .533
**
 .829
**
 .741
**
 .306
**
 1         
Miscellaneous .855
**
 .713
**
 .589
**
 .776
**
 .665
**
 .179
**
 .764
**
 1        
Firm Size .312
**
 .287
**
 .266
**
 .278
**
 .227
**
 .641
**
 .292
**
 .128
**
 1       
Profitability(ROE) .013 -.027 -.002 .000 .036 .049 .009 .028 .031 1      
Profitability(ROA) .236
**
 .189
**
 .184
**
 .193
**
 .251
**
 .123
**
 .198
**
 .207
**
 -.076
*
 .104
**
 1     
Audit firm .128
**
 .088
**
 .134
**
 .138
**
 .068
*
 .268
**
 .104
**
 .076
*
 .316
**
 .006 .223
**
 1    
Multinational .134
**
 .132
**
 .060 .114
**
 .148
**
 .023 .092
**
 .164
**
 .117
**
 -.011 .288
**
 .413
**
 1   
Industry .117
**
 .109
**
 .173
**
 .061 .032 .539
**
 .123
**
 .054 .535
**
 -.036 -.041 .129
**
 -.037 1  
Ownerships -.053 -.043 -.019 -.091
**
 -.009 -.225
**
 -.019 .020 -.190
**
 -.073
*
 .145
**
 .117
**
 .212
**
 -.182
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Table: 6.11 Non Financial Sample's Pearson's Correlation for Dependent and Independent Variables  
Pearson's Correlations 
 
Mandatory General Director 
Balance 
sheet 
Income 
statement 
Cash 
Flow Notes 
Miscel- 
laneous LASSt ROE ROA Leverage 
Audit 
firm 
Multi 
parent Ownerships 
Mandatory 1               
General .816
**
 1              
Director .671
**
 .601
**
 1             
Balance sheet .962
**
 .776
**
 .599
**
 1            
Income statement .887
**
 .629
**
 .516
**
 .800
**
 1           
Cash flow .402
**
 .372
**
 .373
**
 .353
**
 .368
**
 1          
Notes .927
**
 .703
**
 .555
**
 .870
**
 .780
**
 .307
**
 1         
Miscellaneous .895
**
 .742
**
 .627
**
 .836
**
 .730
**
 .279
**
 .819
**
 1        
Firm Size .206
**
 .225
**
 .231
**
 .143
**
 .224
**
 .320
**
 .177
**
 .145
**
 1       
Profitability(ROE) -.004 -.052 -.011 -.032 .045 .112
**
 .001 -.002 .070 1      
Profitability(ROA) .292
**
 .252
**
 .222
**
 .260
**
 .305
**
 .368
**
 .234
**
 .224
**
 .168
**
 .104
*
 1     
Leverage -.109
*
 -.122
**
 -.054 -.118
**
 -.123
**
 -.096
*
 -.065 -.048 .145
**
 .096
*
 -.077 1    
Audit firm .148
**
 .102
*
 .211
**
 .116
**
 .123
**
 .238
**
 .145
**
 .128
**
 .337
**
 -.010 .390
**
 .127
**
 1   
Multinational  .156
**
 .178
**
 .132
**
 .104
*
 .168
**
 .122
**
 .126
**
 .172
**
 .203
**
 -.016 .452
**
 .158
**
 .460
**
 1  
Ownerships .010 .007 .056 -.047 .039 -.028 .033 .040 -.036 -.089
*
 .178
**
 -.141
**
 .153
**
 .144
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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Regarding the different categories of mandatory reporting, there is a significant positive 
relationship between different categories of mandatory reporting and firm size, firm 
profitability (ROE), firm profitability (ROA), audit firm size and multinational parents. On 
the other hand, the findings show that there is non-significant relationship between the 
different categories of mandatory reporting and firm ownerships. Moreover, there is 
significant negative relationship between general reporting, balance sheet reporting, 
income statement reporting and cash flow statement with firm leverage.  
 
Table 6.10 and table 6.11 show the correlation between the different categories of 
mandatory reporting and the determinants of reporting of both the combined and non 
financial sample using Pearson's correlation coefficients respectively. The results of 
combined sample using Pearson's correlation do not significantly differ from the results of 
the combined sample using Spearman's correlation: the exception is firm profitability 
(ROE) which has a non-significant relationship with all categories of mandatory reporting 
and total mandatory reporting. Income statement reporting has a significant relationship 
with audit firm, and balance sheet and miscellaneous reporting has non-significant 
relationships with industry categories. 
 
Similarly, the results of the non financial sample, using Pearson's correlation, do not 
significantly differ from the results of non financial sample using Spearman's correlation 
with the exception of firm profitability (ROE) which has an non-significant negative 
relationship with mandatory reporting, general reporting, director reporting, balance sheet 
reporting, and miscellaneous reporting and an non-significant positive relationship with 
income statement reporting and notes reporting.  
 
6.6 Multivariate Analysis: 
The result of bivariate analysis is specific, so to generalise the result of this study 
multivariate analysis is applied. Multivariate analysis can statistically estimate 
relationships between different variables, and correlate how important each one is to the 
final outcome and show where dependencies exist between them. Among multivariate 
analyses, regression analysis is one of the most common and widely used techniques in 
statistical analysis, especially in disclosure literature (Cooke 1998). Gujarati and Dawn 
(2009) also suggest that under certain assumptions, the method of least squares has some 
very attractive statistical properties that have made it one of the most powerful and 
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popular methods of regression analysis. The following sections start with the regression 
diagnostics that represent the first step in choosing the relevant statistical method to 
analyse the collected data in the current study. After that follows the discussion about 
selecting fixed effect and random effect and finally the test of the hypothesis, the 
association between, the total mandatory reporting and its determinants on one side, and 
the association between each reporting category and the different determinants on the 
other side. 
 
6.6.1 Regression Diagnostic: 
Before deciding the appropriate statistical method, it is important in disclosure studies to 
assess the impact of distribution problems, non linearity, in addition to the problems of 
outliers (Cooke 1998). In general, there are several methods to estimate regression 
coefficients (parameters). In this study; linearity, independence and normality of error, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity has been checked to justify the regression. 
 
6.6.1.1 Checking Linearity: 
The association between the dependent and independent variables is supposed to be linear. 
It can be checked by the plot(s) of the residuals versus the independent variable values, 
and if linearity exists, there will be no obvious clustering of positive residuals or clustering 
of negative residuals. Linearity can also be checked effortlessly through plotting each 
independent variable against the dependent variable and observing how well the fitted 
regression line represents their relationship. The graphs for checking the linearity of each 
independent variable indicate that most in the model do not have an obvious linear 
relationship with the dependent variable (Appendix F). 
 
This may be, either because of the presence of outliers or unusual observations, or because 
the linear model is not a good fit to describe the relation between the dependent variable 
and each independent variable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the linearity 
assumption is not satisfied. However, this result of non linearity is common in the majority 
of prior reporting studies (Cooke 1998). The study has to be able to fit this non linear data 
into an appropriate regression.  
 
6.6.1.2: Checking Normality: 
Normality implies that errors (residuals) should be normally distributed. Technically, 
normality is necessary only for hypothesis tests to be valid. Normality of residuals can be 
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checked by two methods; graphical methods and numerical methods. Both of them; 
normality plots and normality tests; have been employed in the current study. 
Graphical Method: 
Two most common plots have been used in this study to check the normality- P-P plot 
(standardised normal probability plot) and Density estimate (plots the density of a variable 
and the normal density). 
Figure 6.1:  P-P plot for Mandatory Reporting 
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Figure 6.2: Kernel Density Estimate 
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Numerical Methods of Normality: 
There are many numerical methods which  can be used to test the assumption of normality 
(examples of these methods include- Kolmogorov - Smimov D statistic, skewness, and 
Shapiro - Wilk W statistic). Among them Shapiro - Wilk W statistic has been shown to 
have a good power against a wide range of non normal distribution. If the value of p is 
small, then the data may not be considered normally distributed. 
Table 6.12: Shapiro-Wilk W test for Normal Data 
Variables obs W V Z Prob>Z 
Residual 861 0.95029 27.356 8.144 0.0000 
Total Mandatory 861 0.94976 27.649 8.17 0.0000 
 
The two methods of normality test, graphical and numerical method, suggest the same 
result. It is clear from the previous results that errors and dependent variables are not 
normally distributed and this is mainly related to the skewness of the distribution. 
 
6.6.1.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals: 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance of the error terms is constant for 
each observation. The current study employs two numerical methods for 
heteroscedasticity; and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's test; and Cameron & 
Trivedi's decomposition of IM test. 
Table 6.13: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and White's tests  
Test Chi-square Prob>chi
2
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg  422.07 0.0000 
White's 252.06 0.0000 
 
Table 6.14: Cameron & Trivedi's Decomposition of IM test  
Source Chi-square df p 
Heteroskedasticity 252.06 31 0.0000 
Skewness 89.17 7 0.0000 
Kurtosis 11.99 1 0.0005 
Total 353.22 39 0.0000 
 
The test results point out that errors have non-constant variance (heteroscedastic), which 
indicate that the regression estimators will not have the minimum variance of all unbiased 
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estimators, and also the P-values will be unreliable. In other words the current data suffers 
from heteroscedasticity. 
 
6.6.1.4 Checking Multicollinearity: 
According to Murray (2006), it will be difficult to differentiate the individual effects of 
explanatory variables and regression estimators may be biased when multicollinearity 
exists. This means there is a linear relationship between two or more independent 
variables and the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The two 
common ways to check for the presence of multicollinearity between independent 
variables are correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance 
values. These two ways have been used widely in the reporting literature. The current 
study employs both of them to check whether the explanatory variables or the model 
suffer from multicollinearity. Table 6.15 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and 
tolerance coefficients of each explanatory variable both for combined and non financial 
companies: 
   Table 6.15: Variable Inflation Factor 
Combined Sample Non financial Sample 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
(1/VIF) 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
(1/VIF) 
Firm Size 1.625 .615 Firm Size 1.165 .859 
Profitability(ROE) 1.027 .974 Profitability(ROE) 1.044 .957 
Profitability(ROA) 1.158 .864 Profitability(ROA) 1.422 .703 
Audit Firm 1.370 .730 Leverage 1.107 .903 
Multinational Parent 1.321 .757 Audit Firm 1.492 .670 
Industry 1.439 .695 Multinational Parent 1.488 .672 
Ownerships 1.130 .885 Ownerships 1.084 .922 
Mean of VIF 
1.296 
 Mean of VIF 
1.257 
 
 
As regards the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), it is indicated that data is normally 
distributed if the VIF is less than 10(Gujarati and Dawn 2009; Gaur and Gaur 2009; Neter 
et al. 1983; Mendenhall and Sincich 1989). However, others suggest that the value of 5 
can be used as a rule of thumb (Groebner et al. 2005). From the table 6.15, it is observed 
that the maximum VIF is 1.625 (for the combined sample) and 1.492 (for the non financial 
sample) with mean VIF is 1.296 (for combined sample and 1.257 (for the non financial 
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sample). Moreover, the lowest tolerance coefficient for the combined sample is 0.615 and 
for non financial sample is 0.670. As suggested by Hair et al. (2011), the tolerance value 
more than 0.20 may be used as a criterion for considering the data being free from the 
problem of multicollinearity. Therefore, based upon the rule of thumb, the results of VIF 
and tolerance coefficients indicate that there is not an unacceptable level of 
multicollinearity in the current study. 
 
It is also commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool for indicating the 
relationship between explanatory variables but there is no agreement among researchers 
regarding the cut off correlation percentage (Alsaeed 2006). While, some researchers use 
0.8; e.g. Hair et al. (2011); Gujarati and Dawn (2009); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Tables 6.8, 6.9, 6.10 and 6.11 present the correlation 
coefficients of non parametric and parametric tests and Spearman and Pearson coefficients 
for the combined and the non financial sample respectively. It can be noticed from the 
tables that correlation coefficients confirm the results of VIF. According to Spearman 
correlations (table 6.8 and table 6.9), the correlation coefficients of all independent 
variables are less or equal to 0.604 (for the combined sample) and 0.669 (for the non 
financial sample). 
  
From the table 6.8, although the study has a correlation coefficient 0.941(for balance 
sheet), 0.826(for income statement), and 0.877(for notes to the financial statements), 
balance sheet, income statement and notes to the financial statement are dependent 
variables: furthermore, these three are categories of mandatory reporting. In the regression 
equation, the above are not running in the same equation with mandatory reporting. So, the 
correlation coefficient of balance sheet, income statement and notes to the financial 
statement with total mandatory reporting do not affect multicollinearity. In other words as 
there is no value more than 0.80 for comparing correlation between dependent and 
independent variable, it can be concluded that there is no potential multicollinearity 
problem in the current study. 
 
Similarly in table 6.9, the study find correlation coefficients of 0.828 (general reporting), 
0.960 (balance sheet reporting), 0.8699 (income statement reporting), 0.918 (notes to the 
financial statement) and 0.882 (miscellaneous reporting) with total mandatory reporting. 
As these are categories of mandatory reporting, this does not affect the multicollinearity. 
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The same can be concluded from Pearson's rank correlation (table 6.10 and table 6.11) 
which indicates that the highest coefficient is 0.641(for combined sample) and 0.460 (for 
non financial sample) except the correlation coefficients of categories of total mandatory 
reporting. Based on these results, it can be concluded that there is no potential 
multicollinearity problem in the current study. 
 
6.6.2 Choosing Between Fixed and Random Effects: 
When modeling group data, perhaps the first question the researcher faces is whether to 
account for unit effects and, if so, whether to employ so called fixed effects or random 
effects. Advice on this topic is plentiful (e.g., Greene 2008, Kennedy 2008, Frees 2004, 
Gelman 2005, Wilson and Butler 2007, Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009, Wooldridge 
2010), even if sometimes confusing and contradictory (Gelman and Hill 2007, 245). 
However, the generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is 
running a Hausman test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less 
efficient but consistent model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives 
consistent results (James and Marks 2012). 
Table 6.16: Hausman Test of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 Combined Data 
Hausman  random fixed 
Non Financial Data 
Hausman  random fixed 
 chi
2
 Prob>chi
2
 chi
2
 Prob>chi
2
 
Mandatory Reporting 166.55 0.0000 28.07 0.0002 
General Reporting 59.09 0.0000 26.47 0.0004 
Director Report 97.09 0.0000 30.23 0.0001 
Balance Sheet 137.49 0.0000 29.06 0.0001 
Income statement 11.10 0.0000 35.08 0.0000 
Cash flow Statement 3.12 0.0000 0.92 0.0000 
Structures 13.97 0.0000 29.55 0.0001 
Miscellaneous 96.29 0.0000 26.68 0.0004 
 
According to James and Marks (2012), in cases of the Hausman random fixed, if there are 
non-significant Prob>chi
2
 value, then it is safe to use random effects. From the table 6.16, 
as Prob>chi
2
 is zero or non-significant in both combined data and non financial data, the 
current study goes for random test. If there is reason to believe that some omitted variables 
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may be constant over time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases 
but vary over time, then the research should include both types by using random effects. 
 
6.6.3 Test of Hypotheses: 
Regression diagnostics indicate that data set are non linear, non normal and there are 
heteroscedasticity in the current study. There are several reasons for this case of unequal 
variance, e.g. outliers and skewness. Moreover, from descriptive statistics, the current 
study observed that skewness and kurtosis is beyond the normal range. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) does not make use of the information contained in the unequal variability 
of the dependent variable since it assigns equal weight to each observation. Generalized 
Least Squares (GLS) is OLS on the transformed variables that satisfy the standard least-
squares assumptions. As such, GLS minimises a weighted sum of residual squares not 
minimizing an unweighted or equally weighted as OLS (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). 
Therefore, the data analysis needs to be applied using a nonparametric test that fits with 
this no normally distributed non parametric data. The GLS is a parametric test, so to fit 
with the non parametric data it needs to be employed using robust standard error. 
 
To benefit from the advantages of panel data analysis in the current study the study 
employed GLS using robust standard error. The results are shown in table 6.17(for 
combined sample) and 6.18 (for non financial sample). The panel regression is used to 
differentiate between the data of years from 2004 to 2010. Therefore, seven groups are 
examined. As the study used the same number of companies all the year, minimum, 
maximum and average number of observations is 123 companies for the combined sample 
and 67 companies for the non financial sample per each year. 
 
The results of table 6.17 show that mandatory reporting has positive association (p ≤ 0.01) 
with firm size, firm profitability (ROA), and firm multinational parents, while it has 
negative association (p ≤0.01) with firm ownerships, firms profitability(ROE), audit firm 
size and industry. The positive associations mean that mandatory reporting increases with 
the increase of firm size, firm profitability measured by return on assets, and firms having 
multinational parents. On the other, hand, the negative associations mean that mandatory 
reporting decrease in non profitable companies(having less ROE), audited by a non big 
four audit firm, in the non financial companies rather than in the financial companies and 
in the firm having sponsorship of more than 50%. 
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Table: 6.17 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Combined Sample 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement Cash Flow Structure of notes Miscellaneous 
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
Firm Size 0.0413*** 19.65 0.0259*** 9.03 0.0503*** 6.79 0.041*** 21.69 0.041*** 13.69 0.077*** 24.83 0.061*** 14.93 0.019*** 3.86 
ROE -0.0002 -0.09 -0.0028** -2.13 -0.0034 -0.97 -0.001 -0.47 0.002 0.77 0.002 0.72 0.000 0.01 0.006*** 4.94 
ROA 0.0042*** 9.55 0.0023*** 7.04 0.0057*** 8.34 0.004*** 9.3 0.005*** 6.99 0.004*** 4.26 0.006*** 10.8 0.006*** 8.06 
Audit Firm -0.0025 -0.33 -0.0097* -1.84 0.0127 0.79 0.014 1.47 -0.025*** -2.99 0.031*** 3.92 -0.006 -0.71 -0.009 -0.84 
Multi.  Parent 0.0137*** 2.94 0.0145*** 3.43 -0.0237* -1.7 0.007 1.46 0.028*** 4.95 -0.041*** -8.68 0.002 0.34 0.075*** 8.05 
Industry -0.0024 -1.1 -0.0048 -0.64 0.0223** 2.26 -0.019*** -3.41 -0.021*** -10.17 0.075*** 10.76 0.020* 1.73 0.044*** 8.16 
Ownerships -.0074*** -3.24 -0.0033* -1.71 0.0054 0.63 -0.021*** -6.92 -0.001 -0.3 -0.030*** -15.56 0.006 1.23 0.006 0.77 
Constant 0.3682 18.96 0.6577 23.25 0.2827 3.44 0.369 17.68 0.326 14.31 -0.020 -0.83 0.107 5.01 0.586 10.16 
Adjusted R 2 0.2665 0.1753 0.1273 0.2031 0.1557 0.5157 0.2018 0.1441 
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However, according to the results indicated in table 6-17, there is a significant relationship (p 
≤ 0.01) between the mandatory reporting and firm size, firm profitability (ROA), 
multinational parents and ownerships. On the other hand, there is a non-significant 
relationship between mandatory reporting and firm profitability (ROE), audit firm size and 
industry. The adjusted R Squared of the models explains how much of the changes in the 
dependent variable are explained by the changes in the independent variables. The R Squared 
is 0.2653 indicating that 26.53% of the changes of the total mandatory reporting is explained 
by the changes in its examined determinants. Some of the earlier research studies, however, 
have reported better explanatory power using different sets of independent variables [Hossain 
(2008) at 53.80%, Akhtaruddin (2005) at 57.70% and Haniffa and Cooke (2002) at 58.30 %]. 
Addition of more explanatory variables in the regression equation can improve the 
explanatory power. 
 
Referring to the different categories of mandatory reporting, there is a significant relationship 
between, firm size and firm profitability (ROA) with all parts of reporting. There is a 
significant relationship between, firm profitability (ROE) and general reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting. Also, there is a significant relationship between, audit firm size and 
general reporting, income statement reporting and cash flow statement reporting. Moreover; 
there is a significant relationship between, multinational parents and general reporting, 
director reporting, income statement reporting, cash flow statement reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting. In addition, there is a significant relationship between, industry and 
director reporting, balance sheet reporting, income statement reporting, cash flow statement 
reporting, structures of notes reporting and miscellaneous reporting. Also, there is a 
significant relationship between, ownerships and general reporting, balance sheet reporting 
and cash flow statement reporting. The rest of the relationships between the different 
categories of mandatory reporting and the determinants are non-significant which supports 
the weak or no relationship with mandatory reporting. 
 
This study also checks the effect of other determinants that are used in voluntary reporting 
and timeliness reporting. The main objective of this is to identify whether the factors which 
affect voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting also affects mandatory reporting. For 
this purpose financial condition has been omitted as it has multicollinearity with board size. 
This additional finding, appendix I, indicates that mandatory reporting also has significant 
positive relationship with age, audit committee, percentage of independent director, role 
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duality, industry categories and modified opinion. However, mandatory reporting has 
significant negative relationships with liquidity and sign of earning, while it has no or weak 
association with market categories, number of independent director, board size and year end. 
 
These findings indicates that mandatory reporting also increases with the number of years  
passed since the company was listed, number of audit committee member, a high percentage 
of independent directors on the board, dual board structure, financial companies rather than 
non financial and modified audit opinion. Whereas, mandatory reporting decreases when a 
company’s liquidity increases and when companies earned negative profit. However, market 
categories of companies, number of independent directors on the board, number of board 
member and company's financial year end do not affect mandatory in Bangladesh. 
 
Firm Size: Consistent with H1, the study found a statistically significant positive relationship 
between mandatory reporting and firm size in both bivariate and multivariate analysis. This 
suggests that large companies tend to disclose more mandatory information than smaller 
companies in their annual reports. This may be because of a competitive cost advantage, 
possessing more resources, more scrutiny from analysts or because they wish to maintain 
their reputation in the eyes of the public and investors. Findings of the study are supported by 
agency theory: larger firms disclose more information as they have higher agency costs and 
they are more sensitive to political cost (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Leftwich et al. 1981). On 
the other hand the findings are supported by stakeholder theory: larger firms naturally have a 
large number of suppliers, customers, and analysts, which consequently increases the demand 
for information and as a result there is more mandatory disclosure (Wallace and Naser 1995). 
Moreover, the findings are supported by signalling theory: higher disclosure enables large 
companies to maintain their reputation in the eyes of the public and to attract investors 
(Camfferman and Cooke 2002). This result is in line with prior studies of Clarkson et al. 
2003; Ali et al. 2004; Kamal et al. 2006; Alsaeed 2006; Hasan et al. 2008; Fekete et al. 2008; 
Kent and Stewart 2008; Adelopo 2010; Gialani et al. 2011 and Nandi and Ghosh 2012. 
However, it is contradictory to the evidence presented by Ahmed and Nicholls (1994); 
Ahmed (1996), Aljifri (2008), Anurag and Bhatia (2010) and Hasan et al. (2013). 
 
Profitability: Consistent with H2, both in bivariate and multivariate analysis the study found 
that firm profitability measured by ROA has a statistically significant relationship with 
mandatory reporting. It can be explained by the fact that profitable companies release more 
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mandatory information than poor performing company. This is also supported by signalling 
theory which states that management, when in possession of “good news” due to better 
performance, are more likely to disclose more detailed information to the stock market (Ross 
1979). Supporting agency theory, it can be said that companies which disclose more 
mandatory information can save bonding and monitoring costs. These results are similar with 
the conclusions of Wallace 1987; Karim et al. 1996; Owusu-Ansah 1998; Hossain 2000; 
Kribat et al. 2013. However, current result is in contrast with Wallace and Naser 1995; 
Inchausti 1997; Chen and Jaggi 2000 who provided evidence of negative association  and 
Wallace et al. (1994), Raffounier (1995), Meek et al. (1995) who suggest a non-significant 
relationship. 
 
Audit Firm Size: Inconsistent with H4, the result of the panel regression analysis does not 
accept the hypothesis, audit firm size, and found a non-significant relationship with 
mandatory reporting although it is significant in bivariate analysis. That means the audit firm 
whether or not one of the Big 4 does not influence the mandatory reporting in Bangladesh. 
The difference between the results of bivariate and multivariate analysis may be attributable 
to the effect of other variables included in the model. It may due to poor regulations and low 
investor protection in a small and emerging market; it may be because only 23.5% of 
companies are audited by the big four audit firm. However, the results are in line with- Firth 
1979; Benjamin et al. 1990; Hossain et al. 1994; Wallace et al. 1994; Barako et al. 2006; and 
Kabir et al. 2011. However, these results are inconsistent with the evidence from the prior 
studies of Owusu-Ansah and Yeoh (2005); Kent and Stewart (2008); Hasan et al. (2008); and 
Uyar (2011). 
 
Multinational Parents: Consistent with H5, both the bivariate and multivariate analysis 
found that multinational parents have a statistically significant positive relationship with 
mandatory reporting. This hypothesis suggests that firms which have multinational parent 
affiliation are likely to disclose more mandatory information in their annual report. This may 
be due to the regulations of multiple countries, geographical separation between management 
and owners, various political and pressure groups and diffusion of ownership. Supporting 
agency theory, companies discloses more mandatory information to reduce the gap of 
information asymmetry due to the geographical separation between the management and 
owners (Bradbury 1992; Craswell and Taylor 1992). Moreover, supporting stakeholder 
theory, multinational parents companies provide more mandatory information as demand for 
 - 226 - 
information is expected to be greater from various stakeholder groups when a proportion of 
shares are held by foreign investors. These results of the study are supported by Wallace 
1987; Ahmed and Nicholls 1994; Ali et al. 2004 and Karim and Jamal 2005.  
 
Industry: Inconsistent with H6, the results from panel regression do not accept the 
hypothesis and found a non-significant relationship between mandatory reporting and 
industry categories while bivariate analyses also indicate a significant relationship. This 
suggests that the financial or non-financial status of companies does not affect mandatory 
reporting behavior. Some prior studies provide evidence of non-significant association 
between the industry type and the extent of mandatory reporting: Wallace et al. 1994; 
Raffournier 1995; Inchausti 1997; Naser et al. 2002; Eng and Mak 2003 and Alsaeed 2006. 
However, a number of studies reported evidence of a significant association between the 
extent of disclosure and the industry type (Meek et al. 1995; Suwaidan 1997; Camfferman 
and Cooke 2002; Haniffa and Cooke 2002 and Fekete et al. 2008). 
 
Ownership: Consistent with H7, the results of multivariate GLS regression found that firm 
ownership has a significant negative relationship with mandatory reporting. This indicates 
that if 50% or more of a company is owned by to one particular group, that company 
discloses less mandatory information. This is consistent with agency theory: the determined 
ownership structure provides firms with lower incentives to disclose information to meet the 
needs of shareholders groups (Akther and Rouf 2011). This finding is consistent with prior 
research, for example, Akther and Rouf 2011; Adelopo 2010; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009, 
Bauwhede and Marleen 2008; Oliveira et al. 2006; Eng and Mark 2003 and Chau and Gray 
2002. However, the current study results contradict with the findings of Oliveira et al. (2006); 
Bauwhede and Marleen (2008); and Eng and Mark (2003) reported that firms with a lower 
management ownership provide more information. 
 
The results of the non financial sample are shown in table 6.18. According to table 6.18 five 
variables were found to have significant association, at the 1 % level, with total mandatory 
reporting. Firm size, firm's profitability (ROA) and multinational parents were positively 
significantly associated with total mandatory reporting at the 1 % level. While the leverage 
and firm ownerships were significant variables at the 1% level, they were found to have a 
negative association with total mandatory reporting. On the other hand audit firm and 
profitability measured by ROE did not appear to have a significant association with the 
dependent variable. 
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The significant positive associations mean that mandatory reporting affected and increases 
with the increase of firm size, firm profitability measured by return on assets, and firms 
having multinational parents. On the other hand, the negative associations mean that 
mandatory reporting affects, and increases in, unlevered  firms, rather than levered firms, and 
also increases in firms having sponsorship of not more than 50% rather than having 
sponsorship of more than 50%. Audit firm, however, has no association or relation with 
mandatory reporting. The R Squared for non financial sample is 0.1723 indicating that 
17.23% of the changes of the total mandatory reporting is explained by the changes its 
examined determinants for non financial companies. 
 
In the case of the non financial sample, referred to the different categories of mandatory 
reporting, there is a significant relationship between, firm size and firm's profitability (ROA) 
with all parts of reporting. There is a significant negative relationship between, firm 
profitability (ROE) and general reporting. In addition, there is a significant relationship 
between, leverage and general reporting, director reporting, balance sheet reporting, income 
statement reporting, cash flow statement reporting, structures of notes reporting and 
miscellaneous reporting. Also, there is a significant relationship between, audit firm size and 
general reporting, director reporting, income statement reporting and cash flow statement. 
Moreover, there is a significant relationship between, multinational parents and general 
reporting, income statement reporting, cash flow statement reporting structure of notes 
reporting and miscellaneous reporting. Also, there is a significant negative relationship 
between, ownerships and general reporting, balance sheet reporting, income statement 
reporting and cash flow statement reporting. The rest of the relationships between the 
different categories of mandatory reporting and the determinants are non-significant 
relationship: this supports their weak or no relationship with mandatory reporting.  
 
In the case of the non financial sample, the results of the GLS regression analysis agree with 
the research hypotheses concerning the existence of positive significant relationship between 
mandatory reporting and firm size (hypothesis 1.1), and firm profitability (ROA) (hypothesis 
1.2), and multinational parents (hypothesis 1.5) and significant negative relationship with 
firm ownerships (hypothesis 1.7). However, the results of the panel regression analysis do not 
accept the audit firm size hypothesis, and found a non-significant relationship with 
mandatory reporting (hypothesis 1.4). 
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Table: 6.18 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Non Financial Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 532 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =76;    Average = 76  ; Maximum = 76 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement Cash Flow Structure of notes Miscellaneous 
Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
Firm Size 0.062*** 13.34 0.041*** 13.53 0.072*** 5.36 0.048*** 7.8 0.068*** 11.35 0.055*** 14.11 0.101*** 8.15 0.084*** 11.6 
ROE -0.002 -0.78 -0.003* -1.89 -0.001 -0.36 -0.004 -1.36 0.001 0.39 0.002 1.54 -0.003 -0.65 0.002 0.39 
ROA 0.005*** 6.28 0.002*** 6.33 0.004*** 3.53 0.005*** 7.07 0.005*** 5.01 0.005*** 5.11 0.007*** 4.44 0.005*** 3 
Leverage -0.001*** -3.73 -0.001*** -4.86 -0.001** -2.18 -0.001*** -4.13 -0.002*** -2.96 -0.001*** -4.39 -0.002*** -2.69 -0.002** -2.12 
Audit firm -0.021 -1.38 -0.030*** -3.39 0.034* 1.65 -0.014 -0.79 -0.039*** -2.73 0.028*** 3.69 -0.025 -0.88 -0.040 -1.48 
Multi. parent 0.037*** 3.21 0.036*** 3.94 0.027 1.08 0.014 1.19 0.055*** 6.1 -0.030*** -4.68 0.047*** 2.12 0.119*** 5.2 
Ownerships -0.020*** -3.91 -0.009** -2.01 0.007 0.93 -0.039*** -5.19 -0.012*** -3.03 -0.020*** -5.22 -0.016 -1.48 -0.012 -0.89 
Constant 0.205 6.91 0.537 13.02 0.093 0.62 0.323 9.26 0.099*** 2.79 0.168 5.56 -0.210 -3.51 0.058 0.54 
Adjusted R
2
 0.1723 0.1671 0.1175 0.1293 0.2000 0.2944 0.1312 0.0928 
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Leverage: Inconsistent with H3, the results of multivariate GLS regression found a 
significant negative relationship between mandatory reporting and leverage. However, the 
results of bivariate analysis found a significant negative relationship with leverage. The 
results of GLS suggest that highly levered firm disclose less mandatory information in their 
annual report. This is due to highly levered companies tending to disclose private information 
to their creditors which may not be reflected in their annual reports (Nandi and Ghosh 2012). 
Findings of the current study are supported by Allegrini and Greco 2013; Nandi and Ghosh 
2012; Zarzeski 1996; and Belkaoui and Kahl 1978. However, some previous studies found 
contradictory results: Aksu and Kosedag (2005), Barako et al. (2006), Adelopo (2010), and 
Hajji and Ghazali (2013). 
 
6.7 Sensitivity Analysis: 
The main objective of the sensitivity analysis is to examine how sensitive the results and 
findings are towards changes in the statistical test. The used test is fixed effect GLS 
regression using robust standard error, as the examined data is not normally distributed as 
stated before by the descriptive statistics(see also Ananchotikul and Eichengreen 2009;  
Sánchez-Ballesta
 
and García-Meca 2007; Gedajlovic and Daniel 2002; Baltagi 1995). 
According to Greene (2008, p.183)-“…the crucial distinction between fixed and random 
effects is whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated 
with the regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not”. 
 
Regarding the combined sample, the results of adjusted R square of GLS fixed were similar 
to the GLS random indicating that GLS fixed regression has the same strength as the main 
GLS random regression. GLS fixed regression also showed the similar adjusted R square 
with GLS random for different parts of mandatory reporting. 
 
According to table 6.19, for both GLS random and GLS fixed regression mandatory reporting 
has significant positive association (p ≤ 0.01) with firm size, firm profitability (ROA), and 
firm multinational parents, while it has significant negative association with firm ownerships( 
p ≤ 0.05). On the other hand, in both cases, there is non-significant relationship between 
mandatory reporting and firm profitability (ROA), audit firm and industry. 
 
Referred to the different categories of mandatory reporting, the results of GLS random were 
similar to the results of GLS fixed at 5% level for firm size, firm profitability (ROE), firm 
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profitability (ROA), audit firm size, multinational parents, industry and ownerships with the 
exception that firm profitability(ROE) is significant(at 5%) with general reporting in random 
regression while it is non-significant in fixed regression; multinational parents is 
significant(at 1%) with miscellaneous reporting but it is non-significant in fixed regression; 
industry is significant (at 1%) with balance sheet reporting but in the case of fixed it is non-
significant; ownership is non-significant with miscellaneous reporting while in case of fixed 
it is significant at 1%. 
 
Regarding the non financial sample, the results of adjusted R square of GLS fixed (16.35%) 
were similar to the GLS random (17.23%) indicating that GLS fixed regression has the same 
strength as the main GLS random regression. GLS fixed regression also showed the similar 
adjusted R square with GLS random for different parts of mandatory reporting. 
 
According to table 6.20, for both GLS random and GLS fixed regression, mandatory 
reporting has significant positively association with firm size (p ≤ 0.01), firm profitability 
(ROA) (p ≤ 0.01), and firm multinational parents (p ≤ 0.05); while it has significant negative 
association with firm leverage (p ≤ 0.05), firm ownerships (p ≤ 0.05). On the other hand, in 
both cases, there is non-significant relationship between mandatory reporting and firm 
profitability (ROA) and audit firm. 
 
Referred to the different categories of mandatory reporting, the results of GLS random were 
similar to the results of GLS fixed at 10% level for firm size, firm profitability (ROE), firm 
profitability (ROA), leverage, audit firm size, multinational parents and ownerships with the 
exception that firm size, firm profitability(ROA) and leverage are non-significant with 
miscellaneous reporting; multinational parent is non-significant with general reporting and 
leverage is non-significant with director reporting. 
 
The results of the GLS fixed regression showed that the results of the GLS random data 
analysis are not sensitive to changing the type of the test. Hence, the selected GLS random 
analysis is considered to be well matched with the examined data. Moreover, the results of 
this sensitivity analysis confirm the reliability of the results and findings which support the 
generalisation of such results. 
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Table 6.19: Comparison of GLS Random and GLS Fixed Regression for Combined Sample 
 
Table 6.20: Comparison of GLS Random and GLS Fixed Regression for Non Financial Sample 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement Cash Flow Structure of notes Miscellaneous 
 Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T 
Firm Size 19.65*** 21.65*** 9.03*** 16.27*** 6.79*** 10.42*** 21.69*** 36.48*** 13.69*** 12.83*** 24.83*** 26.09*** 14.93*** 12.18*** 3.86*** 3.51** 
ROE -0.09 0.13 -2.13** -1.41 -0.97 -0.58 -0.47 -0.3 0.77 0.8 0.72 0.72 0.01 0.16 4.94*** 6.14*** 
ROA 9.55*** 10.21*** 7.04*** 7.86*** 8.34*** 5.85*** 9.3*** 11.33*** 6.99*** 6.59*** 4.26*** 4.57*** 10.8*** 10.95*** 8.06*** 8.48*** 
Audit Firm -0.33 0.35 -1.84* -1.11 0.79 2.04* 1.47 1.89 -2.99*** -3.12** 3.92*** 3.81*** -0.71 -0.42 -0.84 0.38 
Multi.  Parent 2.94*** 3.28** 3.43*** 5.2*** -1.7* -1.41 1.46 1.61 4.95*** 5.35*** -8.68*** -8.69*** 0.34 0.44 8.05*** 9.78 
Industry -1.1 1.39 -0.64 0.23 2.26** 4.74*** -3.41*** -3.06 -10.17*** -7.42*** 10.76*** 10.26*** 1.73* 1.88 8.16*** 16.4*** 
Ownerships -3.24*** -2.94** -1.71* -1.39 0.63 0.78 -6.92*** -6.86** -0.3 -0.17 -15.56*** -16.44*** 1.23 1.28 0.77 0.91*** 
Constant 18.96 31.32 23.25 68.03 3.44 13.35 17.68 56.95 14.31 13.84 -0.83 -1.18 5.01 3.7 10.16 44.68 
R square 0.2665 0.2653 0.1753 0.1753 0.1273   0.1243 0.2031 0.2023 0.1557 0.1555 0.5157 0.5157 0.2018 0.2014 0.1441 0.1400 
 Mandatory General Director Balance Sheet Income Statement Cash Flow Structure of notes Miscellaneous 
 Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T Z T 
Firm Size 13.34*** 3.7*** 13.53*** 7.93*** 5.36*** 4*** 7.8*** 2.03* 11.35*** 5.2*** 14.11*** 12.36*** 8.15*** 2.85** 11.6*** 1.5 
ROE -0.78 -0.25 -1.89* -1.4 -0.36 -0.06 -1.36 -0.79 0.39 0.7 1.54 1.54 -0.65 -0.25 0.39 1.08 
ROA 6.28*** 4.95*** 6.33*** 4.39*** 3.53*** 2.27* 7.07*** 5.75*** 5.01*** 4.45*** 5.11*** 5.26*** 4.44*** 3.35** 3*** 1.92 
Leverage -3.73*** -3.22** -4.86*** -4.65*** -2.18** -1.7 -4.13*** -3.53** -2.96*** -2.65*** -4.39*** -4.31*** -2.69*** -2.04* -2.12** -1.41 
Audit firm -1.38 0.13 -3.39*** -2.59** 1.65* 3.38** -0.79 0.56 -2.73*** -2.55*** 3.69*** 3.78*** -0.88 0.48 -1.48 0.73 
Multi. parent 3.21*** 2.95** 3.94*** 3.89 1.08 1.07 1.19 1.22 6.1*** 5.38*** -4.68*** -4.77*** 2.12*** 1.96* 5.2*** 4.75*** 
Ownerships -3.91*** -2.94** -2.01** -1.6*** 0.93 1.53 -5.19*** -4.63*** -3.03*** -1.77*** -5.22*** -5.29*** -1.48 -0.62 -0.89 -0.15 
Constant 6.91 5.29 13.02 23.08 0.62 3.04 9.26 6.44 2.79*** 3.03 5.56 4.84 -3.51 1.09 0.54 3.77 
R square 0.1723 0.1635 0.1671 0.1597 0.1175 0.1118 0.1293 0.1203 0.2000 0.1967 0.2944 0.2944 0.1312 0.1225 0.0928 0.0777 
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6.8 Conclusion: 
The chapter includes two phases of analysis. Firstly, it examines the extent of mandatory 
reporting over the period from 2004 to 2010 and especially before and after the corporate 
governance code of 2006. Finally, it scrutinises the association between mandatory 
reporting and the determinants; firm size, firm profitability, leverage, audit firm size, 
multinational parents, industry and ownerships for two group of sample, combined and 
non financial. 
 
As expected in developing countries, the first part of the findings indicates that the level of 
total mandatory reporting in the annual reports of listed Bangladeshi companies is low. 
However, a gradual increase in the extent of mandatory reporting and its categories has 
been noticed over the period of study. Kruskal-Wallis test indicates significant differences 
between mandatory reporting scores over the seven years. Moreover, Wilcoxon Matched-
pairs Signed Rank test indicate that there is significant difference in patterns of mandatory 
reporting before and after the corporate governance code. This suggests that the 
Bangladesh corporate governance code has had some consequences for mandatory 
reporting in corporate annual reports. However, caution must be taken when explaining 
such finding: there may well be other factors, including customer or international buyer 
influence, institutional reforms and different expectations which may all have influence 
the level of mandatory reporting. 
 
Based on the findings of the empirical section, it is concluded that there is a significant 
positive relationship between mandatory reporting and firm size, firm's profitability 
measured by ROE and multinational parents and a significant negative relationships with 
firm ownerships for both combined and non financial sample. Moreover, non financial 
determinants and leverage have a significant negative relation; combined determinants 
industry has a non-significant relationship with mandatory reporting. In addition to this, 
firm profitability measured by ROA and audit firm size has non-significant or no relation 
with mandatory reporting in the annual reports of listed Bangladeshi companies over the 
examined period. 
 
These results indicate the compliance gaps which need to be considered by the regulatory 
authorities of Bangladesh. On the other hand, the Bangladeshi business culture is still not 
sufficiently aware of the codes and practices of corporate governance. This chapter 
 - 233 - 
emphasises the different areas of mandatory reporting that need improving to raise the 
total of mandatory reporting to a level which satisfies the different users of the 
Bangladeshi annual reports, where the existence or survival of these companies is 
dependent on the degree of satisfaction of these stakeholders. Therefore, by offering an 
adequate level of information to satisfy its stakeholders the company unlocks its main 
source of financing, ensuring its existence and survival. 
 
The study concludes that the determinants of mandatory reporting vary among the 
different categories. Only firm size and firm's profitability (ROA), can explain the total 
mandatory reporting and each of the seven categories. Some variables that were significant 
with total mandatory reporting such as multinational parents' and ownership were found to 
be non-significant associated with structure of notes reporting. Moreover, the explanatory 
power of the model varies among the different categories. These findings justify the need 
to analyse mandatory reporting practice based on its different categories. 
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Chapter Seven: Analysis and Findings-Corporate Voluntary Reporting 
 
 
7.1 Introduction: 
This chapter has two main objectives: the first objective is to measure the level of 
voluntary corporate reporting and its different categories. The second objective is to 
examine the determinants of corporate voluntary reporting and to test the hypotheses of 
the association between these different determinants and the different categories of 
voluntary reporting. The findings of the empirical analysis show the contribution of each 
voluntary reporting category to the whole level of reporting over the seven examined years 
from 2004 to 2010.  
 
Most studies on voluntary reporting look at the overall reporting levels and relate them to 
certain corporate characteristics (Wang and Claiborne 2008; Prado- Lorenzo et al. 2009; 
Uyar 2011; Samah et al. 2012; Qu et al. 2012 and Alves et al. 2012). However, to gain a 
better understanding of reporting policies adopted by companies, a detailed analysis of 
each category disclosed is desirable. That is why the second part of this chapter 
investigates the association between the total voluntary reporting and its determinants and 
at the same time the association between each reporting category and its determinants. 
 
The chapter starts with the analysis of the extent and trend of total voluntary reporting 
over the period of study and then considers the different categories of voluntary reporting 
in section 7.2. The findings of the empirical analysis show the contribution of each 
voluntary reporting category to the whole level of reporting over the seven examined years 
and also sector wise performance. The level and determinants of voluntary reporting is 
given in section 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. Then the chapter examines the bivariate analysis 
in section 7.5. Section 7.6 represents the multivariate analysis. It starts with a discussion of 
the regression diagnostic to determine the regression technique. After that, an argument 
between fixed and random effect is developed and finally the tests of hypothesis: the 
association between the total voluntary reporting and its determinants from one side, and 
the association between each reporting category and the different determinants from the 
other side. A sensitivity analysis is applied to identify the effect of changing the statistical 
test on the results and findings of the main applied test in section 7.7 followed by the 
conclusion in section 7.8. 
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7.2 The Extent and Trend of Voluntary Reporting and its Categories: 
To measure the extent of voluntary reporting in annual reports of the listed companies of 
Bangladesh, the study constructed a checklist of 97 items classified into eight groups. A 
total of 861 annual reports of 123 companies for the years of 2004 to 2010 have been 
analysed using this checklist. Both weighted and unweighted measures have been used to 
assess the extent of voluntary reporting. Weight has been taken from the questionnaire 
survey as indicated in Chapter 5. The percentage of awarded reporting score to the 
applicable score represents the extent of voluntary reporting, the dependent variable in the 
current study.  
 
To start our analysis, appendix D presents the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary 
reporting and its categories for each year and for the seven years all together for 
unweighted data. Appendix D indicates that the mean of total voluntary reporting score 
over the seven years is about 28.56%. This average suggests a low level of voluntary 
reporting. The table also shows that the extent of voluntary reporting over the years has a 
wide range but is increasing year by year. While the minimum reporting index obtained is 
7.22% for the year 2004 to 2007, the maximum is 70.10% for the year 2009 and 2010. 
This wide range in the level of voluntary can also be found in each year of the investigated 
period. The minimum score of voluntary reporting for all the years is still around 7.22%. 
On the other hand, the maximum score has not crossed over 70.10%. This result confirms 
the wide variation in the voluntary reporting practices in the annual reports of listed 
Bangladeshi companies. In addition, it justifies our decision to focus the current study on 
the extent of voluntary reporting practices. 
 
Appendix D also indicates the variation in the level of voluntary reporting categories over 
the period of study. It can be seen from table that there is a gradual increase in the average 
score of before (2004-05, 25.19%) and after (2007-10, 30.64%) the Corporate Governance 
Code of 2006. However; the increasing rate differs among the categories. For example, the 
maximum increasing rate in the corporate environmental reporting is 169.26% (from 
2.44% in 2004 to 6.57% in 2010) over the year followed by CSR reporting 113.05 %( 
from 11.34% in 2004 to 24.16% in 2010). On the other hand, the lowest increasing rate is 
in financial reporting for the same years: this is 9.452% (from 55.12% in 2004 to 60.33% 
in 2010). Regarding the average over the period, it is found that general information 
reporting scored the highest, 84.20%( maximum 93.74%, minimum 86.31%) and 
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structures of notes reporting is the lowest, 70.34%( maximum 100%; minimum 42.86%). 
Corporate social responsibility average reporting over the period is 17.03% with a 
maximum of 88.89% and a minimum of 0%. Throughout the period the study found the 
minimum CSR reporting was 0%: that means that at least one company in every year did 
not disclose anything regarding CSR in their annual report. The highest average CSR 
reporting found in 2010 is 24.16% whereas the lowest average found in 2004 is 11.34% 
indicating a growth of 113.05% over the period. From the overall data it is clearly 
observed that CSR is gradually increasing over the period from 2004 to 2010 but is still 
not up to the desired standard as the highest average is only 24.16%. 
 
Corporate environmental reporting (CER) is the least focused area of all the categories of 
voluntary reporting: here average reporting over the period is 4.21% with a maximum of 
61.54% and a minimum of 0%. Throughout the period the study found the minimum CER 
reporting at 0%: as in CSR this means that at least one company in every year did not 
disclose anything regarding CER in their annual report. Highest average CER reporting 
found in 2010 is 6.57% whereas the lowest average found in 2004 is 2.44%, indicating a 
growth of 169.26% over the period. From the overall data, it is clearly observed that CER 
is gradually increasing over the period from 2004 to 2010 but not up to the standard as the 
highest average is only 6.57% and only in years 2008, 2009 and 2010 has the average 
crossed 5%.  
 
Very few researchers have focused on corporate sustainability reporting in Bangladesh and 
the term is relatively new in the voluntary reporting family where average reporting over 
the period is 14.33% with maximum 53.33% and minimum 0%. Throughout the period 
current period found minimum sustainability reporting disclosure was 0% just like CSR 
and CER: again this means sustainability reporting is absent in reports by some companies 
in every year.  Highest average sustainability reporting found in 2010 is 16.72% whereas 
the lowest average 11.33% was found in 2004: this indicates a growth of 47.57% over the 
period. From the overall data it is clearly observed that sustainability reporting is gradually 
increasing and over the period although this increase is inconsistent (11.33% to 16.72%). 
 
Appendix E presents the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary reporting and its 
categories for each year and for the seven years all together for weighted data where the 
mean of total voluntary reporting score over the seven years is about 22.94%. This average 
suggests a low level of voluntary reporting just like the average of unweighted data. The 
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minimum score of voluntary reporting for all the years is still around 5.7%. On the other 
hand, the maximum score has not crossed over 55.21%. This result also confirms the wide 
variation in the voluntary reporting practices in the annual reports of listed Bangladeshi 
companies for weighted data.  
 
It can be seen from the appendix E that there is a gradual increasing in the average score 
after the Corporate Governance Code of 2006: the rate before in 2004-05 was 20.31% but 
after in 2007-2010 it rose to 24.56%: this was the case for weighted data also. However; 
the increasing rate differs among the categories. For example, the maximum increasing 
rate in corporate environmental reporting is 169.72 %, rising from 1.85% in 2004 to 
4.99% in 2010, over the year, followed by CSR reporting 113.11% rising from 8.39% in 
2004 to 17.88% in 2010. On the other hand, the lowest increasing rate in financial 
reporting for the same years is 9.14%, rising from 45.53% in 2004 to 49.69% in 2010. 
 
CSR average reporting over the period is 12.60% with a maximum of 65.78% and a 
minimum of 0%, whereas corporate sustainability reporting average reporting over the 
period is 10.98% with a maximum of 40.96% and a minimum of 0%. On the other hand, 
corporate environmental reporting is the least focused area of all the categories of 
voluntary reporting where average reporting over the period is 3.20% with a maximum of 
46.77% and a minimum of 0%. 
 
7.2.1: Sector Wise Voluntary Reporting: 
From previous discussions it is already understand that average voluntary reporting is 
relatively low (28.56%) in Bangladesh. In order to obtain a detailed overview, it is 
necessary to discuss the sector wise voluntary reporting pattern of the listed companies in 
Bangladesh. No previous studies in Bangladesh consider different sectors to analyse 
voluntary reporting performance. It will help to find out the sectors disclosing most 
voluntary information in their annual report and at the same time it will highlight the 
sectors disclosing less voluntary information.   
 
From the table 7.1, it is observed that highest voluntary reporting over the period of time is 
found in Banks (Unweighted 48.05% and Weighted 38.21%) followed by Financial 
Institutions (Unweighted 41.14% and Weighted 32.93%). On the other hand worst 
voluntary reporting pattern is found in Services and Real Estate, Tannery sectors 
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(Unweighted 15.12% and Weighted 12.34%). In addition, voluntary reporting pattern of 
Ceramic, Jute, Paper and Printing and Miscellaneous sectors are all below 20%. 
 
Table 7.1: Sector Wise Total Voluntary Reporting 
Sectors Voluntary Reporting 
Un Weighted 
Voluntary Reporting 
Weighted 
Bank 48.05% 38.21% 
Cement 32.02% 25.87% 
Ceramic 15.76% 12.96% 
Engineering 23.85% 19.30% 
Financial Institution 41.14% 32.93% 
Food & Allied 22.15% 17.78% 
Insurance 24.15% 19.44% 
IT Sector 19.11% 15.51% 
Jute , Paper and Printing 15.71% 12.85% 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 31.97% 25.63% 
Services and Real Estate, Tannery 15.12% 12.34% 
Textile 21.82% 17.68% 
Miscellaneous 19.20% 15.53% 
 
7.2.2 Voluntary Reporting Before and After the Code:  
If the study focuses on the difference between before and after the Corporate Governance 
Code of 2006, table 7.2 clearly justifies its effect. It is observed that the average voluntary 
reporting of 2004 to 2005 is 25.19% which is lower than the 30.64% average of 2007 to 
2010 indicating reporting improvement of 20% from 2004-05. This can be understood as 
the effect of Corporate Governance Code, issued 2006, in which year current study find 
reporting standing at 27.01%. This justification also is observed if the study looks the 
different categories of voluntary reporting. 
 
Now, it is necessary to identify whether this difference between total voluntary reporting 
over the period under investigation and before and after the code is significant or not. 
Testing for normality is essential to determine the type of tests to be used (parametric tests 
or non-parametric tests). After conducting a series of statistical tests, the results indicate 
that voluntary reporting data are not normally distributed, so nonparametric tests are 
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recommended.  For this study, significance test has been measured by Kruskal-Wallis tests 
for over the period and Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed Rank test for before and after the 
code period. 
Table 7.2: Average Voluntary Reporting Before and After the Code 
Reporting 2004-05 2006 2007-2010 
Voluntary Reporting 25.19% 27.01% 30.64% 
General Information 76.89% 78.98% 82.96% 
Corporate Strategic Information 29.68% 32.85% 42.56% 
Corporate Governance Information 47.39% 48.66% 53.45% 
Financial Information 55.37% 57.56% 59.56% 
Financial Review Information 46.21% 47.15% 49.81% 
Social Responsibility  11.86% 14.54% 20.24% 
Environmental Reporting 2.57% 3.19% 5.29% 
Sustainability Reporting 11.58% 13.58% 15.84% 
 
 
Regarding the differences among the seven years, Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is 
significant difference between voluntary reporting over the period. Again to test the effect 
of corporate governance code 2006 on the extent of voluntary reporting, Wilcoxon 
Matched-pairs Signed Rank test indicate that there is significant difference of voluntary 
reporting before and after the corporate governance code.  
Kruskal-Wallis test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Chi-squared =   28.700 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
Ho: before = after 
z =  -2.666 
Prob > z =   0.0077 
 
Chi-squared with ties =   28.727 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0001 
 
In summary, from the descriptive analysis it is observed that extent of voluntary reporting 
is improving over the period and this increase is sufficient to be statistically significant 
especially before and after the corporate governance code. 
 
7.3 Measuring the Level of Voluntary Corporate Reporting: 
In this part of the analysis, the study used descriptive analysis to measure the extent of 
voluntary reporting. Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data 
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in a study. The strength of descriptive statistics is their ability to collect, organise and 
compare vast amounts of data in a more manageable form. The descriptive analysis of this 
model shows the average voluntary reporting and the average of different components of 
this voluntary reporting. This part includes two different analyses. The first one considers 
unweighted measurement where all components of the index have the same weight and 
then the study consider weighted measurement on the basis of users' responses through the 
questionnaire described in chapter 5. 
 
7.3.1 Descriptive Statistics for Unweighted Voluntary Reporting: 
Table 7.3 shows the descriptive statistics of total voluntary reporting level and the level of 
each of the voluntary reporting categories using unweighted data for year 2004-2010. The 
total voluntary reporting level presents 28.60% of the examined checklist items with a 
variant of between 7.20% and 70.10% for the least and highest Bangladeshi companies 
reporting respectively. Moreover, the general information represents the highest reporting 
level of 80.70%, while the environmental reporting disclosure presents the lowest 
reporting level of 4.20%. In addition, it is observed that the maximum reporting of all 
categories is 100% presented by general information, corporate strategic, corporate 
governance, financial information and financial review reporting. As found previously, for 
the whole categories of reporting, again the minimum reporting for any category of 
reporting is 0%, which means that at least one of the examined companies missed 
corporate strategic, financial review, social responsibility, environmental and 
sustainability reporting in their annual report. 
Table: 7.3 Descriptive Statistics for Unweighted Voluntary Data 
  
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Skew- 
ness 
Kur- 
tosis 
Voluntary Reporting 861 0.286 0.2371 0.141 0.072 0.7010 0.7938 2.672 
General Information 861 0.807 0.8571 0.175 0.286 1 -0.4296 2.139 
Corporate Strategic 861 0.375 0.4 0.278 0 1 0.1754 1.867 
Corporate Governance 861 0.511 0.4285 0.232 0.1428 1 0.4893 2.252 
Financial Information 861 0.583 0.6 0.216 0.2 1 0.1099 3.117 
Financial Review 861 0.484 0.5 0.233 0 1 0.1858 2.117 
Social Responsibility 861 0.17 0 0.242 0 0.8888 1.2339 3.155 
Environmental 861 0.042 0 0.099 0 0.6153 2.9079 12.513 
Sustainability 861 0.1430 0.10 0.1079 0 0.5333 0.7555 2.9809 
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Moreover, in relation to standard skewness statistics the presented data is not normally 
distributed. As a common rule, the standard skewness of the data needs to be within the 
range of ±1.96 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). It is observed that environmental reporting is 
more than 1.96 evidencing that the data is not normally distributed. On the other hand, 
with respect to the standard kurtosis, the data is also not normally distributed. The data is 
said to be normally distributed if the standard kurtosis fall in the range of ±3 (Gujarati and 
Dawn 2009). The standard kurtosis of the total voluntary reporting and its different 
categories has a value more than 3, indicating that the data is not normally distributed. As 
a result any hypotheses test related to the entire data needs to use a robust analysis. 
 
7.3.2 Descriptive Statistics for Weighted Voluntary Reporting: 
Table 7.4 shows the descriptive statistics of the total voluntary reporting level and the 
level of each of the voluntary reporting categories using weighted data over the period 
2004 to 2010. These results indicate that the mean total voluntary reporting is 23% which 
is considered a low level in comparison to unweighted voluntary reporting.  
 
Table 7.4: Descriptive Statistics for Weighted Data 
  
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Skew- 
ness 
Kur- 
Tosis 
Voluntary Reporting 861 0.230 0.194 0.110 0.057 0.552 0.764 2.635 
General Information 861 0.671 0.713 0.146 0.238 0.832 -0.430 2.139 
Corporate Strategic 861 0.317 0.338 0.235 0 0.846 0.175 1.867 
Corporate Governance 861 0.383 0.321 0.174 0.107 0.857 0.489 2.252 
Financial Information 861 0.478 0.496 0.171 0.165 .9912 -0.175 2.252 
Financial Review 861 0.409 0.423 0.197 0 0.846 0.186 2.117 
Social Responsibility 861 0.126 0 0.179 0 0.658 1.234 3.155 
Environmental 861 0.032 0 0.075 0 0.468 2.908 12.513 
Sustainability 861 0.110 0.077 0.083 0 0.410 0.755 2.981 
 
Moreover, the general information represents the highest reporting level of 67.10%, while 
the environmental reporting presents the lowest reporting level of 3.20%. Again, the 
minimum reporting for any category is 0%: at least one of the examined companies did not 
disclose corporate strategic, financial review, social responsibility, environmental 
reporting and sustainability reporting disclosure in their annual report. 
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The descriptive statistics also shows the normality of the different variables data. It is 
noted that environmental reporting represents the maximum skewness of 2.908, while 
financial review reporting shows the minimum skewness of -0.430. This indicates that 
minimum and maximum skewness are not within the normally distributed range of ±1.96 
(Gujarati and Dawn 2009) while the Kurtosis of the reporting data indicates that reporting 
data is not normally distributed. The maximum Kurtosis is shown by environmental 
reporting (12.513), while the minimum Kurtosis is shown by the corporate strategic 
reporting (1.867). With reference to the Kurtosis reporting data is not normally distributed 
as they are out of the range of ±3 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). Since the data is not normally 
distributed, that would cast some shadows over the selected test to examine the research 
hypotheses applied over the entire data. Therefore, a robust analysis should be employed 
when testing the research hypotheses in the further analysis. 
 
7.4 Measuring the Determinants of Voluntary Reporting: 
This section investigates the determinants of voluntary reporting through descriptive 
statistics. The determinants of voluntary reporting that are examined in this model are: 
firm size, firm liquidity, market categories, company age, audit committee, number of 
independent directors, independent director percentage on the board, board structure and 
board size. Descriptive statistics simplify large amounts of data in a sensible way by 
simply describing what the data shows and easily translates results into a distribution of 
frequency, percentages and overall averages.  Descriptive analysis, showing averages 
along with range, is necessary in this part to find out the extent of determinants. Also it 
will give an idea of whether the data set is normal or abnormal which will direct 
alternative analysis techniques in the next part of analysis. 
 
Table 7.5 shows the descriptive statistics of the voluntary reporting determinants. From 
the table it is found that there were 861 observations which indicate the sample size. It can 
be also seen that there were companies that did not disclose any information under each of 
the categories as indicated by a minimum score of zero. The 'mean' indicates the average 
number of items disclosed by companies under each category.  
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Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Reporting Determinants 
  
  
N 
Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Skew- 
ness 
Kur- 
tosis 
Firm Size 861 9.250 8.996 .879 6.43 11.77 .459 2.530 
Liquidity 861 1.723 1.363 1.656 .02 17.00 3.775 26.345 
Market Categories 861 .223 .000 .416 0 1 1.333 2.771 
Company Age 861 14.518 14.000 7.951 0 44.00 .501 3.005 
Audit Committee 861 .194 .143 .223 0 1.00 .896 3.088 
Ind. Director(number) 861 .520 .000 .639 0 4.00 1.158 4.782 
Ind. Director (%) 861 .124 .000 .176 0 1 1.256 4.615 
Board Structure 861 .777 1.000 .421 0 1 -1.283 2.647 
Board Size 861 10.747 9.000 6.434 3.00 37.00 1.518 5.132 
 
As indicated in table 7.5, the mean firm size is about 9.250 with minimum 6.43 and 
maximum 11.77. Also liquidity measured by quick assets divided by current liabilities is 
1.723: 1, which indicates that on average companies have 1.723 times of quick assets to 
repay its current liabilities. It is also notable that 22.30% of observations are in Z 
categories, the audit committee is 19.4% of the board and 77.7% observation have dual 
leadership structure. Regarding the presence of independent directors, nearly 50% 
companies do not have independent director and independent director size is only 12.4 % 
of the board. The average number of board of director is around 11 people. Moreover, 
companies in the sample observations have on average operated in the market for 15 years.   
 
The skewness of the different determinants indicates that the data of the different variables 
are not normally distributed. The maximum skewness is 3.375 represented by liquidity, 
while the minimum skewness is -1.283 represented by board structure. The maximum 
skewness is not within the skewness range of ±1.96 which indicates the non normality of 
the data (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). Therefore, based on the skewness, the data of the 
different variables is not normally distributed and considered to be non parametric data. 
 
The kurtosis shows that the minimum kurtosis is 2.530 which represented by the firm size, 
while the maximum kurtosis is 26.345 represented by firm liquidity. Since the minimum 
and maximum kurtosis are not within the range of ±3 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). 
 - 245 - 
Therefore the data is not normally distributed and the data is considered to be non 
parametric. So, observations have some extreme figures (outliers) which need more 
attention during the analysis process and the interpretation of the results. 
 
7.5 Bivariate Analysis: 
Bivariate analysis is one of the simplest forms of quantitative analysis (Babbie 2009). It 
provides an estimate as to the level of association between the variables. In fact, it 
scrutinises for interdependence of the variables. In this study, correlation analysis is used 
to discover the degree of association between the dependent and independent variables. 
With the help of this, it is also possible to recognise the correlation among the independent 
variables. Moreover, it will suggest whether the data needs to be modified or whether any 
independent variables need to be taken out. So, before approaching to the regression 
analysis, this study carried out correlation analysis to recognise whether all the 
independent variables are appropriate for the multiple regression analysis. As the data set 
is non-normal, non- parametric Spearman correlation is suitable for the study. However, 
the study used both Spearman correlation and parametric Pearson correlation to check for 
differences between them. 
 
The correlation between the different categories of voluntary reporting and the 
determinants of reporting is shown for unweighted sample using Spearman correlation 
coefficients in the table 7.6. The Spearman correlations in table 7.6 show the significance 
association between the total and different categories of reporting with the different 
determinants of this type of reporting for unweighted data. The significance association is 
identified using a confidence level of 99% and 95%. Referred to the correlation 
coefficients, there is a significant positive relationship (at 1 % and 5% significance levels) 
between total voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, audit committee, 
independent director percentage, board structure and board size. This suggests the stronger 
association between these variables and voluntary reporting. According to the results, 
companies with big size, high liquidity, audit committee members in the board, high 
percentage of independent directors in the board, dual leadership structure and large board 
size disclose more voluntary information in their annual reports. 
 
On the other hand, number of independent director in the board is identified to have a non-
significant relationship with voluntary reporting. The results indicate weak or no 
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association between voluntary reporting and number of independent directors in the board. 
However, there is a significant negative association between market category, company 
age, and voluntary reporting. This indicates companies listed in the Z category and old 
companies rather than new companies disclose less voluntary information in their annual 
reports. The results of this table agree with the research hypothesis regarding the 
association between voluntary reporting and the different reporting determinants. 
 
Regarding the different categories of voluntary reporting, there is a significant positive 
relationship between different categories of voluntary reporting and firm size, audit 
committee and board leadership structure. On the other hand, the findings show that there 
is a significant negative relationship between the different categories of voluntary 
reporting and market category. Moreover, there is significant positive relationship between 
general reporting, corporate strategic reporting, corporate governance reporting, financial 
reporting, financial review reporting, corporate social reporting, and sustainability 
reporting with firm liquidity and Board size. Also, corporate governance reporting and 
financial review reporting have a significant negative association whereas corporate 
environmental reporting has a significant positive association with company age. In 
addition, there is a significant positive relationship of general reporting, corporate strategic 
reporting, corporate governance reporting, and significant negative relationship of 
financial review reporting with number of independent director. Moreover, there is 
significant positive relationship between general reporting, corporate strategic reporting, 
corporate governance reporting, financial reporting, and corporate environmental reporting 
with independent director percentage.  
 
Table 7.7 shows the correlation between the different categories of voluntary reporting and 
the determinants of reporting for the weighted sample using Spearman's correlation 
coefficients. The Spearman's correlations in table 7.7 show the significance of the 
association between the total and different categories of reporting with the different 
determinants of this type of reporting for weighted data. The significance association is 
also identified using a confidence level of 99% and 95%. Referred to the correlation 
coefficients, there is a significant positive relationship (at 1 % and 5% significance levels) 
between total voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, audit committee, 
independent director percentage, board structure and board size. This suggests a stronger 
association between these variables and voluntary reporting. According to the results, 
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companies with big size, high liquidity, audit committee members in the board, high 
percentage of independent directors in the board, dual leadership structure and large board 
size disclose more voluntary information in their annual reports.  
 
On the other hand, independent director number is identified to have a non-significant 
relationship with voluntary reporting. The results indicate weak or no association between 
voluntary reporting and the number of independent director in the board. While, there is a 
significant negative association between market category, company age, and voluntary 
reporting. This indicates that companies listed in Z category and old companies rather than 
new companies disclose less voluntary information in their annual reports. The results of 
this table agree with the research hypothesis regarding the significant association between 
voluntary reporting and the different reporting determinants. 
 
Regarding the different categories of voluntary reporting, there is a significant positive 
relationship between different categories of voluntary reporting and firm size, audit 
committee and board leadership structure. On the other hand, the findings show that there 
is a significant negative relationship between the different categories of voluntary 
reporting and market category. Moreover, there is a significant positive relationship 
between general reporting, corporate strategic reporting, corporate governance reporting, 
financial reporting, financial review reporting, corporate social reporting, and 
sustainability reporting with firm liquidity and board size. Also, corporate governance 
reporting and financial review reporting has a significant negative association whereas 
corporate environmental reporting has a significant positive association with company age. 
In addition, there is a significant positive relationship of general reporting, corporate 
strategic reporting, corporate governance reporting, and significant negative relationship 
of financial review reporting with the number of independent directors. Moreover, there is 
significant positive relationship between general reporting, corporate strategic reporting, 
corporate governance reporting, financial reporting, and corporate environmental reporting 
with independent director percentage. 
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                                 Table 7.6: Spearman's Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables for Unweighted Data 
Spearman's Correlation 
 
Volun 
tary 
Gen- 
eral 
Cor. 
Strat. 
Cor. 
Gover. 
Fina- 
ncial 
Finan. 
review CSR CER 
Sustain 
ability Size 
Profit-
ability 
Market 
Cat. Age 
Audit 
Com. 
Indir. 
Num. 
Indir. 
% 
Board 
Struct. 
Board 
Size 
Total Vol. reporting 1.000                  
General reporting .769
**
 1.000                 
Corporate Strategic .744
**
 .618
**
 1.000                
Corporate governance .784
**
 .656
**
 .542
**
 1.000               
Financial reporting .733
**
 .556
**
 .564
**
 .577
**
 1.000              
Financial review .801
**
 .500
**
 .516
**
 .533
**
 .585
**
 1.000             
Corporate Social .837
**
 .542
**
 .635
**
 .630
**
 .617
**
 .649
**
 1.000            
Cor. Environmental .493
**
 .247
**
 .314
**
 .258
**
 .307
**
 .367
**
 .518
**
 1.000           
Sustainability  .842
**
 .636
**
 .553
**
 .647
**
 .501
**
 .575
**
 .667
**
 .408
**
 1.000          
Firm Size .683
**
 .556
**
 .564
**
 .617
**
 .540
**
 .556
**
 .656
**
 .257
**
 .534
**
 1.000         
Firm Liquidity .402
**
 .460
**
 .275
**
 .437
**
 .244
**
 .259
**
 .289
**
 -.002 .423
**
 .257
**
 1.000        
Market Category -.364
**
 -.333
**
 -.175
**
 -.331
**
 -.310
**
 -.286
**
 -.276
**
 -.115
**
 -.285
**
 -.359
**
 -.380
**
 1.000       
Company Age -.073
*
 -.065 -.031 -.102
**
 -.050 -.151
**
 -.062 .081
*
 -.047 .065 -.208
**
 -.055 1.000      
Audit committee .242
**
 .179
**
 .300
**
 .203
**
 .193
**
 .189
**
 .178
**
 .181
**
 .146
**
 .202
**
 .001 -.139
**
 .230
**
 1.000     
Ind. Dir. number .046 .105
**
 .075
*
 .106
**
 .035 -.086
*
 -.057 .057 .010 -.030 -.019 -.152
**
 .262
**
 .540
**
 1.000    
Ind. Dir. Percentage. .111
**
 .100
**
 .171
**
 .131
**
 .069
*
 -.009 .032 .131
**
 .065 .013 -.035 -.119
**
 .271
**
 .719
**
 .804
**
 1.000   
Board Structure .301
**
 .303
**
 .182
**
 .353
**
 .225
**
 .150
**
 .223
**
 .069
*
 .319
**
 .258
**
 .216
**
 -.224
**
 -.170
**
 .027 .108
**
 .011 1.000  
Board Size .366
**
 .484
**
 .229
**
 .498
**
 .208
**
 .161
**
 .228
**
 -.026 .379
**
 .316
**
 .461
**
 -.350
**
 -.224
**
 -.122
**
 .088
**
 -.005 .471
**
 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.7: Spearman's Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables for Weighted Data 
Spearman's Correlation 
 Volun. 
Dis. 
Gene- 
ral 
Cor. 
Strat. 
Cor. 
Gover. 
Fina- 
ncial 
Fin- 
review CSR CER 
Sustain 
ability Size 
Profit-
ability 
Market 
Cat. Age 
Audit 
Com.. 
Ind. 
num 
Ind. 
% 
Board 
Struct. 
Board 
Size 
Total Vol. reporting 1.000                  
General reporting .770
**
 1.000                 
Corporate Strategic .751
**
 .618
**
 1.000                
Cor. governance .777
**
 .656
**
 .542
**
 1.000               
Financial reporting .739
**
 .555
**
 .566
**
 .576
**
 1.000              
Financial review .811
**
 .500
**
 .516
**
 .533
**
 .593
**
 1.000             
Corporate Social .836
**
 .542
**
 .635
**
 .630
**
 .622
**
 .649
**
 1.000            
Corporate Environ. .492
**
 .247
**
 .314
**
 .258
**
 .311
**
 .367
**
 .518
**
 1.000           
Sustainability  .833
**
 .637
**
 .551
**
 .649
**
 .501
**
 .574
**
 .666
**
 .407
**
 1.000          
Firm Size .685
**
 .556
**
 .564
**
 .617
**
 .545
**
 .556
**
 .656
**
 .257
**
 .537
**
 1.000         
Firm Liquidity .398
**
 .460
**
 .275
**
 .437
**
 .244
**
 .259
**
 .289
**
 -.002 .426
**
 .257
**
 1.000        
Market Category -.364
**
 -.333
**
 -.175
**
 -.331
**
 -.313
**
 -.286
**
 -.276
**
 -.115
**
 -.286
**
 -.359
**
 -.380
**
 1.000       
Company Age -.073
*
 -.065 -.031 -.102
**
 -.046 -.151
**
 -.062 .081
*
 -.048 .065 -.208
**
 -.055 1.000      
Audit committee .244
**
 .179
**
 .300
**
 .203
**
 .194
**
 .189
**
 .178
**
 .181
**
 .145
**
 .202
**
 .001 -.139
**
 .230
**
 1.000     
Ind. Dir. number .044 .105
**
 .075
*
 .106
**
 .035 -.086
*
 -.057 .057 .013 -.030 -.019 -.152
**
 .262
**
 .540
**
 1.000    
Ind. Dir. Percentage. .111
**
 .100
**
 .171
**
 .131
**
 .069
*
 -.009 .032 .131
**
 .064 .013 -.035 -.119
**
 .271
**
 .719
**
 .80
**
 1.000   
Board Structure .298
**
 .302
**
 .183
**
 .353
**
 .226
**
 .150
**
 .225
**
 .073
*
 .323
**
 .259
**
 .217
**
 -.225
**
 -.171
**
 .025 .106
**
 .009 1.000  
Board Size .360
**
 .484
**
 .229
**
 .498
**
 .204
**
 .162
**
 .228
**
 -.026 .381
**
 .316
**
 .461
**
 -.350
**
 -.224
**
 -.122
**
 .088
**
 -.005 .469
**
 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.8 and table 7.9 show the correlation between the different categories of voluntary 
reporting and the determinants of reporting of both the weighted and unweighted sample 
using Pearson's correlation coefficients respectively. From the table 7.8, the results of the 
unweighted sample using Pearson's correlation do not significantly differ from the results 
of the unweighted sample using Spearman's correlation with the exception of general 
reporting and corporate social reporting which have a significant negative relationship 
with company age. Corporate strategic reporting has a non-significant relationship 
whereas corporate environmental reporting has a significant positive relationship with 
independent director's number; sustainability reporting has a significant positive 
relationship with independent director percentage. Corporate strategic reporting and 
financial review reporting have a non-significant relationship, whereas corporate 
environmental reporting has a significant negative relationship with board size. 
 
Similarly as indicated in table 7.9, the results of the weighted sample using Pearson's 
correlation do not significantly differ from the results of the weighted sample using 
Spearman's correlation with the exception of general reporting and corporate social 
reporting which have a significant negative relationship with company age; corporate 
strategic reporting has a non-significant relationship, whereas corporate environmental 
reporting has a significant positive relationship with independent director numbers; 
sustainability reporting has a significant positive relationship with independent director 
percentage  and corporate strategic reporting and  financial review reporting  has a non-
significant  relationship. However, corporate environmental reporting has a significant 
negative relationship with board size. 
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Table 7.8: Pearson's Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables for Unweighted Data 
Pearson's Correlations 
 
Volun. 
Dis. 
Gene- 
Ral 
Cor. 
Strat. 
Cor. 
Gover. 
Fina- 
Ncial 
Fin- 
review CSR CER 
Sustain 
ability Size 
Liqui 
dity 
Market 
Cat. Age 
Audit 
Com.. 
Ind. 
num 
Ind. 
% 
Board 
Struct. 
Board 
size 
Total Vol. reporting 1                  
General reporting .711
**
 1                 
Corporate Strategic .753
**
 .607
**
 1                
Cor. governance .799
**
 .630
**
 .563
**
 1               
Financial reporting .675
**
 .551
**
 .542
**
 .564
**
 1              
Financial review .789
**
 .506
**
 .525
**
 .549
**
 .539
**
 1             
Corporate Social .915
**
 .536
**
 .659
**
 .679
**
 .535
**
 .652
**
 1            
Corporate Environ. .541
**
 .258
**
 .327
**
 .341
**
 .284
**
 .327
**
 .486
**
 1           
Sustainability  .868
**
 .595
**
 .582
**
 .671
**
 .488
**
 .581
**
 .746
**
 .441
**
 1          
Firm Size .763
**
 .560
**
 .611
**
 .648
**
 .520
**
 .599
**
 .755
**
 .253
**
 .605
**
 1         
Firm Liquidity .211
**
 .249
**
 .119
**
 .243
**
 .087
*
 .142
**
 .155
**
 .006 .259
**
 .142
**
 1        
Market Category -.333
**
 -.355
**
 -.173
**
 -.326
**
 -.296
**
 -.290
**
 -.266
**
 -.115
**
 -.279
**
 -.347
**
 -.240
**
 1       
Company Age -.070
*
 -.068
*
 -.041 -.072
*
 -.059 -.149
**
 -.069
*
 .151
**
 -.032 .000 -.227
**
 -.026 1      
Audit committee .165
**
 .126
**
 .223
**
 .142
**
 .142
**
 .146
**
 .118
**
 .170
**
 .081
*
 .141
**
 -.010 -.113
**
 .225
**
 1     
Ind. Dir. number .023 .130
**
 .043 .128
**
 .050 -.096
**
 -.036 .109
**
 .035 -.055 .055 -.157
**
 .247
**
 .425
**
 1    
Ind. Dir. Percentage. .105
**
 .113
**
 .152
**
 .147
**
 .098
**
 -.007 .051 .188
**
 .091
**
 -.013 .035 -.117
**
 .259
**
 .595
**
 .747
**
 1   
Board Structure .303
**
 .290
**
 .187
**
 .347
**
 .228
**
 .157
**
 .264
**
 .082
*
 .311
**
 .273
**
 .133
**
 -.224
**
 -.178
**
 .004 .125
**
 .030 1  
Board Size .185
**
 .372
**
 .059 .342
**
 .104
**
 .038 .127
**
 -.085
*
 .238
**
 .182
**
 .209
**
 -.266
**
 -.241
**
 -.252
**
 .088
*
 -.063 .387
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 7.9: Pearson's Correlations of Independent and Dependent Variables for Weighted Data 
Pearson's Correlations 
 
Volun. 
Dis. 
Gene- 
ral 
Cor. 
Strat. 
Cor. 
Gover. 
Fina- 
ncial 
Fin- 
review CSR CER 
Sustain 
ability Size 
Liqui 
dity 
Market 
Cat. Age 
Audit 
Com. 
Ind. 
num 
Ind. 
% 
Board 
Struct. 
Board 
Size 
Total Vol. reporting 1                  
General reporting .715
**
 1                 
Corporate Strategic .757
**
 .607
**
 1                
Cor. governance .796
**
 .630
**
 .563
**
 1               
Financial reporting .701
**
 .555
**
 .558
**
 .569
**
 1              
Financial review .798
**
 .507
**
 .525
**
 .548
**
 .580
**
 1             
Corporate Social .910
**
 .536
**
 .659
**
 .679
**
 .562
**
 .653
**
 1            
Corporate Environ. .537
**
 .258
**
 .327
**
 .341
**
 .303
**
 .327
**
 .486
**
 1           
Sustainability  .864
**
 .596
**
 .581
**
 .672
**
 .500
**
 .580
**
 .746
**
 .441
**
 1          
Firm Size .764
**
 .560
**
 .611
**
 .648
**
 .551
**
 .599
**
 .755
**
 .253
**
 .607
**
 1         
Firm Liquidity .211
**
 .249
**
 .119
**
 .243
**
 .092
**
 .142
**
 .155
**
 .006 .261
**
 .142
**
 1        
Market Category -.336
**
 -.355
**
 -.173
**
 -.326
**
 -.316
**
 -.291
**
 -.266
**
 -.115
**
 -.280
**
 -.347
**
 -.240
**
 1       
Company Age -.070
*
 -.068
*
 -.041 -.072
*
 -.045 -.149
**
 -.069
*
 .151
**
 -.032 .000 -.227
**
 -.026 1      
Audit committee .167
**
 .126
**
 .223
**
 .142
**
 .150
**
 .145
**
 .118
**
 .170
**
 .080
*
 .141
**
 -.010 -.113
**
 .225
**
 1     
Ind. Dir. number .022 .130
**
 .043 .128
**
 .050 -.096
**
 -.036 .109
**
 .037 -.055 .055 -.157
**
 .247
**
 .425
**
 1    
Ind. Dir. Percentage. .104
**
 .113
**
 .152
**
 .147
**
 .100
**
 -.008 .051 .188
**
 .090
**
 -.013 .035 -.117
**
 .259
**
 .595
**
 .747
**
 1   
Board Structure .286
**
 .263
**
 .179
**
 .313
**
 .219
**
 .146
**
 .253
**
 .090
**
 .304
**
 .252
**
 .117
**
 -.208
**
 -.170
**
 -.010 .100
**
 .017 1  
Board Size .182
**
 .372
**
 .059 .342
**
 .074
*
 .038 .127
**
 -.085
*
 .240
**
 .182
**
 .209
**
 -.266
**
 -.241
**
 -.252
**
 .088
*
 -.063 .337
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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7.6 Multivariate Analysis: 
One of the limitations of bivariate analysis is that the results cannot be generalised. So in 
order to generalise the results of this study multivariate analysis is applied. Multivariate 
analysis can statistically estimate relationships between different variables, and correlate 
how important each one is to the final outcome as well as revealing where dependencies 
exist between them. Among multivariate analyses, regression analysis is one of the most 
common and widely used techniques in statistical analysis especially in disclosure 
literature (Cooke 1998). Gujarati and Dawn (2009) also suggest that under certain 
assumptions, the method of least squares has some very attractive statistical properties that 
have made it one of the most powerful and popular methods of regression analysis.  
 
The following sections start with the regression diagnostics that represent the first step in 
choosing the relevant statistical method to analyse the collected data in this study. There 
follows a discussion about selecting fixed effect and random effect and finally the test of 
the hypothesis: the association between, the total voluntary reporting and its determinants 
on one side, and the association between each voluntary reporting category and the 
different determinants on the other side. 
 
7.6.1 Regression Diagnostic: 
In order to decide the appropriate statistical technique, it is essential in disclosure studies 
to evaluate the impact of distribution problems, non linearity and problems of outliers 
(Cooke 1998). Usually, there are numerous ways to estimate regression coefficients 
(parameters). The current study uses linearity, independence and normality of error, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity to justify the regression. 
 
7.6.1.1 Checking Linearity: 
The relationship between the dependent and independent variables is believed to be linear. 
It can be verified by the plot(s) of the residuals versus the independent variable values. If 
linearity exists, there will be no obvious clustering of positive residuals or a clustering of 
negative residuals. Linearity can also be checked through plotting each independent 
variable against the dependent variable and seeing how well the fitted regression line 
represents their association. The graphs for checking linearity of each independent indicate 
that most of the independent variables in the model do not have an obvious linear 
relationship with the dependent variable (Appendix G). 
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There are a number of possible causes for this: it may be due to the presence of outliers, 
unusual observations, or it may be that the linear model is not a good fit to describe the 
relation between the dependent variable and each independent variable. Therefore, it can 
be concluded that the linearity assumption is not satisfied. However, non linearity is 
common in the majority of prior reporting studies (Cooke 1998). So the current study has 
to fit this non linear data into an appropriate regression.  
 
7.6.1.2 Checking Normality: 
Normality entails that errors (residuals) be supposed to be normally dispersed. In 
principle, normality is essential only for the hypothesis tests to be legitimate. Normality of 
graphical methods and numerical methods are two ways to measure the normality of 
residuals. Both normality plots and normality tests have been used in the current study. 
Graphical Method: 
The two most common plots have been used in this study to check the normality- P-P plot 
(standardized normal probability plot), Q-Q plot (quantile quantile plot) and Density 
estimate (plots the density of a variable and the normal density). 
Figure 7.1:  P-P Plots for Voluntary Reporting 
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Figure 7.2 Q-Q Plots for Voluntary Reporting 
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Figure 7.3: Kernel Density Estimate 
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power against a wide range of non normal distribution. If the value of p is small, then the 
data may not be considered normally distributed.  
 
Table 7.10: Shapiro-Wilk W test for Normal Data 
Variables obs W V Z Prob>Z 
Residual 861 0.98468 8.433 5.248 0.0000 
Voluntary Disclosure 861 0.923 42.378 9.221 0.0000 
 
The two methods of normality test, graphical and numerical, suggest the same result. It is 
clear from the previous figure (7.1 and 7.2) and table 7.10, that errors and dependent 
variables are not normally distributed and this is mainly related to the skewness of the 
distribution. 
 
7.6.1.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals: 
The homoscedasticity supposition indicates that variance of the error terms is constant for 
each observation. The current study employs two numerical methods for 
heteroscedasticity; and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's test; and Cameron & 
Trivedi's decomposition of IM test. 
Table 7.11: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and White's tests  
Test Chi-square Prob>chi
2
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg  14.11 0.0002 
White's 259.11 0.0000 
 
Table 7.12: Cameron & Trivedi's Decomposition of IM test  
Source Chi-square df p 
Heteroskedasticity 269.11 52 0.000 
Skewness 69.32 9 0.000 
Kurtosis 7.27 1 0.007 
Total 345.7 62 0.000 
 
The test results point out that errors have non-constant variance (heteroscedastic), which 
mean that the regression estimators will not have the minimum variance of all unbiased 
estimators, and also the P-values will be unreliable. In other words the current data suffer 
from heteroscedasticity. 
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7.6.1.4 Checking for Multicollinearity: 
According to Murray (2006), it will be difficult to differentiate the individual effects of 
explanatory variables and regression estimators may be biased when multicollinearity 
exists. It means there is a linear relationship between two or more independent variables 
and the estimates for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed. The two common 
ways to check for the presence of multicollinearity between independent variables are 
correlation coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance values. These 
two ways have been used widely in the reporting literature. The current study employs 
both of them to check whether the explanatory variables or the model suffer from 
multicollinearity. Table 7.13 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance 
coefficients of each explanatory variable: 
 
Table 7.13: Variable Inflation Factor 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
(1/VIF) 
Firm Size 1.284 .779 
Liquidity 1.150 .870 
Market Categories 1.285 .778 
Company Age 1.249 .801 
Audit Committee 1.787 .560 
Ind. Director(number) 2.493 .401 
Ind. Director (%) 2.899 .345 
Board Structure 1.220 .820 
Board Size 1.433 .698 
Mean of VIF 
1.644 
 
 
As regards the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), it is indicated that data is normally 
distributed if the VIF is less than 10(Gaur and Gaur 2009; Gujarati and Dawn 2009; Neter 
et al. 1983; Mendenhall and Sincich 1989). However, others suggest that the value of 5 
can be used as a rule of thumb (Groebner et al. 2005). From the table 7.13, it is observed 
that the maximum VIF is 2.899 with mean VIF of 1.644. Moreover, the lowest tolerance 
coefficient is 0.345. As suggested by Hair et al. (2011), the tolerance value of more than 
0.20 may be used as a criterion for considering the data being free from the problem of 
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multicollinearity. Therefore, based upon the rule of thumb, the results of VIF and 
tolerance coefficients indicate that there is not an unacceptable level of multicollinearity in 
the current study. 
 
It is commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool for indicating the 
relationship between explanatory variables but there is no agreement among researchers 
regarding the cut off correlation percentage (Alsaeed 2006). While, some researchers use 
0.8; e.g. Hair et al. (2011); Gujarati and Dawn (2009); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Tables 7.6, 7.7, 7.8 and 7.9 present the correlation 
coefficients of nonparametric and parametric tests; Spearman and Pearson coefficients for 
weighted and unweighted sample respectively. It can be noticed from the tables that 
correlation coefficients confirm the results of VIF. According to Spearman correlations 
(table 7.6 and table 7.7), the correlation coefficients of all independent variables are less or 
equal to 0.763(for unweighted) and 0.764 (for weighted sample). Although the study 
found a correlation coefficient of 0.915(for CSR both weighted and unweighted data) and 
0.864(for sustainability both weighted and unweighted data), CSR and sustainability are 
dependent variables and also these two are categories of voluntary reporting. Moreover, in 
the regression equation, above do not run in the same equation as voluntary reporting.  
Thus, the correlation coefficient of CSR and sustainability with total voluntary reporting 
does not affect multicollinearity. In other words as there is no value greater than 0.80 for 
comparing correlation between dependent and independent variables, it can be concluded 
that there is no potential multicollinearity problem in the current study. 
 
The same can be concluded from Pearson's rank correlation (table 7.8 and 7.9) which 
indicates that the highest coefficient for independent variables is 0.80 both for unweighted 
and weighted data. Similarly with Spearman, the study find: the financial review 
coefficient (0.811 for weighted and 0.801 for unweighted data), CSR coefficient (0.83 for 
both data set) and sustainability coefficient (0.833 for weighted and 0.842 for unweighted) 
in Pearson which is more than the standard value of 0.80. But as these are categories of 
total voluntary reporting and also these are dependent variables, it can be concluded that, 
based on results, there is no potential multicollinearity between dependent and 
independent variables of the current study. 
 
7.6.2 Choosing Between Fixed and Random Effects: 
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When modeling group data, perhaps the first question the researcher faces is whether to 
account for unit effects and, if so, whether to employ so called fixed effects or random 
effects. Advice on this topic is plentiful (e.g., Greene 2008, Kennedy 2003, Frees 2004, 
Gelman 2005, Wilson and Butler 2007, Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009, Wooldridge 
2010), even if sometimes confusing and contradictory (Gelman and Hill 2007, 245). 
However, the generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is 
running a Hausman test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less 
efficient but consistent model to make sure that the more efficient model also gives 
consistent results (James and Marks 2012). 
Table 7.14: Hausman Test of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
 Unweighted Data 
Hausman  fixed random 
Weighted Data 
Hausman  fixed random 
 chi
2
 Prob>chi
2
 chi
2
 Prob>chi
2
 
Voluntary Reporting 5.20 0.8168 5.25 0.8120 
General Information 0.28 1.0000 0.29 1.0000 
Corporate Strategic 12.53 0.1852 12.47 0.1882 
Corporate Governance 7.60 0.5752 7.29 0.6066 
Corporate Financial 1.26 0.9986 1.41 0.9978 
Financial Review 1.57 0.9966 1.67 0.9957 
Corporate Social 15.79 0.0714 15.91 0.0687 
Corporate Environmental 0.89 0.9996 0.88 0.9997 
Corporate Sustainability 8.91 0.4452 9.27 0.4125 
 
In the case of Hausman fixed random, if the Prob>chi
2
 value is more than 0.05 then it is 
safe to use random effects (James and Marks 2012). From the table 7.14, as Prob>chi
2
 is 
more than 0.05 in both unweighted data and weighted data, the current study goes for 
random test. If there is reason to believe that some omitted variables may be constant over 
time but vary between cases, and others may be fixed between cases but vary over time, 
then it should include both types by using random effects. 
 
7.6.3 Test of Hypotheses: 
Regression diagnostics indicate that data set are non linear, non normal and there are 
heteroscedasticity in the current study. There are several reasons for this case of unequal 
variance, e.g. outliers and skewness. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) does not make use of 
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the information contained in the unequal variability of the dependent variable since it 
assigns equal weight to each observation. Generalised Least Squares (GLS) is OLS on the 
transformed variables that satisfy the standard least-squares assumptions. As such, GLS 
minimises a weighted sum of residual squares not minimising an unweighted or equally 
weighted as OLS (See Gujarati 2003, pp.388-398). 
 
The descriptive statistics also showed that the data is not normally distributed. Therefore, 
the data analysis needs to be applied using a nonparametric test that fits with this non 
parametric data not normally distributed. The GLS is a parametric test, so to fit with the 
non parametric data it needs to be employed using robust standard error. 
 
To benefit from the advantages of panel data analysis, the current study employed GLS 
using robust standard error. The results are shown in table 7.15(for unweighted data) and 
7.16 (for weighted data). The panel regression is used to differentiate between the data of 
years from 2004 to 2010. Therefore, seven groups are examined. As the study used same 
number of companies in all years, the minimum, maximum and average number of 
observations comes from those 123 companies each year. 
 
The results of table 7.15 show that total voluntary reporting has positive association (p ≤ 
0.01) with firm size, firm liquidity, percentage of audit committee member, percentage of 
independent director, board structure and board size: it is negatively associated (p ≤0.01) 
with market categories, company age and number of independent director. The positive 
associations mean that voluntary reporting increases with the increase of firm size, firm 
liquidity, high percentage of audit committee members, high proportion of independent 
directors in the board, role duality of the organisation and having large number of board 
members. On the other, the negative associations mean that the companies that disclose 
less voluntary reporting are those in Z categories, old companies rather than new 
companies, and those having large numbers of independent directors in the board. 
 
However, according to the results indicated in table 7.15, there is a significant relationship 
(p ≤ 0.01) between voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, market categories, 
company age, number of independent directors, percentage of independent directors, and 
board structure. On the other hand, there is a non-significant relationship of voluntary 
reporting with audit committee, and board size. The adjusted R Squared of the models 
explains how much of the changes in the dependent variable are explained by the changes 
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in the independent variables. The R Squared is 0.6217 indicating that 62.17% of the 
changes of the total voluntary reporting are explained by the changes in its examined 
determinants. The R-squared is comparable to Depoers (2000) 65%; Abdel-Fattah (2008) 
63% and higher than Haniffa and Cooke (2002) 47.9% and Barako et al. (2006) 53.4%; 
however, it is lower than Hassan et al. (2006) 86.3%. 
 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary reporting, there is a significant 
relationship between, firm size and company age with all parts of reporting. There is a 
significant relationship of firm liquidity with general reporting, corporate strategy 
reporting, financial reporting, CSR reporting and sustainability reporting. Also, there is a 
significant relationship of market categories with general reporting, corporate governance 
reporting, financial reporting, financial review reporting, and corporate environmental 
reporting. Moreover, there is a significant relationship of audit committee with general 
reporting, corporate governance reporting, financial review reporting, and corporate 
sustainability reporting. In addition, there is a significant relationship of the number of 
independent directors with corporate governance reporting, financial review reporting, 
CSR reporting, and corporate sustainability reporting.  
 
In the case of the percentage of independent director, all parts of voluntary reporting have 
a significant relationship with the exception of general reporting. Similarly, in the case of 
board structure all parts of voluntary reporting have a significant relationship except 
financial review reporting. In the same way all parts of voluntary reporting have 
significant relationships with board size, except corporate governance reporting. The rest 
of the relationships between the different categories of voluntary reporting and the 
determinants are non-significant which is supporting the weak or no relationship of 
voluntary reporting with them. 
 
Regarding corporate social reporting disclosure, there is a significant relationship with 
firm size, firm liquidity, company age, number of independent directors, percentage of 
independent directors, board structure and board size. In the case of corporate 
environmental reporting, there is a significant relationship with firm size, market 
categories, company age, percentage of independent directors, board structure and board 
size. As regards to corporate sustainability reporting, there is a significant relationship 
with firm size, firm liquidity, company age, audit committee, number of independent 
directors, percentage of independent directors, board structure and board size. 
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In this part, the study determines the effect of factors that are used in mandatory reporting 
and timeliness of reporting. The main intention of this is to identify the association of 
factors with voluntary reporting which have significant or non-significant relationships 
with mandatory reporting and timeliness of reporting. As Spearman's correlation found 
that financial condition has multicollinearity with board size, it has been omitted in this 
part. Appendix J indicates that voluntary reporting has significant positive association with 
multinational parents, ownerships, industry categories and modified opinion while it has 
negative association with sign of earning. However, voluntary reporting has non 
significant or weak relationships with profitability, audit firm size and financial year end. 
 
The positive associations indicates that voluntary reporting increases when the company 
has multinational parents, more than 50% ownerships of a particular group, financial 
companies rather than non financial and company received modified audit opinion. 
However, voluntary reporting decreases when the company reports negative profit in their 
income statement. Whereas, profitability whether measured by ROA or ROE, big or non 
big audit firm and companies financial year end in a particular period do not have 
significant power to affect voluntary reporting. 
 
Firm Size: Consistent with H1, both bivariate and multivariate analysis found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between voluntary reporting and firm size. 
This suggests that large firms tend to disclose more voluntary information than smaller 
firms in their annual reports. Findings of the study, supported by stakeholder theory, show 
that firms are expected to have high levels of voluntary disclosure in order to be registered 
in the stock market: this attracts more funds at a lower cost of capital: in this case they 
have a greater responsibility to provide information to customers, suppliers, analysts and 
government (Choi 1973; Cooke 1991). Moreover, findings also support agency theory; 
larger firms disclose more information as they have higher agency costs (Leftwich et al. 
1981). Generally, large size companies have a variety of stakeholders who are willing to 
have more and different information. Based on the relative power of stakeholders, 
managers may respond to such information needs by disclosing information beyond the 
minimum requirements. This result is in line with prior studies of Black et al. 2006; 
Ghazali and Weetman 2006; Barako et al. 2006; Alsaeed 2006; Agca and Onder 2007 and 
Boesso and Kumar 2007; Khanchel 2007; Da Silveira et al. 2009; Uyar 2011; Samaha et 
al. 2012; Alves et al. 2012; Hajji and Ghazali 2013.  
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Firm Liquidity: Consistent with H2, both bivariate and multivariate analysis found a 
statistically significant positive relationship between voluntary reporting and firm 
liquidity. The result indicates that companies with higher liquidity are expected to disclose 
more voluntary information. Findings of the study are supported by signalling theory: 
companies with a considerable or reasonable liquidity ratio may be more motivated to 
disclose information voluntarily to distinguish themselves from other companies that face 
liquidity problems (Abd El Salam 1999). Moreover, agency theory indicates that 
companies with a low liquidity ratio might disclose more to satisfy the needs of 
shareholders and creditors (Aly et al. 2010). In addition, supporting stakeholder theory, 
managers are motivated to disclose more information about liquidity (Barako et al. 2006). 
This result is similar to the conclusions of Wallace and Naser 1995; Camfferman and 
Cooke 2002; Ghosh and Nandi 2009 and Al-Akra et al. 2010. However, the results are in 
contrast with Wallace et al (1994) and Naser et al. (2002) who report evidence of negative 
association, while Barako et al. (2006) provide evidence of a non-significant association 
between liquidity and voluntary disclosure. 
Company Age: Inconsistent with H4, the results from panel regression do not accept the 
hypothesis and found significant negative relationship between voluntary reporting and 
company age. This indicates that old companies disclose less voluntary information. It 
may be that younger firms exhibit better reporting quality since they need to compete with 
older firms to survive. In other ways, new companies disclose more voluntary information 
to the market to give signals about their performance. This result is in line with Lei (2006). 
However, the result is contradictory to the evidence presented by Owusu-Ansah (1998); 
Akhtaruddin (2005); Alsaeed (2006); Hossain (2008); and Nandi and Ghosh (2012). 
Audit Committee: Inconsistent with H5, the results of GLS do not accept the hypothesis 
and found a non-significant relationship between voluntary reporting and audit committees 
while bivariate analysis found a significant positive relationship. The result of GLS 
indicates that audit committee size does not affect voluntary reporting quality. As an audit 
committee with at least three members is mandatory for Bangladesh, whether the number 
increases or not does not affect the voluntary reporting pattern of the firms. The results 
indicate that the number of audit committee members does not reduce information 
asymmetry and effectively discharge management responsibility to various stakeholders. 
This result is similar with the conclusions of Eng and Mak 2003; and Akhtartuddin et al. 
2009. 
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Independent Directors: Consistent with H6, both bivariate and multivariate analysis 
found a statistically significant positive relationship between voluntary reporting and 
independent directors. That means companies which have a high proportion of 
independent directors in the audit committee disclose more voluntary information in the 
annual report. The explanation of this positive association may be based on the firm-
specific knowledge on the committee; that provides a greater independent knowledge 
base. With such a knowledge base, independent directors help to reduce managerial 
leeway, thus increasing transparency and financial reporting quality; this encourages 
management to disclose more information voluntarily as a signal directed to the 
stakeholders. The result is in line with Chau and Gray 2010; Samah and Dahawy 2010; 
Duchin et al. 2010; Akhtaruddin et al. 2009; Cheng and Courtenay 2006; and Ho and 
Wong 2001. However, the results contradict with the evidence presented by with Al 
Shammari and Al Sultan (2010), Andres and Vallelado (2008), Barako et al. (2006), Nazli 
and Weetman (2006). Moreover, the results also found that the number of independent 
directors has a significant negative relationship with voluntary reporting, which is also 
supported by Eng and Mark 2003; and Gul and Leung 2004. 
Board Structure: Consistent with H7, there is a statistically significant positive 
relationship with board structure and voluntary reporting. Result indicates that duality 
gives a greater understanding of the firm’s operating environment and impacts positively 
on the firm’s voluntary reporting. Based on agency theory, the existence of role duality 
would improve the board effectiveness in performing good control over the board and 
reporting (Eisenhardt 1989; Dahya et al. 1996; Rechner and Dalton 1991; Donaldson and 
Davies 1991). Moreover, according to stakeholder theory this situation does not affect the 
independency status and the bias as two people share power by driving two critical 
positions (Williams 2002). This result is similar with the conclusions of Forker 1992; 
Nandi and Ghosh 2012; Gao and Kling 2012.However, this result is inconsistent with 
Arcay and Vazquez (2005); Cheng and Courtenay (2006); Ghazali and Weetman (2006); 
and Barako et al (2006), who report a lack of a significant relationship between role 
duality and the extent of voluntary disclosure. 
Board Size: Inconsistent with H8, the results of GLS do not accept the hypothesis and 
found a non-significant relationship between voluntary reporting and board size: bivariate 
analysis found a significant relationship. The findings of panel regression indicate that the 
number of board member does not have any influence on voluntary reporting. In this area 
the findings of the study suggest that large numbers of board members do not reduce 
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information asymmetry and do not provide more information voluntarily as a signal 
directed to the stakeholders. This is due either to the number of inactive members on the 
board or the large number of family members on the board. This result is similar with the 
conclusions of Cheng and Courtenay (2006) and Arcay and Vazquez (2005), who found 
that there is no association between board size and the level of voluntary reporting. 
However, it is contradictory to the evidence presented by Akhtaruddin et al. (2009); 
Allegrini and Greco (2011); and Nadia and Ghosh (2012). 
 
The results of weighted data are shown in table 7.16. According to table 7.16 seven 
variables were found to have significant association, at the 1 % level, with total voluntary 
reporting. Firm size, firm's liquidity, percentage of independent directors and board 
structures were positively significantly associated with total voluntary reporting at the 1 % 
level. While the market categories, company age and number of independent directors 
were significant variables at the 1% level, they were found to have negative association 
with total voluntary reporting. On the other hand audit committee and board size did not 
appear to have a significant association with the dependent variable. 
 
The significant positive associations mean that voluntary reporting increases with the 
increase of firm size, firm liquidity, number of independent directors and the role duality 
of the board. On the other hand, the negative associations mean that voluntary reporting 
decreases in firms which are in Z categories, old companies rather than new companies 
and firms having large number of independent directors in the board. While the audit 
committee and board size has no association or relation with voluntary reporting. The 
adjusted R Squared for weighted data is 0.6209 indicating that 62.09% of the changes to 
the total voluntary reporting is explained by the changes in its examined determinants for 
the weighted sample. 
 
In the case of the weighted data sample, referred to the different categories of voluntary 
reporting, there is a significant relationship between, firm size and company age with all 
parts of reporting. There is a significant relationship of firm liquidity with general 
reporting, corporate strategy reporting, financial reporting, CSR reporting and 
sustainability reporting. Also, there is a significant relationship of market categories with 
general reporting, corporate governance reporting, financial reporting, financial review 
reporting, and corporate environmental reporting. Moreover, there is a significant 
relationship of audit committee with general reporting, corporate governance reporting, 
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financial review reporting and corporate sustainability reporting. In addition, there is a 
significant relationship of the number of independent directors with corporate governance 
reporting, financial review reporting, CSR reporting, and corporate sustainability 
reporting. 
 
In the case of percentage of independent directors all parts of voluntary reporting have a 
significant relationship at the 5 % level except general reporting. Similarly, in the case of 
board structure all parts of voluntary reporting have a significant relationship at the 5% 
level except financial review reporting. In the same way all parts of voluntary reporting 
have significant relationships with board size at the 10% level except corporate 
governance reporting. The rest of the relationships between the different categories of 
voluntary reporting and the determinants are non-significant which is supporting the weak 
or no relationship with voluntary reporting with them. 
 
Regarding corporate social reporting disclosure, there is a significant relationship with 
firm size, firm liquidity, company age, number of independent directors, percentage of 
independent directors, board structure and board size. In case of corporate environmental 
reporting, there is a significant relationship with firm size, market categories, company 
age, percentage of independent directors, board structure and board size. As regards to 
corporate sustainability reporting, there is a significant relationship with firm size, firm 
liquidity, company age, audit committee, number of independent directors, percentage of 
independent directors , board structure and board size. 
 
The results of the GLS regression analysis agree with the research hypotheses concerning 
the existence of positive significant relationship between voluntary reporting and firm size 
(hypothesis1), and firm liquidity (hypothesis 2), percentage of independent directors 
(hypothesis 7), board leadership structure (hypothesis 7) and significant negative 
relationship with market categories (hypothesis 3). However, the results of the panel 
regression analysis does not accept the hypothesis, and found a significant negative 
relationship of voluntary reporting with company age (hypothesis 4), independent director 
number (hypothesis 6), The results also does not accept and found non-significant 
relationship between voluntary reporting and audit committee (hypothesis 5) and board 
size (hypothesis 8). 
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Table: 7.15 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Unweighted Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123; Maximum = 123 
 Voluntary General Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate 
Strategy 
Financial Financial Review CSR CER Sustainability 
Coeffici. Z Coeffici Z Coeffici. Z Coeffiici. Z Coeffci. Z Coeffci. Z Coeffci. Z Coeffci. Z Coeffci. Z 
Firm Size 0.115
*** 
20.79 0.092
***
 30.18 0.196
***
 55.33 0.152
***
 33.13 0.118
***
 50.82 0.147
***
 56.66 0.206
***
 0.206 0.028
***
 3.53 0.067
***
 15.71 
Liquidity 0.006
***
 2.98 0.011
***
 2.96 0.005 1.31 0.013
***
 3.41 -0.004
*
 -1.8 0.003 1.5 0.005
**
 0.005 0.000 -0.01 0.010
***
 5.94 
Mkt 
Categories -0.015
***
 -4.91 -0.033
***
 -4.14 0.041
***
 3.8 -0.008 -1 -0.071
***
 -7.42 -0.072
***
 -10.28 0.000 0.000 -0.007
**
 -2.2 -0.001 -0.31 
Company 
Age -0.001
***
 -4.91 -0.001
**
 -2.47 -0.003
***
 -7.78 -0.001
***
 -3.8 -0.003
***
 -5.62 -0.005
***
 -9.89 -0.002
***
 -0.002 0.001
***
 3.16 0.000
**
 2.14 
Audit 
Committee 0.002 0.13 0.056
***
 2.56 0.079
**
 2.49 0.028 1.45 -0.001 -0.04 0.078
***
 5.08 -0.046 -0.046 -0.010 -0.95 -0.025
**
 -2.56 
Ind. 
Dir.(num) -0.015
***
 -2.99 0.016 1.55 -0.029
*
 -1.87 0.009 1.03 -0.001 -0.09 -0.041
***
 -4.9 -0.032
***
 -0.032 -0.006 -0.99 -0.013
***
 -3.01 
Ind. Dir. 
(%) 0.139
***
 5.97 0.042 1.41 0.313
***
 7.89 0.179
***
 4.72 0.134
***
 4.42 0.082
**
 2.35 0.224
***
 0.224 0.109
***
 4.99 0.108
***
 5.75 
Board 
Structure 0.024
***
 6.41 0.007
***
 2.64 0.013
**
 2.19 0.038
***
 3.86 0.033
**
 2.16 0.006 0.62 0.036
***
 0.036 0.018
***
 7.21 0.028
***
 16.99 
Board Size 0.000 0.06 0.007
***
 13.91 -0.002 -1.51 0.007
***
 4.73 -0.003
***
 -4.71 -0.004
***
 -13.2 -0.002
**
 -0.002 -0.002
***
 -7.33 0.001
*
 1.71 
Constant -0.793 
-
14.67 -0.152 -4.62 -1.444 -39.06 -1.034 -15.81 -0.462 
-
14.53 -0.751 -27.2 -1.718 -1.718 -0.234 -3.72 -0.537 
-
12.32 
Adjusted 
R square 
0.6217 0.4326 0.4181 0.5211 0.3351 0.4176 0.5913 0.1293 0.4349 
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Table: 7.16 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Weighted Sample 
                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
 Voluntary General Corporate 
Goverance 
Corporate 
Strategy 
Financial Financial Review CSR CER Sustainability 
Coeffi. Z Coeffi. Z Coeffi. Z Coeffii. Z Coeff.. Z Coeff.. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z Coeff. Z 
Firm Size 0.090
***
 21.78 0.077
***
 30.87 0.166
***
 55.1 0.114
***
 33.66 0.099
***
 45.21 0.125
***
 56.15 0.152
***
 14.13 0.021
***
 3.55 0.051
***
 15.74 
Liquidity 0.005
***
 2.99 0.009
***
 2.97 0.004 1.31 0.010
***
 3.49 -0.003
*
 -1.69 0.002 1.42 0.004
**
 1.96 0.000 -0.03 0.008
***
 5.97 
Mkt 
Categories 
-
0.012
***
 -5.37 -0.027
***
 -4.15 0.035
***
 3.77 -0.006 -0.97 -0.061
***
 -8.69 -0.062
***
 -10.44 0.000 0.15 -0.005
**
 -2.22 -0.001 -0.26 
Company 
Age 
-
0.001
***
 -4.96 0.000
**
 -2.43 -0.003
***
 -7.53 -0.001
***
 -3.35 -0.002
***
 -4.85 -0.005
***
 -9.69 -0.002
***
 -3.36 0.001
***
 3.14 0.000
**
 2.34 
Audit 
Committee 0.003 0.23 0.046
**
 2.55 0.066
**
 2.48 0.021 1.44 -0.004 -0.18 0.066
***
 5.11 -0.035 -1.52 -0.007 -0.96 -0.020
***
 -2.58 
Ind. 
Dir.(num) 
-
0.012
***
 -3 0.013 1.52 -0.025
*
 -1.87 0.007 0.98 0.000 0.03 -0.033
***
 -4.65 -0.024
***
 -2.84 -0.004 -0.97 -0.010
***
 -3.06 
Ind. Dir. 
(%) 0.107
***
 5.96 0.035 1.41 0.265
***
 7.88 0.135
***
 4.72 0.107
***
 4.41 0.067
**
 2.26 0.166
***
 5.79 0.083
***
 4.97 0.083
***
 5.76 
Board 
Structure 0.017
***
 6.12 0.007
***
 2.77 0.013
**
 2.1 0.029
***
 3.8 0.025
**
 2.08 -0.007 -1.15 0.027
***
 6.08 0.013
***
 7.11 0.023
***
 12.67 
Board Size 0.000 0.01 0.006
***
 14.39 -0.001 -1.58 0.005
***
 4.79 -0.002
***
 -7.73 -0.003
***
 -11.41 -0.001
**
 -2.29 -0.002
***
 -7.29 0.001
*
 1.71 
Constant -0.614 
-
15.09 -0.126 -4.65 -1.221 
-
39.23 -0.775 
-
15.98 -0.392 
-
12.71 -0.638 -26.94 -1.270 
-
12.55 -0.178 -3.73 -0.412 
-
12.37 
Adjusted 
R square 
0.6209 0.4327 0.4183 0.5194 0.3445 0.4177 0.5913 0.1282 0.4360 
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Table: 7.17 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Unweighted Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123; Maximum = 123 
 Voluntary General Corporate. 
Governance 
Corporate 
Strategy 
Financial Financial Review CSR CER Sustainability 
Coeffi. t Coeffi. t  Coeffi. t Coeffii. t Coeff. t  Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.113
***
 21.26 0.092
***
 26.59 0.191
***
 47.78 0.155
***
 31.23 0.119
***
 41.08 0.145
***
 63.94 0.201
***
 14.87 0.028
**
 3.44 0.066
***
 15.54 
Liquidity 0.006
**
 2.89 0.011
**
 3.03 0.004 1.15 0.014
**
 3.54 -0.004 -1.73 0.002 1.33 0.004 1.5 0.000 -0.06 0.010
***
 6.21 
Mkt 
Categories 
-
0.017
***
 -4.94 -0.034
***
 -3.73 0.033
**
 2.93 -0.002 -0.27 -0.069
***
 -7.6 -0.075
***
 -10.21 -0.007 -1.42 -0.007
*
 -2.03 -0.004 -1.09 
Company 
Age 
-
0.001
***
 -6.05 -0.001
*
 -2.24 -0.003
***
 -9.27 -0.001
**
 -2.93 -0.002
***
 -4.85 -0.005
***
 -10.6 -0.003
***
 -5.21 0.001
**
 3.1 0.000 1.61 
Audit 
Committee -0.007 -0.47 0.053
*
 2.24 0.049 1.66 0.050
**
 2.7 0.004 0.14 0.067
**
 3.59 -0.069 -1.87 -0.009 -0.81 -0.038
***
 -4.17 
Ind. 
Dir.(num) 
-
0.020
***
 -3.7 0.015 1.26 -0.045
**
 -2.8 0.020 1.67 0.003 0.36 -0.046
***
 -5.23 -0.045
**
 -3.28 -0.007 -0.93 -0.018
***
 -4.11 
Ind. Dir.( 
%) 0.135
***
 5.85 0.041 1.44 0.300
***
 8.03 0.186
***
 4.91 0.139
***
 4.34 0.078
*
 2.29 0.213
***
 5.17 0.107
***
 4.75 0.106
***
 5.85 
Board 
Structure 0.024
***
 6.66 0.006
**
 2.71 0.011 1.71 0.039
***
 3.82 0.034
*
 2.17 0.005 0.56 0.034
***
 7.04 0.018
***
 6.96 0.028
***
 19.5 
Board Size 0.000 -0.05 0.007
***
 13.34 -0.002 -1.69 0.007
***
 4.87 -0.002
***
 -4.68 -0.004
***
 -12.9 -0.002
**
 -2.59 
-
0.002
***
 -7.71 0.001 1.59 
Constant -0.770 
-
14.04 -0.148 -3.64 -1.371 
-
41.49 -1.085 
-
18.11 -0.483 
-
12.57 -0.726 -28.58 -1.650 
-
12.59 -0.229 -3.52 -0.514 -11.03 
Adjusted 
R square 
0.6203 0.4325 0.4144 0.5190 0.3347 0.4169 0.5875 0.1292 0.4320 
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Table: 7.18 GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Weighted Sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
 Voluntary General Corporate 
Governance 
Corporate 
Strategy 
Financial Financial 
Review 
CSR CER Sustainability 
Coeffi. t Coeffi. t Coeffi. T Coeffii. t Coeff.. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t Coeff. t 
Firm Size 0.089
***
 22.27 0.076
***
 27.07 0.162
***
 47.35 0.116
***
 31.81 0.100
***
 37.39 0.124
***
 60.55 0.149
**
 14.97 0.021
**
 3.47 0.050
***
 15.58 
Liquidity 0.005
**
 2.9 0.009
**
 3.03 0.003 1.15 0.011
**
 3.62 -0.003 -1.61 0.002 1.25 0.003 1.48 0.000 -0.08 0.008
***
 6.26 
Mkt 
Categories -0.014
***
 -5.36 
-
0.028
***
 -3.73 0.028
**
 2.92 -0.001 -0.27 -0.059
***
 -8.89 -0.065
***
 -10.47 -0.005
*
 -1.44 -0.006
*
 -2.06 -0.003 -1.08 
Company 
Age -0.001
***
 -6.02 0.000
*
 -2.2 -0.003
***
 -8.92 -0.001
**
 -2.44 -0.002
***
 -4.2 -0.005
***
 -10.45 -0.002
**
 -5.2 0.001
**
 3.07 0.000 1.78 
Audit 
Committee -0.005 -0.38 0.044
*
 2.23 0.041 1.66 0.037
**
 2.69 0.001 0.03 0.057
**
 3.6 -0.052 -1.88 -0.007 -0.85 -0.030
***
 -4.28 
Ind. 
Dir.(num) -0.016
***
 -3.75 0.012 1.24 -0.039
**
 -2.8 0.015 1.62 0.004 0.5 -0.038
***
 -4.96 -0.034 -3.3 -0.005 -0.92 -0.014
***
 -4.29 
Ind. Dir.( 
%) 0.105
***
 5.86 0.034 1.44 0.254
***
 8.03 0.140
***
 4.9 0.111
***
 4.32 0.064
*
 2.19 0.157
***
 5.17 0.081
***
 4.73 0.082
***
 5.84 
Board 
Structure 0.017
***
 6.37 0.007
**
 2.79 0.012 1.84 0.030
***
 3.73 0.026
*
 2.1 -0.008 -1.31 0.025
***
 6.6 0.013
***
 6.81 0.022
***
 13.57 
Board Size 0.000 -0.11 0.006
***
 13.76 -0.002 -1.76 0.005
***
 4.93 -0.002
***
 -7.53 -0.003
***
 -10.98 -0.002
***
 -2.64 
-
0.002
***
 -7.69 0.001 1.58 
Constant -0.596 -14.4 -0.123 -3.65 -1.160 -41.84 -0.812 -18.34 -0.410 -11.41 -0.616 -28.02 -1.220 -12.65 -0.174 -3.53 -0.394 -11.08 
Adjusted 
R square 
0.6195 0.4327 0.4146 0.5174 0.3440 0.4169 0.5874 0.1282 0.4330 
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7.7 Sensitivity Analysis: 
The main objective of the sensitivity analysis is to examine how sensitive the results and 
findings are towards changing the statistical test. The test used is fixed effect GLS 
regression using robust standard error as the examined data is not normally distributed as 
stated before by the descriptive statistics (Ananchotikul and Eichengreen 2009; Sánchez-
Ballesta
 
and García-Meca 2007; Gedajlovic and Daniel 2002; Baltagi 1995). According to 
Greene (2008, p.183)-“…the crucial distinction between fixed and random effects is 
whether the unobserved individual effect embodies elements that are correlated with the 
regressors in the model, not whether these effects are stochastic or not”. 
 
Regarding the unweighted sample, the results of adjusted R square of GLS fixed  were 
similar to the GLS random indicating that GLS fixed regression has the same strength as 
the main GLS random regression. Also, GLS fixed regression showed the similar adjusted 
R square with GLS random for different parts of voluntary reporting. 
 
According to table 7.17, for both GLS random and GLS fixed regression voluntary 
reporting has significant positive association with firm size, firm liquidity, percentage of 
independent directors, and board structure, while it has significant negative association 
with market categories, company age and number of independent directors. On the other 
hand, in both cases, there is a non-significant relationship of voluntary reporting with audit 
committee and board size. 
 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary reporting, the results of GLS random were 
similar to the results of GLS fixed  for firm size, market categories, independent director 
number and percentage of independent directors with the exception that firm liquidity is 
significant with general reporting  and CSR reporting:  in random regression, while it is 
non-significant in fixed regression, company age is significant with sustainability 
reporting but it is non-significant in fixed regression; audit committee is significant with 
corporate governance reporting but in the case of fixed it is non-significant. Audit 
committee is non-significant with corporate strategy reporting but in the case of fixed it is 
significant; board structure is significant with corporate governance reporting but it is non-
significant in fixed regression; board size is significant with sustainability reporting but it 
is non-significant in fixed regression. 
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Regarding CSR reporting, the results of GLS random were similar to the results of GLS 
fixed for all dependent variables except firm liquidity which is significant in the case of 
random but it is non-significant in fixed regression. As regards to corporate environmental 
reporting the results of GLS random were similar to the results of GLS fixed level for all 
dependent variables. Concerning corporate sustainability reporting both GLS random and 
GLS fixed are the same for all dependent variables except company age and board size 
which is significant  in case of random but it is non-significant in fixed regression. 
 
Regarding the weighted data sample, the results of adjusted R square of GLS fixed  were 
similar to the GLS random indicating that GLS fixed regression has the same strength as 
the main GLS random regression. GLS fixed regression showed the similar adjusted R 
square with GLS random for different parts of voluntary reporting. 
 
According to table 7.18, for both GLS random and GLS fixed regression voluntary 
reporting has significant positive association with firm size, firm liquidity, percentage of 
independent directors, and board structure, while it has significant negative association 
with market categories, company age and number of independent directors. On the other 
hand, in both cases, there is a non-significant relationship of voluntary reporting with audit 
committee and board size. 
 
Referred to the different categories of voluntary reporting, the results of GLS random are 
similar to the results of GLS fixed for firm size, market categories, independent director 
number and percentage of independent directors; exceptions are that firm liquidity is 
significant with general reporting and CSR reporting in random regression while it is non-
significant in fixed regression; company age is significant with sustainability reporting but 
it is non-significant in fixed regression; audit committee is significant with corporate 
governance reporting but in case of fixed it is non-significant; audit committee is non-
significant with corporate strategy reporting but in case of fixed it is significant; board 
structure is significant with corporate governance reporting but it is non-significant in 
fixed regression and board size is significant with sustainability reporting but it is non-
significant in fixed regression. 
 
Regarding CSR reporting, the results of GLS random were similar to the results of GLS 
fixed for all dependent variables except firm liquidity which is significant in case of 
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random but it is non-significant in fixed regression. As regards to corporate environmental 
reporting the results of GLS random were similar to the results of GLS fixed for all 
dependent variables. Concerning corporate sustainability reporting both GLS random and 
GLS fixed are the same for all dependent variables except company age and board size 
which is significant  in the case of random but it is non-significant in fixed regression. 
 
The results of the GLS fixed regression showed that the results of the GLS random data 
analysis are not sensitive to changing the type of the test. Hence, the selected GLS random 
analysis is considered to be well matched with the examined data. Moreover, the results of 
this sensitivity analysis confirm the reliability of the results and findings which supports 
the generalisation of such results. 
 
7.8 Conclusion: 
This chapter examines the extent and level of voluntary reporting in the annual report of 
the listed companies in Bangladesh over the period of 2004 to 2010. It also investigates 
the association between voluntary reporting and the determinants; firm size, firm liquidity, 
market categories, company age, audit committee, independent directors, board structure 
and board size for the two groups in the sample, weighted and unweighted data. Findings 
of the study also focused on CSR, CER and sustainability reporting and sector wise 
performance.  
 
As expected in developing countries, the first part of findings indicates that the level of 
total voluntary reporting in the annual reports of listed Bangladeshi companies is low. 
However, a gradual increase in the extent of voluntary reporting and its categories has 
been noticed over the period of study. Statistical tests indicate significant differences 
between voluntary reporting scores over the seven years. This may be due to the indirect 
effect of the Corporate Governance Code, a desire to enhance corporate image and the 
opportunity to receive government support.  
 
 
Based on the findings of the empirical section, it is concluded that there is a significant 
positive relationship between voluntary reporting and firm size, firm's liquidity, 
percentage of independent directors and board structure and significant negative 
relationships with market categories, company age and number of independent directors 
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both in the weighted and the unweighted sample. In addition to this, audit committee and 
board size have a non-significant or no relationship with voluntary reporting in the annual 
reports of listed Bangladeshi companies over the examined period. 
 
The findings of the study agree with the research hypotheses concerning the existence of 
positive significant relationship between voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, 
percentage of independent directors and a significant negative relationship with market 
categories. However, the results of the panel regression analysis does not accept the 
hypothesis, and found a significant negative relationship of voluntary reporting with 
company age, independent director numbers, and a significant positive relationship with 
board structure and an non-significant relationship with audit committee  and board size. 
 
As the study consider different categories of voluntary reporting, it is important to 
understand category wise, performance and lack of reporting. At the same time, it explores 
the factors affecting different parts of  voluntary reporting which is a new area of study 
relating to voluntary reporting for developing country especially Bangladesh. 
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Chapter Eight: Analysis and Findings-Timeliness of Reporting 
 
8.1 Introduction: 
An accurate and timely financial statement helps many organisations accomplish their 
aims. Furthermore, the accuracy and availability of financial information is vital in 
decision making for investors and shareholders (Apodore and Marjan 2013). Timeliness 
enhances the usefulness of information: without it, economic value decreases. The 
objective in this chapter is to answer the research question: to what extent do auditors 
delay in giving their audit opinion and to what extent do company's management delay in 
disclosing financial report or holding annual general meeting. These questions are 
answered primarily, through a detailed analysis of the audit lag, preliminary lag and total 
reporting lag using descriptive analysis. Then, the study examines the determinants of 
timeliness of reporting and tests the hypotheses of the association between these different 
determinants and the different categories of timeliness of reporting: audit lag, preliminary 
lag and reporting lag. 
 
The chapter starts in section 8.2 with the analysis of the extent and trend of audit lag, 
preliminary lag and total reporting lag. Next 8.3 analyses the determinants of timeliness 
through descriptive analysis. Then it examines the bivariate analysis in section 8.4. Section 
8.5 presents the multivariate analysis. It starts with the discussion of the regression 
diagnostic to determine the regression technique. After that, an argument between fixed 
and random effect is developed using Hausman test to determine the appropriate model. 
Finally, comes the test of the hypothesis: the association between the timeliness of 
reporting and its different determinants. Then a sensitivity analysis is applied to identify 
the effect of changing the statistical test on the results and findings of the main applied test 
in section 8.6. Finally, section 8.7 gives the implications of the research, concluding 
remarks and recommendations. 
 
8.2 The Extent and Trend of Timeliness of Reporting: 
In order to determine the timeliness of reporting of the listed companies in Bangladesh, the 
current study uses descriptive statistics and calculates the audit lag (the interval of days 
between the balance sheet closing date and the signed date of the auditor’s report) 
preliminary lag (the interval between the balance sheet closing date and the date of notice 
of the AGM) and the total reporting lag (the interval of days between the balance sheet 
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closing date and the date of the AGM) of 123 sample companies for the years of 2004 to 
2010. Descriptive statistics are used to describe the basic features of the data in a study. 
The strength of descriptive statistics is its ability to collect, organise and compare vast 
amounts of data in a more manageable form. The ultimate findings from the descriptive 
analysis are the extent of timeliness of reporting represented in days, the dependent 
variable in the current study. The timeliness of reporting scored in days over the seven 
years provides the trend of timeliness of reporting practice in the annual reports. 
 
The results indicated in table 8.1, are that average audit delay over the seven years is 110 
days: this indicate that audit delay time is improving in Bangladesh as Ahmed (2003) 
found audit lag at 162 days in 1998, Karim and Jamal (2005) found the average of 175.13 
days during the period 1990-2003 and Karim et al. (2006) found 156 days during 1990 to 
1999. Although a direct comparison with western developed countries may not be valid 
due to strict reporting requirements, the audit lag in Bangladesh may be compared with 
other emerging and newly developed countries. Apadore and Noor (2103) found that 
companies took 100 days to complete their audit report in Malaysia, while Abdul Rahman 
(2011) discovered that on average companies took 103 days. Muhoro et al. (2009) found 
Kenyan companies took an average of 97.1 days. Al-Ajmi (2008) found the average audit 
lag period was 48 days for the Bahrain Stock Exchange. Ng and Tai (1994) and Jaggi and 
Tsui (1999) found that the average audit delay in Hong Kong is about 105 days, while 
Abdullah (1996) and Owusu-Ansah (2000) report companies in Bahrain and Zimbabwe 
take about two months to complete the audits following the end of the financial year.  
 
Nevertheless, when compared with the audit report lags in other countries such as the 
Poland with 86 days, Czech Republic, 84 days, Romania and Hungary, 83 days 
(Gajevszky 2013), USA 59.36 days (Lee et al. 2009), a European emerging economies 
average of 83.5 days(McGee and Igoe 2008), Athens takes 97.56 days (Leventis 2005), 
New Zealand 87.7 days (Carslaw and Kaplan 1991), Canada 54 days (Newton and Ashton 
1989), the mean period of audit lag among Bangladeshi companies seems to be longer. 
The reason could be due to the Companies Act 1994 and Stock exchange listing 
requirement. Thus the average time taken to sign the audit report is within the statutory 
maximum of 120 days: however, each year the maximum audit delay exceeds the statutory 
maximum and 41.38% companies exceed the time limit of 120 days. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables 
Year  Descriptive Statistics Audit Lag Preliminary Lag Total Reporting Lag 
2004 Mean 115 136 179 
Minimum 38 40 69 
Maximum 275 328 349 
2005 Mean 115 136 176 
Minimum 37 38 71 
Maximum 275 328 349 
2006 Mean 114 134 176 
Minimum 35 38 78 
Maximum 282 329 352 
2007 Mean 108 130 174 
Minimum 34 39 64 
Maximum 239 449 497 
2008 Mean 108 124 166 
Minimum 34 42 61 
Maximum 266 418 449 
2009 Mean 103 116 159 
Minimum 31 34 72 
Maximum 179 238 284 
2010 Mean 104 118 159 
Minimum 32 32 72 
Maximum 212 499 551 
Grand 
Total 
Mean 110 128 170 
Minimum 31 32 61 
Maximum 282 499 551 
 
Table 8.1 also suggest that,  preliminary lag, which is defined as the average difference 
between the balance sheet end date and the notice date of the annual general meeting, is 
around 128 days over the period of time with the  highest, 136 days, found in 2004 and 
2005 and the lowest, 118 days in 2010. That means companies took on average 18 days to 
issue the notice of the AGM which also a substantial improvement for Bangladesh as 
Karim et al (2006) found an average period of 31 days was taken to issue the notice while 
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Ahmed (2003) found that it took an average of 24 days. But this average is higher in 
comparison to other country, as Al-Ajmi (2008) found that the average interim period is 
12.46 days for Bahrain Stock Exchange, with a minimum period of one day and a 
maximum of 79 days. There is no statutory binding to issue the date of AGM after 
receiving the audited report in Bangladesh. However, as preliminary time affects the total 
reporting lag, it is advised that company management complete it as soon as possible to 
reduce reporting time. 
 
The last part of Table 8.1 shows the total reporting lag – time between the financial year 
end and the date of holding AGM. This lag could be compared with the statutory 
maximum of 270 days allowed by the Companies Act and listing regulations of DSE (as 
mentioned in chapter 2). As the table shows, the mean total delay is 170 days for the entire 
period. Maximum mean delays can be observed in 2010 (551 days), 2007 (497 days), and 
2008(449 days). This shows that companies are becoming more efficient and more 
concerned to issue annual reports as early as possible in order to share information with 
public:  Ahmed (2003) found the total lag 220 days and Karim et al. (2006) found the total 
delay 218 days.  However, this finding is still unsatisfactory when compared with other 
countries for example A-Ajmi (2008) 60.5 days. Moreover, 3.36% of the Bangladesh 
sample companies are above the maximum time period of 270 days; this indicates low 
level of effectiveness of the regulations. 
 
8.2.1 Sector Wise Descriptive Analysis: 
In order to obtain a detailed overview of timeliness of reporting, it is necessary to discuss 
the sector wise performance of the listed companies in Bangladesh. The majority of the 
previous studies focused only on the total. No previous studies in Bangladesh consider 
different sectors when analysing the timeliness of reporting. It is also necessary because 
some sectors may have different regulations for reporting their annual reports. For 
example the Insurance Act of 2010 specifies that insurance companies’ audited accounts, 
statements and abstracts together with a report on the working of the corporation during 
that year should be submitted to the Government and the Authority within six months 
from the balance sheet date (details in chapter 2). However the Companies Act requires 
listed companies to submit annual reports to the BSEC and the Registrar of joint stock 
companies within 270 days from the year ending.  
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The results from table 8.2 indicate that lowest average audit lag for the seven years is 69 
days for financial institutions: on the other hand, the highest is 130 days for miscellaneous 
sectors. If the study focuses on the time frame of 120 days mentioned in the SEC rules for 
completion of the audit, findings indicate that Ceramic, Insurance, Jute, Paper and Printing 
and Miscellaneous sectors cross this maximum time frame. Preliminary lag findings are 
slightly different than that of audit lag. Although, financial institutions completed their 
audit faster than  others sectors, they need more time,10 days, to announce their AGM 
date: this is longer than the Jute, Paper and Printing (4 days), Ceramic(5 days), IT Sector(8 
days), Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals(8 days). Just in the findings of audit lag, the highest 
preliminary lag is 35 days for miscellaneous sector. 
Table 8.2: Sector Wise Descriptive Analysis of Dependent Variable 
Sectors Audit Lag Preliminary Lag Reporting Lag 
Bank 89 112 150 
Cement 116 143` 177 
Ceramic 122 127 174 
Engineering 106 129 168 
Financial Institution 69 79 113 
Food & Allied 101 129 172 
Insurance 123 142 186 
IT Sector 110 118 163 
Jute , Paper and Printing 122 126 177 
Pharmaceuticals and Chemicals 113 121 170 
Services and Real Estate, Tannery 105 119 161 
Textile 119 129 174 
Miscellaneous 130 165 202 
Sector wise reporting lag as indicated in table 8.2, the greatest lag is again the   
miscellaneous sector at 202 days; the lowest is for banks (150 days). The authorities 
regulating insurance should focus more on reporting time as the average in the insurance 
sector is 186 days, higher than the maximum time allowed in Insurance Act. 
 
8.2.2 Timeliness of Reporting Before and After the Code:  
If the study focuses on the differences before and after the Corporate Governance Code of 
2006, the justification of the code is seen clearly in table 8.3. It is observed that the 
average total lag in 2007-10 is 165 days which is lower than the average of 2004 to 2005 
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which stood at 178 days. In the year of the Code itself, 2006, the figure stood at 176 days. 
The effect of the Code is also observed if the study looks at the different categories of total 
lag: audit lag and preliminary lag. 
Table 8.3: Timeliness of Reporting Before and After the Code 
Lag 2004-05 2006 2007-10 
Audit Lag         115  114         106  
Preliminary Lag         136  134         122  
Total Lag         178  176         165  
Now, it is necessary to identify whether this difference between reporting lags over the 
period under investigation and before and after the code is significant or not. Testing for 
normality is essential to determine the type of tests to be used (parametric tests or non-
parametric tests). After conducting a series of statistical tests, the results indicate that 
reporting lags are not normally distributed, so nonparametric tests are recommended.  For 
this study, the significance test has been measured by Kruskal-Wallis tests across the 
period and Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed Rank test for before and after the code period. 
 
Regarding the differences among the seven years, Kruskal-Wallis test indicate that there is 
a significant difference between reporting lag over the period. Again, to test the effect of 
the Corporate Governance Code of 2006 on the extent of timeliness of reporting, 
Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed Rank test is used: it indicates that there is a non-
significant difference of reporting lags before and after the corporate governance code.  
Kruskal-Wallis test Wilcoxon signed-rank test 
Chi-squared = 22.873 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0008 
Ho: before = after 
z =  1.602 
Prob > z =   0.1088 
 
Chi-squared with ties =   22.881 with 6 d.f. 
probability =     0.0008 
In summary, from the descriptive analysis it is observed that extent of timeliness of 
reporting is improving over the period as the lag time decreases which is statistically 
significant but timeliness lags before and after the corporate governance code is not 
statistically significant. 
 
8.3 Measuring the Determinants of Timeliness of Reporting: 
This section investigates the determinants of timeliness through descriptive statistics. The 
determinants of the timeliness of reporting that are examined in this model are firm size, 
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earning, financial condition, audit firm size, financial year end, company age, industry 
category and audit opinion. Descriptive statistics simplify large amounts of data in a 
sensible way by simply describing what the data shows and easily translates results into a 
distribution of frequency and percentages and overall averages. Descriptive analysis is 
necessary in this part to reveal the average and range of the determinants. Also it will give 
an idea of whether the data set is normal or abnormal which directs alternative analysis 
techniques in the next part of analysis. 
 
Table 8.4 presents the descriptive statistics for all the explanatory variables investigated in 
the study. As indicated in the table, the mean firm size is about 9.25 with a minimum of 
6.428 and a maximum of 11.765. The standard deviation of this variable is large though 
skewness and kurtosis reveal that firm size measure is normally distributed. Average 
earning 0.10 indicates that 10% of the sample companies had negative earnings over the 
sample period.  ZFCINDEX indicates the financial condition, measured on the basis of 
Zmijewski’s (1984) model. Large standard deviation statistics suggest that there are 
variations across the companies. The audit firm size mean at 0.235 indicates that Big 4 
audit firms audit 23.50% of the sample companies. The financial year, 0.647, indicates 
that 64.7% of the sample companies’ year closing is in the month of December. From the 
table it also observed that on average the sample companies have been operating for 14 
years in the market. 38.2% of the samples are in the financial category and 12.7% of the 
sample companies received modified audit opinion. 
Table 8.4: Descriptive Statistics on Explanatory Variables 
  Mean Median 
Std.  
Deviation 
Mini- 
mum 
Maxi- 
mum 
Skew- 
ness 
Kur- 
tosis 
Firm Size 
9.250 8.996 0.879 6.428 11.765 0.458 2.530 
Earning 
0.100 0.000 0.300 0.000 1.000 2.669 8.123 
Financial Condition 
-18.479 -12.917 32.542 -249.537 160.236 -0.992 11.411 
Audit Firm Size 
0.235 0.000 0.424 0.000 1.000 1.253 2.569 
Financial Year 
0.647 1 0.478 0.000 1 -0.615 1.378 
Company Age 
14.518 14.000 7.951 0.000 44.000 0.500 3.005 
Industry 
0.382 0.000 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.485 1.235 
Audit Opinion 
0.127 0.000 0.333 0.000 1.000 2.246 6.044 
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Referred to the standard skewness the data is considered not to be normally distributed. As 
a common rule, the standard skewness of the data needs to be within the range of ±1.96 
(Gujarati and Dawn 2009). It is observed that earning and audit opinion skewness exceeds 
the standard normality range of ±1.96 evidencing that the data is not normally distributed. 
On the other hand, with respect to the standard kurtosis, the data is also not normally 
distributed. The data is said to be normally distributed if the standard kurtosis fall in the 
range of ±3 (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). The standard kurtosis of earning, financial 
condition, company age and audit opinion are more than 3 indicating that the data is not 
normally distributed. The figures in table 8.4 indicate that the observations have some 
extreme figures, outliers, which need more attention during the analysis process and the 
interpretation of the results. As a result any hypotheses test related to the entire data needs 
to use a robust analysis. 
 
8.4 Bivariate Analysis: 
According to Babbie (2009), one of the simplest forms of quantitative analysis is bivariate 
analysis. It provides an estimate as to the level of association between the variables. In 
fact, it scrutinises for interdependence of the variables. In this study, correlation analysis is 
used to discover the degree of association between the dependent and independent 
variables. With the help of this, it is also possible to recognise the correlation among the 
independent variables. Moreover, it reveals whether the data needs to be modified or 
whether any independent variables need to be taken out. So, before approaching the 
regression analysis, this study carried out a correlation analysis to recognize whether all 
the independent variables are appropriate for the multiple regression analysis. As the data 
set are non normal, non- parametric Spearman correlation is suitable for the study. 
However, the study used both Spearman correlation and parametric Pearson correlation to 
check if there is any difference between the results. 
 
The correlation between the different categories of timeliness of reporting and the 
determinants of timeliness using Spearman correlation coefficients is shown in the table 
8.5. The Spearman correlations in table 8.5 show the significant association of audit lag, 
preliminary lag and reporting lag with the different determinants of timeliness of 
reporting. The significance association is identified using a confidence level of 99% and 
95%.  
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Referred to the correlation coefficients, there is a significant positive relationship (at 1 % 
and 5% significance levels) of audit lag with earning and financial condition. This 
suggests the stronger association between these variables and audit lag. According to the 
results, companies with negative earning and a weak financial condition need more time to 
disclose their audit report. On the other hand, company age and audit opinion is identified 
as having a non-significant relationship with audit lag. The results indicate weak or no 
association of audit lag with the number of years operating in the market and types of 
audit opinion given. While, there is a significant negative association between firm size, 
audit firm size, financial year ending and industry categories with audit lag. This indicates 
big firms, companies audited by the Big 4 audit firm, companies whose financial year ends 
in busy season and financial companies need less time to publish their audit report. 
  
In the case of preliminary audit lag the correlation coefficient represents a significant 
positive association with earning, financial condition and audit opinion. On the other hand, 
company age is identified to have a non-significant relationship with preliminary lag. 
While, there is a significant negative association between firm sizes, audit firm size, 
financial year ending and industry categories. Regarding total reporting lag, the correlation 
coefficient represents a significant positive association with earnings, financial condition 
and audit opinion. On the other hand, company age is identified as having a non-
significant relationship with reporting lag. While, there is a significant negative 
association between firm sizes, audit firm size, financial year ending and industry 
categories with it. 
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Table 8.5: Spearman's Correlations of Dependent and Independent Variables.  
 
 
 
 
Spearman's Correlations 
 
Audit 
lag 
Preliminary 
Lag 
Reporting 
lag 
Firm 
Size Earning 
Financial 
Condition 
Audit 
size 
Financial 
Year 
Company 
Age Industry 
Modified 
Opinion 
Audit lag 1.000           
Preliminary lag .788
**
 1.000          
Reporting lag .761
**
 .840
**
 1.000         
Firm Size -.294
**
 -.216
**
 -.279
**
 1.000        
Earning .135
**
 .111
**
 .122
**
 -.106
**
 1.000       
Financial Condition .099
**
 .096
**
 .097
**
 .052 .457
**
 1.000      
Audit Firm Size -.208
**
 -.198
**
 -.193
**
 .335
**
 -.102
**
 -.164
**
 1.000     
Financial Year -.204
**
 -.135
**
 -.102
**
 .442
**
 -.159
**
 -.216
**
 .312
**
 1.000    
Company Age .025 -.048 .035 .065 .006 -.086
*
 .159
**
 -.049 1.000   
Industry -.195
**
 -.101
**
 -.105
**
 .472
**
 -.190
**
 -.026 .129
**
 .567
**
 -.291
**
 1.000  
Audit Opinion .024 .100
**
 .084
*
 .012 .129
**
 .107
**
 .061 .146
**
 .003 .132
**
 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 8.6: Pearson's Correlation of Dependent and Independent Variables.  
 
Pearson's Correlations 
 
Audit 
lag 
Preliminary 
Lag 
Total 
lag 
Firm 
Size Earning 
Financial 
Condition 
Audit 
Size 
Financial 
Year 
Company 
Age Industry 
Modified 
Opinion 
Audit lag 1           
Preliminary lag .742
**
 1          
Reporting lag .749
**
 .936
**
 1         
Firm Size -.252
**
 -.154
**
 -.191
**
 1        
Earning .106
**
 .148
**
 .170
**
 -.112
**
 1       
Financial Condition .117
**
 .128
**
 .113
**
 .054 .413
**
 1      
Audit Firm Size -.154
**
 -.120
**
 -.144
**
 .316
**
 -.102
**
 -.195
**
 1     
Financial Year -.092
**
 -..092
**
 -.080
*
 .454
**
 -.159
**
 -.195
**
 .312
**
 1    
Company Age .044 .083
*
 .148
**
 .000 .042 -.105
**
 .172
**
 -.033 1   
Industry -.165
**
 -.080
*
 -.110
**
 .535
**
 -.190
**
 .004 .129
**
 .555
**
 -.304
**
 1  
Audit Opinion .022 .113
**
 .087
*
 .031 .129
**
 .099
**
 .061 .149
**
 .009 .132
**
 1 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Regarding the different categories of the lag, there is a significant positive relationship 
between different categories of lag and earning and financial condition. On the other hand, 
the findings show that there is significant negative relationship between the different 
categories of lag with firm size, financial year and industry categories. There is a 
significant negative relationship between the different categories of lag with company age. 
From the table 8.5, it is clear that audit opinion is non-significant for audit lag but 
positively significant for preliminary lag and total reporting lag. That means that when the 
company received any modified opinion, other than standard unqualified audit opinion, it 
will take more time to issue the notice of and to arrange the AGM. It may that the 
management need more time to justify or explain their work. The results of this table agree 
with the research hypothesis regarding the association between timeliness of reporting and 
the different disclosure's determinants.  
 
Table 8.6 shows the correlation between the different categories of lag and the 
determinants of timeliness of reporting using Pearson's correlation coefficients. The results 
of association using Pearson's correlation do not significantly differ from the results of 
association using Spearman's correlation: exceptions are that company age has significant 
relationship with preliminary lag and total reporting lag. 
 
8.5 Multivariate Analysis: 
In order to generalise the results of this study multivariate analysis is applied. Multivariate 
analysis can statistically estimate relationships between different variables, and correlate 
how important each one is to the final outcome and reveal where dependencies exist 
between them. Among multivariate analyses, regression analysis is one of the most 
common and widely used techniques in statistical analysis especially in disclosure 
literature (Cooke 1998). Gujarati and Dawn (2009) also suggest that under certain 
assumptions, the method of least squares has some very attractive statistical properties that 
have made it one of the most powerful and popular methods of regression analysis.  
 
The following section starts with the regression diagnostics that represent the first step in 
choosing the relevant statistical method to analyse the collected data in this study. After 
that a discussion about selecting fixed effect and random effect is provided and finally the 
test of hypothesis, the association between the timeliness of reporting and its different 
determinants, is presented. 
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8.5.1 Regression Diagnostic: 
In order to determine the appropriate statistical method, it is important to assess the impact 
of distribution problems, non linearity, in addition to the problems of outliers (Cooke 
1998). Ordinarily, there are several methods to estimate regression coefficients 
(parameters). The current study checked linearity, independence and normality of error, 
homoscedasticity and multicollinearity to justify the regression. 
 
8.5.1.1 Checking Linearity: 
The association between the dependent and independent variables is supposed to be linear. 
It can be checked by the plot(s) of the residuals versus the independent variable values, 
and if linearity exists, there will be no obvious clustering of positive residuals or a 
clustering of negative residuals. Linearity can also be checked effortlessly through plotting 
each independent variable against the dependent variable and noting how well it fits the 
regression line representing their relationship. The graphs for checking linearity of each 
independent variable indicate that most of the independent variables in the model do not 
have an obvious linear relationship with the dependent variables (Appendix H). 
 
It may be either because of the presence of outliers or unusual observations, or the linear 
model is not a good fit to describe the relation between the dependent variable and each 
independent variable. Therefore, it can be concluded that the linearity assumption is not 
satisfied. However, this result of non linearity is common in the majority of prior reporting 
studies (Cooke 1998). So, the study has to fit this non-linear data into appropriate 
regression.  
 
8.5.1.2: Checking Normality: 
Normality implies that errors (residuals) should be normally distributed. Technically, 
normality is necessary only for the hypothesis tests to be valid. Normality of residuals can 
be checked by two methods; graphical methods and numerical methods. Both of them; 
normality plots and normality tests; have been employed in the current study. 
 
Graphical Method: 
Two most common plots have been used in this study to check the normality- P-P plot 
(standardized normal probability plot) and Density estimate (plots the density of a variable 
and the normal density). 
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Figure 8.1:  P-P Plots for Timeliness of Reporting 
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Figure 8.2: Kernel Density Estimate 
 
Numerical Methods of Normality: 
There are many numerical methods that can be used to test the assumption of normality: 
examples of these methods include- Kolmogorov - Smimov D statistic, skewness, and 
Shapiro - Wilk W statistic. Among them Shapiro - Wilk W statistic has been shown to 
have a good power against a wide range of non normal distribution. If the value of p is 
small, then the data may not be considered normally distributed.  
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Table 8.7: Shapiro-Wilk W tests for Normal Data 
 
Variables obs W V Z Prob>Z 
Residual 861 0.92015 43.946 9.311 0.0000 
Total Reporting Lag 861 0.89247 59.179 10.043 0.0000 
 
The two methods of normality test, graphical and numerical method, suggest the same 
result. It is clear from the previous results that errors and dependent variables are not 
normally distributed and this is mainly related to the skewness of the distribution. 
 
8.5.1.3 Checking Homoscedasticity of Residuals: 
The homoscedasticity assumption means that variance of the error terms is constant for 
each observation. The current study employs two numerical methods for 
heteroscedasticity; and Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg and White's test; and Cameron & 
Trivedi's decomposition of IM test. 
Table 8.8: Breusch-Pagan I Cook-Weisberg and White's tests  
Test Chi-square Prob>chi
2
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg  58.24 0.0000 
White's 248.27 0.0000 
Table 8.9: Cameron & Trivedi's Decomposition of IM test 
Source Chi-square df p 
Heteroskedasticity 248.27 38 0.0000 
Skewness 65.64 8 0.0000 
Kurtosis 3.86 1 0.0495 
Total 317.77 47 0.0000 
 
The test results point out that errors have a non-constant variance (heteroscedastic), which 
indicate that the regression estimators will not have the minimum variance of all unbiased 
estimators, and also the P-values will be unreliable. In other words the current data suffer 
from heteroscedasticity. 
 
8.5.1.4 Checking for Multicollinearity: 
When multicollinearity exists, it will be complicated to differentiate the individual effects 
of explanatory variables and regression estimators may be biased (Murray 2006). It means 
there is a linear relationship between two or more independent variables and the estimates 
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for a regression model cannot be uniquely computed.  The two common ways to check for 
the presence of multicollinearity between independent variables are correlation 
coefficients and variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance values. These two ways 
have been widely used in disclosure literature. The current study employs both of them to 
check whether the explanatory variables or the model suffer from multicollinearity. Table 
8.10 shows the variance inflation factor (VIF) and tolerance coefficients of each 
explanatory variable: 
 
Table 8.10: Variable Inflation Factor of Dependent Variables 
Variable VIF Tolerance(1/VIF) 
Firm Size 1.646 .608 
Earning 1.290 .775 
Financial Condition 1.343 .745 
Audit Firm Size 1.258 .795 
Financial Year 1.694 .590 
Company Age 1.207 .828 
Industry 2.084 .480 
Audit Opinion 1.071 .934 
Mean of VIF 
1.449 
 
 
As regards the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF), it is indicated that data is normally 
distributed if the VIF is less than 10(Gaur and Gaur 2009; Gujarati and Dawn 2009; Neter 
et al. 1983; Mendenhall and Sincich 1989). However, others suggest that the value of 5 
can be used as a rule of thumb (Groebner et al. 2005). From the table, it is observed that 
the maximum VIF is 2.084 with means VIF is 1.449. Moreover, the lowest tolerance 
coefficient is 0.480. As suggested by Hair et al. (2011), the tolerance value of more than 
0.20 may be used as a criterion for considering the data being free from the problem of 
multicollinearity. Therefore, based upon the rule of thumb, the results of VIF and 
tolerance coefficients indicate that there is no unacceptable level of multicollinearity in the 
current study. 
 
Also, it is commonly agreed that the correlation matrix is a powerful tool for indicating the 
relationship between explanatory variables but there is no agreement among researchers 
regarding the cut off correlation percentage (Alsaeed 2006). While, some researchers use 
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0.8; e.g. Hair et al, (2011); Gujarati and Dawn (2009); others suggest using 0.7; e.g. 
Tabachnick and Fidell (1996). Tables 8.5 and 8.6 present the correlation coefficients of 
nonparametric and parametric tests; Spearman and Pearson coefficients respectively. It can 
be noticed from the tables that correlation coefficients confirm the results of VIF. 
According to Spearman correlations (table 8.5), the correlation coefficients of all 
independent variables are less or equal to 0.567. Although the study find correlation 
coefficient of 0.840 for preliminary lag, because preliminary lag is a dependent variable 
and also  is a part of total reporting lag time, the correlation coefficient of preliminary lag 
with total reporting lag does not affect multicollinearity. Moreover, in the regression 
equation, these are not running in the same equation with total reporting lag. Thus, as there 
is no value more than 0.80 for comparing correlation between dependent and independent 
variable, it can be concluded that there is no potential multicollinearity problem in the 
current study. 
 
The same can be concluded from Pearson's rank correlation (table 8.6) which indicates 
that the highest coefficient for all independent variables is 0.555. Similarly in Spearman, 
the study has a correlation coefficient of 0.936, for preliminary lag, in Pearson it is more 
than the standard value 0.80. However, as preliminary lag is a part of total reporting lag 
and also a dependent variable, it can be concluded that, based on results, there is no 
potential multicollinearity between dependent and independent variables of the current 
study. 
 
8.5.2 Choosing Between Fixed and Random Effects: 
When modeling group data, perhaps the first question the researcher faces is whether to 
account for unit effects and, if so, whether to employ so called fixed effects or random 
effects. Advice on this topic is plentiful (e.g., Greene 2008, Kennedy 2003, Frees 2004, 
Gelman 2005, Wilson and Butler 2007, Arceneaux and Nickerson 2009, Wooldridge 
2010), even if sometimes confusing and contradictory (Gelman and Hill 2007,p.245). 
However, the generally accepted way of choosing between fixed and random effects is 
running a Hausman test. The Hausman test checks a more efficient model against a less 
efficient but consistent model, to make sure that the more efficient model also gives 
consistent results (James and Marks 2012). 
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Table 8.11: Hausman Test of Dependent and Explanatory Variables 
Dependent Variables Hausman  fixed random 
chi2(8) Prob>chi2(8) 
Audit Lag 38.43 0.0000 
Preliminary lag 28.68 0.0002 
Total Reporting lag 24.90 0.0008 
 
According to James and Marks (2012), in case of Hausman fixed random, if Prob>chi2 
less than 0.05 then it is safe to use fixed effects. From the table 8.11, as Prob>chi2 is less 
than 0.05, the study used a fixed test. Fixed effects regression is the model to use when it 
is necessary to control omitted variables that differ between cases but are constant over 
time. It allows the use of changes in the variables over time to estimate the effects of the 
independent variables on the dependent variable. 
 
8.5.3 Test of Hypotheses: 
Regression diagnostics indicate that data set are non linear, non normal and there are 
heteroscedasticity in the current study. There are several reasons for this case of unequal 
variance, the most probable being outliers and skewness. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
does not make use of the information contained in the unequal variability of the dependent 
variable since it assigns equal weight to each observation. Generalised Least Squares 
(GLS) is OLS on the transformed variables that satisfy the standard least-squares 
assumptions. As such, GLS minimises a weighted sum of residual squares not minimising 
an unweighted or equally weighted as in OLS (Gujarati and Dawn 2009). 
 
The descriptive statistics also showed that the data is not normally distributed. Therefore, 
the data analysis needs to be applied using a nonparametric test that fits with this non- 
parametric data which is not normally distributed. The GLS is a parametric test, so to fit 
with the non parametric data it needs to be employed using robust standard error. 
 
To benefit from the advantages of panel data analysis, the current study employs GLS 
using robust standard error. The results are shown in table 8.12. The panel regression is 
used to differentiate between the data of years 2004 to 2010. Therefore, seven groups are 
examined. As the study uses the same number of companies for each year, there are 
minimum, maximum and average numbers of observations for 123 companies each year. 
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The results of table 8.12 show that audit lag has significant positive association with 
financial condition, while it has significant negative association with firm size. The 
positive associations mean that audit lag time increases with the increase propensity of 
failure for the firm. On the other, the negative association means that audit lag time 
decreases for big size firms. Moreover, earning, audit firm size, financial year, company 
age, industry categories and audit opinion type has weak or non-significant association 
with audit lag time: this indicates that these factors have no power to increase or decrease 
audit lag time. 
 
Table 8.12 reveals that preliminary lag has significant positive association with earning, 
financial condition, company age, industry classification and audit opinion. The positive 
associations mean that preliminary lag time increases when a company has negative 
earning, high propensity to fail, in old companies rather than new, financial companies 
rather than non financial manufacturing companies, and has modified opinion or other 
than standard unqualified audit opinion in its audit.. However, firm size has significant 
negative association with preliminary lag which indicate that big firms need less time for 
preliminary reporting. In addition, audit firm size has weak or non-significant association 
with preliminary lag time which indicates that audit firm size does not affect preliminary 
lag time. 
 
Finally, the total reporting lag time data present in table 8.12 showed that reporting lag 
time has positive association with earning, financial condition, company's age and industry 
classification, while it has negative association with firm size and audit firm size. The 
positive associations mean that total reporting lag time increases when the company has 
negative earning, high propensity to fail, in old companies rather than new and financial 
companies rather than non financial manufacturing companies. On the other hand, the 
negative associations mean that reporting lag time decreases for big firms and firms which 
are audited by the Big 4 audit firm. Moreover, audit opinion type has weak or non-
significant association with total reporting lag time which indicates audit opinion does not 
have any power to increase or decrease total reporting lag time. 
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Table 8.12: Fixed-effect GLS Regression using Robust Standard Error 
 
The adjusted R Squared of the models explains how much of the changes in the dependent 
variable are explained by the changes in the independent variables. The adjusted R 
Squared is 0.1014 indicating that 10.14 % of the changes of the timeliness of reporting is 
explained by the changes its examined determinants. The R-squared is comparable to 
Reheul et al. (2013) 8%, Apadore and Noor (2013) 11%, Mohamad–Nor et al. (2010) 
16%, Ahmad and Kamarudin (2003) 14%, Ahmed (2003), Bangladesh (1%), India (8%), 
Pakistan (23%) and Henderson and Kaplan (2000) 13%. This difference can be explained 
by different variables and the time period taken by different researchers. 
 
As financial condition measurement (Zmijewski’s model) includes financial leverage, the 
study also crosschecks the effects of financial condition for non financial firms and 
financial firms. Using fixed effects GLS regression for 532 non financial firms, the study 
found the same effects as observed in the total sample: financial condition is positively 
significant with audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag which indicates that a 
high propensity to fail increases audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag. On the 
other hand, using fixed effects GLS regression for 329 financial firms the study found the 
Fixed-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
Determinants Audit Lag Preliminary Lag Reporting Lag 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
Firm Size -10.827
***
 -7.91 -11.045
***
 -7.6 -12.978
***
 -10.98 
Earning 0.958 0.43 11.881
*
 2.12 16.607
**
 2.65 
Financial Condition 0.155
**
 2.73 0.174
**
 2.64 0.143
*
 2.27 
Audit Firm Size -4.863 -1.81 -6.554 -1.26 -9.932
*
 -2.38 
Financial Year 1.014 1.75     
Company Age 0.034 0.39 
0.478
*
 2.19 0.968
***
 
4.73 
Industry -3.944 -1.01 
5.496
*
 2.43 8.034
*
 
2.64 
Audit Opinion 1.395 0.42 
14.539
*
 2.24 10.135 
1.36 
Constant 204.318 16.97 
222.562 16.36 274.692 
25.99 
Adjusted R
2
 0.0885 0.0703 0.1014 
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same effects for non financial firms and total firms. So, the findings indicate that financial 
condition is not case sensitive. 
 
This part the study determines the effect of factors that are used in mandatory reporting 
and voluntary reporting. The main intention of this is to identify the association of factors 
with timeliness of reporting which have significant or non-significant relationships with 
mandatory reporting and voluntary reporting. As Spearman's correlation found that 
financial condition has multicollinearity with board size, it has been omitted in this part. 
These additional findings given in appendix K indicate that timeliness of reporting also 
has a significant positive relationship with market categories, age of the company and 
board size while it has a significant negative relationship with multinational parents, 
ownership structure and industry categories. However, timeliness of reporting also has a 
non-significant or weak association with profitability, liquidity, audit committee, 
independent directors and board structure. 
 
These findings indicate that reporting lag also increases when the company is in Z 
categories, is an old company rather than new and there is an increase in the number of 
members on the board. Whereas, reporting lag time also decreases when the company has 
multinational parents and has more than 50% ownership by a particular group of sponsor. 
However, high profitability or low, highly liquid firm or not, number of audit committee 
member, percentage and number of independent director in the board and dual board 
structure do not affect timeliness of reporting in Bangladesh. 
 
Firm Size: Consistent with H1, the study observes a statistically significant negative 
relationship of firm size with audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag both in 
bivariate and multivariate analysis. The negative coefficient of reporting lag signifies that 
larger companies are more prompt reporters than smaller companies. These results could 
be because large companies in Bangladesh are affiliated with multinational corporations, 
and so they tend to have access to modern technology and are able to produce their 
accounts on a timely basis. Another explanation is that large companies tend to have 
strong internal control systems and efficient audit committees, and as result auditors spend 
less time in conducting compliance and substantive tests (Owusu-Ansah 2000).  It may 
also be due to better resources and the use of a continuous audit (Ahmed 2003). This result 
is in line with prior studies of Jaggi and Tsui (1999); Afify (2009); Mohamad-Nor et al. 
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(2010); Hashim and Abdul Rahman (2011) and Apadore and Noor (2013). However, the 
results contrast with the evidence presented by Simnett et al. 1995; Abdulla 1996; 
Leventis and Weetman 2004; and Owusu-Ansah and Leventis 2006. 
Earning: Consistent with H2, the results of GLS multivariate regression found that the 
sign of earnings has a significant positive relationship with preliminary lag and total 
reporting lag. This suggests that successful companies, those with good news, report more 
promptly relative to their counterparts with poor operating results, those with bad news. 
This result is not surprising given the tendency of stock markets to reward profitable 
companies more than they reward unprofitable ones. Profitable companies, therefore, have 
the incentive to signal the public about their superior performance by releasing their 
annual reports quickly (Owusu-Ansah, 2000). This result is in line with prior studies 
Owusu-Ansah (2000); Ahmed (2003); Ismail and Chandler (2004); and Afify (2009). 
Although the sign of earnings is not statistically significant in audit lag time, the positive 
coefficient indicates that negative earning also increase the audit lag time. However, the 
results disagree with the evidence presented by Annaert et al. (2002) who reported a non-
significant association between reporting lag and either good or bad news and profit or 
loss. 
Financial Condition: Consistent with H3, both bivariate and multivariate analysis found 
that financial condition is statistically significant with audit lag, preliminary lag and total 
reporting lag. This result indicates that a firm's financial condition is a determinant of 
reporting lag in Bangladesh. Results indicate that the higher the value of the index, the 
higher the propensity to fail and the weaker the financial condition, the greater will be the 
increase in reporting lag time. In other words, firms with a weak financial condition pose a 
greater audit risk, which in turn increases lag time to review the accounts (Jaggi and Tsui 
1999). In the same way, taking a long time to review accounts provides a signal of weak 
financial condition to the market and at the same time increases information asymmetry. 
This finding is in line with Jaggi and Tsui (1999) who found that financial condition is 
highly significant in Hong Kong. However, the findings contradict results obtained by 
Ahmed (2003) who suggested that a firm’s financial condition is not a determinant of 
audit reporting lag in South Asia. 
Audit Firm Size: Consistent with H4, audit firm size is negatively significant with total 
reporting lag both in bivariate and multivariate analysis indicating that companies audited 
by large audit firms take less time to report. This hypothesis suggests that larger audit 
firms are more efficient because they have better resources and access to modern 
 - 298 - 
technology due to their affiliation with international accounting firms and the experience 
gained through auditing more firms (Ahmed 2003).The statistical results support the 
theoretical argument of signalling theory. Companies may prefer to be audited by one of 
the big four audit firms to distinguish themselves. At the same time big audit firms 
complete audits more efficiently and in less time and provide a signal of its own quality 
and reputation. The findings of this study are in line with Ahmed (2003), Owusu and 
Leventis (2006) and Afify (2009). However, some studies found no difference in audit 
delay between big and non-big audit firms (Garsombke 1981; Carslaw and Kaplan 1991; 
Ng and Tai 1994; Al-Ajmi 2008; Affify 2009). 
Financial Year End: Inconsistent with H5, the result of multivariate GLS regression 
found that financial year-end is non-significant with audit lag time. The study assumed 
that financial year- end will have an effect on timeliness because during the busy season 
more time is needed for scheduling and completing the audit of company accounts. 
Because of this, the current study only checks this hypothesis for audit lag time. This 
result is inconsistent with the arguments: it may be because audit firms employ more audit 
staff and pay overtime to complete audits on time or it may be the recent trend to employ 
auditors to undertake a continuous audit rather than a year-end audit. However, the results 
of bivariate analysis found significant negative association of financial year end with audit 
lag, preliminary lag and reporting lag. 
Company Age: Inconsistent with the H6, the results of multivariate GLS regression found 
that company age has a positive significant association with preliminary lag and total 
reporting lag. However, the result of bivariate analysis found that company age has a non-
significant relationship with audit lag, preliminary lag and reporting lag. This indicates 
that the number of years a company has been operating in the market positively affects the 
reporting lag. That means old companies need more time to disclose their annual reports. 
This hypothesis is supported by Owusu-Ansah (2000), who employs a two-stage least 
square regression model and found age as significant determinants of reporting lags, and 
Musa et al. (2013), who found age appears to exert a positive influence on reporting. 
However, Courtis (1976) did not find age as a significant attribute in his study. It also 
disproved that the older the firms, the more likely they are to have strong internal control 
procedures while younger firms are more prone to failure and have less experience with 
accounting controls (Hope and Langli 2008).  
Industry: Consistent with the H7, multivariate GLS regression found that industry has a 
significant positive association with preliminary lag and total reporting lag. This indicates 
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that non financial companies need more time to disclose their annual report. Interestingly, 
industry is non-significant for audit lag but provides a negative sign, which indicates 
financial companies need more time to publish their audit report. It may be because 
financial companies are large in size, and have  high investment and capital, or it may be 
due to the regulatory differences between financial and non financial companies. In 
addition, it may due to financial companies having large number of stakeholders: 
management wishes to signal to them about their performance as early as possible. 
Moreover, the results of bivariate analysis indicate that industry has significant negative 
association with audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag. This finding of GLS is 
in line with Courtis (1976), Ashton et al. (1989), Carslaw and Kaplan (1991) and Ng and 
Tai (1994). 
Audit Opinion: Inconsistent with the H8, the results of multivariate GLS regression found 
that audit opinion is non-significant with audit lag and reporting lag, while significant with 
preliminary lag. However, the results of bivariate analysis found that audit opinion is 
significant with preliminary lag and reporting lag, while non-significant with audit lag. 
The findings of GLS provide evidence that companies with other than standard 
unqualified audit opinion do not influence auditors to perform more extensive audit work. 
However, when the company has a modified audit opinion, they generally need more time 
to announce their date of AGM. It may because management needs some extra time to 
develop arguments to justify the audit opinion. The findings of the study is supported in 
line with Soltani (2002); Reheul et al. (2013). 
 
8.6 Sensitivity Analysis: 
According to the Hausman test in table 8.11, the study has fixed effect GLS regression 
using robust standard error analysis is our main test. For sensitivity, the current study used 
random effect GLS regression using robust standard error. The main objective of the 
sensitivity analysis is to examine how sensitive the results and findings are towards 
changing the statistical test. Regarding the timeliness of reporting, the results of adjusted R 
square of GLS random were the same as the GLS fixed, indicating that GLS random 
regression has the same strength as the main GLS fixed regression. Also, GLS random 
regression showed the similar adjusted R square with GLS fixed for audit lag and 
preliminary lag. 
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Table: 8.13: Random-effects GLS Regression using Robust Standard Error 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
 Audit Lag Preliminary Lag Reporting Lag 
 Coefficient  Z Coefficient Z Coefficient Z 
Firm Size -9.272
***
 -7.03 -9.06
***
 -4.73 -11.12
***
 -6.75 
Earning 1.831 0.89 13.08
**
 2.31 17.67
***
 2.8 
Financial Condition 0.132
**
 2.29 0.14
**
 2.17 0.11
*
 1.79 
Audit Firm Size -6.543
**
 -2.38 -9.27
*
 -1.72 -12.55
***
 -2.74 
Financial Year 0.854 1.48     
Company Age 0.247
**
 2.04 0.75
***
 3.26 1.22
***
 5.17 
Industry -3.586 -0.89 5.40
**
 2.43 7.92
***
 2.67 
Audit Opinion 1.600 0.49 14.60
**
 2.28 10.22 1.4 
Constant 188.14 15.77 200.14 10.05 253.80 15.52 
Adjusted R
2
 
0.0931 0.0731 0.1040 
 
According to table 8.13, for both GLS random and GLS fixed regression, total reporting 
has significant positive association with earning, financial condition, company age and 
industry categories, while it has significant negative association  with firm size and audit 
firm size. On the other hand, in both cases, there is a non-significant relationship of the 
total reporting lag with audit opinion. In respect of preliminary lag, the results of GLS 
random were similar to the results of GLS fixed for all dependent variables except audit 
firm size which is significant negatively associated in case of random but it is non-
significant in fixed regression. In the same way in audit lag, audit firm size which is 
significant negative in the case of random but it is non-significant in fixed regression. 
Company age, which is significant positively in the case of random, is non-significant in 
fixed regression.  
 
The results of the GLS random regression showed that the results of the GLS fixed data 
analysis are not sensitive to changing the type of the test. Hence, the selected GLS fixed 
analysis is considered to be well matched with the examined data. Moreover, the results of 
this sensitivity analysis confirm the reliability of the results and findings and support the 
generalisation of such results. 
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8.7 Conclusion: 
One measure of financial reporting quality is the timeliness of reporting. Thus this study 
provides empirical evidence relating to reporting lag of 123 companies listed on Dhaka 
Stock Exchange from the year 2004 to 2010. The study also investigated the factors that 
influenced timely reporting of these companies. Three measures of timeliness (reporting 
lags) have been used. These are: the length of time between the reporting year-end and 
audit signature date, audit lag, date of notice of the AGM, preliminary lag, and the time of 
actually holding the AGM, total reporting lag. This study shows that it took about 110 
days to complete the audit process. On average, shareholders in Bangladesh had waited 
about 170 days to discuss the performance of their companies with the management at the 
AGM. 
 
Through regression analysis, the outcomes show that audit lag time is influenced by firm 
size and the financial condition of the company. While firm size, earning, financial 
condition, company age, industry categories and audit opinion affected how quickly a 
sample company announced its preliminary earnings. Moreover, firm size, earning, 
financial condition, audit firm size, company age and industry categories influenced the 
timeliness by which a sample company released its annual report to the AGM. The results 
of regression with robust standard errors indicate that firm size and financial condition are 
significant predictors of timely reporting in Bangladesh, regardless of how timeliness is 
measured. 
 
The above findings and conclusions are subject to a number of limitations. This study did 
not consider all relevant factors that might affect timeliness in reporting which is why 
statistical analyses carried out in this study may suffer from omitted explanatory variables 
problems. The model’s low explanatory power is an indication of such problems 
underlying the model development. Moreover, like most prior studies (Ahmed 2003; 
Karim et al. 2006; Apadore and Noor 2013; Reheul et al. 2013), this research adopts a 
single mechanism focus in that it investigates the time taken to release the published 
annual corporate reports. Other timely information sources such as publication of web-
based annual reports are not considered. In recent years, some large firms in South Asia 
have begun releasing abridged annual reports through the web prior to holding the annual 
general meeting. These factors merit exploration in further research work on timeliness. 
Also, the functional form of models examining the relationship between timeliness and its 
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determinants warrants further investigation. It is not likely that the relationship will always 
be linear. Future research studies may consider non-linear models. Finally, financial 
reporting lags have received a great deal of attention in for profit settings, the issue 
remains unexplored in non profit settings: this may provide an interesting avenue for 
future research. 
 
Apart from its contribution to the literature on financial reporting and auditing, the current 
study adds to the recent and rapidly growing literature by examining the audit lag, 
preliminary lag and reporting lag using longitudinal analysis among the sample of listed 
companies in Bangladesh.  Specifically, the study extend prior research on  developing 
economies, by providing important empirical evidence, on the role of financial reporting 
and auditing in improving the quality of reporting. The findings also contradict Karim et 
al. (2006) and found that regulatory changes have not totally failed to bring about 
improvement in the quality of financial reporting in Bangladesh with respect to timeliness. 
 
However, although the age-old problem of chronic publication delay in corporate 
reporting has been reduced by a few days, as the results show, it could not said to be 
satisfactory when the study compare with other developing countries or other South Asian 
countries. The regulatory provisions are partly responsible for these long reporting delays 
because the Companies Acts and listing rules allow listed companies nine months to hold 
the AGM of shareholders. Further, that 3.36% companies have failed to call the meeting 
within the prescribed time also reflects a lack of effectiveness of the regulatory authorities. 
The lack of timeliness creates uncertainty among investors, resulting in less than optimum 
investment. In particular, companies seeking overseas investment will miss out most since 
investors in developed countries are used to receiving information on a timely basis and 
will be reluctant to invest if uncertainty is created due to a lack of prompt information. 
Thus the Securities and Exchange authorities along with company legislators should look 
into this matter and consider improving monitoring mechanisms and aligning provisions 
consistent with developed countries.  
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Chapter Nine: Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
9.1 Introduction: 
The purpose of this chapter is to summaries and discuss the analysis and findings of 
chapter six, seven and eight with respect to the research objectives stated in chapter one. In 
order to do so, the findings of the present research are related to previous literature in 
chapter three in order to identify the contribution of this thesis, with its focus on the 
quality of corporate reporting of the listed companies in Bangladesh. These findings are 
used to make academic conclusions as well as recommendations about the possible future 
development of reporting quality in Bangladesh. The limitations of the study and 
suggestions for further research in relation to quality of reporting are discussed at the end 
of this chapter. 
 
9.2 Research Questions and Methodology: 
The main objective of the study is to evaluate the quality of reporting through quality of 
mandatory reporting, quality of voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting of the 
listed companies in Bangladesh. The period of study covers the seven years from 2004 to 
2010. The final sample consists of 123 companies listed in the Dhaka Stock Exchange in 
Bangladesh with 861 firm year observations.  
 
The current research argument is based on the agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory. The objectivist ontological and positivist epistemological position fits 
with this research. Based on ontological and epistemological positions, a nomothetic 
methodology has been appropriate for the study. Referred to the research philosophy 
discussion, objectivism is the current research philosophical assumption. Therefore, a 
functionalist paradigm and deductive approach fits with the current research nature and 
philosophy. With reference to the objective ontological position of the current research, 
the quantitative research and survey technique was appropriate to test the developed 
hypotheses. 
 
The first three questions mentioned in chapter one have been answered by applying a 
descriptive analysis of mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting, timeliness of reporting 
and its categories in the annual reports of the listed companies over the period of the study. 
The results of the checklist, the research instrument, have been analysed by different 
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categories, in total and sector wise. To find out the answer to the fourth question, the study 
formulated a number of hypotheses based on agency theory, stakeholder theory and 
signalling theory, evidence from prior studies and on the basis of the legal framework of 
Bangladesh as discussed in chapter two. These hypotheses have been tested in the 
empirical section using GLS regression. For research question five, the results have been 
analysed year by year to outline how mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and 
timeliness of reporting practices evolved over time, and to highlight any significant 
difference using the Kruskal-Wallis test and Wilcoxon Matched-pairs Signed Rank test. 
 
9.3 Contribution to the Knowledge: 
The thesis is expected to contribute to corporate reporting from different perspectives. The 
study used panel data set to determine the quality of reporting which is very rare in 
previous literature and this is the first in the context of Bangladesh. In order to determine 
the extent and trend of reporting, the current study used self-structured checklists and 
measured the performance in total, category wise and sector wise. The study also identifies 
three different sets of determinants for three models and examined the determinants not 
just for the total, but for every single category over the examined period of time. The 
mandatory corporate reporting data set is classified in two categories, the total data set 
named as combined data and non financial data to examine the effects of determinants. 
Moreover, in voluntary reporting, the current study applied weighted and unweighted 
method of disclosure index. The study determined the timeliness of reporting through 
calculating audit lag, preliminary lag and total reporting lag from annual reports over the 
period of time.  
 
The thesis provides a comprehensive view of the previous studies that have discussed 
mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of reporting in developed and developing countries 
and especially in Bangladesh. It identifies different methods that are believed to contribute 
to the reduction of this existing gap in the literature relating to developing as well as 
developed countries. 
 
The study highlights the importance of employing a wider theoretical framework; by 
encompassing several disclosure theories; to obtain a fuller explanation of mandatory 
reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness. In addition it supports the notion of looking 
for theoretical explanations that are considered relevant to the topic being studied. 
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The study provides evidence that companies’ reporting policies change over time along 
with the regulatory changes. There was a significant increase in the level of reporting over 
time among the seven years and before and after the introduction of the Corporate 
Governance Code.  
 
The current study also provides evidence that explanatory variables vary among the 
categories of mandatory, voluntary and timeliness of reporting. 
 
The study provides a checklist of mandatory and voluntary reporting items in the context 
of Bangladesh, which can be used by interested parties to rank companies or assess their 
reporting practices. 
 
The results of the study can be generalised especially to other South Asian countries; 
emerging capital markets; countries which have voluntary reporting of social, 
environmental and sustainability information; countries which have similar institutional, 
legal and cultural factors; and with other panel data studies. 
 
9.4 Findings and Results: 
The study measures the quality of corporate financial reporting through mandatory 
reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of reporting. To determine the quality of 
reporting, the current study measures the extent of reporting as well as factors affecting 
such reporting practice. The examination of the extent and trend of mandatory disclosure 
level reveals that the total mandatory reporting level presents at 76.42% of the examined 
checklist items. These results also indicate that non-financial companies mean mandatory 
reporting is 75.03% which is considered a low level in comparison to the combined 
sample. The minimum score of mandatory reporting for all the years is still under 42.29%. 
On the other hand, the maximum score has not exceeded 93.85%. Moreover, the average 
mandatory reporting before the Corporate Governance Code was 72.86%, which is lower 
than the average after the Code which stands at 78.62%. It is also observed that highest 
mandatory reporting over the period of time was in the pharmaceuticals and chemical 
sectors followed by banks. On the other hand worst reporting pattern was found in the 
food & allied sector. 
 
The investigation of the extent and trend of voluntary reporting level reveals that the total 
voluntary reporting score over the seven years is about 28.56% (for un-weighted) and 
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22.94% (weighted) while the minimum reporting index obtained is 7.22% for the year 
2004 to 2007, and the maximum is 70.10% for the year 2009 and 2010. While there is a 
gradual increase in the average score after the Corporate Governance Code of 2006, this 
average suggests a low level of voluntary reporting. However, the increasing rate differs 
among the categories. Corporate social responsibility average reporting over the period is 
17.03% whereas corporate sustainability average reporting over the period is 14.33%. 
However, corporate environmental reporting is the least focused area of all the categories 
of voluntary reporting: here average reporting over the period is 4.21%.The highest 
voluntary reporting over the period of time is found in banks followed by financial 
institutions. On the other hand the worst voluntary reporting pattern is found in services 
and real estate, and tannery sectors. 
 
In case of timeliness, the extent and trend of reporting reveals that the average audit delay 
over the seven years is 110 days. This indicates that audit delay time is improving in 
Bangladesh which also applies to preliminary lag: around 128 days over the period of 
time. In the case of total reporting, the average lag is 170 days for the entire period with 
maximum mean delays observed in 2010 (551 days), 2007 (497 days), and 2008(449 
days). However, 3.36% of the sample companies are above the maximum time period of 
270 days; this indicates a low level of effectiveness of the regulations. The lowest average 
audit lag for the seven years is 69 days for financial institutions: the highest is 130 days for 
miscellaneous sectors. Total reporting lag is also highest in the miscellaneous sector and is 
lowest in the banking sector. 
 
Finally, the study identified the determinants of reporting through bivariate and 
multivariate analysis. In this study, correlation analysis is used to discover the degree of 
association between the dependent and independent variables. The correlation coefficient 
of both the Spearman correlation and the Pearson correlation, showed that the level of 
mandatory disclosure has a significant positive relationship with firm size, firm 
profitability (ROE), firm profitability (ROA) audit firm size and multinational parents: 
there is a significant negative association between leverage and mandatory reporting. On 
the other hand, firm ownership is identified as having a non-significant relationship with 
mandatory reporting.  
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Regarding voluntary disclosure, there is a significant positive relationship between total 
voluntary reporting and firm size, firm liquidity, audit committee, independent director 
percentage, board structure and board size. On the other hand, the number of independent 
directors in the board is identified as having a non-significant relationship with voluntary 
reporting. However, there is a significant negative association between market category, 
company age, and voluntary reporting.  
 
In the case of timeliness, there is a significant positive relationship of audit lag with 
earning and financial condition while, there is a significant negative association with firm 
size, audit firm size, financial year ending and industry categories. On the other hand, 
company age and audit opinion is identified as having a non-significant relationship with 
audit lag. In the case of preliminary audit lag the correlation coefficient represents a 
significant positive association with earning, financial condition and audit opinion. On the 
other hand, company age is identified to have a non-significant relationship with 
preliminary lag. There is a significant negative association between firm size, audit firm 
size, financial year ending and industry categories. Regarding total reporting lag, the 
correlation coefficient represents a significant positive association with earnings, financial 
condition and audit opinion. On the other hand, company age is identified as having a non-
significant relationship with reporting lag. However, there is a significant negative 
association between firm sizes, audit firm size, financial year ending and industry 
categories. 
 
In order to generalise the results of this study multivariate analysis was applied. The result 
of multivariate analysis, using GLS random effect with robust standard error, differed 
slightly from correlation analysis which revealed that the level of mandatory reporting has 
significant positive association with firm size, firm profitability (ROA), and firms’ 
multinational parents, while it has a significant negative association with firm ownership. 
However, there is a non-significant relationship between mandatory reporting and firm 
profitability (ROE), audit firm and industry category. 
 
Regarding voluntary reporting, using both weighted and unweighted data, total voluntary 
reporting has significant positive association with firm size, firm liquidity, percentage of 
independent directors and board structure, while it has significant negative association 
with market categories, company age and the number of independent directors. However, 
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there is a non-significant relationship of voluntary reporting with audit committee, and 
board size. 
 
In the case of timeliness, total reporting lag time has a significant positive association with 
earning, financial condition, company's age and industry classification, while it has a 
significant negative association with firm size and audit firm size. However, audit opinion 
type has a weak or non-significant association with total reporting lag time. Moreover, 
audit lag has significant positive association with financial condition, while it has negative 
association with firm size. In addition, earnings, audit firm size, financial year, company 
age, industry categories and audit opinion have weak or non-significant association with 
audit lag. In addition, preliminary lag has significant positive association with earnings, 
financial condition, company age, industry classification and audit opinion; whereas, firm 
size has significant negative association. However, audit firm size has weak or non-
significant association with preliminary lag time. 
 
9.5 Recommendations for Improving Reporting Quality: 
Based on the current reporting practice and research outcomes, some recommendations are 
suggested in relation to corporate reporting and disclosure practices in general, and within 
the Bangladeshi context in particular. These recommendations include: 
 
A new Company Act is supposed to be drafted and passed into law as part of broader 
reform to make the legal framework for corporate reporting more coherent and effective. It 
should draw on experience from the recent revision of the UK Companies Act, Acts in 
other countries, including Australia and India, as well as current SEC regulations. It also 
should make mandatory CSR, CFR and sustainability disclosure; it should make explicit, 
directors’ duties and responsibilities and improve shareholders’ rights; finally, it needs to 
revise the penalties for non compliance. 
 
The Registrar of Joint Stock should undergo comprehensive reform to fulfill its legal 
obligations. The independence and professionalism of boards should be enhanced. Current 
efforts to improve accounting and auditing should be accelerated, and the disclosure of 
corporate control improved. A number of steps should be taken to raise audit quality. 
Regular reviews of audits performed for listed companies should be introduced. This may 
be through reasonable limits placed on auditors performing non-audit services for their 
clients; a Financial Reporting Commission should also be established. 
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For better protection of investors, provisions on related party transaction should be 
significantly reinforced. The potential operations in which related parties are involved 
should be disclosed before they take place, together with the opinion of the audit 
committee on the operation.  
 
To improve the accounting profession’s status and reporting practices, and to provide 
guidance for companies in disclosing financial and non financial information, professional 
bodies  in Bangladesh and the BSEC should develop, adopt and update the standard for 
accounting and auditing which are suitable for Bangladesh. This standard should be in the 
Companies Act, SEC listing regulation or other legislation that organises businesses in 
Bangladesh and should include the requirement to ensure the quality of reporting by 
Bangladeshi companies. 
 
It is time to make it mandatory for all companies to publish corporate social reporting, 
environmental reporting and sustainability reporting. In this regard BSEC can circulate 
guidelines which may be easily updated from time to time. Disclosure should also be 
improved for directors’ and key executive remuneration, material risks and risk 
management policy, human resources and other material issues related to stakeholders. 
 
More company information, especially the contents of annual reports, should be available 
to investors online. One website—either the BSEC, Registrar of Joint Stock, one or both 
of the exchanges, or a newly created website—should have extensive information for all 
listed companies. BSEC or stock exchanges should also keep listed companies full annual 
reports either as a hard or soft copy, year by year for future use. A government task force 
should be constituted comprising of members from the concerned government agencies 
and the corporate sector, the accountancy profession and regulatory bodies, to propose and 
effect necessary legislative amendments for harmonisation of legal, fiscal and financial 
reporting practices.  
 
Corporate reporting and disclosure practices should be included in accounting education 
and accounting techniques. Accounting education in Bangladesh should take into 
consideration the country’s economic, social and political objectives. Moreover, the 
accounting program of Bangladeshi universities and colleges should be adapted in a way 
that includes the different role of accounting, different categories of reporting and 
disclosure in Bangladesh. The academics in the accounting field who work in Bangladeshi 
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universities and colleges can also affect the corporate reporting and disclosure practices in 
a country by carrying out research and entering into a dialogue with practitioners and 
official concerned. 
 
Many Asian countries have adopted governance guidelines and codes of best practice. 
Like these countries, Bangladesh has a Corporate Governance Code but now the 
government must take initiatives to implement it by necessary changes in the Companies 
Act. Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission (BSEC) needs to be strengthened 
so that it can devise and enforce a code for good CG. Strict implementation of accounting 
and auditing standards are very important. Government should introduce measures, or 
enhance existing measures, to provide non-controlling shareholders with adequate 
protection from exploitation by controlling shareholders through strengthening disclosure 
requirements, ensuring that regulators have the capacity to monitor companies and 
clarifying and strengthening the fiduciary duty of directors to act in the interest of the 
company and all of its shareholders.  
 
Public and private sector institutions should continue to raise awareness among 
companies, directors, shareholders and other interested parties of the value of good 
corporate reporting. Bangladesh has made little progress in raising awareness of the value 
of good corporate reporting. To achieving the desired framework in Bangladesh, requires 
not only a strong national commitment to corporate reporting, but one that is also broad 
based. Professional accountancy bodies like the ICAB should organize seminars and 
conferences on IAS/IFRS and ISA on a regular basis, for developing user and market 
awareness and familiarisation with the practical implementation aspects of these highly 
conceptualized standards.    
 
In Bangladesh, quality of financial reporting needs to be improved. This requires a robust 
regulatory regime and effective enforcement of the accounting and auditing standards. 
Bangladesh has taken important steps to improve corporate governance over the past few 
years. However, fully tapping the potential of capital markets and professionalising boards 
and management will require continued and sustained reform. 
 
9.6 Limitations of the Study: 
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Like all studies, the current study has some limitations that need to be acknowledged and 
addressed when assessing the findings of the study. This section summarises these 
limitations. 
 
The study focuses on the mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and timeliness of 
reporting practices in corporate annual reports. But, corporate disclosure can be done 
through other media such as corporate website and press release. Therefore the findings of 
this study must be interpreted in light of this limitation. One of the important justifications 
of choosing the annual report in the current study is related to the time horizon of the 
study. In Bangladesh website reporting is very limited and only in few cases is it possible 
to find previous years’ data. The study is considered to be longitudinal since it seeks to 
assess the reporting over the years: this is only possible through annual reports. 
 
The study developed a self constructed checklist to measure the extent of mandatory and 
voluntary reporting using the disclosure index technique. While a number of steps have 
been followed to lessen subjectivity in selecting information items to be included in the 
checklist (see section 5.6.1.1), it cannot be argued that the study is free from subjectivity. 
Further more, the study covers only seven years, and any conclusions drawn regarding 
long term trends must be viewed with caution. However, this period of time is better than 
most other studies, which tend to address only a single period. 
 
In this study an unweighted index has been used for mandatory reporting which implies 
equal importance of the selected information items. However, an unweighted approach 
seems to be appropriate and justified in this study for mandatory reporting as the study 
focuses on the annual report which has a general purpose, addresses all stakeholders not a 
specific type of information or user groups, and covers more than one year. 
 
On the basis of theory and the literature review, the study uses three different set of 
determinant of company characteristics, board characteristics and corporate governance   
characteristics for three models. However, other variables have been excluded from the 
current study due to data availability, for example, the qualification of accountants. 
 
The results and findings are based on one category of content analysis, dichotomous 
approach (0 and 1). Therefore, the same study could be applied using other types of 
content analysis, number of pages, number of sentences and number of words. However, a 
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dichotomous approach is more reliable and most of the previous study used this approach, 
which encourages the current study to use it. 
 
9.7 Scope of Future Research: 
The findings and the limitations of the study recommend some research opportunities 
related to disclosure literature. The following paragraphs present some scope for future 
research. 
 
Future research can investigate by adding more variables such as family members and 
foreign members of the board, cross listing, block holder ownerships, accountant quality, 
and cross directorship. Moreover, the relationship between voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure could be addressed. 
 
Future research can consider other media of reporting such as corporate web site 
advertising, promotional leaflets, press releases, discussions and meetings with financial 
analysts and journalists, and separate reports as well. In this regard the relationship of 
reporting between corporate annual reports and corporate websites would be examined. It 
may be interesting to investigate if both media have the same explanatory variables. 
 
A comparative study with developed and other developing countries in the South Asian 
region would be fruitful. Moreover, similar studies might be carried out in the context of 
other developing countries in order to identify both similarities and differences when 
compared with this study. It would be interesting if the study could compare between 
listed and non listed companies. 
 
A comprehensive longitudinal investigation over a longer time period might establish the 
trends of quality of reporting in Bangladesh using TOBIT, LOGIT and other data analysis. 
At the very least, though, future research can use the findings of this study as a baseline in 
order to judge trends. 
 
9.8 Conclusion: 
This chapter has discussed the findings of this study with respect to the research aims. 
Overall, the thesis has made a contribution in the area of corporate reporting and 
disclosure especially in mandatory reporting, voluntary reporting and the timeliness of 
reporting. The work has achieved its aims, has made policy recommendations and has 
identified issues for future research in the area. 
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S.N. General Disclosures Source(s) 
1 A brief description of the nature and principal activities of the company and its 
subsidiaries 
BAS 1(26); CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
2 The country of incorporation and the address of the registered office BAS 1 
3 Legal form of the enterprise. BAS 1 
4 Significant change in the nature of the entity’s operations BAS 1; CG Code 2006 
5 Names of the top employees, lines of authority and their remuneration CA 1994, U/S 36; SEC 1987, U/S 7 
6 Audited financial statements (balance sheet and profit and loss account) CA 1994, U/S 183(3) 
7  Auditor’s report. CA 1994, U/S 183(3) 
8 Report of the chairman or CEO CA 1994, U/S 184 
9 Balance Sheet CA 1994, U/S 183(1); SEC 1987, U/S 87(5); BAS 1 
10 Profit and Loss Account CA 1994, U/S 183(1); SEC 1987, U/S 87(5);BAS 1 
11 Statement of cash flows SEC 1987, U/S 12; BAS 1 
12 Retained Earnings Statement CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); BAS 1 
13 Gross profit for the year. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
14 Net profit for the year. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
15 Names and size of holdings of largest shareholders CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule X 
16  Significant changes in the company’s or its subsidiaries’ fixed assets SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
17 Fundamental accounting assumptions. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
18 The date when the financial statements were authorized for issue and who gave that BAS 10; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
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authorization 
19 Post-balance-sheet events SEC 1987, U/S 12(II) 
20 Discussion of major events which will influence next year’s results BAS 1 
21 A significant acquisition or disposal BAS 1; SEC 1996, U/S 36(2) 
22 Forecast of company performance BAS 1 
23 Review of its financial statements BAS 1 
24 Comparative information shall be disclosed in respect of the previous period BAS 1; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
25 Comparative balance sheet for two years SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
26 Method used to account for foreign currency transactions. BAS 21; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
27 The period covered by the financial statements; BAS 1, CA 1994, U/S 183(4) 
  Director’s Report  
28  The state of the company’s affairs CA 1994, U/S 184(1) 
29  Amount proposed to carry to any reserve CA 1994, U/S 184(1) 
30  Recommended dividend CA 1994, U/S 184(1); CG Code 2006 
31  Material changes and commitment affecting the financial position of the company CA 1994, U/S 184(1) 
32  Changes in the nature of the company’s business during the year CA 1994, U/S 184(2) 
33  Changes in the company’s subsidiaries or in the nature of their business CA 1994, U/S 184(2) 
34  Changes in the classes of business in which the company has an interest CA 1994, U/S 184(2) 
35  Explanation and information of every reservation, qualification, or adverse remark in 
the auditor’s report 
CA 1994, U/S 184(3) 
36 Number of Board Meeting and attendance CG Code 2006 
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  Balance Sheet Items  
37 The total carrying amount of inventories BAS 2; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); 
38 Classification of  Inventories BAS 1 
39  Inventory valuation method. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
40 Inventories carried at net-realizable value CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); 
41 Cash and cash equivalents BAS 1; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
42 The components of cash and cash equivalents should be disclosed and a 
reconciliation of the amounts. 
SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
43 Trade and other receivables BAS 1; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II); CA 1994, 
U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
44 Receivables analyzed by trade customers, members of the group, and related parties. BAS 1 
45 Additions/disposals/acquisitions/impairment losses of carrying amount of inventory BAS 2 
46 Advances and loans to staff or directors  CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
47 Advances recoverable in cash or in kind or for value to be received. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
48 Interest accrued on investment CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
49 Provision for provident fund scheme CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
50 Secured short-term and long term borrowings CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
51 Unsecured short-term and long term borrowings CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
52 Unpaid dividends CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
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Schedule (II) 
53 Provision for doubtful debts BAS 1, SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
54 Trade and other payables BAS 1 
55 A brief description of the nature and amount of the contingent assets/liabilities BAS 18; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
56 Provision for taxation CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
57 Provision for proposed dividends CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
58 Provision for gratuity CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
59 Provision for contingencies CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
60 Provision for insurance, pension, and similar staff-benefit schemes CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
61 Provision for liabilities CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
62 Deferred tax liabilities BAS 1 
63 Classification of assets and liabilities BAS 1; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
64 Aggregate value of intangible assets BAS 38; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
65 Breakup of intangible assets BAS 38; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
66 Aggregate amount of investments BAS 1; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
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67 Investment in subsidiary companies/associated companies/shares in other 
group/government securities 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1996, U/S 37 
68  Amount of accumulated depreciation on property, plant and equipment at the end of 
the period. 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
69  Current liabilities and its composition. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
70 Total fixed assets and its composition. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
71 Carrying amount of property plant and equipment individually and total BAS 16 
72 Measurement bases used for determining the gross carrying amount of property, 
plant, and equipment 
BAS 16 
73 Amount of the leasehold property BAS 17 
74 Expenditure upon development of property BAS 16 
75 Information about patents, trade marks, and designs CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
76 Original cost of each fixed asset. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
77 Additions to fixed assets during the year. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
78 Current assets and its composition. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
79 Details of advance and prepayments made. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); 
80 Details of bank overdraft (amount and bank). CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); 
81 Terms of repayment of long term debt. SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
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82 The rate of interest on long term loan SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
83 The amount of commitments for the acquisition of property, plant and equipment BAS 16, SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
84 The amount of goodwill/negative goodwill arising on the acquisition IFRS 3; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
85 The gross amount of depreciable assets and the related accumulated depreciation CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
86  Non-current interest-bearing liabilities CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
87 Long-term liabilities: secured loans, unsecured loans, inter-company loans, and loans 
from associated companies 
SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
88 The amount of borrowing costs capitalized during the period BAS 23 
 89 The capitalized rate used to determine the amount of borrowing costs eligible for 
capitalization 
BAS 23 
90  Share capital: authorized, issued, subscribed, called up and paid up BAS 1; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, 
U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
91 Assets acquired on hire purchase CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
92 Debts due to associated companies CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
93 maximum of debt due by directors or officers of the company CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I); SEC 1987, U/S 12 
Schedule (II) 
94 Debts due in less than 6 months and due in months or more CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
95 Restricted cash (Cash which is not available for use) CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
  Income Statement  
96 Sales/revenue, aggregate amount BAS 1; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
97 Amount of revenue in each significant category of revenue CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
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98 The cost of inventories sold during the period. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
99 Quantities of sales for each class of goods CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
100 Raw materials consumed CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
101 Finance costs BAS 1 
102 Share of results of jointly controlled entity and associates BAS 1 
103 Profit or loss from ordinary activities CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
104 Any exceptional or unusual credits or charges CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
105 Profit or loss arising from sale or disposal of fixed assets SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
106 Break up of income from investments CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
107 Remuneration paid to directors. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
108 Remuneration paid to Managing Director. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
109 Amount paid to auditors for audit services CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
110 Recognition and depreciation/amortization of tangible assets BAS 1 
111 Recognition and depreciation/amortization of intangible assets B AS 1 
112 The amount adjusted to net profit or loss due to change in accounting policy CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
113 The amount of the correction recognized in net profit or loss for the current period CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
114 The tax expense (income) related to profit or loss from ordinary activities BAS 1; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); BAS 12 
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115  The major components of tax expense (income) should be disclosed separately BAS 12 
116  Tax expense relating to extraordinary items BAS 12 
117 Brokerage and discount on sales other than the usual trade discounts CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
118 Amount set aside or provisions made for meeting specific liability, contingency, or 
commitment 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
119  Workmen and staff welfare expenses CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
120  Separate disclosure of staff remuneration not less than Tk. 36,000 CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
121  Commission or other remuneration payable separately to a managing agent or his 
associate 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
122 Disclosure of pension costs CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
123 Payment for gratuity CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
124  Expenditure in foreign currency on account for royalty, know-how professional 
consultation fees, interest, and other matters 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
125  Value of percentage of all imported and local raw materials, spare parts, and 
components consumed 
CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
126  Advertisement expenditure SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
127  Social security costs SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
128  Pension costs contribution plan CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
129  Contributions in excess of Tk. 50,000 made to government approved charities or 
other charities 
SEC 1996, U/S 37 
130  Basic and Diluted earnings per share BAS 33 
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131  Amount of depreciation for the current year. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
132  Interest on loans paid during the year. CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
133 Amount of foreign exchange earned on FOB basis CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
134 Spent in foreign exchange to procure management advisory services CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
135 Value of imports on CIF basis CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II) 
 Cash Flow Statement  
136 Presents its cash flows from operating, investing and financing activities BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
137 Cash flows arising from interest and dividends received and paid BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
138  Cash flows arising from taxes on income. BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
139 The aggregate cash flows arising from acquisitions and from disposals of subsidiaries BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
140 Disclose the components of cash and cash equivalents BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
141 Present a reconciliation of the amounts for cash and cash equivalents in its cash flow 
statement with the equivalent items reported in the B/S. 
BAS 7; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
  Structure of notes  
142 Basis of preparation of the financial statements and the  accounting policies used BAS 1 ; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
143 Mode of valuation of fixed assets. SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
144 A summary of significant accounting policies BAS 1 , CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
145  The reason and nature of a change in an accounting policy and estimates BAS 8 , CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
146 Statement of compliance with approved IASs BAS 1, CG Code 2006 
147 Basis of consolidation BAS 27 
 - 379 - 
148 Accounting policies adopted in measuring inventories, including cost formula used. BAS 2 
149 The accounting policies adopted for the recognition of revenues BAS 18 
150  Disclose firm policy for foreign currency risk management BAS 21 
151  Method of valuing goodwill SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
152 The methods used to account for investments in associates SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
153  Accounting policy for borrowing costs BAS 23 
154  Accounting policy for actuarial gains and losses BAS 19 
155  Method of depreciation. BAS 16; CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
156  Treatment of retirement benefits BAS 19 
157  Treatment of preliminary expenses SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
158  Methods of advance payments SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
159 Purchase policy SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
160 Sales policy SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
161  Deferred taxation system BAS 12 
162 Conversion or translation of foreign currencies BAS 21 
163 Treatment of contingent liabilities CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(I) 
164 Revaluation: basis; firm’s policy and the effective date CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II), SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
165 A description of the nature and purpose of each reserve BAS 1 
166 A description of the investment policies. BAS 26; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
  Others  
 - 380 - 
167  Number of shares hold by directors and members CG Code 2006; CA 1994, U/S 36 
168 A reconciliation of the number of shares outstanding at the beginning and at the end 
of the year 
BAS 1 
169 Par value per share, or that the share have no par value BAS 1 
170 The rights, preferences, and restrictions for each class of share including restrictions 
on dividends and the repayment of capital 
BAS 1; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
171  Shares in the enterprise held by the enterprise itself or by subsidiaries or associates 
of the enterprise 
BAS 1; SEC 1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II) 
172 If any shares or debentures have been issued, the number, class, and consideration 
received and the reason for the issue 
SEC 1996, U/S 37 
173 Information regarding the licensed capacity, installed capacity, and actual production CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 1987, U/S 
12 Schedule (II) 
174 Management structure and its system of internal financial reporting to the board of 
directors 
CG Code 2006 
175 Material changes and commitments, if any, that occurred after balance sheet date BAS 10; SEC 1996; U/S 37 
176 Number of nonresident shareholders SEC 1987 
177 Reconciliation between the carrying amount of each class of contributed equity and 
reserves at the beginning and end of period. 
BAS 1 
178 A distribution schedule of each class of equity security SEC 1996; U/S 37 
179 Information concerning provident fund/ gratuity fund/ superannuation benefits. BAS 19, CA 1994, U/S 185, Schedule XI(II); SEC 
1987, U/S 12 Schedule (II). 
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S.N. A. General Corporate Information Examples of disclosure studies/Sources 
1 Corporate  vision/mission /goal/objective  ACCA (2005), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
2 Brief history of the company Gray et al (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Hossain (2008). 
3 Corporate structure / chart Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al. (1995); Chau and Gray (2002); Eng and Mak (2003); 
Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et al. (2006), Patelli and Prencipe (2007), Lim et al. 
(2007) and Abdel- Fatah (2008). 
4 Description of major goods/services produced Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis 
and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Abdel- Fatah 
(2008). 
5 Information about company listed. Rouf (2011). 
6 Company’s contribution to the national economy GRI (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
7 Review of current financial results and discussion of 
major factors underlying performance. 
GRI (2006). 
 B. Corporate Strategic Information  
8 Statement of corporate strategy and objectives –
general and social 
Chow and Wong - Boren (1987), Ferguson et al.(2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and 
Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Leventis and Wetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), Barako et al. (2006), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
9 Impact of strategy on current performance Gray et al. (1995), Hossain (2008). 
10 Market share analysis Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Barako et al.(2006), Abdel-Fatah 
(2008) 
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11 Corporate policy and strategy for sustainable 
development  
ACCA (2005), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
12 Managing risks and uncertainties  Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Tsamenyi et 
al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah (2008). 
 C. Corporate Governance/Directors Information  
13 Name of principal shareholders Leventis and Weetman (2004), ACCA (2005), Hassan et al. (2006), Abdel-Fatah (2008). 
14 List of Directors Hossain et al. (1994), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et al. (2006), GRI (2006), UNEP-FI 
(2006),  Tsamenyi et  al. (2007), Abdel Fatah(2008). 
15 Outside affiliations of the directors Hossain (2008). 
16  Educational qualifications and experience of the 
directors 
Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), 
Abdel Fatah (2008). 
17  Position or office held by executive directors GRI (2006) , Sobhani et al.(2012). 
18  Other directorship held by executive directors Gray et al. (1995). 
19  Compensation policy of the directors Leventis and Weetman (2004), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah (2008). 
 D. Financial Information  
20 Sources(country/region) of revenue and their 
amount 
GRI (2006) ; Rouf (2011) 
21  Dividend payout policy Meek et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004),Abdel- 
Fatah(2008), Sobhani et al.(2012) 
22 Retained earnings/Owners equity policy GRI (2006). 
23 Foreign currency information/ policies Rouf(2011) 
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24  Intangible assets break-down and its amortization Rouf(2011) 
 E. Financial Review Information  
25  Liquidity ratios Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
26 Debt / equity ratio Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
27  Return on capital employed Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
28  Return on shareholders‘ equity Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
29 Return on assets Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
30  Net tangible assets per share Cooke (1989), Hossain et al. (1994), Suwaidan (1997), Ho and Wang (2001), Ferguson et al. 
(2002), Eng and Mak (2003), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Hassan et 
al. (2006), Tsamenyi et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
31  Dividend per ordinary share for the period Rouf (2011), Hassan et al. (2006). 
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32 Effects of inflation on future operations- qualitative Gray et al. (1995). 
33 Comparative financial growth with previous years Hossain et al. (1994), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Eng and Mak 
(2003), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Tsamenyi et al (2007), 
Abdel- Fatah  (2008). 
34 Infrastructural and institutional development  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
35  Graphic presentation of non- financial information Leventis and Weetman (2004), Abdel- Fatah (2008), Rouf (2011). 
36  Graphic presentation of financial information Leventis and Weetman (2004), Abdel- Fatah (2008), Rouf (2011). 
 F. Social Responsibility Information  
37 Information about employee welfare information GRI (2006). 
38 Information on safety measures Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Abdel-Fatah(2008).  
39 Information on community services Hossain et al. (1994), Meek et al. (1995), Ferguson et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), GRI 
(2006), Abdel Fatah(2008), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
40 Information about employee appreciation SAI (2002). 
41 Amount spent for CSR activities  GRI (2006) Ref. EN30, Sobhani et al.(2012).  
42 Commitment to societal development  GRI (2006) Ref. SO1, Sobhani et al.(2012).  
43 Formation of separate body for CSR activities  Sobhani et al. (2012). 
44 Poverty alleviation programs  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
45 Rural development programs Sobhani et al.(2012). 
46 Financial assistance for poor women and children Sobhani et  al.(2012). 
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47 Sponsoring sports and cultural functions  Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al.(1995), Ferguson et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel-Fatah 
(2008), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
48 Patronizing religious functions and activities  Sobhani et al. (2012). 
49 Sponsoring Education and health Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Ferguson et al. (2002),SAI(2002), Chau and Gray 
(2002), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman 
(2006), Abdel-Fatah(2008), Azim et al.(2011), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
50 Social awareness programs  UNEP-FI(2006),  Sobhani et al.(2012) 
51 Donation and subscription Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Ferguson et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel-
Fatah(2008). 
52 Employment and Advancement of minorities Azim et al. (2011). 
53 Employment of women Azim et al. (2011). 
54 Overtime provision with due benefits Sobhani et al. (2012). 
 G. Environmental Information  
55  Investing in energy projects and renewable energy GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
56  Information concerning energy consumption  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
57  Corporate environmental policies  EPFI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
58  Investing in waste recycling/treatment plant  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
59  Tree plantation programs  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
60 Environmental cost saving operations  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
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61  Issues concerning climate change  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
62  Environmental protection programs EPFI (2006), GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
63 Information concerning pollution control EPFI (2006), GRI (2006), Azim et al. (2011), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
64 Conservation of natural resources Hossain et al. (2006). 
65 Energy efficiency of products/services Azim et al. (2011). 
66  Environment friendly measures GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
67 Amount spent for environmental activities  GRI (2006). 
 H. Sustainability Information  
68 Category of employees by sex GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012) 
69  Average compensation per employee  GRI (2006). 
70  Number of employees trained Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel-Fatah( 2008) 
71  Competitor analysis- quantitative/qualitative Hossain et al. (1994), Haniffa and Cooke (2002), Barako et al. (2006), GRI (2006), Lim et al. 
(2007), Abdel-Fatah (2008). 
72  HRD plans and policies  Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al.(2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel- Fatah(2008), 
GRI (2006) Ref. LA11, Sobhani et al.(2012). 
73 Training employees through in-house programs  GRI (2006), Hossain et al. (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012) 
74 Information about employee turnover/growth   Sobhani et al. (2012). 
75 Appreciating employees for their efforts  SA1(2002), Sobhani et al.(2012) 
76  Healthy and safe workplace for staff  GRI (2006), Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Ghazali and 
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Weetman (2006), Abdel- Fatah(2008), Azim et al.(2011). 
77 Healthcare facilities for the employees  Meek et al. (1995), Gray et al. (1995), Chau and Gray (2002), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), 
Abdel- Fatah(2008), GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
78 Disclosing accident statistics  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
79 Provisions for maternity and paternity leaves  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
80 Disclosure on child labor or free from child labor  SAI (2002), GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
81 Appreciating customers for their support  GRI (2006), Sobhani et al.(2012). 
82 Policy on Employee training Hossain et al. (1994), Ferguson et al. (2002), Chau and Gray (2002), Haniffa and Cooke 
(2002), Leventis and Weetman (2004), Ghazali and Weetman (2006), Abdel- Fatah(2008). 
83  Future Forecast Information Barako et al. (2006). 
84  Market share forecast Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel-Fatah(2008), Rouf (2011). 
85  Future cash flow forecast SAI (2002), Gul and Leung (2004), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel-Fatah(2008), Rouf (2011). 
86  Revenue forecast Gul and Leung (2004), GRI (2006), Lim et al. (2007), Abdel- Fatah(2008), Rouf (2011). 
87  Profit forecast Gray et al. (1995), Barako et al. (2006), GRI (2006), Rouf (2011). 
88 Earnings per share forecast Barako et al. (2006), 
89 Factors that may affect future performance Barako et al. (2006), 
90 Planned capital expenditure Gul and Leung (2004), GRI (2006), Barako et al. (2006), Abdel-Fatah(2008). 
91 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure Rouf (2011). 
92 Operating income changes and explanations Rouf (2011). 
93 Gross profit changes and explanations Rouf (2011). 
94  Accounts receivables changes and explanations Rouf (2011). 
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95  Inventory changes and explanations Rouf (2011). 
96  Sales amount changes and explanations Rouf (2011). 
97 Amount spent for sustainability activities GRI (2006), Sobhani et al. (2012). 
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Appendix C: Descriptive Statistics of Total Mandatory Reporting and it Categories of 2004 to 2010 
 
 
 
 
  Mandatory General Director Balance 
Sheet 
Income 
Statement 
Cash 
Flow 
Structure Miscellaneous 
2004 Mean 0.7264 0.8631 0.6951 0.7114 0.6859 0.7154 0.6628 0.7389 
Minimum 0.4122 0.68 0 0.3542 0.3143 0.3333 0.2353 0.2222 
Maximum 0.9189 1 1 0.9583 0.9429 1 1 1 
2005 Mean 0.7307 0.8654 0.7063 0.7154 0.6885 0.7168 0.6705 0.7471 
Minimum 0.4122 0.68 0 0.3542 0.3143 0.3333 0.2353 0.2222 
Maximum 0.9257 1 1 0.9583 0.9429 1 1 1 
2006 Mean 0.7473 0.884 0.7543 0.7312 0.7034 0.7263 0.6626 0.7805 
Minimum 0.4145 0.6923 0 0.375 0.3143 0.3333 0.2222 0.2 
Maximum 0.9276 1 1 1 0.9429 1 1 1 
2007 Mean 0.7708 0.9097 0.8031 0.7565 0.7091 0.7344 0.7116 0.8336 
Minimum 0.4229 0.7037 0 0.4035 0.3 0.3333 0.2609 0.2308 
Maximum 0.92 1 1 0.8947 0.925 1 0.9565 1 
2008 Mean 0.7875 0.9226 0.8284 0.7699 0.7262 0.7385 0.7402 0.8505 
Minimum 0.4229 0.7407 0 0.4035 0.3 0.3333 0.2609 0.2308 
Maximum 0.9371 1 1 0.9123 0.925 1 1 1 
2009 Mean 0.7963 0.9338 0.841 0.7781 0.7341 0.7425 0.7494 0.8593 
Minimum 0.4229 0.7778 0 0.4035 0.3 0.3333 0.2609 0.2308 
Maximum 0.9371 1 1 0.9474 0.925 1 1 1 
2010 Mean 0.7901 0.9374 0.8437 0.7652 0.7384 0.7425 0.7265 0.863 
Minimum 0.4134 0.7778 0 0.3898 0.3 0.3333 0.24 0.2308 
Maximum 0.9385 1 1 0.9831 0.925 1 0.96 1 
Grand 
Total 
Mean 0.7642 0.9023 0.7817 0.7468 0.7122 0.7309 0.7034 0.8104 
Minimum 0.4122 0.68 0 0.3542 0.3 0.3333 0.2222 0.2 
Maximum 0.9385 1 1 1 0.9429 1 1 1 
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Appendix D: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Reporting and its Categories for Unweighted Data. 
 
 
 
 
Year Descriptive 
Statistics 
Voluntary General Corporate 
Strategic 
Corporate 
Governance 
Financial Financial  
Review 
Social 
Responsibility 
Environ- 
mental 
Sustain- 
ability 
2010 Mean 0.3227 0.8420 0.4472 0.5528 0.6033 0.5054 0.2416 0.0657 0.1672 
Minimum 0.0928 0.4286 0 0.1429 0.2000 0.0833 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.7010 1 1 1 1.4000 1 0.8889 0.6154 0.5333 
2009 Mean 0.3151 0.8386 0.4455 0.5470 0.6000 0.5047 0.2200 0.0575 0.1623 
Minimum 0.0928 0.4286 0 0.1429 0.2000 0.0833 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.7010 1 1 1 1 1 0.8889 0.6154 0.5333 
2008 Mean 0.3022 0.8293 0.4260 0.5296 0.5935 0.4973 0.1879 0.0513 0.1561 
Minimum 0.0928 0.4286 0 0.1429 0.2000 0.0833 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.6598 1 1 1 1.4000 1 0.8333 0.6154 0.4667 
2007 Mean 0.2854 0.8084 0.3837 0.5087 0.5854 0.4851 0.1599 0.0369 0.1480 
Minimum 0.0722 0.2857 0 0.1429 0.2000 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.6289 1 1 1 1.0000 1 0.8333 0.6154 0.4667 
2006 Mean 0.2701 0.7898 0.3285 0.4866 0.5756 0.4715 0.1454 0.0319 0.1358 
Minimum 0.0722 0.2857 0 0.1429 0.2000 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5773 1 1 1 1.0000 1 0.7778 0.5385 0.4000 
2005 Mean 0.2546 0.7712 0.2992 0.4762 0.5561 0.4641 0.1238 0.0269 0.1182 
Minimum 0.0722 0.2857 0 0.1429 0.2000 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5464 1 0.8000 1 1 1 0.7778 0.5385 0.3667 
2004 Mean 0.2492 0.7666 0.2943 0.4715 0.5512 0.4600 0.1134 0.0244 0.1133 
Minimum 0.0722 0.2857 0 0.1429 0.2000 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5361 1 0.800 1 1 1 0.7222 0.5385 0.3333 
Grand 
Total 
Mean 0.2856 0.8065 0.3749 0.5104 0.5803 0.4840 0.1703 0.0421 0.1430 
Minimum 0.0722 0.2857 0 0.1429 0.2000 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.7010 1 1 1 1.0000 1 0.8889 0.6154 0.5333 
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics of Voluntary Reporting and its Categories for Weighted Data. 
 
 
 
 
Year Descriptive 
Statistics 
Voluntary General Corporate 
Strategic 
Corporate 
Governance 
Financial Financial  
Review 
Social 
Responsibility 
Environ- 
mental 
Sustain- 
ability 
2010 Mean 0.2581 0.7006 0.3783 0.4155 0.4969 0.4276 0.1788 0.0499 0.1284 
Minimum 0.0767 0.3566 0 0.1071 0.1652 0.0705 0 0 0.0512 
Maximum 0.5521 0.8320 0.8460 0.8571 0.8260 0.8460 0.6578 .4677 0.4096 
2009 Mean 0.2524 0.6977 0.3769 0.4130 0.4969 0.4270 0.1628 0.0437 0.1247 
Minimum 0.0767 0.3566 0 0.1071 0.1652 0.0705 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5521 0.8320 0.8460 0.7500 0.9912 .8460 0.6578 0.4677 ..4096 
2008 Mean 0.2424 0.6900 0.3604 0.3972 0.4889 0.4207 0.1390 0.0390 0.11199 
Minimum 0.0757 0.3566 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5211 0.8320 0.8460 0.7500 0.8260 0.8460 0.6167 0.4677 0.3584 
2007 Mean 0.2293 0.6726 0.3246 0.3815 0.4822 0.4104 0.1183 0.0280 0.1136 
Minimum 0.0570 0.2377 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.4974 0.8320 0.8460 0.7500 0.8260 0.8460 0.6167 0.4677 0.3584 
2006 Mean 0.2172 0.6571 0.2779 0.3650 0.4714 0.3689 0.1076 0.0242 0.1043 
Minimum 0.0570 0.2377 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.4584 0.8320 0.8460 0.7500 0.8260 0.8460 0.5756 0.4092 0.3072 
2005 Mean 0.2052 0.6416 0.2531 0.3571 0.4593 0.3926 0.0916 0.0204 0.0970 
Minimum 0.0570 0.2377 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.4316 0.8320 0.6768 0.7500 0.8260 0.8460 0.5756 0.4092 0.2816 
2004 Mean 0.2010 0.6378 0.2490 0.3537 0.4553 0.3892 0.0839 0.0185 0.870 
Minimum 0.0570 0.2377 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.4250 0.8320 0.6768 0.7500 0.7500 0.8460 0.5344 0.4092 0.2560 
Grand 
Total 
Mean 0.2295 0.6710 0.3172 0.3829 0.478 0.4095 0.1260 0.320 0.1098 
Minimum 0.0570 0.2377 0 0.1071 0.1652 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 0.5521 0.8320 0.8460 0.8571 0.9912 0.8460 0.6578 0.4677 0.4096 
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Appendix F: Mandatory Scatter Plots 
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Appendix G: Voluntary Scatter Plots 
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Appendix H: Timeliness Scatter Plots 
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Appendix I: GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Mandatory Reporting 
 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
lasst 0.032609 .0038437 8.48 0.000 
roe -0.00206 .0027593 -0.75 0.456 
roa 0.002042 .000299 6.83 0.000 
auditfirm -0.00824 .0057445 -1.43 0.151 
multinatio~t 0.011124 .0038453 2.89 0.004 
ownerships -0.00591 .0021868 -2.70 0.007 
acidtestra~o -0.00187 .0010325 -1.81 0.070 
mktcata -0.0115 .0095606 -1.20 0.229 
age 0.000693 .0001333 5.20 0.000 
auditcommi~e 0.067768 .0096248 7.04 0.000 
indedirnum~r 0.005509 .0051433 1.07 0.284 
inddirperc~e 0.050446 .0172881 2.92 0.004 
roleduality 0.008251 .0016055 5.14 0.000 
boardsize -0.0000289 .0006221 -0.05 0.963 
signofearn~g -0.05432 .0124074 -4.38 0.000 
yend -0.00269 .0033295 -0.81 0.418 
indclassi 0.006322 .0025388 2.49 0.013 
modifiedop~n 0.019467 .00518 3.76 0.000 
_cons 0.427519 .0416291 10.27 0.000 
 
R-sq:   within  = 0.3216                         
           between = 0.9680                                       
           overall = 0.3793                                         
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
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Appendix J: GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Voluntary Reporting 
 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Err. Z P>|z| 
lasst 0.099067 0.0053564 18.50 0.000 
roe 0.00282 0.0018018 1.56 0.169 
roa 0.000898 0.0006463 1.39 0.214 
auditfirm -0.00709 0.0055842 -1.27 0.251 
multinatio~t 0.086554 0.0039789 21.75 0.000 
ownerships 0.006403 0.0025363 2.52 0.045 
acidtestra~o 0.002336 0.0019764 1.18 0.282 
mktcata -0.0037 0.0036763 -1.01 0.354 
age -0.00141 0.0000966 -14.63 0.000 
auditcommi~e -0.04081 0.0195487 -2.09 0.082 
indedirnum~r -0.03383 0.0059484 -5.69 0.001 
inddirperc~e 0.145752 0.0227583 6.40 0.001 
roleduality 0.008315 0.0018599 4.47 0.004 
boardsize -0.0021 0.0005554 -3.78 0.009 
signofearn~g -0.03698 0.0103504 -3.57 0.012 
yend 0.012135 0.0094093 1.29 0.245 
indclassi 0.049628 0.0039093 12.69 0.000 
modifiedop~n 0.017424 0.0088448 1.97 0.096 
_cons -0.63149 0.0456445 -13.83 0.000 
 
R-sq:     within  = 0.6675                        
              between = 0.8713                                
              overall = 0.6621                                    
 
 
 
 
 
Random-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
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Appendix K: GLS Regression Using Robust Standard Error for Timeliness Reporting 
 
 Coefficient Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
lasst -6.299 1.675 -3.76 0.009 
roe 1.856 1.623 1.14 0.296 
roa -0.388 0.389 -1 0.357 
auditfirm 0.264 3.519 0.07 0.943 
multinatio~t -16.849 3.022 -5.58 0.001 
ownerships -6.121 1.519 -4.03 0.007 
acidtestra~o -0.545 0.715 -0.76 0.475 
mktcata 22.912 4.027 5.69 0.001 
age 1.007 0.187 5.37 0.002 
auditcommi~e -11.834 7.023 -1.69 0.143 
indedirnum~r -0.779 2.126 -0.37 0.727 
inddirperc~e -7.306 12.307 -0.59 0.574 
roleduality 0.616 2.349 0.26 0.802 
boardsize 2.422 0.318 7.61 0 
signofearn~g 12.263 6.973 1.76 0.129 
yend 6.139 5.419 1.13 0.3 
indclassi -22.296 6.726 -3.32 0.016 
modifiedop~n 4.259885 6.282 0.69 0.493 
_cons 165.4166 15.961 10.34 0.000 
 
R-sq:       within  = 0.1924                         
                between = 0.8987                                         
                overall = 0.1776                                        
 
 
 
 
 
Fixed-effects GLS regression Number of observation = 861 
Group variable: year Number of groups = 7 
Observation per group: Minimum =123;    Average = 123  ; Maximum = 123 
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Appendix L: Name of the Sample Companies 
 
Serial Name of the Company Serial Name of the Company 
1 AB Bank Limited 36 Bangladesh lamps 
2 Al Arafah Bank 37 BD Thai Aluminium 
3 Bank Asia 38 Kay and Kue 
4 The city Bank 39 National Polymer 
5 Dhaka Bank 40 National Tubes 
6 Dutch Bangla Bank 41 Quasem Drycell 
7 Eastern Bank 42 Rangpur Foundry Ltd 
8 EXIM bank 43 Singer Bangladesh 
9 ICB Bank 44 IDLC 
10 IFIC Bank 45 United Leasing  
11 Mercantile Bank ltd 46 Uttara Finance 
12 Mutual Trust Bank 47 AMCL pran 
13 National Bank Ltd 48 Apex Foods 
14 NCC bank 49 BATBC 
15 One Bank Ltd 50 Gemini Sea Food 
16 Prime Bank Ltd 51 National Tea 
17 Pubali Bank 52 Rahima Food 
18 Rupali Bank LtD 53 Shyampur Sugar Mills 
19 Shahajalal Islami Bank 54 Alpha Tobaco Man. Ltd 
20 Social Investment Bank ltd 55 BOC 
21 Southeast Bank Ltd 56 Agrani Insurance Co. Ltd. 
22 Standard Bank Ltd 57 BGIC 
23 Trust Bank Ltd 58 Central Insurance 
24 United Commercial Bank Ltd 59 Eastern Insurance  
25 Aramit Cement 60 Eastland Insurance 
26 Confidence Cement 61 Federal Insurance 
27 Hidelberg Cement 62 Green Delta Insurance 
28 Lafarge Surma cement 63 Janata Insurance 
29 Megna Cement 64 Mercantile Insurance Ltd 
30 Fu-wang Ceramic 65 National Life Insurance 
31 Monno Ceramic 66 Peoples Insurance 
32 Standard Ceramic Ltd 67 Phoenix Insurance 
33 Abtab Automobiles 68 Poineer Insurance 
34 Anwar Galvanizing Limited 69 Pragati Insurance 
35 Aziz pipes 70 Prime Insurance 
71 Purabi Insurance 98 Bata Shoe 
72 Reliance Insurance 99 Samata leather 
73 Rupali Insurance Ltd 100 Alltex industries 
74 Sandhani Life Insurance 101 Anlima Yarn Dying 
75 United Insurance 102 Apex Spinning and Knitting 
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76 Agni System 103 Bextex 
77 Bd com Online 104 Delta Spinners 
78 Intech Online 105 Desh Garments 
79 Information Service Network 106 Dulamiya Cotton 
80 Jute Spinners 107 HR Textiles 
81 Northern Jute 108 Metro Spinning Mills 
82 Hakkani Pulp & Paper  109 Mithun Knitting and Dyeing 
83 ACI Limited 110 Rahim Textile 
84 Ambee Pharma 111 Safko Spinning 
85 Beximco pharmaceuticals 112 Saiham Textile 
86 Beximco Synthetics 113 Square Textiles 
87 Glaxo Smithkline  114 Stayle Craft 
88 IBN Sina Pharma 115 Tallu Spinning 
89 Immam Button 116 Bangladesh Services Ltd 
90 Libra Infusion 117 Aramit Limited 
91 Reckitt Benckiser 118 BEXIMCO 
92 Renata Limited 119 Bangladesh Shipping Corporation 
93 Square Pharma 120 GQ Ball pen 
94 Eastern Housing Ltd 121 Miracle Industries 
95 Samorita Hospital 122 Savar Refactories 
96  Apex Adelchi Footwear Ltd.  123 Sinobangla Industries 
97 Apex Tannery     
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Appendix M: Penalty for Non Compliance over the Period 
 
N
o
n
 c
o
m
p
li
a
n
ce
  
 
                 Categories 
Year 
2
0
1
0
-1
1
 
2
0
0
9
-1
0
 
2
0
0
8
-0
9
 
2
0
0
7
-0
8
 
2
0
0
6
-0
7
 
2
0
0
5
-0
6
 
2
0
0
4
-0
5
 
P
en
al
ty
 
Failure to submit the audited financial 
statements 
4 25 9  
 
 
    
42 
 
 
 
    
32 
 
 
 
7 
1 
Failure to submit the half-yearly 
financial statements  
9 16 13 4 
Failure to comply with securities 
related laws  
12 6 1 8 
Non-submission of Capital & 
Shareholding Position 
14 16 25  
Non-compliance of 
Directive/Notification/Order 
3 5 3 1 
Accurate and transparent information 
not reflected in the audited financial 
statements 
3 17 1  
W
ar
n
in
g
 
Failure to submit the audited financial 
statements 
4 3 25  
 
   68 
 
 
117 
 
 
  18 
 
 
36 Failure to submit the half-yearly 
financial statements  
2 22 7 
Failure to comply with securities 
related laws  
18 31 24 
Non-compliance of 
Directive/Notification/Order 
9 5 5 
 Total 78 146 113 108 149 25 60 
Sources: Complied from SEC annual report from 2004/05 to 2010/2011. 
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Appendix N: Basic Information about Respondents 
 
Gender 
Serial No. Categories Percentage 
1 Male 65% 
2 Female 35% 
 Total 100% 
Highest Educational Qualification 
Serial No. Categories Percentage 
1 Less than Bachelor Degree 3% 
2 Bachelor Degree 12% 
3 Masters Degree 47% 
4 PhD(or equivalent) 12% 
5 Professional Qualification 15% 
6 Others, please specify 12% 
 Total 100% 
Age Range 
Serial No. Categories Percentage 
1 20 to 30 Years 44% 
2 30 to 40 Years 50% 
3 40 to 50 Years 3% 
4 Above 50 Years 3% 
 Total 100% 
Work Experience 
Serial No. Categories Percentage 
1 Less than 5 Years 52% 
2 5 to 10 Years 32% 
3 10 to 15 Years 9% 
4 15 to 20 Years 4% 
5 Above 20 Years 3% 
 Total 100% 
Profession 
Serial No. Categories Percentage 
1 Accountant 18% 
2 Financial Analyst 3% 
3 Researchers 6% 
4 Academician 26% 
5 Students 29% 
6 Other Users 18% 
 Total 100% 
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S.N. A. General Corporate Information Weight 
1 Corporate  vision/mission /goal/objective  
0.8588 
2 Brief history of the company 
0.8000 
3 Corporate structure / chart 
0.7806 
4 Description of major goods/services produced 
0.8606 
5 Information about company listed. 
0.8182 
6 Company’s contribution to the national economy 
0.8121 
7 Review of current financial results and discussion of major factors  
underlying performance. 
0.9000 
 B. Corporate Strategic Information  
8 Statement of corporate strategy and objectives –general and social 
0.8000 
9 Impact of strategy on current performance 
0.8727 
10 Market share analysis 
0.8471 
11 Corporate policy and strategy for sustainable development  
0.8471 
12 Managing risks and uncertainties  
0.8606 
 C. Corporate Governance/Directors Information  
13 Name of principal shareholders 
0.7333 
14 List of Directors 
0.7939 
15 Outside affiliations of the directors 
0.7273 
16  Educational qualifications and experience of the directors 
0.7818 
17  Position or office held by executive directors 
0.7813 
18  Other directorship held by executive directors 
0.7125 
19  Compensation policy of the directors 
0.7250 
 D. Financial Information  
20 Sources(country/region) of revenue and their amount 
0.9000 
21  Dividend payout policy 
0.8824 
22 Retained earnings/Owners equity policy 
0.8444 
23 Foreign currency information/ policies 
0.7611 
24  Intangible assets break-down and its amortization 
0.7421 
 E. Financial Review Information  
25  Liquidity ratios 
0.9235 
26 Debt / equity ratio 
0.9152 
Appendix O: Voluntary Disclosure Checklist Items and their weight 
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27  Return on capital employed 
0.8941 
28  Return on shareholders‘ equity 
0.8824 
29 Return on assets 
0.9000 
30  Net tangible assets per share 
0.8313 
31  Dividend per ordinary share for the period 
0.8882 
32 Effects of inflation on future operations- qualitative 
0.8118 
33 Comparative financial growth with previous years 
0.8765 
34 Infrastructural and institutional development  
0.7706 
35  Graphic presentation of non- financial information 
0.7097 
36  Graphic presentation of financial information 
0.7515 
 F. Social Responsibility Information  
37 Information about employee welfare information 
0.7818 
38 Information on safety measures 
0.8294 
39 Information on community services 
0.7118 
40 Information about employee appreciation 
0.6824 
41 Amount spent for CSR activities  
0.8294 
42 Commitment to societal development  
0.7765 
43 Formation of separate body for CSR activities  
0.7235 
44 Poverty alleviation programs  
0.7294 
45 Rural development programs 
0.7235 
46 Financial assistance for poor women and children 
0.7235 
47 Sponsoring sports and cultural functions  
0.6848 
48 Patronizing religious functions and activities  
0.6606 
49 Sponsoring Education and health 
0.7706 
50 Social awareness programs  
0.7706 
51 Donation and subscription 
0.7176 
52 Employment and Advancement of minorities 
0.7118 
53 Employment of women 
0.7500 
54 Overtime provision with due benefits 
0.7500 
 G. Environmental Information 
 
55  Investing in energy projects and renewable energy 
0.7939 
56  Information concerning energy consumption  
0.7500 
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57  Corporate environmental policies  
0.8063 
58  Investing in waste recycling/treatment plant  
0.7697 
59  Tree plantation programs  
0.7063 
60 Environmental cost saving operations  
0.7333 
61  Issues concerning climate change  
0.7697 
62  Environmental protection programs 
0.7818 
63 Information concerning pollution control 
0.7879 
64 Conservation of natural resources 
0.7212 
65 Energy efficiency of products/services 
0.7273 
66  Environment friendly measures 
0.7939 
67 Amount spent for environmental activities  
0.7313 
 H. Sustainability Information  
68 Category of employees by sex 
0.5133 
69  Average compensation per employee  
0.6813 
70  Number of employees trained 
0.7235 
71  Competitor analysis- quantitative/qualitative 
0.7438 
72  HRD plans and policies  
0.7353 
73 Training employees through in-house programs  
0.6882 
74 Information about employee turnover/growth  
0.7576 
75 Appreciating employees for their efforts  
0.7118 
76  Healthy and safe workplace for staff  
0.7697 
77 Healthcare facilities for the employees  
0.7576 
78 Disclosing accident statistics  
0.6500 
79 Provisions for maternity and paternity leaves  
0.7438 
80 Disclosure on child labor or free from child labor  
0.8125 
81 Appreciating customers for their support  
0.7375 
82 Policy on Employee training 
0.6970 
83  Future Forecast Information 
0.7879 
84  Market share forecast 
0.8727 
85  Future cash flow forecast 
0.8424 
86  Revenue forecast 
0.8688 
87  Profit forecast 
0.8848 
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88 Earnings per share forecast 
0.8727 
89 Factors that may affect future performance 
0.8303 
90 Planned capital expenditure 
0.8182 
91 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure 
0.7212 
92 Operating income changes and explanations 
0.8000 
93 Gross profit changes and explanations 
0.8061 
94  Accounts receivables changes and explanations 
0.8061 
95  Inventory changes and explanations 
0.7879 
96  Sales amount changes and explanations 
0.8118 
97 Amount spent for sustainability activities 
0.7879 
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Appendix P: Questionnaire Survey of Voluntary Reporting 
 
 
 
 
 
Questionnaire Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
Quality of Corporate Financial Reporting: 
 A Longitudinal Study of the Listed Companies in Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Durham University Business School 
 Elvet Hill Road 
Durham DH1 3LB, UK 
 
 
Supervised by: 
Professor Rob Dixon, BA, MA  
Dean of Business School 
Telephone: 45382 (GL), 45408 (UC) 
Email at: robert.dixon@durham.ac.uk 
Dr Amir Michael, BSc, MBA, PhD 
Senior Teaching Fellow in Accounting 
Telephone: GL 45129 QC 40222 
Email:  a.e.iskander@durham.ac.uk 
Mr. Sumon Das  
PhD student  
Department of Accounting and Finance 
Durham University Business School 
Tel. 07440153543 (Mobile)  
Email: sumon.das@durham.ac.uk   
           sdas1207@yahoo.com 
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Date: January, 2013 
 
 
Dear Sir 
 
Quality of Corporate Financial Reporting:  A Longitudinal Study of the Listed 
Companies in Bangladesh 
 
I am writing to ask for your help with a research study I am carrying out for my PhD degree 
at the University of Durham, UK. You have been selected as a member of the sample to 
receive a copy of the questionnaire that is an important part of my research. Your prompt 
responds of the questionnaire, which should take only 10-15 minutes to complete, would be 
greatly appreciated. 
 
I would like to assure you that all responses will be kept confidential and used only for 
academic purposes. If you have any questions about the research, please do not hesitate to 
contact me or my supervisors, Professor Rob Dixon and Dr. Amir Michael. 
 
Thank you very much in advance for your assistance and kind co-operation. I am looking 
forward to receiving your highly valued responses and comments. 
 
Yours faithfully 
 
 
Mr. Sumon Das  
PhD student  
Department of Accounting and Finance 
Durham University Business School 
Tel. 07440153543 (Mobile)  
Email: sumon.das@dur.ac.uk   
           sdas1207@yahoo.com 
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Part One: Voluntary Disclosure Items in the Annual Reports  
Please give your opinion on how important you think the following items in the annual 
report. To answer the question in this part, please tick (only one in each row) the number that 
indicate your answer. The objective is to obtain your opinion on the importance of these 
items in general which Bangladeshi listed companies should disclose for producing annual 
financial reports. 
 
1 = Very Little Important, 2 = Little Important, 3 = Moderate Important, 4 = Important, 
5 = Very Important. 
N/R=Not Relevant, If you think any of the following voluntary disclosure is not relevant to 
Bangladesh. 
 
S.N. A. General Corporate Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
1 Corporate sustainability vision/mission /goal/objective        
2 Brief history of the company       
3 Corporate structure / chart       
4 Description of major goods/services produced       
5 Stock exchanges on which company listed       
6 Company’s contribution to the national economy       
7 Review of current financial results and discussion of major factors underlying 
performance. 
      
 B. Corporate Strategic Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
8 Statement of corporate strategy and objectives –general and social       
9  Impact of strategy on current performance       
10 Market share analysis       
11 Corporate policy and strategy for sustainable development        
12 Managing risks and uncertainties        
 C. Corporate Governance/Directors Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
13 Name of principal shareholders       
14 List of Directors       
15 Outside affiliations of the directors       
16  Educational qualifications and experience of the directors       
17  Position or office held by executive directors       
18  Other directorship held by executive directors       
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19  Compensation policy of the directors       
 D. Financial Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
20  Amount and sources of revenue       
21  Dividend payout policy       
22 Retained earnings       
23 Foreign currency information       
24  Intangible assets break-down and its amortization policies       
 E. Financial Review Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
25  Liquidity ratios       
26 Debt / equity ratio       
27  Return on capital employed       
28  Return on shareholders‘ equity       
29 Return on assets       
30  Net tangible assets per share       
31  Dividend per ordinary share for the period       
32 Effects of inflation on future operations- qualitative       
33 Comparative financial growth with previous years       
34 Infrastructural and institutional development        
35  Graphic presentation of non- financial information       
36  Graphic presentation of financial information       
 F. Social Responsibility Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
37 Information about employee welfare information       
38 Information on safety measures       
39 Information on community services       
40 Information about employee appreciation       
41 Amount spent for CSR activities        
42 Commitment to societal development        
43 Contribution of separate body to CSR activities        
44 Poverty alleviation programs        
45  Rural development programs       
46 Financial assistance for poor women and children       
47 Sponsoring sports and cultural functions        
48 Patronizing religious functions and activities        
49 Sponsoring Education and Health       
50 Social awareness programs        
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51 Donation and subscription       
52 Employment and Advancement of minorities       
53 Employment of women       
54  Overtime provision with due benefits       
 G. Environmental Information       
55  Investing in energy projects and renewable energy       
56  Information concerning energy consumption        
57  Corporate environmental policies        
58  Investing in waste recycling/treatment plant        
59  Tree plantation programs        
60 Environmental cost saving operations        
61  Issues concerning climate change        
62  Environmental protection programs       
63 Information concerning pollution control       
64 Conservation of natural resources       
65 Energy efficiency of products/services       
66  Environment friendly measures       
67 Amount spent for environmental activities        
 H. Sustainability Information 1 2 3 4 5 N/R 
68 Category of employees by sex       
69  Average compensation per employee        
70  Number of employees trained       
71  Competitor analysis- quantitative/qualitative       
72  HRD plans and policies        
73 Training employees through in-house programs        
74 Information about employee turnover/growth        
75 Appreciating employees for their efforts        
76  Healthy and safe workplace for staff        
77 Healthcare facilities for the employees        
78 Disclosing accident statistics        
79 Provisions for maternity and paternity leaves        
80 Disclosure on child labor or free from child labor        
81 Appreciating customers for their support        
82  Policy on Employee training       
83  Future Forecast Information       
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84  Market share forecast       
85  Future cash flow forecast       
86  Revenue forecast       
87  Profit forecast       
88 Earnings per share forecast       
89 Factors that may affect future performance       
90 Planned capital expenditure       
91 Planned advertising and publicity expenditure       
92 Operating income changes and explanations       
93 Gross profit changes and explanations       
94  Accounts receivables changes and explanations       
95  Inventory changes and explanations       
96  Sales amount changes and explanations       
97 Amount spent for sustainability activities       
Part Two: To answer the relevant questions in this part, please tick or circle the numbers that 
indicate your answer, or write in the appropriate answer. 
 
1. Gender: Male                      Female 
 
2. Highest educational qualification: 
a) Less than bachelor degree   
b) Bachelor degree 
c) Masters degree 
d) PhD (or equivalent) 
e) Professional Qualification 
f) Other, please specify ………………………................. 
3. Age Range: 
         a) 20 - Below 30                  
          b) 30 - Below 40 
          c) 40 - Below 50 
          d) Above 50 
4. Work Experience: 
 a) None   
 b) Below 5 years 
 c) 5-10 years 
d)10 - 15 years 
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e) 15 - 20 years 
f) Above 20 years 
5) Profession: 
a) Accountant 
b) Financial Analyst 
c) Researchers 
d) Academician 
e) Students 
f) Others 
 
Thank you for taking the time to complete the questionnaire. If you have any comments you 
think might be appropriate to this questionnaire, please do not hesitate to add them here: 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
…………………. 
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Summary of Mandatory Reporting in Developed Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Dependent Variable Independent Variable Findings 
Cerf (1961) United 
States 
527 companies. Disclosure Index, 31 
items. 
Corporate size, listing 
status, profitability.  
Corporate size and listing status has positive 
association with reporting but not with 
profitability. 
Wallace et al. 
(1994) 
Spain 50 non 
financial firms, 
1991. 
Unweighted (equal 
weight/dichotomous) 
disclosure index. 
Company size, 
profitability, listing status, 
industry, liquidity, audit 
firm, gearing ratio and 
earning ratio. 
Firm size and stock exchange listing has 
positive significant while liquidity has 
significant negative association. The remaining 
five firm characteristics were found not to be 
associated significantly. 
Glaum and 
Street (2003) 
Germany 100 firms, 
2000. 
Unweighted (equal 
weight/dichotomous) 
disclosure Index. 
Company size, industry 
type, profitability, 
multinational, domicile, 
maturity, growth, growth 
options, choice, ownership 
structure, country and 
listing. 
Average compliance level is significantly lower 
for companies that apply IAS as compared to 
companies applying US GAAP. Level of 
compliance with IAS and US GAAP disclosures 
is positively related to firms being audited by 
Big 5 auditing firms, audit opinion and to cross-
listings on US exchanges.  
Owusu-Ansah 
and Yeoh 
(2005) 
New 
Zealand. 
1992-93 and 
1996-1997, 
200 
Mandatory disclosure  
compliance level. 
Size, age, liquidity, 
profitability, management 
equity holding, auditor 
The findings indicate that corporate compliance 
levels in the post-FRA period are statistically 
higher than those in the pre-FRA period.  
Appendix Q: Summary Table of Literature Review 
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observations type, industry type. 
Fekete et al. 
(2008) 
Hungary 17 companies, 
2006 
IFRS disclosure 
requirements, IFRS 3, 
IAS 27, IAS 28 and 
IAS 31. 
Corporate size, industry, 
profitability, leverage, 
auditor type, listing status, 
international visibility and 
industry. 
Corporate size and industry type are statistically 
associated with the extent of compliance with 
IFRS disclosure requirements. 
Kent and 
Stewart (2008) 
Australia 965 companies, 
2004. 
Disclosure and 
corporate governance 
quality. 
Board independence, audit 
committee, size, intangible 
asset, tax losses, 
geographical segments and 
industry. 
Corporate disclosure quality is positively related 
to board size and audit firm size; on the other 
hand, there is no relation between board 
committee independence and corporate 
mandatory disclosure. 
Apostolos and 
Nanopoulos 
(2009) 
Greece All listed 
manufacturing 
and 
construction 
companies, 
2004. 
Company 
characteristics and 
corporate governance. 
Board of Directors, 
profitability and number of 
common shares. 
The key factors associated with the levels of 
compliance with IAS's include the composition 
of the board of directors, profitability and the 
number of common shares. 
Galani et al. 
(2011) 
Greek 43 listed 
companies, 
2009. 
Firm Characteristics 
and Mandatory 
Disclosure. 
Size, age, profitability, and 
industry type. 
The findings also indicate that firm size was 
significant positively associated with the level of 
mandatory disclosure while age, profitability, 
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industry type were found to be non-significant. 
Matocsy et al. 
(2012) 
Australia 450 firms, 
2006-2007. 
Corporate mandatory 
disclosure and board 
composition. 
Board Characteristics. They find that there is no relationship between 
board composition and different types of 
continuous disclosure. 
Summary of Mandatory Reporting in Developing Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Dependent Variable Independent Variable Findings 
Wallace 
(1988) 
Nigeria 47 companies 
1982 - 1986. 
Extent and level of 
reporting. 
!85 items of disclosure 
index. Weighted   and un-
weighted disclosure index. 
Poor compliance with the disclosure 
requirements of Nigerian reporting, and the 
relatively low importance attached to the needs 
of the users. 
Benjamin et 
al. (1990) 
Hong Kong 76 companies. Compliance of 
mandatory items. 
10 items of disclosure 
index. 
They found a significant association between the 
extent of size, non-compliance and company 
size, and no relationship with the size of 
company's audit firms and business type. 
Wallace and 
Naser (1995) 
Hong Kong 80 companies, 
Between 1988 
and 1992. 
Comprehensiveness 
of the mandatory 
information. 
Foreign registration, profit 
margin, earnings return, 
liquidity, market 
capitalization, proportion 
of equity shares and 
leverage. 
Total assets, profit margin, type of  independent 
auditor, and scope of business contributed in 
variation of disclosure where as market 
capitalization, liquidity ratios, earnings return on 
equity, and outside shareholders' interests are 
less useful. 
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Xiao (1999) China 13 listed 
companies. 
Corporate disclosure 
compliance. 
Descriptive analysis of 10 
categories information. 
The general level of compliance is satisfactory 
in the sample. 
Samuel 
Sejjaaka 
(2003) 
Uganda 43, Financial 
institutions, 
2001 
IAS disclosure 
requirements 
compliance. 
Auditor type, size, age, 
MNC status, leverage, 
return on equity, and 
liquidity.  
 
The findings showed that there is a significant 
correlation between relative mandatory scores 
and auditor type, MNC status, size and age 
while leverage, return on equity and liquidity is 
found not to be significant.  
Ali et al. 
(2004) 
India, 
Pakistan 
and 
Bangladesh 
566 non 
financial 
companies, 
1998 
level of compliance 
with disclosure 
requirements. 
Size, financial leverage, 
MNC, corporation, size of 
audit firm, and firm's 
profitability. 
Compliance levels are found to be positively 
related to company size, profitability and 
multinational-company status, and unrelated to 
leverage and the quality of external auditors. 
Hassan et al. 
(2006) 
Egypt 77 non-
financial 
companies, 
1995-2002. 
Extent and 
determinants of 
disclosure. 
Firm size, gearing, 
profitability, stock activity. 
More profitable companies disclose more 
information than less profitable ones. Results for 
firm size, gearing and stock activity are mixed. 
Aljifri (2008) UAE 31 listed firms, 
2003. 
Extent of disclosure 
in annual reports. 
Size, debt equity ratio, and 
profitability. 
Significant differences are found among sectors; 
however, the size, the debt equity ratio, and the 
profitability were found to have insignificant 
association with the level of disclosure. 
Al-Akra et al. Jordan  80 matched Mandatory disclosure Market capitalisation, Mandatory disclosure compliance has 
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(2010) pairs of non -
financial 
companies, 
1996 and 2004. 
compliance. leverage, auditor type, 
audit committee, size of 
the board, liquidity, 
ownership, non executive 
director and gearing ratio. 
significantly increased through the time period 
of the study. Two company attributes appeared 
to influence disclosure compliance: market 
capitalization and long-term leverage. 
Gao and Kling 
(2012) 
China 8864 
observations, 
2001-07. 
Corporate governance 
and audit on 
compliance to 
mandatory disclosure. 
Board size, CEO salary, 
CEO duality and external 
governance. 
Size of audit firm and role of the external 
governance does not influence mandatory 
disclosure while ownership concentration 
enhances mandatory disclosure. 
Agyei-Mensah 
(2013) 
Ghana 35 listed firms, 
2006 and 2008. 
Disclosure before and 
after IFRS adoption. 
Firm size, profitability, 
debt equity ratio, liquidity 
and audit firm size. 
Quality of financial information disclosure mean 
of 76.80% (pre adoption) and 87.09% (post 
adoption) indicate that the quality of financial 
reports has improved significantly after adopting 
IFRS's. 
Summary of Voluntary Reporting in Developed Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Focus Independent Variable Findings 
Firth (l979) United 
Kingdom 
180 companies, 
1976. 
Voluntary Disclosure, 
48 items. 
Firm size, listing status and 
auditor type. 
The firm size and listing status were found to be 
positively associated with the level of voluntary 
reporting whereas audit firm is not associated 
significantly. 
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Firth (1980) United 
Kingdom 
274 companies, Weighted and un-
weighted disclosure 
index, 48 items. 
Voluntary disclosure levels 
between the new issue and 
rights issue group and the 
control groups. 
The study concluded that the levels of voluntary 
disclosure by smaller sized companies increase 
when raising new stock market finance, via new 
issues and right issues. 
McNally et al. 
(1982) 
New 
Zealand 
103 annual 
reports, 1979. 
Voluntary disclosure, 
41 items. 
Size, profitability, growth, 
audit firm and industry. 
Firm size is associated positively and 
significantly with voluntary reporting while the 
other characteristics were found non significant. 
Cooke (1989) Sweden 90 non-
financial 
companies, 
1985. 
Voluntary disclosure, 
146 items. 
Quotation status, parent 
company relationship, 
company size, total asset 
size, number of 
shareholders. 
 
Listing status and firm size are positively 
associated with voluntary reporting. The results 
also suggested that trading companies disclose 
information less than companies in 
manufacturing and service sectors. 
Cooke(1991) Japan 48 companies, 
1988. 
Voluntary disclosure. Firm size, listing status and 
industry type. 
The study employs stepwise regression and 
concluded that firm size is the   best explanatory 
variable followed by listing status. 
Craswell and 
Taylor (1992) 
Australia 86 companies. Specific item of 
disclosure. 
Firm size, leverage, cash 
flow risk, proportion of 
share and ownerships and 
audit firm. 
Audit firm is associated positively with the 
disclosure decision, while there is weak support 
for the effect of each of leverage, firm size, cash 
flow risk and the proportion of shares held by 
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the top 20 shareholders. 
Raffournier 
(1995) 
Sweden 161 listed 
companies, 
1991. 
Voluntary reporting 
and firm 
characteristics. 
Size, leverage, 
profitability, audit firm, 
industry, fixed assets, 
internationality level, and 
ownership structure. 
Firm size and internationality play a major role 
in the disclosure policy of firms. 
Hossain et al. 
(1995) 
New 
Zealand 
55 non-
financial 
companies. 
Voluntary reporting 
and firm 
characteristics. 
Firm size, leverage, assets 
in place, type of auditors, 
and foreign listing status. 
Firm size, leverage, and foreign listing status 
have significant association with the level of 
information voluntarily disclosed in the annual 
reports. 
Walden and 
Schwartz 
(1997) 
Alaska 53 firms, 1988, 
1989, and 
1990. 
Environmental 
disclosure. 
Levels of environmental  
disclosure between years. 
Significant positive differences in the levels of 
environmental disclosures from year 1988 to 
1989 and from year 1989 to 1990. 
Bewley and Li 
(2000) 
Canada 188 
manufacturing 
firms, 1993. 
Environmental 
disclosure. 
Environmental exposure, 
corporate pollution 
propensity, firm size, 
Financial performance, and 
auditor quality. 
Firms with more news media coverage of their 
environmental exposure, higher pollution 
propensity, and more political exposure are 
more likely to disclose general environmental 
information. 
Deegan et al. 
(2000) 
Australia 41 companies, 
5 incidents. 
Social and 
environmental 
Total incidents, positive 
incident, BHP disclosure. 
After the incidents, sample firms operating in 
the affected industries provided more 
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disclosures. environmental information than they did earlier. 
Depoers 
(2000) 
France 102 listed 
companies, 
1995. 
Extent of  voluntary 
disclosure. 
Firm size, foreign activity, 
ownership structure, 
leverage ,auditor size, 
proprietary costs and labor 
pressure. 
The results of multiple regressions based on 
stepwise procedure indicate that firm size, 
foreign activity and proprietary costs have 
significant association with the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. 
Visser( 2002)   South 
Africa 
184 companies, 
17 standalone 
public reports. 
Sustainability 
reporting. 
Extent of Sustainability 
reporting. 
Disclosure on sustainability issues continues to 
improve, on average 57% of the top companies 
are reporting on these issues. On the other hand, 
around 10% of South Africa’s top 100 
companies are issuing environmental and social 
reports. 
Hedberg and 
Malmborg 
(2003) 
Sweden 10 Companies, 
2001. 
Corporate 
sustainability 
reporting. 
Qualitative interviews with 
representatives from each 
company. 
GRI guidelines would have the potential for 
gaining visibility and control of the triple 
bottom line on a corporate level, but they are in 
need of further development, not least in relation 
to the issue of verification. 
Idowu and 
Towler (2004) 
United 
Kingdom 
17 companies. Corporate social 
reporting. 
CSR of different 
companies. 
telephone interview. 
Some companies issue separate reports for their 
CSR activities whilst others devote a section in 
their annual reports. UK CSR reports disclose 
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information about environment, community, 
marketplace and workplace. 
O'Dwyer et al. 
(2005) 
Ireland  5 
environmental 
NGOs and 3 
social NGOs. 
Corporate social 
reporting. 
Eight in-depth semi-
structured interviews. 
Active corporate resistance to discursive 
dialogue, corporate resistance to voluntary 
reporting, and compliant political elite unwilling 
to confront the corporate sector on social and 
environmental issues. 
Frost et al. 
(2005) 
Australia 25 companies, 
2004. 
Sustainability 
reporting. 
Benchmarked against GRI. The discrete report and website provide greater 
levels of information on sustainability, however 
the overall levels of information is generally 
low. 
Michelon 
(2007) 
Dow Jones 
Global 
Index  
57 companies. Sustainability 
reporting. 
Strategic, financial, 
environmental and social 
information. 
The empirical research provided evidence that 
reputation does affect the extent of sustainability 
disclosure. 
Silberhorn and 
Warren (2007) 
German 
and UK 
40 companies. Corporate social 
reporting. 
Qualitative content 
analysis and interviews 
with senior managers. 
Companies focus on how they interact with 
stakeholders and how business activities impact 
on society. Most CSR policies addressed 
community, employee, customer issues and 
quality of life. 
Gruning Germany 60 annual Corporate reporting. Firm size, cross listing, Four characteristics have interrelated factors that 
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(2007) and Poland reports industry, and home 
country. 
affect corporate disclosure quality. The firm size 
was found to have only an indirect effect on 
corporate disclosure. 
Clarkson et 
al.(2008) 
USA 191 firms, 
2003. 
Environmental 
reporting. 
Firm size, leverage, return 
on assets, stock price 
volatility, Tobin Q, assets 
newness, and capital 
intensity. 
Positive association between environmental 
performance and the level of discretionary 
environmental disclosures. 
Wang and 
Claiborne 
(2008) 
China 110 Listed 
companies, 
2005. 
Voluntary reporting. State ownership, foreign 
ownership, firm 
performance, reputation of 
the engaged auditor, 
leverage and cost of debt 
capital. 
Level of voluntary reporting is positively related 
to the proportion of state ownership, foreign 
ownership, firm performance measured by 
return on equity, and reputation of the engaged 
auditor while no relation with cost of debt 
capital. 
Prado- 
Lorenzo et al. 
(2009) 
Spain 99 non 
financial firms. 
Corporate Social 
Reporting. 
Financial institution, 
dominant shareholder and 
independent board.  
Presence of stockholders whose personal image 
and social reputation are strongly associated 
with the evolution of the company notably 
fosters the development of these disclosure 
practices. On the contrary, the investors with a 
reduced stake in the firm’s capital show only a 
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limited interest in this area. 
Tang and 
Geling (2010) 
China 82 firms, 2008. Environmental 
Reporting. 
Firm size, profitability, 
capital structure, 
independent directors, 
shareholder equity ratio, 
proportion of shares, and 
industry type. 
Firm size and capital structure have significant 
impact on environmental reporting while others 
are not significant.  
Alves et al. 
(2012) 
Portugal 
and Spain 
140 listed 
companies. 
Voluntary disclosure. Firm size, growth, 
organizational 
performance, board 
compensation, large 
shareholder, marketing 
category, human capital 
category and board 
characteristics. 
Firm size, growth opportunities, organizational 
performance, board compensation and the 
presence of a large shareholder are main 
determinants of corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Skouloudis et 
al.(2014) 
Greek Top 100 
companies, 
2011. 
Social and 
environmental 
Responsibility. 
Size, business sector, 
profitability, ownership 
identity 
internationalization, 
consumer proximity, 
Noticeable variation across sectors regarding 
their propensity to disclose non-financial 
information. Large group of leading Greek firms 
still tend to treat business-and society dialogue 
superficially and in an imprecise manner. 
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environmental sensitivity, 
and subscription to CSR. 
Summary of Voluntary Reporting in Developing Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Focus Independent Variable Findings 
Hossain et al. 
(1994) 
Malaysia 67 non-
financial 
companies, 
1991. 
Voluntary Reporting, 
78 items. 
Firm size, ownership 
structure, gearing, assets-in 
place, audit firm, and 
foreign listing status. 
Firm size and ownership structure have 
significant association with the level of 
voluntary disclosure in corporate annual reports. 
Thompson and 
Zakaria (2004) 
Malaysia 257 largest 
companies, 
2000. 
Social responsibility 
reporting. 
Content analysis: number 
of sentence, measured 
pages and derived pages.  
CSR reporting in their infancy compeering with 
other developed countries. Lack of government 
and public pressure, lack of perceived benefits 
and widely held view that companies do not 
significantly impact on the environments. 
Abreu et al. 
(2005) 
Portugal Top ten, 2002. Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Values and transparency, 
workplace, environment, 
suppliers, consumers and 
customers, community, 
government and society.  
The preliminary analysis generated three 
components of CSR: the external influence , the 
market influence and the operative influence of 
the enterprises in Portugal. 
Naser et al. 
(2006) 
Qatar 21 companies 
out of 22. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Size, leverage, corporate 
growth, government 
Variations in corporate social disclosure by the 
sampled companies are associated with the firm 
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ownership, Individual 
shareholders, institutional 
ownerships, dividend 
payout, and majority 
shareholders. 
size, business risk and corporate growth. 
Ratanajongkol 
et al. (2006) 
Thailand 40 companies   
, 1997, 1999 
and 2001. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Amount of disclosure, 
theme, quality of 
disclosure. 
Level of corporate social reporting is increasing 
with Thai companies reporting more on human 
resources.  
Alsaeed 
(2006) 
Saudi 
Arabia. 
40 Firms, 
2003. 
Voluntary disclosure. Firm size, debt, ownership 
dispersion, firm age, profit 
margin, return on equity, 
liquidity, industry type and 
audit firm size. 
Mean of the disclosure index was lower than 
average. Also, it was found that firm size was 
significantly positively associated with the level 
of disclosure. 
Barako et al. 
(2006) 
Kenya 43 companies, 
1992- 2001. 
Voluntary Disclosure. Audit committee, non-
executive directors, 
institutional and foreign 
ownership, board 
leadership structure, 
liquidity, profitability and 
audit firm. 
There is an increase in the level of information 
voluntary disclosed. The extent of voluntary 
disclosure is influenced by a firm’s corporate 
governance attributes, ownership structure and 
company characteristics. 
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Sumiani et al. 
(2007) 
Malaysia 50 public 
companies, 
2003. 
Environmental 
Reporting. 
Financial factors, 
litigation, pollution 
abatement, environmental 
preservation, and 
environmental initiatives. 
Extent of environmental information reported in 
Malaysian corporate annual reports is rather 
low. All ISO companies made some form of 
environmental disclosures in their annual 
reports. 
Gunawan, 
2007 
Indonesia 68 annual 
report 2003, 
2004, and 
2005. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility 
Company’s type, size, age, 
financial performances, 
influence of creditors, and 
influence of auditors. 
There are three main motives for the Indonesian 
listed companies in conducting CSD: “to create 
positive image”, to “act accountability” and to 
“comply with stakeholders’ needs”. 
Ghazali (2007)   Indonesia 87 companies, 
2001. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Ownership concentration, 
director ownership, 
government ownership, 
company size, and 
industry. 
Companies in which have a higher proportion of 
equity shares disclosed significantly less CSR 
information, while companies in which the 
government is a substantial shareholder 
disclosed significantly more CSR information. 
Dincer and 
Dincer (2007) 
Turkey 324 consumers, 
5 firms, 2007. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Structured questionnaire. The most appreciated companies on CSR have a 
pro-active approach.  
Narwal (2007) India 33 public-
private  
sector banks. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Survey questionnaire. Banks have an objective view-point about CSR 
concentrating on education, balanced growth, 
health, environmental marketing and customer 
satisfaction. 
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Rizk et al. 
(2008) 
 Egypt 60 annual 
reports, 2002. 
Social and 
environmental 
reporting. 
Content analysis, 
disclosure index 34 items. 
Significant differences in reporting practices 
among the members of the nine industry 
segments surveyed. Ownership structure has 
significance on the reporting decision. 
Akhtaruddin et 
al. (2009) 
Malaysia 105 listed 
firms, 2002. 
Voluntary disclosure. Board size, independent 
non-executive directors, 
share ownership, family 
control, and audit 
committee members.  
Voluntary disclosure has positive association 
with board size and proportion of independent 
director while negatively related to family 
control. Audit committee member is not related 
to voluntary disclosure. 
Pratten and 
Mashat, 
(2009) 
Libya 56 companies, 
1999-2002. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Content analysis, 
questionnaire survey. 
The results suggest that the emphasis on CSR 
disclosure in Libya is different from that to be 
found in the west. 
Mitchell and 
Trevor (2009) 
South 
Africa 
51 companies 
from 17 
segments. 
Corporate social and 
environmental. 
Structured questionnaire 
survey. 
Implementation of a comprehensive and 
externally controlled and certified standard 
would not only reduce environmental impacts, 
but facilitate increased CSR. 
Potluri et al 
(2010) 
Kazakhstan 50 companies. Corporate social 
responsibility. 
Structured questionnaires 
and informal personal 
interviews. 
Kazakhstan companies conveyed a difference of 
opinion in almost every stakeholder area 
because of the present day economic crunch. 
Akhtaruddin Malaysia 124 public Voluntary reporting. Expert members on the Board ownership is associated with lower levels 
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and Haron 
(2010) 
listed 
companies. 
AC, independent non-
executive directors. 
of corporate voluntary disclosures. 
Al Shammari 
and Al Sultan 
(2010) 
Kuwait 170 companies, 
2007. 
Voluntary reporting. Non-executive directors, 
family members, role 
duality; and audit 
committee. 
Existence of a voluntary audit committee is 
significantly and positively related to the extent 
of corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Samaha and 
Dahawy 
(2010) 
Egypt 30 actively 
traded 
companies. 
Voluntary reporting. Number of Shareholder, 
ownership categories, 
independent directors, 
audit committees, size, 
profitability, industry, 
leverage, liquidity, auditor 
type and internationality.  
Introduction of a new corporate governance 
code has not improved information symmetry as 
the overall level of voluntary disclosure is very 
low at just 19.38%. 
Uyar (2011) Turky 72 Companies , 
2006. 
Voluntary Disclosure Auditor size, ownership 
structure, firm 
performance 
(profitability), and firm 
size. 
Firm size and auditor size have significant 
positive association with voluntary disclosure 
level of graphs. However profitability and 
ownership structure do not have any significant 
association. 
Samaha et al. 
(2012) 
Egypt 100 companies, 
2009. 
Corporate governance 
voluntary 
Board composition, board 
size, CEO duality, director 
CG is lower for companies with duality in 
position and higher ownership concentration as 
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Disclosure. ownership, block holder 
ownership, audit 
committee, leverage, size, 
profitability and industry 
types. 
measured by block holder ownerships and 
increases with the proportion of independent 
directors on the board and firm size. 
Francis et al. 
(2012) 
Ghana 20 listed 
companies, 
2003-07. 
Corporate Reporting. Corporate governance 
characteristics. 
Significant positive relationship between the 
presence of accounting/finance expert(s) on the 
audit committees and corporate disclosure 
practices. 
Qu et al. 
(2012) 
China 297  listed 
companies, 
1995-2006 
Voluntary Reporting. Market pressure and 
regulatory pressure. 
They find that over the study period, listed 
companies have gradually increased their 
voluntary disclosure. 
Haji(2013) Malaysia 85 companies, 
2006 and 2009. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
Director ownership, 
government ownership, 
board characteristics, 
profitability, leverage and 
company size. 
Director ownership, government ownership, 
board size and company size were found to be 
significant in explaining both the extent and 
quality of CSR disclosures. 
Haji and 
Ghazali (2013) 
Malaysia 76 selected 
firms, 2009. 
Voluntary Reporting. Board size, company size, 
leverage and government 
ownership. 
Board size, company size, leverage, government 
ownership is significant in explaining the quality 
of corporate voluntary disclosure 
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De Villiers 
and Alexander 
(2014) 
South 
Africa and 
Australia 
18 from each 
country, 2007. 
Corporate Social 
Responsibility. 
GRI guideline categories 
and the disclosure items 
suggested by GRI. 
Overall characteristics of CSRR patterns or 
report structures, specific examples of CSRR, 
and the CSRR management structures of mining 
companies found to be similar. 
Summary of Timeliness of Reporting in Developed Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Focus Independent Variable Findings 
Ashton et al. 
(1987) 
United 
States 
488 clients of 
Peat, Marwick, 
Mitchell and 
Co, 1981- 82. 
Multivariate relations 
between audit delay. 
Total revenue; industry 
classification; public or 
nonpublic classification; 
month of fiscal year-end; 
quality of internal controls; 
operational, reporting, 
financial, and electronic 
data-processing 
complexity; relative of 
audit work performed at 
interim and final dates; 
number of years; current-
year net income; ratio of 
net income or loss to total 
Study found significant association of revenue, 
quality of internal controls, operation 
complexity, relative of audit work performed at 
interim and final dates, and public or nonpublic 
classification. The developed model explains 
26.5% of cross-sectional audit delay. 
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assets; and type of audit 
opinion. 
Ashton et al. 
(1989) 
Canada 465 public 
Canadian 
companies, 
1977-82. 
Descriptive Model, 
Audit Delay. 
Company size, industry, 
audit opinion, 
extraordinary items, signs 
of profit, contingency and 
earning per share. 
 
Client industry, type of audit opinion, reporting 
of extraordinary items, and the sign of net profit 
had significant association with audit delay 
while weak significance with disclosure of 
contingency and no significant relationship with 
earning per share. 
Carslaw and 
Kaplan (1991) 
New 
Zealand 
245 firms for 
1987 and 206 
firms for 1988. 
Audit Delay Company size, income, 
debt proportion, company 
ownership, extraordinary 
item, and industry 
classification. 
Company size and income (loss) significantly 
affected audit delay across both years. 
Ng and Tai 
(1994) 
Hong Kong 292 companies 
for 1991 and 
260 companies 
for 1990. 
Audit Delay Seven variables were taken 
from the Ashton et al. 
study (1989), and three 
variables—degree of 
diversification, change of 
auditor, and principal 
subsidiaries/joint ventures 
Company size and degree of diversification—
tested as significant over a period of two years. 
Extraordinary items and month of year-end—
tested as significant in one year. 
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were added. 
Simnett et al. 
(1995) 
Australia 1981 to 1989. Audit delay Audit complexity, 
debt/equity position, 
extraordinary items, audit 
technology, Big Eight–
non-Big Eight auditor, 
profit, audit opinion and 
timing of year. 
Three variables: profit, audit opinion, and timing 
of the year-end were found to be significant for 
from 3 to 6 years. 
Jaggi and Tsui 
(1999) 
Hong Kong 393 companies, 
1991–1993. 
Audit delay and 
auditor business risk 
and audit-firm 
technology. 
Financial condition, family 
owned and controlled 
companies as measures for 
auditor business risk. 
A positive relationship between audit delay and 
financial risk index. Family owned and 
controlled companies have shorter audit delays 
and companies audited by audit firms using the 
structured audit approach have longer audit 
delays. 
Leventis et al. 
(2005) 
Greece 171 companies, 
2000. 
Audit report lag. Type of auditor, number of 
remark, Audit fee, 
extraordinary items, size, 
ownership concentration, 
profitability gearing, 
number of subsidiaries, 
A statistically significant association is found 
between audit report lag and type of auditor, 
audit fees, number of remarks in the audit 
report, the presence of extraordinary items, and 
an expression of uncertainty in the audit report. 
Mean audit report lag is 98 days. 
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uncertainty in the audit 
report, other auditor, 
auditor change. 
Al-Ghanem 
and Hegazy 
(2011) 
Kuwait 149 and 177 
listed 
companies, 
2006 and 2007 
respectively. 
Audit Lag Company size, industry 
classification, leverage, 
percentage change in 
earning per share, type of 
auditors, and liquidity. 
Company size is the only variable that 
negatively correlates with audit delay in the 
period tested. 
A.-M. Reheul 
et al. (2013) 
Belgium 2266 Non 
Profit 
Organization 
year 
observation, 
2006 to 2008. 
Audit Lag Client size, degree of 
reliance upon donations 
and/or grants, industry, 
year, auditor industry 
expertise, profitability, 
liquidity, leverage, audit 
opinion, extraordinary 
items, total assets, audit 
fee. 
Average audit lag is 133 days. The degree of 
reliance upon donations and grants and its 
industry to which the non profit organisation 
belongs are significantly related to the audit 
report lag. 
Summary of Timeliness of Reporting in Developing Countries 
Author(s) Country Sample Size Focus Independent Variable Findings 
Hossain and Pakistan 103 non Audit delay and Size of company, Debt The audit delay ranged from a minimum interval 
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Taylor(1998) financial 
companies. 
1993. 
company 
characteristics. 
equity ratio, Profitability, 
Subsidiaries of 
multinational companies, 
Audit firm size. 
of 30 days to a maximum interval of 249 days. 
Subsidiaries of multinational companies had a 
significant negative effect on audit delay. 
Owusu-
Ansah(2000) 
Zimbabwe 47 non-
financial 
companies. 
Timeliness through 
Audit Lag, 
Preliminary lag, Total 
reporting Lag. 
Extraordinary and/ or 
contingent items, the 
month of financial year-
end and the complexity of 
a company’s operations, 
size, profitability, gearing 
and company age.  
98% of the companies in the sample reported 
promptly to the public. Regression identified 
company size, profitability and company age as 
statistically significant explanators of the 
differences in the timeliness of annual reports 
issued by the sample companies. 
Ahmad and 
Kamarudin 
(2003) 
Malaysia 100 companies, 
1996-2000. 
Audit Delay. Company size, industry  
classification, sign of 
income, extraordinary 
item, audit opinion, 
auditor, year-end and risk. 
Audit delay is significantly longer for company 
that listed non-financial industry, receive other 
than unqualified audit opinion, financial year-
end other than December 31, audited by a non–
Big Five firm, negative earnings, and have 
higher risk. 
Owusu-Ansah 
and Leventis 
(2006) 
Greece 95 non-
financial 
companies. 
Financial reporting Size of the company, 
extraordinary items, 
number of remarks in 
 A descriptive analysis indicates that 92% of the 
companies reported early. The result also show 
that size of company and audited by big-5 audit 
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annual report, and type of 
auditor. 
firm will have shorter audit report lag. 
Prabandari and 
Rustiana 
(2007) 
 
Indonesia 111 financial 
companies, 
2002-2004. 
Audit delay Total revenue, debt to 
assets ratio, gains or 
losses, audit opinion, and 
characteristic’s of 
accounting firms. 
The result show that the differences of audit 
delay in total revenue and profit or loss 
announcement but, no differences of audit delay 
in audit opinion and characteristic’s accounting 
firms. 
Che-Ahmad 
and Abidin 
(2008) 
Malaysia All publicly 
held 
companies, 
1993. 
Audit delay Size, industry, director 
shareholdings, total assets, 
subsidiaries, audit firms 
type, audit opinion, 
leverage, ratio of inventory 
proportion of debt, change 
of auditor and return on 
equity. 
Mean audit delay of Malaysian companies to be 
much longer than the Western countries. 
Moreover, director shareholdings, total assets, 
number of subsidiaries, type of audit firms, audit 
opinion and return on equity to be important 
determinants of audit delay. 
Al-Ajmi 
(2008) 
Bahrain 231 financial 
and non-
financial, 
1992–2006. 
Timeliness through 
audit lags, interim 
period, total period. 
Company size, profitability 
leverage, accountancy 
complexity, good and bad 
news, audit type, auditor's 
size and leverage. 
Using multivariate analysis, he found that three 
variables: company size, profitability and 
leverage had significant effects on audit delay. 
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Tauringana et 
al. (2008) 
Kenya 36 companies 
listed, 2005 
and 2006. 
Association of 
corporate governance 
and dual language 
with timeliness. 
Company size, gearing, 
profitability and industry. 
Result showed that the finance expert on audit 
committee and frequency of board meeting 
significantly affect the timely reporting whereas 
board independence is not an influencing factor. 
Afify (2009) Egypt 85 companies. Audit Lag  Board independence, 
duality of chief executive 
officer, existence of an 
audit committee, 
ownerships concentration. 
The board independence, duality of CEO, and 
existence of an audit committee significantly 
affect audit lag where as ownership 
concentration has insignificant affect. Control 
variables: company size, industry and 
profitability significantly affect audit lag. 
Mohamad 
Naimi et al. 
(2010) 
Malaysia 628 listed 
companies, 
2002. 
Audit report lag. Audit committee 
characteristics, board 
characteristics, audit firm 
quality, busy period, client 
complexity, client business 
risk and client size. 
They found that the minimum audit report lag 
was 19 days and the maximum was 332 days. 
The study provides that more members in the 
audit committee and more frequent audit 
committee meetings are more likely to produce 
audit reports timely whereas that board 
characteristics do not contribute to reduce of 
reporting lag. 
Hashim and 
Abdul 
Malaysia 288 companies, 
2007-09. 
Audit report lag. Board diligence, board 
independence, board 
The results show that audit report lag for the 
listed companies in Malaysia ranges from 36 
 437 
Rahman, 
(2011) 
expertise and CEO duality. days to 184 days for the three year period. There 
are significant negative relationships between 
board diligence and audit report lag. 
Iyoha (2012) Nigeria 61 companies, 
1999-2008. 
Reporting Lag. Company size, 
profitability, company age, 
size of audit firm and 
company financial year-
end. 
AGE is significant in determining timeliness 
whereas company size, profitability, size of 
audit firm and financial year end do not appear 
to have any adverse bearing on reporting lag. 
Apadore and 
Marjan(2013) 
Malaysia 180 companies, 
2009 and 2010. 
Audit report lag. Board independence, 
ownership concentration, 
audit committee 
independence, expertise, 
meeting, size, internal 
audit and investment. 
Audit committee size, ownership concentration, 
organization size and profitability significantly 
associated with audit report lag. However, audit 
committee independence, meetings, expertise 
and types of auditors found to have insignificant 
relationship with audit report lag. 
 
 
 
